

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Second Series

23

A stylized, handwritten signature in white ink, likely representing Jawaharlal Nehru, positioned at the bottom right of the cover. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a prominent initial 'J' and a long, sweeping tail that extends towards the bottom right corner.

"So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote...the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being."

Indira Gandhi

**Selected
works of
Jawaharlal
Nehru**



INAUGURATING THE NATIONALIZED AIRWAYS SYSTEM, SAFDARJANG AIRPORT,
NEW DELHI, 1 AUGUST 1953

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Second Series

Volume Twenty Three

(1 July 1953–30 September 1953)

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FOREWORD

Jawaharlal Nehru is one of the key figures of the twentieth century. He symbolised some of the major forces which have transformed our age.

When Jawaharlal Nehru was young, history was still the privilege of the West; the rest of the world lay in deliberate darkness. The impression given was that the vast continents of Asia and Africa existed merely to sustain their masters in Europe and North America. Jawaharlal Nehru's own education in Britain could be interpreted, in a sense, as an attempt to secure for him a place within the pale. His letters of the time are evidence of his sensitivity, his interest in science and international affairs as well as of his pride in India and Asia. But his personality was veiled by his shyness and a facade of nonchalance, and perhaps outwardly there was not much to distinguish him from the ordinary run of men. Gradually there emerged the warm and universal being who became intensely involved with the problems of the poor and the oppressed in all lands. In doing so, Jawaharlal Nehru gave articulation and leadership to millions of people in his own country and in Asia and Africa.


That imperialism was a curse which should be lifted from the brows of men, that poverty was incompatible with civilisation, that nationalism should be poised on a sense of international community and that it was not sufficient to brood on these things when action was urgent and compelling—these were the principles which inspired and gave vitality to Jawaharlal Nehru's activities in the years of India's struggle for freedom and made him not only an intense nationalist but one of the leaders of humanism.

No particular ideological doctrine could claim Jawaharlal Nehru for its own. Long days in jail were spent in reading widely. He drew much from the thought of the East and West and from the philosophies of the past and the present. Never religious in the formal sense, yet he had a deep love for the culture and tradition of his own land. Never a rigid Marxist, yet he was deeply influenced by that theory and was particularly impressed by what he saw in the Soviet Union on his first visit in 1927. However, he realised that the world was too complex, and man had too many facets, to be encompassed by any single or total explanation. He himself was a socialist with an abhorrence of regimentation and a democrat who was anxious to reconcile his faith in civil liberty with the necessity of mitigating economic and social wretchedness. His struggles, both within himself and with the outside world, to adjust such seeming contradictions are what make his life and work significant and fascinating.

As a leader of free India, Jawaharlal Nehru recognised that his country could neither stay out of the world nor divest itself of its own interests in world affairs. But to the extent that it was possible, Jawaharlal Nehru sought to speak objectively

and to be a voice of sanity in the shrill phases of the 'cold war'. Whether his influence helped on certain occasions to maintain peace is for the future historian to assess. What we do know is that for a long stretch of time he commanded an international audience reaching far beyond governments, that he spoke for ordinary, sensitive, thinking men and women around the globe and that his was a constituency which extended far beyond India.

So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote. There is, as is to be expected in the speeches and writings of a man so engrossed in affairs and gifted with expression, much that is ephemeral; this will be omitted. The official letters and memoranda will also not find place here. But it is planned to include everything else and the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Indira Gandhi". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Indira" and the last name "Gandhi" clearly distinguishable.

New Delhi
18 January 1972

Chairman
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund

EDITORIAL NOTE

The present volume of the *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru* covers the period from 1 July to 30 September 1953, which was marked by some seminal developments within the world as well as within India.

At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held in London in June, Jawaharlal Nehru discovered that the Indian point of view carried a weight which it had apparently not carried earlier. True, Nehru differed from his British counterpart on several issues. Nevertheless, India and Britain were able to adopt similar positions on many issues crucial to the preservation of world peace. On the Korean problem, for instance, the two countries took a view which facilitated the discharge of the responsibilities exercised by India, as the Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Over and above this, Winston Churchill expressed his appreciation of the restraint exercised by India when the President of South Korea, Syngman Rhee, struck an intransigent posture, forcing the United States to oppose the participation of India in the political conference organised under the aegis of the United Nations, to resolve the Korean issue. As the British Prime Minister put it: "I thought you were very wise to help the United States out of their difficulty with Syngman Rhee.... You must be gratified by the general recognition of the the wisdom of India's withdrawal."

For Jawaharlal Nehru, however, the stance taken by the United States over the Korean and related issues reflected a wider malaise. In a world quite literally threatened with annihilation through nuclear warfare, the truly powerful nations of the world were unable to transcend petty rivalries when they addressed themselves to the great questions of war and peace which confronted humanity at this juncture. As Nehru told Norman Cousins, an American journalist, he was fearful that the arms race between the nuclear powers was heading towards a general conflagration, which would "degrade and dehumanize those who survived." What the world needed, therefore, was the dissemination of the values of tolerance and social concern within and between Nations, as the surest path to a saner human community.

If the suspicion and hostility between the Super Powers called for a pressing application of the healing touch, events at home had no less urgent a claim upon Jawaharlal Nehru's time and attention. On the domestic front, the vexed problem of Kashmir had assumed alarming proportions. In principle, the Delhi Agreement of 1952, which had defined unambiguously the position of Kashmir within the Indian Union, should have resolved all issues. However, Shaikh Abdullah, the leader of Kashmir, appeared to entertain doubts about the whole business; and spoke openly regarding the desirability of an "autonomous" Kashmir. His stance divided the National Conference, the ruling party, and the

Kashmir Government each into two warring blocs; with the majority under Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad determined to secure a firm place for the State in the Indian Union. The situation was further complicated by an agitation launched by Syama Prasad Mookerjee, the Jan Sangh leader, which gave a blatantly communal turn to the Kashmir imbroglio. In the upshot, the Jan Sangh leader died in Srinagar while in detention. Shortly afterwards, Abdullah was dismissed as the head of the Kashmir Government and placed under detention. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was installed in his place as the new Chief Minister of Kashmir.

The dramatic turn taken by events in Kashmir inevitably affected relations between India and Pakistan. In Mohammad Ali, the newly appointed Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nehru discerned a leader with whom it was possible to conduct a sane dialogue. But the changes in Kashmir introduced a new note of acrimony in relations between the two countries. Driven by the Pakistani Press, Mohammad Ali rushed to New Delhi soon after the change of leadership in Kashmir. But after an exchange of views between the two Prime Ministers, the decisions they took got bogged down in procedural questions, leaving the issues which stood in the way of an Indo-Pakistan understanding on Kashmir wholly unresolved.

The attention which Jawaharlal Nehru devoted to world affairs, and to neighbours like Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka, among others, is understandable in view of the responsibilities which devolved upon a country of India's size, strength and potential. Yet Nehru realised all too well that in the final analysis India's stature would be determined by the extent to which economic growth; rounded social progress; and the establishment of liberal values and institutions; were secured in the short no less than in the long run. Small wonder, then, that Jawaharlal Nehru pursued with all the resources at his command the agendas of change he had initiated in various arenas: in fashioning for India a composite cultural identity that would generate creative inter-play and tolerance in the country; upgrade the status of women in society; keep in check the pathologies of communalism and casteism; and last but not least, undermine vested interests in the country.

These complex and multi-faceted problems, Jawaharlal Nehru fully realised, could not be resolved within a short span of time. The character of social transformation was dialectical in character; and there were bound to be slippages at the same time as victories were scored. Much patience was needed for the task. But given strength of purpose, given also the determination to succeed, there was no doubt whatsoever that the people would triumph. For above all there was the human factor. As Jawaharlal Nehru put it: "the future of India, as indeed of every country, ultimately depends on the quality of the human beings there and how far they can rise above their parochial feelings and petty conflicts."

Jawaharlal Nehru was crucially conscious of the threat posed by vested interests to social progress and economic growth in India. He, therefore, held out that while democracy meant political equality, "it meant also a progressive economic equality." He realised that "our Constitution, and more so, our economic and social structure and customs, protect many kinds of privilege and vested interest." There was some justification for existing privilege in the context of history, but "we must always remember that they are anachronisms and are constant irritants to the people." Nehru, therefore, invited the erstwhile Princely Rulers to set aside a part of the money they received as privy purses, for the development of the regions from which they hailed. As he put it, "the fixation of very large sums of money as privy purses is totally out of keeping with the Directive Principles of our Constitution and the temper of the age." Indeed: "How long can we justify to our people the payment of large sums of money from the public funds to the Princes, many of whom discharge no functions at all?" Nehru's suggestion fell on deaf ears. But a decade and more later, a radical initiative put an end to princely privilege in India.

It is our very pleasant duty, in introducing this volume to its readers, to thank various individuals and institutions for their support and help in bringing it out. Shrimati Sonia Gandhi graciously permitted us to consult the papers in her possession referred to as the JN Collection. The Nehru Memorial Museum and Library has, as always, assisted in the publication of this volume by granting access to the papers of Jawaharlal Nehru. The Cabinet Secretariat, the Secretariats of the President and the Prime Minister, the Ministries of External Affairs and Home Affairs, All India Radio and the Press Information Bureau have allowed us to use relevant material in their possession. We wish to acknowledge in particular the permission given to us by All India Radio to use the tapes of the speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru. Some classified material has necessarily been deleted. One letter has been included in the volume from *Two Alone, Two Together: Letters Between Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru* 1940-1964 edited by Shrimati Sonia Gandhi and three from the book created by Shriman Narayan entitled *Letters from Gandhi Nehru Vinoba*.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AICC	All India Congress Committee
AIR	All India Radio
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States Treaty
BA	Bachelor of Arts
BSc	Bachelor of Science
C & I	Commerce and Industry
CBS	Columbia Broadcasting System
DIB	Director, Intelligence Bureau
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FS	Foreign Secretary
GOI	Government of India
IGP	Inspector General of Police
ILO	International Labour Organization
INTUC	Indian National Trade Union Congress
J & K	Jammu and Kashmir
JS	Joint Secretary
KMT	Kuomintang
LLB	Bachelor of Laws
MA	Master of Arts
MDO	Minister for Defence Organization
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
MES	Military Engineering Service
MLA	Member of Legislative Assembly
MP	Member of Parliament
MSc	Master of Science

NCC	National Cadet Corps
NEFA	North East Frontier Agency
NMML	Nehru Memorial Museum & Library
NR & SR	Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PCC	Provincial / Pradesh Congress Committee
Pepsu	Patiala and East Punjab States Union
PM	Prime Minister
PMS	Prime Minister's Secretariat
POW	Prisoner of War
PSP	Praja Socialist Party
SG	Secretary General
SGPC	Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee
UK	United Kingdom
UN/UNO	United Nations Organization
UP	Uttar Pradesh
UPSC	Union Public Service Commission
US/USA	United States of America

1. Interview to CBS Television¹

Question: Well, Mr Prime Minister, if we can begin. Which would you say is harder—to free a nation politically from foreign domination, or to free a nation from its own bondage of poverty and ignorance and disease?

Jawaharlal Nehru: The latter is far harder undoubtedly. Of course, all this depends on circumstances. It is always more difficult to see one's own failings and to correct them than to see another's failings and go for it.

Q: In this question, how important is leadership as against mass action?

JN: I don't think you can separate the two. It's a combination of mass action with good leadership that produces results. Mass action without leadership may be powerful but will lead to chaos. Leadership without mass action may be wise but it has no strength behind it.

Q: Mr Nehru, do you think the West understands what is happening in Asia and Africa in terms of the struggle for national independence; for racial equality—the struggle for bread itself?

JN: The West is rather a large term, isn't it? I suppose many people do understand it and many do not. By and large I think they do not fully grasp it. That is, one can sometimes understand a thing intellectually but not emotionally. Now, an emotional awareness is not without its significance. It does matter to have an emotional awareness of a distant happening. If you have an accident in your street you are emotionally aware of it. You read in the paper of an earthquake ten thousand miles away which is a much bigger thing and you are not aware of it. It's an item of news for you. So, in that sense probably, most people in the West are not aware—emotionally aware—of the ferment in the East or in Asia or Africa.

Q: Do you find that the change is more real than apparent—that this is inevitable—this great change taking place in Asia and in Africa—or is this something that only political leaders are conscious of?

1. New Delhi, 2 September 1953. JN Collection. The television team of the Columbia Broadcasting System met Nehru at his residence on 2 September 1953.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

JN: Oh no. I think the real thing to understand is the political or economic consciousness seeping down to the masses of the people. That is the important thing. If it only concerned some leaders at the top, well, you would have what is called some *boudoir* revolutions at the top—some palace revolutions at the top. One leader pushing out the other, and so on. But what you see in Asia is something far deeper and more basic. That is, the masses are on the move—sometimes in the right direction—sometimes in the wrong direction—but they are on the move.

Q: Tell me, Mr Prime Minister, do you find any so-called slow and mystic sensibility among Indians, among Asiatics, that would prevent your people from grasping modern technology in the same way that Western people have grasped it? Does that sit right with you?

JN: No, it does not. I do not think there is any essential difference between what is called the West and the East or the Orient. There are differences, of course, in nations. There is a national background. In Europe too there is a German background, a French background, a British background. That is so. In Asia there is a good deal of difference between the Chinese background, the Indian background, the Iranian background, or any other background in India. But to talk of this Orient and Occident in terms of mysticism being applied to the Orient and something else to the Occident, I think, is completely wrong. In Asian countries, not being industrialized, we still have a slower tempo, what might be called the agricultural pre-industrial tempo. And that is sometimes interpreted as mysticism, I suppose.

Q: Was Mahatma Gandhi's method of non-violence something purely for India or do you think this non-violence could be applied in the search for world peace today, as in Korea, for instance?

JN: I think Gandhi's method is a universal method. To what extent it can be applied in any country depends, of course, on circumstances, on the background of the country, or how far the people themselves think that way. Because you can't apply any method unless you make people think that way. Now, in India, we had really a long period of training under Gandhi. Possibly also the background of India helped in that but I am quite sure that that method—that is, the principle underlying that method—is of universal application.

Q: Mr Prime Minister, what community of interest does India hope for with, say, the United States, the Soviet Union and China?

JN: I don't quite understand your question. The world today, it is well known,

moves, in spite of every conflict, towards world cooperation—a world State, if you like. Therefore, there must be a larger community of interests between all the nations, and the conflicts that exist today between what I call the nation-States should gradually diminish. That is the larger outlook. In a small way we in India are intensely interested in solving certain economic problems of our own: in raising our standards of living—not merely copying something elsewhere, because I don't think that would be good enough.

Q: Would you say that the notion of a world federation is a wild dream?

JN: I would say, in terms of the not too distant future, that the only practical alternatives are a world federation or a world disaster sometime or the other. Because if there is no such world federation and conflicts among great nations continue, they are going to just break each other up.

Q: What would India do if today you had atomic energy?

JN: Well, obviously. I would use it for civil purposes, that is, for social development. I lack conventional sources of power. America, for instance, has a great deal of conventional power. Atomic energy doesn't make much difference to America, for they have got the power. We have not got the power. It will take us a long time to develop power resources in the normal way. If we had atomic energy we could develop it much sooner. And take them to the desert where it is difficult for us to transport coal and other things—and develop that region.

Q: Mr Nehru, this is a rather iffy question. But if you had your life to live over, would you have taken the same course? Would you have gone to jail for the years that you went to jail? Would you have had to suffer and struggle, or would you have preferred to have remained a member of a rich family—a fine writer—an artist—a poet, and be a success in that field?

JN: The individual finds fulfilment ultimately in functioning according to some inner urge. That is to say, when its inner urge finds fulfilment in some action, he is functioning satisfactorily. Happiness, after all, it is a trite saying, doesn't consist in just physical comfort. It is an inner mental state and the question you have asked me—I put myself in one of my books the exact question. Well, I couldn't—nobody could answer that question. I couldn't—but what I said there was this: That I have learned from my present experience

and would avoid many mistakes I have committed, but on the main, my life would be the same.² What is more, if I may say so, I often compare my life with the life of many persons of my age who studied with me in school or college—many of them have succeeded in life in the normal way. They have had a comfortable easy life. But I have had a far better time than they have had. I have enjoyed myself at a higher level. I am much, much better—much better for work now. They have retired and they are sort of finished with their life, more or less. So that even from the narrow point of view of personal happiness, you only achieve happiness in the real sense—not in the trivial sense—by striving for something truly significant and durable.

Q: Would you say everything seems to boil down to this simple question? What have the children of this generation in India—what have they got to look forward to?

JN: If you want me to draw a picture of India fifteen years hence, it is difficult. Obviously, I should like what are called the primary necessities of life to be available to all so that this burden of poverty and of lack of opportunity should go. Because I think nothing is really more terrible than lack of opportunity. I do not know among the millions and millions of children in India, if given the opportunity, how many of them might not be geniuses, scientists, engineers, brilliant in any direction of life. But they have just not got the opportunity—very few have—so that I want to give them that opportunity to strive and succeed in whatever direction their talents lie.

2. In the epilogue of his *Autobiography* (1936) written at District Gaol, Almora, on 14 February 1935, Nehru made some observations about the years spent by him in prison: "Sitting alone, wrapped in my thoughts, how many seasons I have seen go by, following each other into oblivion! How many moons I have watched wax and wane, and the pageant of the stars moving along inexorably and majestically! How many yesterdays of my youth lie buried here; and sometimes I see the ghosts of these dead yesterdays rise up, bringing poignant memories, and whispering to me: 'Was it worth while?' There is no hesitation about the answer. If I were given the chance to go through my life again, with my present knowledge and experience added, I would no doubt try to make many changes in my personal life; I would endeavour to improve in many ways on what I had previously done, but my major decisions in public affairs would remain untouched. Indeed, I could not vary them, for they were stronger than myself, and a force beyond my control drove me to them."

2. Conversation with Norman Cousins¹

Norman Cousins:² Mr Prime Minister, two years ago we had a discussion about, well, the state of the human race.³ To some extent it was what one might call a whither-are-we-drifting-and-why talk. Taking into account everything that has happened in those two years, throughout the rest of the world and here in India, how do you feel about the chances of the human species today for making a better world and better future? What, in short, are our chances for a world in which it is possible for a man to be an individual, to be free and yet to survive?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I should imagine that only the unwise give an opinion on such a subject. Like most things, the world picture today has its very good features and its very bad ones. Obviously we have arrived at a state which is highly dynamic, almost explosive. Either we find some new equilibrium or, well, we shatter ourselves into bits. The problem is to find that equilibrium somehow, for war has ceased to be any means of carrying out any policy. Defeat or victory have an importance, no doubt, but war is so bad that the original policy collapses anyway. Therefore, the point is whether, in avoiding war, one can maintain one's independence or general position and objectives. In war, one cannot.

It is a problem of human intelligence and human effort. It is a challenge that involves the art of cooperation and friendliness. Theoretically this is certainly possible. Practically whether it is going to happen or not is anybody's guess. On the whole I should imagine that the chances may be in favour of it.

NC: You indicated a moment ago, Mr Prime Minister, that the important thing is to maintain one's values in the world today—without war if possible. For some things can only be preserved through colossal risk and effort. What would you say, looking towards the future, what these basic values are?

JN: There is a certain vitality in the human race, a creative vitality, which

1. New Delhi, 3 September 1953. JN Collection.

2. Editor, *The Saturday Review of Literature*, New York. The interview was published in the issue of this journal dated 12 December 1953.

3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 16 Part I, pp. 401-426 for interviews with Norman Cousins in March 1951.

leads to progress, leads to new things. You find in history a race sometimes being full of creative endeavour. It may be highly cultured in the sense of having achieved much. Then suddenly that race loses its vitality, becoming quiescent. You find that more especially, say, in Asia. You find two or three hundred years of just quiescence, a very cultured quiescence for a long time perhaps, but quiescence nonetheless. Yet at the same time you find that other races or peoples, which outwardly may have been more backward culturally, were actually more vital or dynamic. Then they proceeded to develop culture at a more rapid pace.

What, then, are the real values, apart from a certain appreciation and regard for fundamental truth and beauty and tolerance? When large numbers of people live together as they do in the world today, unless the nations respect the rights of each other, unless they develop a necessary toleration, there is trouble. I am afraid there is something of a tendency for less and less toleration now—less of even an attempt to understand. This, culturally speaking, is going backwards.

Now, when we talk about the world going to pieces, of course, one does not mean that every human being will die. It really means that the cultural aspect of life will suffer an enormous setback. Even normal war brutalizes, as it has done in the past. Today's type of war is on an enormous scale and brings destruction and hunger and starvation. It is bound to degrade and dehumanize those who survive. That is the worst of it—not death; people die at the end of their days. Brutalization is the evil.

NC: What should the role of a government be—the role of an enlightened government—in helping to protect the people against brutalization—not only the brutalization brought about by war but the brutalization that sometimes exists within the nation itself?

JN: Partly. I suppose, it's an educational role, that is, if education is directed to that end. A person is influenced very greatly by his environment, not merely book environment or what he learns at school or at college, but what he reads in the newspapers, what he sees around him all the time, by his personal relationships. So, in a sense, if he is properly conditioned he lives in the type of society or social structure which encourages those positive values and discourages the wrong values, such as selfishness or pure acquisitiveness, instead of the quality of cooperative work and tolerance.

NC: Do world conditions today represent a threat to the maintenance and enlargement of those values? Isn't it possible that a powerful regime which finds the values of individualism repugnant could jeopardize progress on a world scale?

JN: Certainly. Today you see a very serious threat—also, to some extent, a response to that threat—that is, a determination to maintain those values. We have the constructive side and the destructive side—opposing forces at work in the world today. The particular things that are part of this destructive side, I should say, would include lack of toleration or a desire to force your will on the other person or the other nation. In other words, there is a certain narrowness of outlook in the individual or the group which thinks that it has the truth and that all the others are outside the pale and, so to speak, the real sinners. In fact, to some extent we are getting what corresponds to, well, a narrow religious outlook in politics. In religion there are at least certain countervailing features which tend to balance this narrowness, that is, in those religions in which narrowness may be said to exist. In politics, however, you get the narrowness alone. This idea of forcing your wishes, your ways, down the throats of other people naturally leads to conflict. It may lead, of course, to the other party being compelled to assert himself. But even that is not very satisfactory in the end, because you do not produce any desirable type of human being if he does something only under compulsion.

NC: Mr Prime Minister, when you used the word "you" just a moment ago I wondered whether you had a particular nation or person in mind?

JN: No; I was not thinking of any particular group or country.

NC: I asked that question because a certain totalitarian nation came to my mind as you spoke. I am aware, too, that some people would make an opposite assumption on the basis of what you had just said and point to the United States. In fact, I have been disturbed in recent weeks by the tendency in a number of places I have visited on my way to India—a tendency to blame the United States for everything.

JN: No, of course, I was not thinking of America. This is common, to a more or less degree, all over the world today.

NC: What steps do you think, Mr Prime Minister, can be taken by the nations acting as a group to create a stronger sense on the whole, to help create those conditions under which the individual or the group can maintain those values you spoke of a moment ago?

JN: I suppose the most important thing is, and perhaps the most difficult, is to try to get rid of the terrible prevalence of fear. Fear, in a way, is almost worse, I suppose, than any other reaction, because if you are afraid you are apt to act wrongly. You will feel hatred for the person you are afraid of. You

will try to injure that person or group. And fear generates fear on the other side; fear is an expanding thing. So every step might well be judged according to whether it increases or decreases the element of fear in the world. If there is less fear then there is more reasoned thinking, more understanding. If there is more fear, well, one thinks poorly and only acts in an excited, and usually in the wrong way.

NC: Would you say that there is more or less fear in the world today—justified or unjustified fear—than when we spoke two years ago?

JN: Now I don't know. I should have thought on the whole that there might be a little less; but it is difficult to measure these things. Various good things have happened in recent months—the Korean War has ended, at least for the time being; there's certainly a relaxation in Europe, a very marked relaxation of that fear complex and expectation of disaster of which I spoke a moment ago and which, I think, prevailed much more two years ago. So, in that sense, I should say that conditions are somewhat better. Yet in a more basic sense, in the historical sense, they're much the same.

NC: Has the death of Stalin⁴ had anything to do with the lessening of this tension? Do you believe that the passing of the Soviet dictator marks the beginning of a real change inside Russia?

JN: I do not know how far the death of Stalin has resulted in anything special; but certainly, since the death of Stalin, many things have happened inside Soviet Russia itself. Also there have been a few things done by the Soviet which may have relaxed tension somewhat in Europe. Now, it is quite immaterial what the motive behind that may be. The fact is some of the tensions have eased and therefore it is welcome.

NC: What are some of the actual things that have been done by the Soviet that you feel have justified such an easing or relaxation of world tensions? Have the words been matched by deeds?

JN: I think the new Soviet leaders have done some things apart from saying them. There have been some changes for the better in Austria. Even in the Soviet-occupied territories in Eastern Europe, we have seen certain steps—not very big, to be sure, but certain steps—in the direction of a relaxation of tension. One has the impression that the new Soviet regime may be trying to

4. Josef V. Stalin died on 5 March 1953.

concentrate on Russia's own economic development. Whatever the reason may be, there is little doubt in my mind that they are trying something of a new approach in their policy.

NC: Would you say, Mr Prime Minister, that there is any basic change in the long-range policy of the Soviet, apart from a possible present change in tactics?

JN: I don't quite know what you mean by "long-range", because nobody today can really talk in terms of, let us say, decades. But I think there has been a definite change in a particular direction and it is likely to endure for the next few years. Now, what happens after that nobody can say. Also, I think that the current feeling in the Soviet Union, or at any rate in their top-ranking people, is that by showing results in the economic field in their own country they can produce a more powerful impression on the rest of the world than through other means.

NC: There seems to be a feeling on the part of some nations, including the United States, that one contribution the Soviet could make to the building of a more stable world is by helping to develop the United Nations itself. You may recall that the last time we spoke you referred to the need for a "fresh start" inside the United Nations in order to give it such strength as would be required to guarantee the independence of the individual nations and to protect the world against aggression through workable world law. I believe you also called attention to the work of Mahatma Gandhi in this particular direction. Would you say that the events of the past two years have strengthened you in this belief?

JN: Yes, I do feel strengthened in that belief. It may be on account of events; it may be on account of my own thinking. As for the United Nations, it is facing a difficult time and unless some fresh adjustments are made the internal conflicts of the UN may increase. It is not particularly easy to suggest what the adjustments should be because these matters, after all, are not merely legal or constitutional. It is not the fault of the United Nations, which actually reflects conditions in the world. If the world doesn't pull together properly, the United Nations is affected. And so, while we may try to improve the United Nations, the real thing is to improve the environment of the United Nations or the things that are happening in the world. To repeat, we should try to lessen the world fear complex. If we do this it helps to create a proper atmosphere for the consideration of important problems. This helps in the possible reshaping or reorganization of the United Nations, so that it can protect the independence of nations and prevent the interference of one nation

in the affairs of another and, at the same time, bring about a fuller cooperation of the nations as a whole.

NC: Do I take it from what you have just said that India will support such a fresh examination of the problem of the UN when the question of Charter revision comes up in 1955 on the agenda of the United Nations?

JN: Certainly. Exactly in what form it comes up, of course, I do not know, and much would depend upon that. When one talks about the independence of nations, remember that, in the mind of the average Indian or the average Asian, the fact springs up that there are many countries in Asia which are not independent. What about them? Many policies are being pursued in Asia and Africa which are the reverse of policies meant to preserve the independence or the national cultures or the way of life of any particular country. So that before we start thinking of putting the rest of the world right, the part of the world which is not right should be put right.

NC: Would these logically be some of the questions that should come up at a UN Review Conference in 1955?

JN: They ought to come up in some form or another certainly, because they are very vital questions. Almost all over Asia today you find that these are primary questions in the minds of people. Even in Africa today these questions are very much to the fore.

NC: Here in India I have been tremendously heartened by the evidence of progress since my previous visit. For example, I have gone out to places where there used to be refugee camps—I was looking for people I had met two years ago, and I was happy to learn that they had long since been resettled. And as I go around the countryside; as I see green fields where not long ago there were brown fields caused by the drought; as I see more food and clothes in the stores, I become heartened, as I say, by this evidence of progress. Would you care to review, from the desk of a Prime Minister, the principal steps that have been taken in the last two years to improve conditions in India?

JN: I think it is true that we have been making progress on many fronts—certainly in regard to the rehabilitation of refugees. Also in developing a number of our industries. Most heartening of all, I think, is the improvement in our food situation. I can't say that we have solved the food problem, but we have gone much further than we thought we could go. In fact, we have done in a year or two a large part of what we had thought would take five

years to accomplish. So that is all to the good. But at the same time an ever-increasing sense of urgency oppresses us. And it is good that this should be so, because nothing is more dangerous than feeling of complacency. It is all too easy for governments to make this mistake. At the present moment the overall problem which is most in people's minds here is the problem of unemployment, chiefly urban but really both urban and rural, and we are giving it hard thought.

NC: What are some of the problems in addition to unemployment?

JN: Unemployment surely covers so many problems that if we solve that problem we will have solved nearly all problems. You see, we start with political problem. The internal political problem has been largely solved by independence. After the political problem comes the economic problem, which for us, an underdeveloped country, is a terrific one. It involves the economic health of all our people — providing opportunities of growth to all of them. Some of the particular economic problems you may have in America or Western Europe are still too far off for us to consider since we have to deal with these primary problems. When we manage that we can think some more about the rest. Of course, we do think about these advanced problems too, but meanwhile there is the problem of finding food, housing, clothing, education, health for our people, who increase four or five million every year. Obviously, the best way to achieve all this is through regular employment. Therefore the problem of unemployment can better be expressed as the problem of employment, employment for all. Education, health, and other social services and activities, as I said, are directly connected with employment.

About two years back we announced a programme we hoped to complete in the ensuing five years. We presented an outline and invited criticism. After a year we finalized our programme but, in doing it, we made great changes and, I think, improved it. Now, after another year, we find that we should change it still more; that is, move faster, paying attention more especially to this problem of fuller employment. We are, at the present moment, trying to revise that programme with this in view.

NC: You spoke two years ago of your hopes that India might be able to develop village projects, local projects, that might preserve the cultural values of village life and yet provide the means for fuller employment and for improving the health and living conditions of the Indian people. Has anything specific taken shape along these lines?

JN: As far as I remember, when you came two years back there was not much said about community centres. Was there?

NC: No.

JN: That is a new thing entirely. Well, these community centres are not absolutely new but certainly represent for us a new approach to the old problem and, I think, a very hopeful one. We want to spread them out all over the country. In the first years we started fifty-five such centres. Each centre comprises, I think, some 300 villages, divided up into blocks of a hundred. We started in a fairly big way, and we have slowly increased the number of centres. And in the course of five years we should really cover about a third of India.

Right now we are going in a slightly different direction from before by instituting what is called a national extension service—rural, of course—which will cover much more rapidly the other areas, though not quite so intensively. We always have to decide, of course, whether to spread our activity or to concentrate in some areas. It is not a good idea to spread our activity so thin that it doesn't show at all.

NC: What about the condition of village life in general today?

JN: We are also thinking in terms of improving the living standards of the villages. We want as well to improve the agricultural standards and the cultural standards. We are attacking another problem: the drift to the towns. We have had, as you know, a considerable migration to the cities. But in many of the cities there is little additional work to be had. And so most newcomers join the ranks of the unemployed. Now, if we can build up the villages and offer jobs as well as a measure of some kind of cultural life, we stop this dangerous drift. So this whole idea of community centres has set us thinking along new lines.

In addition to those centres, we are having a national extension service which, in the course of the next three or four years, is meant to cover almost the whole of India, all 600,000 villages. It is a terrific job, and apart from the finances involved in it, the real difficulty is in training human beings. Therefore, we have training programmes in a large number of centres. That is, we are training them not as specialists as much as good village-level workers. We are now in the process of training some 80,000 village-level workers. That helps the employment programme, too.

NC: I should be very proud, Mr Prime Minister, if the American people, through their programme of technical assistance or through the work of private foundations, have been helpful in the development of your community centres.

JN: Yes, they have been helpful, and they will probably be even more helpful in the future.

There is also another side to this general problem; that is, while we want technological development, we do not want technological development if it means technological unemployment. We don't want greater productivity at the expense of large numbers of human beings who would be thrown on the scrap heap, you might say. So we must balance the two.

NC: I had in mind not only American technologists but all the Americans who have come over to help. Today, for example, I met a group of American students from the University of California at Los Angeles. They told me of the schools in India they had helped to build with their bare hands. They told me of their work in the villages. I think these young people reflected something very deep in our country. It is the desire to have a human compact with the people of India and, indeed, with the people of the world. Wherever I have gone in the United States I have found this desire, and I am especially glad that I found it being fulfilled in India itself, where it could become apparent to the Indian people.

JN: Yes, I met this group of students and I have met a number of groups of students from the United States. I have been very much impressed by them—not only because of their general friendliness but because of their outlook, an eagerness to be cooperative, friendly, to learn and, if possible, to teach. And generally they behave in a manner which brings them very near to us. I think they have been very good ambassadors to India.

NC: To return to my opening question, Mr Prime Minister, some time ago, before we set up these microphones, you were philosophizing about the future of the human race. May I ask you whether, in the light not only of the events of the past two years but in the light of your total experience in and out of government, whether you are optimistic or pessimistic about the future?

JN: As I said at the start, that is a question which, if you like, one can try to answer in a sentence or two or in a book, and still not answer it. Looking at the long perspective of history, however, one sees all kinds of terrible tragedies occurring and I have no doubt that during those periods this very same question was asked: namely, what is going to happen to the human race? Is it going to be submerged in barbarism? But, in spite of all those tragedies and disasters, the human race has survived, and I have no doubt today that man will survive—whatever lies ahead. He has an amazing endurance. Whether one can justify that by logic or reasoning or not, one has an inner feeling that it must happen.

NC: I am deeply grateful to you for this discussion today, Mr Prime Minister. Once again, as I did the last time, I wonder whether there are any closing words you would like to say to the American people?

JN: I forget what I said the last time and I certainly don't wish to repeat myself; but it is obvious that in the world today the United States has an extraordinarily important task to fulfil and a tremendous responsibility. When a nation or a people are in that situation everything that they do, big or small, produces an effect that is felt all over the world. I hope and believe that the United States, or rather the people of the United States, will utilize this great historic chance before them and that they will help the world to help itself, for ultimately everyone has to stand on his own feet. But certainly the United States can help the world to build and develop itself. And it can help to create that atmosphere of lack of fear and lack of hatred that can yet bring about a certain spirit of cooperative endeavour, of live and let live.

NC: Because of what you have just said, are you optimistic about good relations between India and America?

JN: I consider these good relations very important, naturally, because America, as I said, has such a great responsibility. What we do or do not do is powerfully affected by our relations with America. Therefore, I would like to work for continuing good relations and I am quite convinced that in doing so I am only doing the same thing that is being done by so many Americans themselves.

GENERAL PERSPECTIVES

1. Celebrations on Independence Day¹

You will remember that it was suggested at the Cabinet meeting that on Independence Day, August 15, schools and colleges should be invited to celebrate it by some kind of simple ceremony including a brief explanation of the significance of that day. Otherwise the day will be a holiday. I suggest that your Ministry might draw the attention of universities, colleges, schools, etc., to this suggestion.

1. Note to Minister of Education, 4 July 1953. File No. 2(430)/49-PMS.

2. India and the World¹

I came back from Europe and Egypt ten days ago.² I was out for nearly a month. I saw a bit of the outside world and saw India too from outside. It is a good thing to view the problems of one's country from a distance. And ever since I returned to India I have been trying to understand what has been happening here during the past month. I am glad that we have this opportunity to be together so soon after my return and particularly at this historic site at Agra. I agree this is not the best season for anyone to visit Agra but then Agra is Agra, no matter what the weather is. I am sure that everyone assembled here today is reminded of long ago and the historic past of this city. It is not always good to look back because we have to look ahead when we are marching ahead. And yet a look back does some good sometimes because we are after all the product of the past. The past, the present and the future are all linked together. We must understand all three.

I shall talk a little about foreign affairs first since I have just come back from abroad. You must have seen how our responsibilities are growing day

1. Speech at a meeting of the All India Congress Committee held at Agra, 6 July 1953. From *Sahi Rasta*, a publication of the Friends of New Kashmir Committee. Nehru delivered the speech first in Hindi and later gave its gist in English.
2. On 28 May 1953, Nehru went to London to attend the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II. He returned to India on 27 June. During this period he also visited Switzerland and Egypt.

by day because India is growing in stature in the eyes of the world. Freedom came and we were happy but it has brought new responsibilities. It is a great responsibility to guard one's freedom. So is it a responsibility to progress, to remain united. All these are responsibilities which freedom has brought in its wake. And as India marches ahead, in politics, economically, so its stature in the world grows, and more and more responsibility is thrust upon us.

For a long time attempts were being made to stop the fighting in Korea and sign an armistice. But there were obstacles. Now those seemingly insoluble problems have been almost resolved. The problem arose that in a world fiercely divided into opposing factions, which was the nation acceptable to both sides? And the eyes of the world fell upon us. It is a matter of great honour that the great warring factions of the world repose confidence in us. It is an honour and yet a burden too. South Korea has created some obstacles in this and opposed the talks with the result that the agreement seemed on the verge of breaking down.³ Efforts are being made even now to retrieve the situation. If not, it will mean that fighting will break out again which will be extremely dangerous.

The most significant thing in the world today is that after years, the mutual suspicion, fear and hatred among nations seem to be abating somewhat. They are looking towards one another and it is possible that they may even extend the hand of friendship towards one another. It is a welcome development and though, there is a long way to go, yet, after years of bitterness, it seems a good thing that the peoples and governments of the world are looking towards one another. It is to be hoped that we can work towards a future without wars.

You must bear in mind, when we talk of wars, the consequences that wars lead to. Modern warfare is not confined to fighting on the borders. It is a terrible thing. If there is an atomic war, half the world could be destroyed. Nobody can remain unaffected if a war breaks out. The whole world will be destroyed. Therefore peace is a crucial issue in today's world and something which concerns everyone, every man, woman and child, and not merely governments. Constant efforts have to be made to see that no false step is taken. The events in Korea seemed to be cleansing the atmosphere when the boat was rocked again. As I told you, we are shouldering a heavy burden in Korea; we are the Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.⁴ We shall be sending in our forces, not to fight but for peace-keeping and to oversee the prisoners of war, to assist the Red Cross, etc.

Why is all this responsibility cast only upon India and not on others? Most of the other countries belong to one camp or the other. India has refused

3. See *post*, p. 502.

4. On 12 June 1953, India had agreed to serve on the Commission.

to join either camp ever since we became free, indeed from before Independence. We have maintained that we would follow our own policy and try to remain friendly towards all nations. You can see the fall out from this. It has benefited not only India but the whole world. The world is gradually beginning to realize this. However, it is not certain whether we shall send out our Commission and the forces into Korea until the talks in Korea reach a conclusion. Please bear in mind that we have agreed to send in our troops only for peace-keeping, not to take part in the fighting.

Whenever I step out of India and Asia to Europe or America, I always draw people's attention to the fact that apart from the momentous events which are taking place, this is the age of Asia's awakening. Asia is beginning to find its own identity after three or four hundred years. Asia's history goes far far back thousands of years, but during the past three or four hundred years, Europe had had a hold over it. We have no right to blame Europe for it. Europe could conquer us because we had fallen, had become completely useless, all of us in Asia, not merely in India. The nation which becomes backward and falls has to take the blame. We had become stagnant. We are still stagnant to a very large extent, and instead of looking ahead, keep looking back towards the past.

In Europe, on the other hand, there has been tremendous progress in science and technology. New inventions, new discoveries led to their becoming more and more powerful. They built new weapons and conquered India, China and other countries. All this happened three or four hundred years ago and their empire lasted for nearly two hundred years. That is slowly coming to an end now. It has ended in India and other countries. There are still some pockets of Asia and of course the whole of Africa which are under Europe's subjugation. But it is absolutely clear that the old order is coming to an end; as a historical process, colonialism is coming to an end. It may drag on for a few years more but it cannot last too long. Most people in India have not understood what freedom means—everyone knows India has become free, but they have not understood what the duties and responsibilities of a free country are. Their outlook belongs to a bygone age. In the same way, the people of Europe have understood only vaguely that the world has changed but they continue to cling to the past. Therefore whenever I go to Europe, I draw their attention to the fact that they must look at the world of Asia and Africa with new eyes.

A big revolution has taken place in China. Many among you may personally approve of it or not. But the basic fact remains that a revolution has taken place and a strong, powerful government has been established. There is no point in closing one's eyes to this fact—it will not disappear, it cannot be wished away. But some big powers in the world are not prepared to accept it fully. Not that that changes anything. But as a result the foreign policy of

those countries has become topsy-turvy, as it is bound to happen if you leave a major factor out of reckoning. It is bound to upset the cart. In the olden days it was known as Balance of Power. The old Balance of Power in Europe has been completely upset. It had already been upset by the last War. Two countries, America and the Soviet Union, emerged as super powers. Great upheavals have taken place in Asia also. India, which is a large country, has got freedom. I agree that we do not have a big military force or an atom bomb. And yet India is a growing power whose voice counts for something. Other countries have been born, Pakistan, Burma, etc. In this way, the old Balance of Power in Asia and Europe has been upset. Then China, which was a weak nation, has suddenly emerged as a very powerful nation. This has completely changed the Balance of Power in the Far East which has had its own repercussions on the rest of the world. Therefore, with all these changes, the Balance of Power which had existed twenty or forty years ago has been completely upset. But some people refuse to understand the new world we are living in. They are still clinging on to old habits. So whenever I go abroad, I try to look back towards the newly emergent Asia and Africa.

Then take Africa, for instance. There are so many large countries in Africa. I think no other continent has undergone so many travails, so much hardship, as the continent of Africa has during the last few centuries. History shakes one up. But they have now found their voice and that is leading to a great deal of tension. Africa has many countries within it. You know the history of South Africa. Indians had a role to play in it and now the mantle has been passed on to the people of Africa. In North Africa, Morocco, Tunis, etc., are under French domination. They are struggling for freedom and are being repressed. There is another small country in the west of Africa, Gold Coast,⁵ which is under the British. It has been given a great deal of autonomy and is forging ahead. It would be an excellent thing for Africa and the whole world, if a similar policy were followed in the whole of Africa. But it is not being followed. There is great injustice and repression in East Africa. Even if we do not go into the details, the broad fact remains that Africa's problems cannot be solved in this manner. It will only escalate tensions and lead to the most lethal war. Any war between nations is bad enough but it becomes extremely lethal when the war is fought on racial grounds between the Blacks and Whites.

I try to present all this to the people because if we are not vigilant and get bogged down in our own petty problems, then the world will go awry. Let me mention one thing more in this connection. There has been a war going on in Indo-China for years. The small countries in Indo-China are under French rule or French protection. I have no doubt about it that this is a war of independence being fought by those countries. Other countries may play a

5. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, p. 20.

role or lend a helping hand. But it is regrettable that France is so completely embroiled in this that not only is it going to harm the little countries, this war will be detrimental to France also. A couple of days ago the French Government had made an announcement to the effect that it would grant complete freedom to its colonies.⁶ I do not know what the ultimate picture will be. But even the announcement is very welcome. Let us see what the outcome will be. I would, however, like to submit that it is strange that the French Government has not seen fit to make an announcement like they have in Indo-China due to pressure of circumstances in Morocco and Tunis and other countries where a voice is being raised for freedom? These are some matters concerning foreign affairs.

India's problems are manifold. Recently someone asked me what India's problems are and I replied that we have 360 million problems. There are as many problems as there are people, and they have to be solved. It is only then that a nation can progress. We have drawn up a Five Year Plan which, I have no doubt, is a very good and fundamentally sound document. We will build our future on that foundation. The Five Year Plan has been drawn up taking into account the condition of the whole country. It is obvious that no Plan can be valid for all times. It will have to be changed as conditions change. It was drawn up two years ago. Then we had more deliberations and it had to be redrafted entirely.⁷ New ideas, new techniques are coming to the fore and we have made some changes. So it would be wrong if anyone thought this is a rigid plan. The First Plan is of course ready to be implemented but we can make changes wherever we feel it is necessary.

We have made great headway during the last few years. If you compare what has happened in India in the last four or five years with other countries in the same period, you will find that we have made tremendous progress. We have drawn up a Plan, established huge factories to build aeroplanes, railway engines; a huge factory has come up in Sindri. We are building ships at Visakhapatnam. We have embarked upon river valley schemes on the major rivers for irrigation purposes and production of electricity. In short, we have laid the foundations for scientific progress. We have set up laboratories. All these are steps which may not yield immediate returns but they will lay the foundations for our future progress. They will also provide employment to people.

6. On 3 July 1953, France had offered a greater measure of self-government to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. At Paris, a note expressing France's willingness to do this was handed over to the diplomatic representatives of these States by Joseph Laniel, the Prime Minister.
7. The report of the Planning Commission containing the First Five Year Plan was presented to Parliament by Nehru on 8 December 1952.

There is no doubt that there is great deal of unemployment in our country. It has become a major problem. What are the millions of our youth who are in schools, colleges and universities to do when they come out? They come out with the hope that they will get government service. That is absurd. If government continues to provide employment to millions of people, it will be unproductive and a drain on our exchequer. The people must be engaged in productive labour, on land, in factories, in cottage industries, etc., because we will have to produce more if we want India to become wealthy and we must ensure proper distribution. There is mention of all this in the Five Year Plan. But we have to pay attention to reducing unemployment because it is not a good thing to have a high unemployment rate. Our goal is to eliminate unemployment altogether.

Resolutions will be presented before this session on various subjects, on foreign policy, our economic policies, our social problems. The important thing is how we look at our social and economic problems. There are many factors in our society which prevent progress. It is not a matter of passing laws or setting up huge factories. We have to change the pattern of our lives if our society is to progress. We want the country as a whole to progress, not just a part of it or the people of any one religious persuasion or a caste. Every citizen of this country must get equal rights, no matter which State or religion or caste they belong to. This is how the West has progressed and so too must we. We have become backward because we have lacked unity. Provincialism and communalism have been the obstacles to our unity. They have weakened us and even today, our enemies want to take advantage of our vulnerabilities. In a sense, it is these weaknesses which led to the creation of Pakistan. We must learn a lesson from all this and not allow such forces to rear their heads. Otherwise India will again become weak and all our strength will be destroyed. Pakistan came into being and we had to accept it. We have made it clear that we have no desire to interfere in the affairs of Pakistan. We wish Pakistan well. They are our neighbours and we have many friends and acquaintances there. Economic disparities between neighbours will be harmful to both sides. We want both countries to prosper. Unfortunately there are several areas of disagreement between India and Pakistan, the biggest problem being the refugees. The second question is of river waters and the third concerns East and West Bengal. The fourth question is regarding Kashmir. But behind all these broad factors is mutual hostility, fear, anger and suspicion, which cloud the judgement. It is a good thing that the atmosphere between Pakistan and India is now much better than before. Therefore it has become easier to hold talks. I do not say that all the problems will be resolved immediately but when two parties wish wholeheartedly to find solutions, it is bound to happen and I am convinced that it will come to pass.

The most difficult of all the issues is the issue of Kashmir. The events of

the last few years in Kashmir make a long and complicated story. I shall not go into that just now though I am aware that the Kashmir issue has become particularly complicated because of both external and internal factors. The Praja Parishad in Jammu has started a movement which the Jan Sangh is supporting.⁸ I was happy to learn that it is petering out. You can imagine the amount of harm it has done. It pits one kind of communalist demand against another kind of communalist demand in Kashmir. If a Hindu communalist voice is raised in any part of Kashmir, it would mean that Muslim communalism will also be awakened. Muslim communalism had been particularly active in Kashmir and they joined India because they did not wish to adopt Mr Jinnah's policy which had laid the communalist foundation of Pakistan. If a Hindu voice is raised, no matter what the issue is, it will immediately lead to the Muslim communal elements also jumping into the fray and that is bound to have an adverse effect. This is how the Kashmir issue has become steadily more complex. It is not a question of guns and swords but of the minds and hearts of the people. India does not believe in forcing itself on anyone.

As you know, we have decided to form a new State of Andhra Pradesh. It will come into being on 1st October. Agitations have been taking place over this issue in other parts of the country. I want to assure you that the decision to form the State of Andhra had nothing to do in my mind with the unfortunate death of Sriramulu after his fast unto death.⁹ The decision had been taken earlier. Taking all this into account we decided that a group of non-partisan people should advise us and their recommendations would be placed before the people, leaving it to them to weigh the pros and cons before we arrived at a decision. Even after a decision has been taken, some people are still bent upon making a noise. I am not bothered in the least about which new provinces need to be formed or where their borders should lie. What would worry me is if anyone talked of secession. Redrawing the boundaries between the states within India is a mere administrative arrangement. We forget that we are one country. Each province is not a separate country. It is strange that there should be a dispute over which side Bellary District should be awarded to. We appointed a judge who gave us his

8. The movement which started on 21 November 1952 called for the full integration of Kashmir State into the Indian Union; full integration of Jammu and Ladakh; application of Indian Constitution to Kashmir; jurisdiction of Supreme Court of India over the State; re-election of the Constituent Assembly by fair elections; elimination of the customs barriers between Kashmir and India; and investigation of corruption charges against the State regime by an impartial Tribunal.
9. He died on 15 December 1952 after fasting for fifty eight days.

report¹⁰ and we accepted it. But now we have some youth in Bellary stopping trains because they say they are against the decision.¹¹ There are some people in Chittoor who say that they do not wish to be part of Andhra Pradesh because they want to be in a Tamil-speaking State.¹² We have decided that once Andhra Pradesh is formed, then a Boundary Commission will decide where the boundaries should rightly be. The people of Chittoor will have full opportunity to state their case before the Commission. This strange method of expressing opposition by stopping trains and what not is absurd. I have issued a statement about this a few days ago.¹³ In any case, I am hopeful that all this agitation will come to an end. Otherwise, as you can imagine, we shall have to deal more severely because we cannot have 50 or 100 people bringing the entire district administration to a halt, especially over something which they can raise legitimately.

I hope all of you will think carefully about these issues and continue to do so when you go back to your own provinces. We have had several by-elections during the last few months and Congress candidates have won some and lost others.¹⁴ Recently, I think, Congress candidates have lost in most of the States. But I am not shocked. I think it will be a good thing for the Congress provided Congressmen learn a lesson. Winning or losing elections is not a big issue. The important thing is that the Congress should keep up its good work. We must maintain strong links with the people. We shall remain strong if we are able to serve the people. If we are engrossed in petty squabbles then we shall undoubtedly become weak and others will take our place. Therefore these election results must make us understand our weaknesses and what we should do about them.

10. Lakshmi Shankar Misra, Chief Justice of the Hyderabad High Court, was appointed by the Government of India on 21 April 1953 to give his verdict. He submitted his report on 18 May 1953.
11. The agitation was against the Misra award on the division of Bellary.
12. The Tamilarasu Kazhagam started the agitation for inclusion of the Tamil areas of Chittoor in Madras State.
13. On 3 July 1953, in a statement issued from New Delhi, Nehru, while deprecating the demonstrations, said that he could not understand how boundaries could be decided by disrupting the railway services.
14. Out of fifteen by-elections for the House of the People, the Congress contested fourteen, and retained seven out of eleven seats it had won during the general elections. In the by-elections to the State Assemblies, out of ninety-seven seats, the Congress won 50 as against 49 held by it earlier in those constituencies.

3. Increase Production to Remove Poverty¹

Brothers and sisters,

In the last two days, the weather has been kind to us. It has rained a little and apart from making the weather cooler, there have been other advantages too. But I do not know if the ground you are sitting upon is dry or wet because I can see some puddles here and there. It is more important that it should rain, even if we are put to a little trouble, rather than that the weather should enable us to hold a public meeting for me. I came back ten days ago from abroad. I had been out for a month and in that time I spent two weeks in England and about two weeks in Switzerland and a few days in Egypt. I could see many countries but more important was the fact that I could see our country more objectively and perceive many new things when I saw her from afar. As you know, if you see something from close quarters, you can perhaps see it better, but the ups and downs are not clearly visible. Even a small hilltop would look like the Himalayas, whereas distance makes the vision more objective. So a new picture emerges and we can make some sense out of the events that are taking place in this changing, revolutionary world of today, and our place in it. It is important to understand the problem of our country, no doubt. But it is equally important to see our country in the world context and understand our place in it. There are both advantages and disadvantages in being a large country. It is an advantage to be a large country because it can become a powerful one if it follows the right path. But people living in large countries tend to forget the rest of the world because their own country seems like a large universe and other countries seem remote. People in smaller countries have to think about other countries. But big or small, we must understand the world of today with its revolutionary ferment and the flow of ideas, so that, first, we may take advantage of them, and, secondly, because, if we fail to grasp them, we shall come to grief. That is why I like to go out sometimes.

This time, as you know, I had gone there in connection with the Coronation,² not to be part of the spectacle, even though it was a grand one, but because there were other things involved in it. People had come from many countries of the world and there was a Prime Ministers' Conference³

1. Speech at a public meeting, Agra, 7 July 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.
2. The Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II was held on 2 June 1953 at Westminster Abbey, London.
3. Held from 3 to 9 June 1953, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference reviewed the situation in Korea, the West Asian issue, and the economic situation of the Commonwealth.

and there were many problems to be discussed. All this refreshes the mind, though the pressure of work is usually very heavy and I could not get much rest. I have come back with a refreshed mind and I want to tell you a couple of things about the state of the world. I agree that the problems of the country have to be solved first—we cannot take upon ourselves the problems of the entire world. Our own country is a large and complex one, with difficult problems. How can we take on the burdens of others? At the same time, it is also true that one's problems get mixed up with world problems, in war or peace. Therefore it is necessary to understand these things. Moreover, a free nation like ours has to shoulder certain responsibilities. When we were under British rule, our only task, in a sense, was to face British imperialism and try to remove it. That was our only task in politics. But the moment we became free, innumerable problems and burdens came upon us. Apart from shouldering the responsibilities of our own country, we had to determine our relations with the other countries and formulate our foreign policy. Please remember that millions of Indians live outside the country and we have to look after their interests and establish trade relations. We do both export and import, and to look after all these things, we had to think of sending ambassadors to other countries. These were the problems which confronted us as soon as we became free and our relations with other foreign countries began to multiply, though I did not want it immediately as we had to do so much at home. But we were helpless. Such were the responsibilities that freedom brought and we got involved in them.

You may have heard of the tremendous responsibility that has been put upon us, with our consent, in connection with Korea where a war has been going on for the last three years and now an agreement has almost been reached. In any case it has been agreed to put a stop to the fighting but there is some slight hitch. Anyhow, in the agreement it was decided that the responsibility for arbitration should be given to us because the two major participants in the war have no confidence in each other but have faith in India's impartiality and integrity. It is not a small matter to have the confidence of these great powers.

As you know, right from the beginning, our policy has been to keep away from war and to make efforts towards peace. Secondly, our policy has also been to keep away from the various power blocs which are dividing the world into armed camps. We want to be friendly with everyone and follow our own policy without aligning ourselves with any power bloc. There were many who felt that our policy was absurd and would leave us friendless in the world. In fact, when we formulated this policy, many of the countries were often annoyed with us for not siding with them. Sometimes it would be the Americans and the British and at others the Russians and the Chinese. Both sides felt that we were mixed up with the other. The fact is that we did

not side with anyone and, in a sense, wished to be friendly with everyone while adhering to our own policy. When our critics, both in India and abroad, saw the results which our foreign policy was yielding, not only for ourselves but also for the world, they changed their tune. At a delicate moment in world affairs, the warring nations are looking towards us in the confidence that we will work with impartiality and integrity. So the Korean problem has descended upon us. Now, I cannot say at this moment what the final result will be. You may have heard that the President of South Korea has not accepted the clauses in the peace treaty and raised objections.⁴ I shall not go into that. But it is certainly a crisis for the world and the United Nations because it is bad for the treaty to be rejected. It shows that one individual can come in the way and turn everything topsy-turvy. What can the United Nations do when nobody listens to them. So these are the big problems before us.

Anyhow, our responsibilities have increased and it is obvious that I feel happy that our country is being accorded such respect. At the same time, I feel a little worried about how well we can discharge our responsibilities. We have to face the situation with courage. There are countries in Asia and Africa where a struggle for freedom is going on even now. They too look to us for help. By help I do not mean military help, but sympathy and support in the United Nations, etc. Our sympathies are certainly with those countries, whether they are in North Africa or South Africa. We are involved in all these problems. But, ultimately, India's standing in the world will be determined only by her strength. For a short while, other issues may push us into the forefront, but ultimately the strength of a nation consists of military and economic power. If we are held in respect in the world today, it is not because of our military power—though our small little army is a good one—or our wealth. We are a poor nation. Why then is India held in respect? It is a little difficult to say but let us say that it is chiefly because we follow our policy firmly with determination and show strength of character and intellectual power. Neither do we succumb to pressure nor do we flatter anyone. We wish to be friendly with everyone which itself imparts a kind of strength. Ultimately it is our combined strength which can take us far. So we come round again to the problems of the country—economic, political, and social problem—and the uplift of thirty-five crores of people. It is an extremely difficult problem and when somebody asked me a few days ago as to what the problems of India

4. Syngman Rhee, the President of South Korea, during his talks on 23 June with Mark W. Clark, the US Commander in charge of the UN forces in Korea, stated that he would accept the armistice provided the USA concluded a mutual defence pact with South Korea; the US and the Chinese forces were withdrawn from Korea; and a political conference was held within 90 days of signing the armistice. He also did not want the Indian troops to land in Korea as India was "pro-Communist."

were, I said that there were thirty-five crores of them, that is, as many as the population of the country. There are the problems of poverty and unemployment, etc.

A session of the All India Congress Committee is going on and practically the whole of today was spent in debating two Resolutions. One was about our social and economic policy.⁵ The second was about unemployment.⁶ Both the questions are actually interlinked and cannot be understood by taking them up separately. After all, if you wish to study the problems in the country you have to look at the picture in its entirety. That is what is known as planning. We have drawn up a Five Year Plan to have a complete picture before us of our resources, production, consumption, deficits, etc. All these things have to be taken into account. We cannot ensure that everybody gets enough food merely by passing a resolution on paper. We cannot hope to cure any ills by such methods. What I mean to say is that we cannot achieve anything by wishful thinking as people often seem to believe. All of us want to remove poverty and unemployment from India, but how is it to be done? Please remember that our population is increasing rapidly. It is estimated that every year nine lakh people reach the age of employment, whether they are farmers or factory workers or something else. So every year nine lakh jobs have to be created even if we want to maintain only the status quo. The magnitude of the problem increases if we wish to progress. Each one of us consumes a certain amount of the national wealth by way of clothes and food, etc., some more, some less, so long as we are alive. A nation's wealth consists of what is produced by its people by hard work, from land, from the factories and through other professions. It is the people who produce the wealth in the first place and then consume it. When the scales are balanced, the people remain where they are. If the expenditure exceeds the income, the result is poverty and bankruptcy. So the effort is to increase production because it benefits the people.

Economics is supposed to be a very difficult subject but these are some of the broad facts. Where does a nation's wealth come from? It does not come from the pockets of money-lenders because that is merely transferring the money from one pocket to another. It is possible for a few to become rich at the expense of others. But the wealth of a nation does not increase in any way because of money-lenders or even through some of the other professions like that of lawyers. It is a very good profession. Please do not think that I am criticizing it. Lawyers are powerful people and get annoyed if they are criticized. But their profession does not add to the wealth of a country. It is only when something new is produced that the wealth of a nation increases.

5. See *post*, pp. 73-74.

6. See *post*, pp. 82-83.

Even a new idea is a valuable addition to the nation's wealth. Gold and silver do not constitute a nation's wealth. Wealth is produced from the land and factories and cottage industries, etc. When a carpenter makes a chair, he produces new wealth. Ironsmiths produce new wealth. Gold and silver are not the real wealth of a nation. They are the tools of trade and are not particularly valuable. The country which produces more goods is considered wealthy. Why is the United States of America regarded as a very wealthy country? It is because it produces an enormous amount of goods by using modern techniques and new machines, etc. In our country too the people, especially the farmers, work very hard. But in the United States and elsewhere, they produce four times as much as what we produce here from one acre of land. So naturally their income is also four times as much as ours. It is so in industries, too. The problem before us is to increase production in order to remove poverty from our country. New jobs have to be found so that unemployment becomes less and production goes up in the country. People seem to covet government jobs. But that cannot solve the problem. A few hundred people may get government jobs which would solve their personal problems. But that will not solve the country's problems. Wherever the young people look to the government for jobs, that country is definitely backward because it means that there are no other avenues of work available. If you go to England you will find that many people are working for the government, but, by and large, they do not depend upon government jobs. It is the same thing in the United States also because there are thousands of avenues open to them. It is happening in our country also but most of these avenues were completely closed during the time of the British and so everyone looked to the Government for jobs or took up law or medicine as professions. We must open up new avenues of employment in villages and cities so that people may produce real wealth and benefit personally and also add to the country's wealth. To the extent that we are able to do this we shall be able to solve the problem of poverty and unemployment. But the question is, how to do it. Enormous sums of money are necessary to do it, for ours is a large country. Where is the money to come from? There is only one way and that is by saving and investing the savings for future progress. Suppose our country's income is four or five hundred crores a year and the expenditure is 500 crores, nothing will be left for investment and progress. We remain where we are and the population keeps increasing by millions—millions of new consumers, looking for food and employment. This is our dilemma.

I am talking to you about all this so that you may also help us to think about these problems and understand them and not think that they can be solved by shouting slogans or making a noise. Many of our colleagues in the Socialist Party and the Communist Party often criticize and oppose us. It is easy to criticize and oppose but difficult to show a responsible alternative

path. It is not enough to come and tell me that I should adopt socialism or communism and all our problems will be solved. That is absurd. I agree that some of the principles of socialism are very good and may clear the way for progress in future. But socialism can merely remove the obstacles from the path. The only way to reach our goal is through hard work. Even in the great socialist and communist countries of the world, nothing has been changed by law alone. It is after twenty or thirty years of hard work and tremendous hardships that they gradually strengthened their countries and increased their production. After all, things do not fall from the heavens or anywhere else. Everything requires hard work. Whatever we produce constitutes the wealth of this country and removes our poverty and unemployment. This is the difficult problem that we have to face.

In the last five to six years, our greatest problem has been food. There have been shortages in the country due to various reasons, like the Partition, for the wheat-producing areas went to Pakistan. But the real problem is that the population is increasing rapidly and the production has to keep up with the number of mouths to be fed. Production has gone up but it is not enough. As you know, in the last one year the situation has improved greatly in respect of the production of wheat and rice and we have had some breathing time. The problem has not been solved entirely but it is not so acute as it was last year and the one before that, when the grain reserves could not last for more than ten to fifteen days and we had to import shiploads of wheat and rice from outside. Even now we have to import but not very much. It is only to build up our reserves and we hope that within two or three years, we will have a surplus and not be dependent on others for food. One big river valley scheme will irrigate millions of acres of land and also generate electricity which will be used in factories, etc. That will provide employment.

So these things are going on. At the same time you must remember a basic fact that in the last two hundred years, we had become backward. Why? The countries of Europe had learnt new techniques and skills and advanced in science. Their strength increased because they invented new machines. They became powerful militarily and their capacity to produce goods increased enormously. This is why the United States of America is so rich. They do not get their wealth from anywhere else. It is through science and technology and modern machinery that they have developed their capacity to produce more. So they progressed and we remained backward because we refused to learn anything new. Let me give you a small example. Books were being printed in the world for hundreds of years but printing was not introduced in India till the British came. It was first started in Calcutta. What I mean to say is that we did not pay any attention to the advance that the world was making. We were tied down into narrow grooves and lived in the past. Old traditions and culture may be good, but when a man refuses to move with the changing

times he becomes backward. We became poor and backward and lost our freedom. Today's world belongs to science. Everything that you see around us works through science whether it is electricity or aeroplanes or railways or radio, gramophone and modern weapons of war, big industries, etc. If some of our big business magnates import machinery from the United States or Germany and put up a factory in Agra, does that advance science in any way? Science can develop in our country only when those magnates think of making the machines in our own country. That is how they can show their real skill. Otherwise importing of machinery can at best only mean some profit for a few individuals. Therefore we have to create scientific thinking in this country and lay the foundations of modern science and technology if we wish to understand the modern world and make progress.

In the last five years we have opened eleven big national laboratories and scientific research centres in the country. They will not show results immediately but they constitute the foundations on which we can build a new India. Many of you who are students may indulge in academic debates about which 'ism' we should follow or what our policy should be and it is a good thing to discuss these issues. But there are certain fundamental things which every country has to do, whichever 'ism' they may follow. The Soviet Union and the United States are diametrically opposite to each other ideologically. But both have adopted modern technology and science, and take advantage of scientific development. There is no difference in that. The difference arises at a later stage when the question of the ownership of the factories, etc., arises. But both have to follow the same path. We cannot hope to solve these problems by passing resolutions.

I mentioned the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union has made tremendous progress. Thirty-five to thirty-six years have passed since the Russian Revolution. Since then that country has made great progress. Even if you leave aside the harmful effects of this rapid progress, they have had to pay an enormous price for it. I am very doubtful how many countries would be willing to pay that price. Anyhow in thirty-six years they have reached where they are and succeeded in achieving a great deal after hard work. We cannot model ourselves on the Soviet Union and try to transform millions of lives in a short time. These things cannot be done by magic. The Soviet Union is three or four times larger than India and has a population which is less than half of ours. I agree that parts of their country are extremely cold and uninhabitable and yet there is great scope for spreading out. In our country, the cheapest commodity is people and they are multiplying rapidly. So a worthwhile question is, how to raise the price of human beings? It is happening in India and there is no doubt that it will go up even more. But anything that is available in plenty loses its value. There are millions of human beings in this country. But if all of them work hard physically and

mentally, they can produce wealth for the country. If they sit idle, they become a burden. All these complications are there. All of you who belong to the younger generation must think about these problems. It is not necessary that all of you must hold similar views. Even if you hold different views, you must realize that, basically, there is only one way to make progress and that is by increasing production. We have to increase our capacity to produce more by way of consumer goods. I am not talking about luxury goods. People must have the basic necessities of life like food, clothing, houses, education, etc. It is only when these necessities are available in plenty that we can think of other things. It is our duty to see that every child in India gets the opportunity to grow and is properly looked after. Each child must have adequate food, clothing, medical attention and opportunities for education. None can take the responsibility for the progress that he makes later on. But everyone must at least get equal opportunities. It is quite obvious that today he does not get the opportunity to grow. It is not everyone who is given the opportunity for education and progress which is not a good thing. We have to do all these things.

A great limiting factor is money. Where is the money to come from? It has to come from your pockets as taxes and other levies and go into government treasuries. If we try to increase the taxes, the burden on the people becomes too heavy. If they are reduced the government cannot fulfil its responsibilities. There are certain objectives which have to be met. For instance, an army has to be maintained for the defence of the country. There are bigger duties of a State like providing health care, education, etc., to every citizen in the country and we want that all these things should grow rapidly. But our hands are tied for there is no money. When the work is done on such a large scale, even one little step costs a great deal of money. For instance, in my opinion, there is no task which is more important than that of a school teacher for the growth and development of a child depends on his parents and teachers, their behaviour and how they teach. It is extremely important. I do not know if you are aware of it, but let me tell you that it is an accepted fact that the most important period in a child's life is its infancy, or say, till he is six or seven years old. He may learn a great deal thereafter but it has always been accepted that his character in all fundamental respects is formed within the first seven years. His character and behaviour, intellectual capacity and moral values are moulded by that time. There may be some changes later but they are not fundamental. So a teacher's job is extremely important. Parents also play an important role for their influence on the children is great. Now, all of us know that the condition of our teachers is not very good. Their salaries are very low, which is bad. There has been improvement in the last five years. But the fact is that they are very poorly paid especially when you see what an important task they perform. But if you want to increase

their salary even by five rupees, it runs into crores of rupees. This is the difficulty. Where is the money to come from? Ultimately it will have to come out of the people's pockets. This is the great dilemma that we face. If we increase the taxes, people get angry. So the problem can be solved only by increasing production so that the people and the government have more. There is no magic formula for all this. If there is not enough money, we cannot pay more. On the other hand, we wish to progress faster, build more hospitals and schools and roads, etc., everywhere. When I go to the mountain regions near the borders, there is demand for two things—roads and schools. The people are willing to build roads themselves if they can get a little help. They are willing to build schools also, if we can give them the material. There is a tremendous demand for these things.

I am talking about all these things at random so that you may understand the basic problems of poverty and unemployment and the need to make the people better off, which India faces today. Now, for the first time, all these things have been examined carefully in the Five Year Plan. These things have been talked about earlier too but they were more theoretical and were not directly relevant to circumstances. The Five Year Plan seeks to examine, for the first time, in a basic way, what our strengths and weaknesses and resources are and what we can do. I do not mean to say that whatever has been put down in the Five Year Plan is the last word but it is the first effort to understand the real circumstances and form our policy accordingly. So the Five Year Plan is a basic document. We can go on from there. We have started a number of tasks which our resources would permit, and have undertaken the big river valley schemes, etc. The factory at Sindri alone has cost crores of rupees. Then there are dams being built under such projects as Damodar Valley, Hirakud, Bhakra-Nangal and Tungabhadra. All these projects are so gigantic that people are amazed to see them and we can take pride in the fact that all these things are being done on a national level. It requires courage to do things on such a large scale. All these things will not bear fruit immediately. It may take years before we see any results, but in the meanwhile we have to spend crores of rupees. Anyhow, we are doing it. I told you about the factory at Sindri. Then we are building rail engines at Chittaranjan in Bengal. We used to import them earlier. Railway coaches and aeroplanes are being built in Bangalore and ships in Visakhapatnam. All these tasks are going on all over the country. They are extremely important for otherwise we would have to import rail engines and ships. We cannot do without them. These are basic things.

On the other hand, we have paid attention to the rural areas too which is extremely important. You may have heard of the community projects and the National Extension Scheme which are aimed at rural development. It is my opinion that if they work well, there will be a transformation all over the

country within four or five years. We shall be working from below. We have been too long in the habit of doing everything from the top. We are now paying attention to laying strong foundations for development. But in undertaking all these things, the Five Year Plan takes into account the national income and the expenditure that is involved. I do not remember the exact figures just now but you can form a rough idea of what it involves. Suppose the amount we wish to spend in the Plan is two thousand crore rupees in five years. The maximum amount that could be raised by way of taxes, loans, etc., was calculated and it did not come to more than 1,500 or 1,600 crore rupees. There was a deficit of nearly four to five hundred crore rupees. Where was this money to come from? We were not prepared to slow down our work for lack of money. Then how were we to get the money? There are only two ways—one is by taxation and the other by borrowing. It is obvious that we can take large sums as loans from foreign countries. The tasks in which the money will be invested will pay dividends soon. We shall not be throwing it away. Whatever we invest in the Damodar Valley or Hirakud, it will pay off. Well, if we can get loans at a reasonable rate of interest, we shall certainly take them. But how can we depend on others? The complication is that too much dependence on external sources weakens the country, just as an individual loses the use of his limbs if he depends on others for support. We need foreign assistance and we shall take whatever is available. But we have to ensure that it does not affect our internal policy. We must be vigilant about this because we do not want any undue pressures or the ill-effects of dependence on others. Then what is the other alternative? We can raise some money by imposing taxes but there is not much scope for it. As you know public loans could help for they would benefit both the people and the nation. They will be an investment in our great schemes which will pay dividends later. So the Government will go in for public loans in the form of postal certificates and other things which will benefit you also.

Therefore it is extremely important at the moment to save as much as possible so that it can be invested in the country's progress. This is usually done in war-time. This too has to be regarded as a war against India's poverty and unemployment. We have to produce the money the country needs. It will be a sign of weakness to depend on others. We have to invest not only in money but also in hard work. All sorts of plans have been drawn up and I think in the last year or so, many thousands of miles of roads have been laid with the help and labour of the people, especially in the rural areas, without any wages. They have built roads, dug wells, constructed schools and so the process of development goes on. This is a special method which requires very little money. Anyhow, we have to make up the deficit of four to five hundred crore rupees in the next three or four years and if possible exceed it. We have passed a resolution about Five Year Plan which is a very good thing

but the thought often arises that the progress is not rapid enough, especially in the matter of providing employment and we want to rectify it.

I have put before you some of the difficulties which we face. These are the real problems and even if views differ about the method of development and progress, by and large there is only one path. I have no doubt about it. Some of our Communist colleagues may feel that nothing can be done unless the existing edifice is razed to the ground and there is fighting and chaos and the entire social and economic system is broken up and a new one is put in its place. I do not like this kind of thinking because it is not a wise thing to destroy an edifice which is standing. It is easy to destroy but it takes time to build. The method of building is more or less the same. We hope to do it by hard work. It cannot be done by magic or by passing resolutions. We must increase production in the country. That is the real problem before us.

For a great task like this, it is obvious that there should be good organization in the country. If there are constant dissensions in the country, with each group pulling in a different direction or squabbles over minor matters, the energies of a nation are frittered away in useless things. Therefore it is essential to have unity in the country. That does not mean that everyone must learn their lessons by rote but we must understand that on the basic issues there ought to be unity.

There are three things which militate against unity in our country—not only in the present but in the past—and have caused great damage to India. These are communalism, provincialism and casteism. All these three keep us in separate compartments and strike at the root of the unity of the country and our energy is wasted in futile squabbles. As we saw, the greatest havoc wrought by communalism is the Partition of the country. I had hoped that people would have learnt a lesson from this but strange organizations of Hindus and Sikhs—Muslim organizations have gone away to Pakistan and the few that were left are not very strong—are cropping up all over the country. It is our misfortune that the narrow-mindedness which had prevented us in the past from making progress should rear its head again. Take our provinces, for instance. We have a great many large and beautiful provinces, each with a separate history of its own. But if each province thinks of itself as a separate country and fights with the others, there will be no country left. Nowadays there is a great deal of talk about reorganization of the States on a linguistic basis. I have no objection to that. But when it arouses tremendous passion and people are ready to break one another's heads instead of coming to a peaceful agreement, it shows a complete lack of wisdom. Our energy is dissipated in petty matters when there are great tasks awaiting to be done in the country. Progress and betterment of the people are gigantic tasks. What difference does it make if one district of this great big province of Uttar Pradesh—the largest in India—goes to Bihar or vice versa? I shall not feel at

all upset about it. It will still be a part of India. What is the difference? Though there is no dispute between Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, the rest of the provinces are fighting over various issues. I am amazed at this. We must sit down and come to a decision about these matters. I have even said that we shall appoint a commission by the end of this year to go into the matter. We do not wish to postpone it but the Andhra issue should be settled first. Let us think over the matter carefully, keeping in mind the picture of the entire country and then reorganize the States. Please remember that it is merely a matter of internal arrangement; the country remains the same. When the commission presents its report, we shall put its recommendations before the people so that they can make their choice and then gradually implement them. That is our intention. What is the meaning of all this shouting and screaming? I cannot understand it. It seems to be a new method. In the South, there has been rioting in Bellary district in connection with the formation of Andhra Pradesh and now there is some fighting in the villages bordering Chittoor. I have told them also that once Andhra Pradesh is formed, we shall set up a Boundary Commission to settle the boundary disputes between Andhra Pradesh, Madras and Mysore. What is the use of fighting over it? Trains are being stopped all over the place. What trains have got to do with boundary disputes, I cannot understand. It is absurd and childish. Even children are often wiser than adults.

So it is a basic weakness in us that we get easily fragmented and live in separate compartments. The same weakness is creeping into the Congress and people are beginning to forget the urgent tasks before us. What can anyone prove by wielding a stick when he can easily prove his worth by taking up any of the great tasks that are waiting to be taken up? We cannot take our country very far so long as we fail to root out this narrow-mindedness from among us.

As you know for months a movement has been going on about the Jammu affair. The Jan Sangh and other organizations had taken it up. I am glad to say and you too will undoubtedly be pleased to hear that it has been finished once and for all. The announcement has been made today.⁷ Now that it is over, I do not wish to go into it again. But in general I should like to point out how sometimes we can go wrong even when our intentions are good, if there are no guiding principles behind us. Now, take the Jammu affair. The idea behind the movement had such a bad effect on the other parts of Kashmir that the Kashmir issue became more complicated than ever before. So instead of helping, they worked against their own goal. This is what I call narrow-mindedness. There can be differences of opinion. But not to see beyond one's nose is not far-sightedness. Certain basic principles must be borne in mind.

7. The eight-month old Praja Parishad movement for fuller integration of Kashmir with India was called off on 7 July 1953. See also *post*, p. 278.

There are no obstacles in the way of India's progress except communalism, provincialism and casteism. These three things will stop India from going ahead. Otherwise there is no power in the world which can stop us if there is unity among us and tolerance for other faiths and equal rights for people of all religions and castes. If we are able to do these things we can progress very rapidly and if we get bogged down by them, it is obvious that our strength will be frittered away. Please remember that the modern world is an extraordinary one, a revolutionary, fast-changing world. People in India who think that there can be *status quo* here while the others change, or that there should be no change are sadly mistaken. In an ancient country like China there has been a great revolution. In India too we want to revolutionize many things and change the bad and undesirable elements in our system.

When I go abroad, I draw the attention of the people of Europe and the United States towards Asia and Africa because they have become accustomed in the last three or four hundred years to think of Europe as the centre of the world in political and economic matters. There is no doubt about it. Asia and Africa are regarded as being on the periphery. Even now they do not fully realize the great changes that have taken place in Asia and other changes that are bound to follow. Now, no other country can solve the problems of Asia from outside. India has become free, as have Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia. There has been a great revolution in China. So the Balance of Power has been turned topsy-turvy. This is why nobody can relax anywhere today. There have been great upheavals and people do not accept them fully. The strange thing is that the United Nations does not accept a large and mighty country like China. A country like that will not disappear because some people close their eyes to it. How can any policy which is formulated without taking that country into account be successful? The war in Korea was a result of this ignoring of realities in the world by some countries of Europe and the United States.

Take Africa. Africa was behind Asia in these matters. But the same thing is happening there. We have had long years of association with the problems of South Africa because settlers had gone there from India. You may remember that the first satyagraha was launched by Mahatma Gandhi in South Africa. So this has been going on since then. The Africans were ill-treated and regarded as an inferior race and Indians too were not treated properly. This cannot be tolerated anywhere in the world. Then in northern Africa there are Arab-Africans who speak Arabic—in Morocco and Tunisia. There also a war of independence is going on and they are being treated very harshly. In Central Africa, in Kenya, there is a strange upheaval taking place. So there is a fire raging in the large continent of Africa and all efforts at suppressing it are unsuccessful. It is possible that neither side may succeed and the trouble may spread farther afield.

So this is the situation in the world today. We have to be constantly vigilant and prepared, have to learn the lesson of unity and follow our principles. If our foreign policy has been successful and the world accepts it, it is not because of any craftiness on our part but because it has been moulded along a few simple, broad principles learnt from our history and our freedom struggle and the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi. So it did not involve any devious policies for we have abided by some broad principles and ultimately we have been proved right and the others wrong. We are a simple, straightforward people and wish to follow a straight path which is the way taught by Mahatma Gandhi. We followed it, perhaps not fully, and we often stumbled and fell, but we were convinced that we were not on the wrong path. I feel sad when I see many of our young people going wrong or getting carried away because, after all, the reins of government will be in their hands in the future. People of our generation may be here for a short while and then others will have to take our place. So we need to feel reassured that they will run the affairs of the country wisely. Sometimes I feel reassured when I see our young people taking on tremendous responsibilities, in this country and abroad, in the armed forces, in our scientific laboratories and elsewhere. How could India move so rapidly but for our bright and able young people? After all, progress cannot come at the orders of a single man from the top. There are good as well as bad human beings in the country but there are more good people than bad. Look at the map of Asia. I do not wish to make any comparisons but you can see for yourselves the progress made by India as against the difficulties that other countries are facing and it becomes quite obvious that India is on a path of stability. Perhaps we are not going as fast as we should. I want that we should move faster. But at least the country is stable. It is our duty now to move faster. I told you that the delay was due to lack of money, but ultimately everything depends upon the ability of the people, mental as well as physical, and their resolution. If we resolve firmly to march together, money is of no consequence. It is men who produce money, not the other way round. If the people are strong and capable of working hard in mutual cooperation, wealth will be produced automatically. *Jai Hind.*

4. Hard Work the Only Way to Progress¹

Sisters and brothers,

I think I have come to Lucknow after six months and I am glad to be standing

1. Speech at a public meeting, Lucknow, 17 July 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.

here and addressing this large public meeting. There are always a number of things that I wish to tell you. Thoughts crowd into my mind and I want to put them before you and also understand your thoughts. The problems before the country are complicated and difficult and can be solved only by understanding one another and by mutual help and cooperation. They cannot be solved by a government order, or by making a noise about them.

It is five or six years since we became free and many things, good and bad, have happened in the interval. You can judge, as the world does, where we are going. We have made some progress—and you can compare our progress with that of other countries—and as a result India is going up very rapidly in the eyes of the world. There is great admiration and respect for India in the world today. We can be happy about that but at the same time, our responsibilities increase. If you look at the various countries of the world and their problems, you will find that our country, in spite of all our difficulties and problems, does not fall short of the standards of other countries and, in fact, is better than most of the other countries in certain respects. That does not mean that we can now relax and become complacent. It certainly means that there is no basis for the constant criticism of ourselves which some of our friends and enemies indulge in. I am surprised that our people should constantly run down their own country. There are opposition parties in other countries also. They may oppose one another, but they present a united front to the world and do not generally criticize their countrymen before strangers. Here it seems to have become the occupation of some of our countrymen to criticize and run down India and point out our shortcomings to the world. I am amazed because I can say with confidence that their criticisms are wrong. I can confidently say that you can compare the things that have happened in India in the last five to six years with the progress of any other country even where there has been a revolution. But apart from that, what sort of service to the country is this, constantly to malign and run down one's own country, telling the world that we are falling and becoming weak, that there is every form of dishonesty and corruption here, and so on? This does not happen in other countries. This seems to be the full-time occupation of some of our own people.

Look at our country objectively. Two and a half weeks ago, I came back to India. I had gone to England and Switzerland, and from there to Egypt. I met many great leaders of the world, prime ministers and others, and discussed the world situation with them. I looked at our own problems from afar and understood them a little better. I was able to observe our weaknesses as well as good points from afar and study the great problems which loom large in front of us. At the same time, I realized that a large number of people in the world seem to look to us in the hope that we may be able to serve the world in some big way, and lessen the talk of war in the world, so that the threat of

war may recede. War is basically bad. All of us know that, but many people tend to forget what war really means. It is an abstract concept to some of us but in other countries which have fought in these great wars and been ruined by them, where no family has been left untouched, war is certainly not a paper concept. So there is great anxiety.

Many countries in the world greatly appreciate our foreign policy of non-alignment and of keeping ourselves aloof from the big power camps while maintaining friendship with everyone, and our principle of not joining in any war. This has been our principle for years. There are criticisms that it is cowardice on our part and yet others feel that we are involved with the opposite camp. Many people in our own country, friends who constantly criticize us, say that it is a strange policy which will lead to our having no friends in the world. Whatever it may be, in the last couple of months it has become obvious to the world, and to everyone in our own country, how successful our policy has been, even if it was not evident earlier.

Our policy has been tremendously successful and India has gone up in the world's esteem. The strange thing is that the super powers, who live in constant fear and hatred of each other, have shown their confidence in India by selecting us to be not only a member but the Chairman of the Commission that is going to be set up for Korea. Such confidence is not a small thing. It is not because of our military might or wealth, for we do not have either. Their confidence is based on our honesty and clear thinking. This is no small matter and we can justifiably be proud about it, though, at the same time, it means an increase in our responsibilities because the higher you go, the greater the responsibilities and a fall from the heights can be shattering. So my mind is constantly perturbed. I see a picture of India's progress, in the minds and hearts of the people and in the things that are happening in the country in regard to development and reconstruction. At the same time, I see great difficulties before us, like unemployment, which are so frustrating to our youth.

Yet another problem is cropping up which all of us can see quite clearly. You can see what is happening in Madras and Calcutta. I do not have any reports yet except what I have read in the newspapers. The tram fares were raised by one paisa in Calcutta.² I do not know how much it was before or what the figures now are. One paisa is not a big amount. I cannot judge whether the increase was justified or not but a great agitation has been launched over it. Trains are being burnt, stones and bombs are being thrown and the

2. An agitation led by the Communists was launched on 1 July 1953, protesting against the West Bengal Government's decision to increase the second class tram fare by one paisa. It took a violent turn on 8 July 1953 when there were incidents of bomb throwing and arson all over Calcutta.

life of the largest city of India with a population of thirty to forty lakhs has come to a standstill. It is really preposterous. As I said, I do not know all the details and what the actual fare was and so on. I have not gone into that. But this business of throwing bombs and stones and burning trains, whatever the issue may be, shows the fundamental weakness of our nation. It is not a good thing, whether we are talking of the people or the government. Such things should not happen in a first-rate nation. They are a sign of a second or third-rate nation. I am convinced that millions of people in Calcutta do not like it. I shall go so far as to say that even the people who indulged in these things mistakenly or in a fit of passion also realize their mistake and regret it to some extent because no sensible person can consider them good. If the train fare has been raised, there are a thousand ways of raising the issue and arguing about it. Why is it that the moment you do not like something, you start beating up people and burning things? Can any country progress in this manner? Please think about it. India has earned a name for herself by solving her problems by peaceful methods. We solved even the tremendous problem of getting freedom from British rule by such methods. Now we are rioting over the increase of train fare by one paisa. Just think if this is wise. Nowadays people's thinking seems to be very immature and so they go astray.

There are some people in Madras who seem to have become annoyed over the issue of education.³ People have the right to get angry or to complain. But look at the way they express their anger. The issue is the system of education and they go and burn something or stop trains from running. These are not the actions of mature people but show a childish mentality. If the reins of government were to pass into the hands of such people, what will become of our country? You must think, as every intelligent person in Calcutta or Madras and elsewhere must, where all this will lead us. It is fortunate that the country is very large and stray incidents like these do not have much effect. As a whole, the country is peaceful. But such acts create a wrong atmosphere and put obstacles in the way of finding a solution to our real problems. What is the difference between the countries of Asia and Europe?

3. A new education scheme was to be implemented in Madras State at this time. The object of the scheme was to see that the boys did not go away from their ancestral homes in search of a living. It was so designed so as to make children pursue the arts and crafts of their parents as part of their daily routine in the schools. The new elementary education scheme was opposed by the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Dravida Progressive Party). At a two-day conference in July 1953 at Chennai, C.N. Annadurai, the leader of the party, said that the scheme would keep the backward communities ever backward socially and economically, and give advantage to the Brahmins over other communities. On 29 July, on demand from the Opposition parties, the Madras Legislative Assembly decided to refer the matter to an expert committee.

The European countries often refer to us derisively. There have been big revolutions in Europe but generally the Europeans are very hard-working and find solutions to their problems peacefully. They do not indulge in hooliganism because they are aware that such methods do not lead to progress. There is a certain amount of energy and dynamism in every country. Either you fritter them away in futile quarrels and hooliganism, or use them for the country's progress; you cannot have it both ways. Take Germany, for instance, a country which lay in ruins after the Second World War; most of its large cities are still a mass of rubble, razed to the ground by bombs. Yet a tremendous change has occurred within the last four or five years. The people of Germany do not complain or wail about their condition, but work day and night with a grim determination to put their country back on its feet. As you know, Germany was divided into two. I think sixty to seventy lakh refugees have poured into West Germany in the last four to five years from East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and so on. Please remember that West Germany is smaller in size than Uttar Pradesh. It is smaller in population as well as size. In spite of this tremendous influx of refugees, there have been no complaints or demands from the people. They have worked together and managed to put the country on its feet.

Take Japan, another hard-working nation which was defeated in the War and had to face tremendous difficulties. Atom bombs were dropped there which was an entirely new event in the history of the world. Hiroshima started a new chapter in world history. The Japanese nation had never faced defeat in thousands of years of its history, nor was it ever captured by enemies. Such a nation was defeated and was under foreign occupation and suffered complete humiliation. But there was not a word of complaint, for they knew that it was futile. They knew that they had to rebuild their country and then speak from a position of strength. So they swallowed all the humiliation in silence and devoted all their energy to the task of rebuilding their nation, so much so that they have even put Hiroshima back on its feet. There is no sign of the atom bomb except for a memorial in the form of a burnt out ruin of a building right in the middle of the city. Japan has become prosperous once again: its trade with the world is expanding and its cities are humming with activity.

I am giving you these examples to show that instead of frittering away our energy in futile arguments and complaints, we must work hard. You have the example of every kind of country—socialist, communist and capitalist—before you. You can see that the countries which are progressive are the ones which are working hard and not bothering too much about theories or ideologies. Japan and Germany are not really socialistic. They are going ahead by sheer hard work. Then there are China and the Soviet Union. The Russian Revolution has become an old story now and the Soviet Union has progressed over the last thirty to forty years. China is a new nation and taking rapid

strides and we should be happy about it, for it is a neighbouring country. We can have no complaint about it. China's problems are similar to ours and it is difficult to say whether India will solve her problems first or China. It is possible that China will do so first. We can learn much from them and also perhaps teach them a few things ourselves. I am not prepared to admit that the grass is indeed greener on the other side whether it is China or the Soviet Union or the United States. Everyone of them has its good points as well as bad. So this is the situation in the world today. A month ago, it seemed as if a solution was near at hand in Korea but one of their statesmen has stalled it by raising some objection. It is strange and nobody knows what may happen in the coming days and weeks. I hope that there will soon be peace. I think it is likely to come about because both the parties wish peace now.


We have East Asia on one side of us and West Asia on the other. We are in the centre. Compare the neighbouring countries and their difficulties with our own. You must see what has been achieved in these countries in the last four, five or seven years and then judge the achievements of our country. It is a fact that the whole of Asia is in a ferment. Imperialism is gradually being rooted out in most places. Some countries are finding it difficult to break the shackles of imperialism. But there is no doubt that European domination is coming to an end. The more complicated problem is how all these countries are going to handle the internal reconstruction. It is all very well to get rid of an existing authority; though very welcome, it is a comparatively easy task. It is far more difficult to run one's own country and handle the tasks of development and progress in the world of today and to face the other countries. It requires intelligence and hard work and special skills. How far we shall succeed in all this, only the future can tell for I cannot speak for the other countries. Look at Africa, for instance. A storm is brewing there. The revolt in South Africa is an old story and was started nearly forty to fifty years ago by Mahatma Gandhi and is now rapidly gaining momentum. It is now no longer an Indian saga but a revolt of the people of Africa in which Indians are also participating. Then, in northern Africa, the Arabs in Morocco, Tunisia and other countries are also fighting for freedom against Europeans who are committing great atrocities there. They too look to India and it is indeed strange how everyone who is struggling for freedom looks up to India. Egypt is an independent country but is facing a complicated problem especially vis-a-vis the British and nobody can predict what the outcome will be. A storm is raging in East Africa—Kenya and in other countries. The only part of Africa which is calm and peaceful is the Gold Coast in the West where the British Government has followed a very liberal policy and conceded many rights to the Africans. So they are making progress.

I gave you the example of Africa to show how an entire continent is in a revolutionary ferment. Great upheavals are taking place there. There are

two problems in Africa. One is colonialism and foreign domination which we have always opposed. These problems are to be found everywhere in different forms and cannot be solved merely by shouting slogans or clapping your hands. Colonialism cannot be removed at once. But it has to be accepted that it has to go and then ways and means have to be found for removing it—and in some places it has to be removed immediately. The second problem is peculiar to Africa. It is the problem of racial discrimination which was first started in South Africa. The Whites regard the Blacks as inferior and indulge in every form of discrimination. This is a grave problem in Africa. Now, this is something, as you can well imagine, that no self-respecting person can ever accept. I said recently in Agra that though we do not wish to go to war with anyone and would like to solve all problems by peaceful methods, this is an issue of our own self-respect and so we cannot tolerate for a moment that we should be considered inferior by any nation.⁴ I agree that there are bound to be disparities between nations and individuals in the matter of opportunities and capabilities. That is one thing but to discriminate by law against someone is intolerable. We have also been guilty of this crime in the past in that we allowed the practice of untouchability and segregation of castes in our country too. This is a great sin and a crime perpetrated over thousands of years and we are still paying for it because no individual or nation can do wrong without paying for it. We are now making efforts to correct it and have succeeded to a large extent by passing laws. So this comes under the same category as the racial discrimination in Africa. The people of Africa have no right to vote, no opportunities for education, and separate registers are maintained for them. Therefore there can be no compromise on this issue except to demand that all nations and races must enjoy equal rights. That is quite clear. In whatever international forum this issue comes up, we shall throw in our weight in favour of equality. Leaving aside the principle underlying it, you can realize that in a nation of millions of Blacks, racial discrimination cannot be tolerated forever and once they rise in revolt against it, there will be a great upheaval. This worries me a great deal. I am unhappy about Africa and have often said that if a peaceful solution is not found very soon to this problem, there will be a major conflagration there which will engulf the entire continent.

I am discussing all these problems with you because of some strange good fortune or whatever you may call it. People of all these countries afflicted with such problems are looking to India for help and sympathy and want our help politically in the United Nations and other forums. All this increases our responsibilities.

4. See *ante*, pp. 20-21.



AT THE AICC SESSION, AGRA, 6 JULY 1953



AT MOHAMMED ALI JINNAH'S GRAVE, KARACHI, 26 JULY 1953

In the ultimate analysis, the real problems before us are of our own country. How long can our prestige last in international affairs if we are not able to control our internal situations? After all, a country's strength comes from within. Its position outside does not help very much. Therefore the question is only of our own country and the various problems of poverty and unemployment, the need to increase production and make the people better-off. We have to put India on a footing of equality with other progressive nations and not let her remain backward. We are extremely backward in many respects not because we are less capable but due to a lack of opportunity to progress in the last hundred years. Now we have got that opportunity and it is entirely up to us to take full advantage of that opportunity. Or are we going to continue to criticize one another and neglect our duties? If we do so, it is obvious that we shall remain backward, for the world today is very hard and merciless and there is no room for the weak in it. Even if there is peace in the world, the competition is tough. How far we can face that competition in the world arena and go ahead in that race is a big question mark. I can put this question to you in many ways. One broad way of judging is how far we are able to solve this problem of unemployment. It is obvious that unemployment is widespread. That does not mean that the opportunities of employment have become fewer. In fact they have increased. There is no dearth of work but the population is also increasing simultaneously and so unemployment increases. Moreover, during the last War, the jobs had been expanded a great deal without any planning. How long could that go on? Now that the War is over, these jobs are no longer needed. We have to draw the line somewhere and bring the situation under control. We have done this to a large extent. I would say that if one-third of the people now employed in government factories were to be removed, more work will be done. It is a fact that when the number increases, the amount of work done decreases, apart from the fact that a great deal of unnecessary expenditure is incurred. But it is difficult to throw people out all of a sudden. So they are kept on even if the work is not done as desired. An effort will be made to absorb them elsewhere. I do not know what the position is in Lucknow, which is small compared to Delhi, but the bureaucracy in Delhi is a vast jungle with thousands of employees and it is difficult to know who is where, and what their jobs are. I have no doubt whatsoever that the work will be done more efficiently if fifty per cent of the employees were to be removed. As I said they had increased in numbers during war-time and have now become the responsibility of the Government and we cannot throw them out suddenly. So we have not done it except in cases where we were absolutely helpless. But it is bad for our efficiency and the only remedy is to increase the avenues of employment into which people can be directed. It is not a solution to keep them on as pensioners in their existing posts which only causes harm in the

long run. But we cannot throw them out. So this is a big dilemma. The real solution lies in increasing the work and by that I do not mean government or bureaucratic jobs. That is absurd, for the government cannot produce work for millions of human beings. After all, work must be productive. Government service may be very good but it is not very productive. What I mean to say is that they do not add to the national wealth. The salaries are paid from the treasury but government servants do not produce anything themselves as farmers and carpenters, factory workers, ironsmiths and others do through their hard work. We have to increase our national wealth by producing more.

The United States is a very rich nation because it produces an enormous amount of goods from the land and from factories and through sheer hard work and brains. We must also do so in our country. We cannot let everyone do as they like because that will mean that our resources will be squandered in useless ways. Suppose we permit everyone to invest their money in whatever they like and the people feel that the best investment is to put up cinema houses which will bring in easy money. They may certainly provide entertainment but will not add in any way to the country's wealth. This is where planning becomes necessary in order to invest money in such a way that there is progress in the country. We have drawn up a Five Year Plan, keeping the condition of India and her resources in mind, which decides our priorities. Otherwise if we try to do everything at once, nothing can be achieved. So a list of priorities is necessary. The Five Year Plan is a fundamental document which everyone of you must read carefully. You must understand the problems that the country faces. Our young men raise many socialist slogans. Socialism is no doubt a good thing. But it cannot be brought about by shouting slogans or by passing a law in Delhi to that effect. If it is suddenly imposed from above, it will not make the slightest difference to India. Socialism is a form of social organization which can be implemented only as far as the circumstances in the country will permit. It is a way of life but ultimately no country can progress by merely adopting socialism or communism. Progress depends on the hard work of the people and what they can produce. Let me tell you where socialism comes in. It comes in when the question of distribution of wealth arises. It would be wrong if the rich become richer. We must build a society in which such a thing does not happen.

The Five Year Plan is a very good thing because it draws your attention to our problems. I do not say that it will solve all our problems. It is obvious that it cannot do so but it shows us the path that is necessary for us to follow. If we have the capacity we can go ahead faster. We have the right to make any changes or additions that we wish to. But basically this is the path we must follow. The greatest benefit that we get from the Five Year Plan is that it brings us down from the world of ideas to the world of reality. The debating societies in schools and colleges live in a world of ideas and it is a good

thing that our boys and girls must think about these problems and express their views. But they are removed from the world of reality and therefore, however good their views might be, they will be in the air. When they begin to understand the problems of the real world, they will change their views. No country can function in vacuum. The Five Year Plan is important because it brings us down from the world of ideas and focuses our attention on reality. You have the right to accept or discard any part of the Plan or to suggest additions or alterations. But you have to look at it realistically. I am not ready to take you at your word if you say that the problems of the country will be solved by bringing in socialism. Let us take the problems of India. Merely talking about socialism cannot solve them. It is important that you should understand this because our young men seem to think that they can solve all problems by shouting slogans. Revolutions have taken place in other countries like the Soviet Union and the progress made there is held out to us as an example. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union is among the great powers of the world today. But the first thing for you to remember is that thirty-five years have passed since the Russian Revolution and they have had this long period for progress. I am not asking for thirty-five years. But I do want that India should get ten or fifteen years to make some progress before anyone starts judging. Secondly, we must remember the price that the other countries have paid for that progress. Are you prepared to pay that price? They have paid a tremendous price in the form of hard work and sacrifice of lives. I am not talking of the days of the Revolution itself. I am talking of the period that followed. The real effort comes in then. For instance, the freedom struggle was a game which we played with the British. The real work started after that. People seem to think that now that we have achieved freedom, they must get whatever they want. You can get nothing except the right to work and freedom of action. But you will have to work for it. You cannot get anything free.

The economic problems before us are tremendous. The problem of unemployment and the need to increase production are all interconnected. As I said, it is of fundamental importance to find a solution to these problems. If we do not accept this basic premise, all our plans will be in the air. We have deliberately included in the Plan things which are fundamental to the building of a nation. For instance, suppose the Government of India or the Government in Lucknow starts free distribution of sweets, or food or whatever it is, to please the people. We may be able to do it for a few months and no doubt the people will be pleased with the government. But soon the treasury will be empty. So this is not a wise thing to do. Similarly we have to utilize the resources of the country carefully and wisely. If we spend whatever little there is on something of temporary utility, it is not wise. So we have to make some arrangement by which the wealth of the country as well as employment

may increase. We have to provide for the future by saving now so that there can be better progress in the years to come. This is the way to make progress. The Soviet Union had faced the same problem and they saved by making tremendous personal sacrifices. They had made a firm resolve to progress which ultimately they did. There is no doubt about it. So the question is whether we should think of our present comfort or future progress. It is obvious that a middle path will have to be found. We can neither condemn ourselves to total misery as at present, nor can we relax today at the cost of progress in the future. Every nation in the world today faces the same problem. The Prime Minister of Egypt, General Nasser,⁵ has appealed to his people to observe austerity in consumption and to save for the country's progress. All the countries have to tackle this problem.

When I went to England this time for the Coronation I found that there was food in plenty. Before this, every time I went there—and I have been nearly every year in the last five or six years—there had been severe rationing of even ordinary foodstuff like sugar. I think they used to get barely a few spoonfuls of sugar per week. They were getting meat only once a week. Perhaps you may think that it is a good thing to eat less meat. But theirs is a meat-eating country with a very cold climate. I am trying to show how they had to give up the habits of a lifetime. They did not get much by way of vegetables. So they existed on bread and sundry other things. This applied to the rich and poor alike, though the rich might have been hoarding a little. Be that as it may, they passed all these years under severe restrictions in order to rebuild the nation after the havoc caused by the War.

Other countries too face the same problem. Take China, for example. They are working very hard to build a strong nation and every day there is an appeal for austerity. The Chinese are willingly making sacrifices and putting up cheerfully with great difficulties for the sake of national progress. So we must also think about these things. I do not say that you should accept whatever I say. But I can say very confidently that you will have to accept that these problems cannot be solved by shouting or hooliganism. The problems of removing unemployment and poverty, increasing production, opening up new avenues of employment have to be solved after due consideration and careful thought. We have to consider the various points of view and arrive at a conclusion. We must try out various solutions and if one fails, adopt another. They cannot be solved by wielding the lathi or indulging in hooliganism as it is happening in Calcutta. We must understand this because it is a test of the political maturity of a nation. If we behave childishly, we shall become the laughing-stock of the world. This is what bothers me. I want that all of you

5. Gamel Abdel Nasser (1918-1970); Egyptian leader; as a senior army officer was actively involved in the military coup of 1952; Prime Minister, 1954-56; President, 1956-70.

should think about these things. I appeal specially to our brethren in Calcutta for, as you know, the people of Bengal have been in the forefront of our freedom movement for the last fifty years. They are a brave people, full of enthusiasm but if that enthusiasm is misplaced, it can cause harm. They must understand that the Government cannot function nor can any progress be achieved by such methods. Those who instigate such actions betray a complete lack of responsibility. It is a strange phenomenon that the parties which are in opposition to the Congress, instead of fighting about principles, get into strange alliances whenever there is an election. The Hindu Mahasabha and the Communists are opposing the Congress together. Well, alliances are not bad even if they are a strange assortment. But generally they do not last as you can imagine. They are all opposed to one another and to come together merely for the sake of opposing the Congress shows a lack of sense of responsibility. I have no objection to their coming together for they have the right to do so. But to vitiate the atmosphere by unlawful activities in order to harass the Government is wrong. As you can understand the rowdy elements in the city come to the fore on such occasions and take full advantage of the situation which becomes difficult to bring under control. Political parties in the country must realize that though they have every right to launch an agitation or a movement, they must behave with some degree of responsibility and wisdom. After all, their ultimate aim is to acquire power and for that, they must first cultivate a sense of responsibility and not encourage subversive forces to harass the Government and the administration and disturb the peace of the country.

The newspapers here have reported that I am coming to Lucknow to discuss the reasons for the defeat of some Congressmen. I want to tell you that there is no connection between that and my coming here, nor have I been particularly bothered about a defeat here or there. In fact, I was not aware of all the details for as you know I was away from India. I heard about it when I came back. We must examine why it happened and try to remove the weaknesses which have crept into our organization. But I am not unduly bothered about it, nor am I going from place to place trying to find out. A new session of Parliament will start soon. I do not mind admitting that I am a little ashamed that I am able to come to your province so seldom and least of all to my city of Allahabad. I am always a little apologetic about it and so the moment there is an opportunity to come here even for a day, I grab it. So I have come here for a day and will go on to Allahabad and from there to Delhi. I shall at least be able to say that I had been to Lucknow and Allahabad and met some of my colleagues and all of you. It makes me feel a little more light-hearted and perhaps some good may come out of it. I certainly benefit from it, I do not know about the others.

Well, I have put some of my thoughts before you to ponder over. In a

short while, the reins of the country will pass into the hands of our youth and you must be prepared for it. Our time is almost over, owing to the efflux of years. We are not greedy about holding on to our seats. But we are proud that though we have gone through many ups and downs in the last thirty years and made many mistakes and often stumbled and fallen, whatever we have done for the country, we have done so with dignity and upheld India's honour. We have never deliberately committed a mistake or sullied India's honour. If we fell, we had the strength and determination to get up and go ahead. So I want that those who come after us must carry on the tradition of holding the banner of India aloft in every way, by making progress and building a strong and glorious nation and never do anything base, even for some temporary advantage. I am fully convinced that neither as individuals nor as a country can we ever benefit by following a mean or lowly path.

Please say *Jai Hind* with me thrice. *Jai Hind. Jai Hind. Jai Hind.*

5. The Responsibilities of a Free Nation¹

Sisters and brothers,

My friend and colleague, Shri Alguraiji,² said just now that I have come to tell you something very important and that you should listen carefully to my thoughts. Let me tell you right at the beginning that I have nothing specially important to tell you. Of course, I would certainly like you to listen to whatever I say. I would have liked to have an opportunity to hear you also. The truth is that I have come to Allahabad after a long interval, not to make a speech at a public meeting, but merely to meet the people of Allahabad. I had not met you for a long time and so felt a desire to meet old friends and colleagues and revive old memories. It is many years since I left Allahabad and I have been able to come here very seldom in the last six years. There were many reasons for my not coming and one of them is that since my ties with Allahabad are already strong, I felt it my duty to go to the places with which I had less contact. I did not want to come running to my State and my city. The rest of this large country is also my responsibility and so I have been visiting the far-flung corners of the country and have been able to come very rarely to

1. Speech at a public meeting at Kayastha Pathshala, Allahabad, 18 July 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.
2. Algurai Shastri, President, Uttar Pradesh Provincial Congress Committee.

my own city and province. The desire to come here has always been there as it is bound to be, since my political work in the last twenty or twenty-five years has lain in Allahabad and Uttar Pradesh. I used often to go to the surrounding villages and districts and meet the people. That is an old story. So I am glad to come here, to refresh my memory and meet the people, old and new, and see Allahabad once again.

I have not come here today to make any long speech or to tell you anything specially important. I would like to put before you some of the thoughts that are in my mind. I want that you and I, residents of Allahabad, may think about the problems of the country a little, for, whether we like it or not, big responsibilities have fallen upon us, indeed upon all the people of India. We have to fulfil them with dignity for India is a great country. We wanted freedom for our country and we got it after years of hard work. But freedom was a step in a long journey and now we have to march ahead, lifting up the people and making a great name for our country in the world. We do not wish to become known, as some countries are, for our military might, but for our high ideals and good work. Even now, there is great respect for our country in the world, not because we are thirty-six crores in number. Our population was large even earlier, but there was no respect for our country. Countries are not respected for their size or numbers, as you know. Many small countries have acquired great fame in the history of the world and large countries are in bondage and remain backward. So respect for a country does not depend on its size or population. It depends upon the quality of the people, their stature, intellect and bravery. India had achieved greatness in the past because she produced great men. She did not become great because of her large population. Her great men were responsible for her greatness and when there were none, in spite of her large population, she fell.

There is great respect for India in the world. There are many reasons for that. The fact that such a large country has acquired freedom and the manner in which she did so have made a difference and the people now look towards India to see what she will do. But the fact is that they feel that India's methods, especially in the field of foreign affairs, are different from those of the other countries. India does not side with anyone in the cold war raging in the world but tries to follow her chosen path. This seems strange to people, for India is not a large military power—her army is quite small compared to the armies of some of the other countries of the world. I agree that there are very fine men in our armed forces but our armed forces cannot be compared in size to many others in the world. We have no atom bombs or any other modern weapons or great wealth. We are a poor country. We hope that we will gradually progress and produce more wealth in the country, but it will take time. At the moment we are poor. In the world of today, it is generally armed might or wealth which is worshipped and we have neither. Why then

are we held in respect? It is because they are surprised that in spite of our weakness, we go our way and do not abandon it under pressure or for some gain. Moreover the manner in which we fought and won freedom under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi has had an effect on the world. Wherever you go in the world, the one name with which people in the other countries are familiar is that of Mahatma Gandhi. Our country goes by many names — Bharat, Hindustan, India, etc.—but in the world we are known as the land of Gandhi and some of his greatness rubs off on us and we are held in respect. In spite of all our weaknesses, and though we are of much smaller stature than Mahatma Gandhi and often stumble and fall, his greatness is reflected on us and so we are able to wield some influence in the world.

Whatever it is, our responsibilities have increased a great deal. We have to understand our various responsibilities. One, of course, is the responsibility which every free nation has, the responsibility of protecting its freedom and working for its progress. A country in bondage has very few responsibilities, except the responsibility of fighting for freedom. But when the country becomes free, there are a thousand responsibilities and burdens upon it because the entire responsibility of running the nation and solving its problems devolves upon the people. When we were not free, the responsibility rested elsewhere and we could blame others. But now we are responsible for everything that happens in the country and cannot blame anyone else.

This is true of all independent countries. But the way the world looks at India, with hopeful eyes, as a saviour who could perhaps avert a war in the world, has put an additional responsibility on us. The countries of Africa and Asia which are facing tremendous problems also often look to India for help not because they think that she is very powerful—we have very little military power or wealth—but because they know that India's voice counts in the world and whichever way she leans, she can influence the world. I feel worried about how we can discharge this great responsibility and how far our people can understand these things or whether they are still thinking as they did during the British rule. It is strange that many of our old colleagues and friends, who are fully aware that India is free, still think in a way which shows that they have not fully understood what freedom is all about and the responsibility it brings. They cannot understand the responsibility that a free nation and people have to shoulder and that they should not get carried away emotionally. We have to solve our problems and difficulties ourselves. Please remember that if we try to solve one problem in such a way that it creates ten new problems, it is no solution at all. If you try to prevent one war and that leads to new disputes, it is not a sign of wisdom. We have tremendous problems before us, but the important thing is not to do anything which creates new problems. I am repeating this again and again because people do not pay attention to it.

Take the matter of war, for instance. I shall not go into the argument whether war is good or bad. In my opinion war is always bad, but there have always been wars throughout history. The last two world wars created great havoc and resulted in the death of millions of people. The peculiar result of the wars was that the principles and goals for which they were fought were soon lost sight of. They also created tremendous problems and led to fresh preparations for war. So this is no solution. Therefore I say that we should not adopt methods to solve any problem which lead us further into a mire. Let me put it differently. If we follow wrong methods to solve something, we can never reach our goal. This was the lesson which Mahatma Gandhi dinned into us repeatedly. Our goal was the freedom of India. Even for that, we could not follow wrong methods. Mahatma Gandhi said that we should not do wrong even to achieve something good. He stopped us from doing anything wrong in a fit of passion or anger. If you read the history of the last thirty or thirty-five years from the time when Mahatma Gandhi entered the political arena in India, you could learn a great deal from it. For many of you who are young, that period has become a matter of history because you have had no direct experience of it. You will find many instances when we were trying to go ahead fast and Mahatma Gandhi applied the brakes. We were upset and frustrated and tried to protest. but he used to say, with great gentleness but extremely firmly, that so long as he was the leader, the people would have to follow him and he would not allow them to go on the wrong path for it could not yield the right result. This is a fundamental principle which we have followed over the last thirty or forty years and though I have often had doubts, one thing that has become firmly embedded in my mind is that right goals do not justify wrong means. I have no doubt about it. The world is in trouble today because even when the ends are right, the methods adopted are wrong and so everything becomes topsy-turvy. This is what has happened in Korea and it is difficult to get out of the tangle. This poor little country, Korea, was inundated with forces from various countries and all of them were fighting on her soil ostensibly to secure freedom for Korea. Korea has won freedom by paying a heavy price in the lives of millions of its people and complete ruination of the country. All this would have been avoided if right means had been adopted from the beginning. It is not always possible to determine what is right. But we must at least accept the principle that no nation can progress by wrong means. I am telling you all this because I find that people often forget it.

Let me give you one example. You read in the newspapers about the trouble in Calcutta. I do not know much more than what the newspapers have reported. The point at dispute is the raising of the tram fare by one paisa. I will not venture to express an opinion whether the hike was right or wrong. I cannot say who is wrong and who is right because I do not know. Everyone

is entitled to his own opinion. But what is the meaning of burning trains and throwing bombs, burning houses and rioting as a mark of protest? Does this add to the country's strength or dignity in any way, or that of the people who do such things? What is the connection between the hiking of the fare and such hooliganism? It is obvious that it will be suppressed and the guilty ones punished and it is possible that many innocent ones will also become victims as often happens in such cases. It will certainly lead to bitterness. All this for what? It is being done as a mark of protest against raising the fare by a paisa. I cannot understand such childishness. I do not want that everyone should be of the same views as myself or even if I wish to persuade you, you have every right to hold your own views. But whatever it is, it should be well thought out and not be governed by momentary passions. It is not a gentlemanly thing to go and abuse people in the market-place because their views are different. You cannot beat up anyone for holding different political views. This is a sign of primitiveness, not of sensible, mature individuals.

What is the picture that we present to the world? Ours is a country of high ideals and high thinking, an ancient culture and civilization. Do we wish to be known in the world for the profundity of thinking, or as a superficial people who are constantly involved in hooliganism? We must consider whether our actions add to our prestige or lead to progress in any way. Why do these riots and disturbances take place? I am not worried because it will settle down in a little while. But it leaves a stain on our character. Then the question arises as to who are the people behind all this, for the majority of them get involved quite innocently. The real culprits are merely a handful—a few hundreds in the entire city of more than forty lakh people. So it is strange that a few hundred persons should turn the lives of millions completely topsy-turvy and in an effort to save one paisa destroy property worth crores. This I cannot understand. There should be some sense behind our actions.

I shall not go further into the Calcutta affair except to say that we must learn a lesson from it. We get carried away very easily and start doing things which harm the country. If we had followed the wrong path to achieve freedom, it would have changed the picture completely. Now the responsibility for everything that we do rests with us. People do not understand this. Our youth often make the error of resorting to hooliganism as a means of protest. So you must think about this. I gave you the example of Calcutta and can give you others. But the important thing is our way of thinking and our attitude to the problems which confront the nation.

There are tremendous problems before us and the grave danger of war threatens the world. Nobody can predict when there will be another war. Have you heard the latest news about Korea? When the question of truce arose there—a strange thing happened—both the participants looked to India and chose her to head the repatriation commission which is being set up.

Now you can imagine that it is a great honour to have the confidence of the two great powers of the world. This adds to our responsibility because they realize that India is a serious and mature nation which will not take sides and will work with integrity and impartiality. This is the opinion of the world about us and then we go and indulge in hooliganism and weaken ourselves and get a bad name.

Five or six years have passed since we became free. They have been hard years, full of tremendous problems. The most difficult of these was the task of looking after seventy to eighty lakh refugees and rehabilitating them, which was no easy matter. There are very few countries in the world capable of handling such a problem. We faced this problem without any help from the United States or other countries. We got aid in other matters but we had to bear the entire burden of looking after the refugees ourselves. You may have heard of the Palestinian refugees—around nine lakhs of them and for years now the United Nations has been looking after them.³ Compare that with what we, a poor country, have had to bear in looking after the seventy to eighty lakh refugees without any aid. The nine lakhs of Palestinian refugees are still living as refugees, under great difficulties, and years have gone by without any arrangements being made for them. We have handled this tremendous problem to the best of our ability, though much remains to be done still. The real problem that we faced was one which any newly independent country would have to face—that of consolidation. With the achievement of freedom, an era ended and 150 to 200 years of British rule was over. It is true that it was done peacefully and by mutual agreement. Yet an old and established system had come to an end, which was not a small matter. Hundreds of little princely states had to be integrated and consolidated into the Indian Union. All this was due to the uprooting of an established system of nearly two hundred years.

Then we had to consolidate India's freedom. Earlier, our unity was based in bondage and we were helpless. Now we had to establish unity in freedom. The unity of bondage is one of helplessness and is maintained under pressure. The unity of freedom comes of free will and the desire to march in step with one another. The way of looking at problems changes. So the problem before us was to promote unity in this large country of ours, not merely on the map, as we did by integrating the princely states, but an emotional and intellectual unity, with an understanding of India's diversity. There are tremendous differences in the various provinces of the country, from the Himalayas and

3. On 5 July 1953, the Damascus daily *Al Bina* reported that the Arab States had prepared a scheme for a solution in Palestine which envisaged payment of compensation to refugees unwilling to return to Palestine with the amount of compensation in money and property to be assessed by the UN.

Ladakh in the north to Kanyakumari in the south, in the climate and the clothes and other habits. Ladakh is intensely cold—it is colder there in the summer than it is here in the winter and you can imagine what it must be like in the winter. Ladakh is in the Himalayas and has very little rainfall and it is bitterly cold in winter. There are no trees there for nothing grows at that height except for some grass and flowers. This is one face of India. It changes completely when you go to Kanyakumari and Travancore where there is no winter, and it is hot weather round the year. These places are very near the equator and people's occupations, languages and life-styles are completely different.

In spite of all this diversity, there is tremendous unity in India. It is easy to sit in Allahabad or Lucknow and Delhi and pass orders. We can pass a decree to the effect that there should be uniformity all over the country but it cannot work. Different customs prevail in different parts of the country—in Ladakh, Travancore, Assam, Manipur, Tripura or where the Nagas live or in the Kutch—and yet all of them are Indians. A decree will not make all of them uniform, even if we might have many things in common. So you must keep this broad picture before you of the unity and diversity of India and take up the task of bringing about emotional integration in this vast country of ours as a challenge of history. We have to retain the diversity because the glory of India and her strength lie in that.

This province of Uttar Pradesh is the largest in India. As you know, the population of India is one-fifth of the entire population of the world and the population of Uttar Pradesh is one-fifth of that. So you can take it that the population of Uttar Pradesh is one-twentyfifth of the world population. It is a very large province, but however large it may be, if it thinks of itself as India, it would be wrong. All the provinces, Bengal, Madras, Andhra, Karnataka, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tripura, Manipur, Assam, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh, are different parts of India. We must understand one another and march together—and not force our views upon others. That is the only way for gentlemen to behave. There can be no coercion.

There are different languages in the various provinces. We have accepted Hindi as the national language and rightly so. We must strengthen Hindi but it should always be remembered that languages cannot be promoted by law. Ultimately it is the people who infuse strength into a language by constant use. Language is a strange thing. You cannot make a tree blossom more or less by decree. You have to nurture it by giving good manure and water for it to grow properly. It is no use thinking that we can change things by an official law. Laws can achieve very little in this world. What is a language? A language is a mirror of the people's thoughts and mind and of their culture. It reflects the thoughts of the past ages and, in a sense, there is nothing more powerful than language in the world. Thousands of years of the world's history

is stored in its languages and without these means of communication, we would be like wild animals without any knowledge of the past. Have you ever thought about the difference between an animal and a human being? There may be many but the real difference is that an animal has no memory. Our culture and traditions have been stored in our books for thousands of years and we can benefit from that. So language is a powerful thing. But it has to flourish on its own and not by laws, though they may have the way.

Well, we have adopted Hindi as the national language and rightly so and we must nurture it and not try to force it on others. We must make it so rich and healthy that it can influence the people on its own. As you know, there are many great languages in our country like Bengali, Tamil, Telugu, Gujarati, Marathi, Malayalam, Oriya, Assamese, etc., and others. There are ten or twelve of them. There are also some dialects. What should our policy be with regard to all these languages and dialects in the country? We have adopted Hindi as the national language which is spoken in the whole of North India—Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, etc. But Bengali and the others are also great languages with powerful literature and a precious heritage. We must respect and nurture them. There is no competition between them and Hindi. Then there is the question of Urdu. I am amazed that it should arise at all. I agree that it was an issue earlier and even then it was futile, though it had some meaning. Now it has no meaning whatsoever. There is no competition between Hindi and Urdu. Why then this fear of Urdu and the desire to suppress it?⁴ It must always be remembered that it is wrong to suppress anything which contributes to our culture and civilization, whether it is English or Persian or Russian or Chinese. Language increases our cultural wealth by contributing thoughts and ideas and words. English is regarded as a great language and is the most widely spoken in the world today. The strength of the English language lies in the fact that it borrows from other languages to enrich itself. You will be surprised to know how many Hindi words have been incorporated into the English language. I made a list one day and found that it ran into hundreds of words. Every year at least 5,000 new words are added to the English language, either coined or borrowed from other languages. This is how a language becomes strong and powerful. In order to grow, a language has to borrow from others. Growth is a sign of life and when something stops growing, it dries up and becomes lifeless, whether it is a nation or a race or a language or culture. The moment it stops growing, it becomes stagnant and dies.

You must have read the history of India. Please read it carefully. What

4. At this time the UP Hindu Mahasabha, the UP Provincial Congress Committee and the UP Bhasha Samiti were opposing the move of Anjuman Taraqqi-e-Urdu to get recognition to Urdu as a regional language of UP.

do you see? It goes back thousands of years. The story of Mohenjodaro itself is about 5,500 years old and it goes back at least another thousand years before that. It is an old, old story, of greatness as well as downfall which is natural in such a long history. We must remember why we fell. Leave aside the past. Why did we succumb to the British? There were many reasons but the most important one was that we had stopped growing as a nation and as a race and had become bound by traditions and rituals. We had put ourselves in a cage and were living in small compartments of casteism. It is true that people who live in cages get some protection but a nation cannot grow by living in a cage. The result was that we stopped growing as a nation and our culture and civilization became stagnant. You will find this in every walk of life. We had had a glorious literary past and suddenly, all new writing stopped and literature began to consist of mere copying which weakened it. A country which in the past had produced such glorious literature that moves the reader even today began to produce puerile, weak writings because the race had stopped growing and our thoughts and intellect were trapped in a cage. This was extremely dangerous and now that we are free, we must try to avoid that pitfall again, for there are many people in this country who like to live in a mental and intellectual cage because, as I said, a cage affords some protection. But then there is no flow of fresh air or sunshine or the impetus to growth in a cage. India has now to decide whether she wants to live a caged life, with our hands and feet bound by chains, repeating the lessons learnt in the past by rote, or go forward with fresh minds in the quest for truth as our ancestors did in the past, with the courage to gaze at the stars, unafraid of new thoughts and ideas. What is the character of our people? We have lived for centuries in a mental cage, with innumerable barriers and taboos and restrictions. How can any nation hope to grow like that? It had come to such a pass that overseas travel was forbidden because it violated caste rituals. Just imagine, how can a nation grow if there are restrictions on travel? We were constantly engrossed in petty taboos against eating and touching, and our energies were frittered away in useless rituals and customs. This is the same country from where people had gone in thousands and settled in East Asia. They are remembered to this day in Borneo, Java, the Philippines, etc. They had even reached Formosa, China and Japan. There were no restrictions on travel in those days and so Indians went forth, carrying their culture and literature and civilization with them, to distant places in Asia and Europe and Africa. If we had been content to remain in a cage, how could we have grown as we did? We must remember this for I see that there are many people around who wish to put us in a prison once again.

The biggest cage is the mental and intellectual one in which our communal organizations live for they cannot understand the problems of today. It is difficult even to talk to them because they refuse to understand. Let me give

you an example. As you know, we are facing a problem in Goa, a small Portuguese colony. It is obvious that Goa has to be free and become part of India for it is dangerous to permit small islands of foreign powers within the country. Well, we are trying to talk to the Portuguese whose thinking is at least 300 years old and their replies are not in keeping with the modern times. Their thinking has been stagnant for the last three or four centuries. They tell us that they are here by a decree issued four hundred years ago by the Pope. Now, can we take a decree by which the Pope had divided the world between the Spanish and the Portuguese seriously? It is ridiculous. I am merely giving you an example of stagnant thinking. Some of our communal organizations are also similar in their thinking. The tendency to live in a cage, a mental and intellectual cage, is a dangerous one, especially in an independent India, which cannot function unless the people are broad-minded and large-hearted. We cannot progress unless we understand the diversity of India and give equal rights to all religious and political groups. Everyone must have equal opportunity to grow. Now, let me turn to the region where the Nagas live, right on the border of Burma. The Naga language is not a very elaborate one and most of it is oral. The missionaries have tried to introduce writing. But the Nagas want to read only in their tongue and I encourage them to do so, along with Hindi. They assure me that they will learn Hindi but their children must learn their mother-tongue also. I tell them that there will be no coercion of any sort and that we shall encourage their own language also. They can learn the national language side by side. We shall find that gradually we can bring about what we want. But the moment we try to put pressure, everything will be ruined. That is why this controversy about Urdu amazes me as though there is a competition between Hindi and Urdu. Please remember that Urdu is not a Pakistani language. Its origins lie in Allahabad and Delhi.

We come round again to communalistic thinking which keeps us in a mental cage. If we fail to understand the revolutionary world of today and live in a society full of restrictions, we are bound to become weak and cannot progress. You may recall that a year and a half or so ago when I was contesting the elections from a constituency in Allahabad, the candidate who stood against me had opposed the Hindu Code Bill.⁵ I had agreed that the people should give their verdict on that issue. That was all right, but I want to be quite frank because I do not want a curtain of secrecy between us. You must understand my mind and heart as I must understand yours. We must understand one another. You have put me in a position of great responsibility. If you do not understand me or feel that what I am doing is absolutely wrong—by you I mean the people of India—you have the right to remove me any time you wish.

5. See *post*, p. 256.

6. India Faces Tremendous Tasks¹

Sisters, brothers and fellow countrymen,
Today is the sixth birthday of free India—the sixth anniversary of the day that we were re-born. Greetings to all of you on this occasion. We must first pay homage to the memory of that soul who was responsible for making India free, who breathed fresh life into a withered nation and made it almost as good as new. We must think of Mahatma Gandhi before we do anything else today. What does that mean? A great man came amongst us, shone like a bright star and then passed on. To think of him means refreshing our memories about the lessons that he taught us. What did he teach us? We must remember once again the principles by which we became strong and ultimately won freedom. If we forget those fundamental principles, we shall become weak and fail to do what we have set out to do.

The history of our country goes back thousands of years. India has occupied a very high position and has also fallen time and again. We must remember the things that gave us strength and those that weakened us. We must think about those fundamental things and our future goal and how we should try to reach it. We must also remember that that goal cannot be reached by wrong methods. Wrong means do not yield right results. This is a fundamental principle which we cannot forget. We reaped the fruits of right action and got freedom. But at the very moment when we were celebrating our victory, and I had unfurled this flag from this very spot, a terrible thing happened. There was a holocaust in Pakistan and in north India and millions of uprooted human beings trekked from both sides in search of refuge and shelter. We are paying the price for that terrible disaster till this day for no evil can fail to leave its traces behind just as no good can fail to produce good results.

We have to think calmly about the tremendous tasks before us—the task of uplifting the thirty-six crores of Indians by making them better off and removing their difficulties. It is a tremendous task to build a new country out of a very ancient one. Where does our duty lie? It is obvious that the most important duty is to protect our freedom. Secondly, it is important to form friendly ties with all the countries of the world and cooperate with them. We must not interfere in the affairs of any other country, nor should we tolerate any interference in our internal affairs. This is the path we must follow. The third important question is what we are going to do within the country. How

1. Speech delivered at Red Fort, Delhi, on the occasion of Independence Day, 15 August 1953, AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.



TALKING TO PRESSMEN ON RETURN FROM KARACHI, NEW DELHI, 28 JULY 1953



WITH M.P. KOIRALA, NEW DELHI, 20 JULY 1953

are we going to make this large family of thirty-six crore human beings better off? Can families survive if they fight among themselves constantly and build barriers? We must remove the barriers that separate us. We must get rid of communalism because it is a wall that keeps us in separate compartments and weakens us. It breaks up the large Indian family into segments and fosters enmity between brothers. We must get rid of provincialism because if we put our province before the country, we shall slip back. We must put our country before everything else and remember that if India progresses, all of us will progress too and if she remains backward, no one in the country can go ahead, even if a district or a province might make some progress. Another thing which keeps us in separate compartments and weakens us is the ancient vice of casteism, for it encourages people to put their own narrow caste before their country.

There are tremendous tasks before us, the task of economic reconstruction, and of making the condition of people in India better by putting an end to unemployment and poverty. Ultimately, the strength of a country lies not in idle talk and building castles in the air, but in its economic conditions and in the character of the people and their unity. We have got political freedom but it is incomplete. It will be complete only when we solve our economic problems and freedom is within the reach of every single Indian. This is the most urgent task in which we are engaged at present, of removing poverty and unemployment from the country, so that every man and woman in India may produce wealth for themselves as well as for the country and thus increase our strength. These are the big tasks before us.

As far as world affairs are concerned, we must make efforts to establish peace in the world and prevent wars. We are striving towards this. We do not wish to get involved in world affairs for we want to set our own house in order first. But we have done what little we could and our efforts have been appreciated and, at the same time, our responsibilities have increased. As you know, we are sending some of our troops to Korea. Why are these forces being sent? In the past, forces used to be sent out to fight in other countries, but our forces are going out not for war but for peace. Our forces are going at the invitation of other countries who are fighting with one another. They are agreed upon one thing and that is to invite our forces to come and do their duty. We do not wish to take on the additional responsibilities of the world but there are some duties which we cannot evade. So our forces are going to Korea. There is a talk of peace again in the world and to make an effort to change the atmosphere in the world away from war. Those efforts are being made but it is my regret that some people are still speaking the language of threats and aggrandisement. If we want peace in the world, it cannot be done by threatening one another or striking fear in others' hearts but by extending a firm hand of friendship. So the talk of peace is welcome

and it would be better if some nations which are involved also change their thinking a little. Mere talk of peace cannot help unless there is a change of outlook.

So we are trying to discharge our duties abroad and at home, of establishing peace and improving the economic condition in the country. Big tasks have been accomplished in the last six years and I think that when history is written, all that has happened in this period will find mention in it. But at the same time it is also true that many of the things which we wished to do could not be done. The task is gigantic and the workers seem very few but if everyone pulls his weight the burden will be lighter.

A week ago, there were some incidents in Kashmir which caused our neighbour, Pakistan, much anxiety. I do not wish to say much about those incidents, because this is not the proper occasion. But I do wish to tell you that you must not pay heed to rumours and be constantly vigilant. I am amazed at the false news and rumours being published in Pakistani newspapers during the last few days about Kashmir and what our forces are supposed to have done or not done there. I wish to say very forcefully that our forces had no hand in those incidents. What is the meaning of spreading such rumours in Pakistan and in some other countries by journalists? It is absurd and absolutely wrong to spread rumours and unnecessarily to incite people and foment bitterness between the countries. It is an internal matter of Kashmir. I am sorry about the recent incidents because it is always a matter of regret when there is a parting of ways between old friends and colleagues² and I can tell you that it is not proper to talk ill of others on such occasions. If we do so, it is bound to boomerang on us. We are unhappy, but sometimes whatever our feelings may be, we have to do our duty with dignity and by the right means, always keeping in mind our fundamental principles. As I said, many things that have happened in Kashmir have made us unhappy. There is a story behind it and there have been other incidents elsewhere which have incited the people of Kashmir to some extent, like the communal incidents which occurred in Delhi and the Punjab. It is strange that they have succeeded in doing just the opposite of what they had wished to do. So you can see how wrong means bring about undesirable results, even if your intentions are pure.

I was talking about Kashmir. I want to repeat what I had said earlier, that we shall stick by the promise made five and a half years ago that the fate of Kashmir will be decided by the people of Kashmir. This is absolutely certain even today and there will be no interference or coercion on our part. The second thing is that a new Government was formed in Kashmir last week, but

2. On 9 August 1953, Shaikh Abdullah was dismissed from the Prime Ministership of Jammu and Kashmir by the Sadar-i-Riyasat, and was arrested the same day. See *post*, p. 310.

it is obvious that it can last only so long as they represent the people of Kashmir and are accepted by the elected Assembly. Otherwise another Government will have to be formed. Our principles apply equally all over India as well as in Kashmir.

So these incidents occurred in Kashmir and I can understand that they may have caused you some surprise for you were not fully aware of the past history. But it has been blown out of all proportion and all sorts of rumours were spread which increased the panic among the people, and in other nations, especially our neighbour, Pakistan, where there was a strange hostility and anger. Views were expressed on this issue which have no relationship with reality. I am not here to criticize anyone but to express my sorrow that we should be so easily led astray and incited. This is not the way to solve major problems. I want to warn you that there are bound to be major issues and crises in India and the world and we shall be put to test. The question is whether we can think and act calmly and peacefully or rush around here and there in a blind panic. A nation is tested in this way and the more insurmountable the problems, the calmer we ought to be and act peacefully and wisely. When we have accepted the fundamental principle that the people of Kashmir will decide for themselves, there is no room for argument. We can certainly discuss the means by which this is to be done. But there can be no argument about principles. We have said this repeatedly ever since the Kashmir issue came up before us. We have also maintained that Kashmir has a special status. When it agreed to join India, we welcomed it. But even then, we have given it a special status owing to geographical and various other reasons. If people make a noise after all this and demand that Kashmir should have equal status with other States, they have obviously failed to understand the circumstances and the real situation. They can see that it has had just the opposite result.

I referred to Pakistan. I went to Pakistan a few days ago at the invitation of their Government and the people welcomed me with great affection. It had a powerful influence on me, especially the love of the people which was very similar to what you might find in any part of India. I found the same thing in Karachi and realized that after all I was not in any foreign country and there was not much difference between our country and theirs. I saw many familiar faces there, of old friends and colleagues and people who had gone away from India. The picture was the same, except for a few differences. In short, I did not feel for a moment that I was in some foreign country. This is the picture just now and it is possible that it may change if the people's attitude changes through some misunderstanding. So you can see from this how people's behaviour depends on the way they are treated. I want that we should not budge from our principles and ideals but follow the right path of friendship with all countries, even with Pakistan, and if there is any misunderstanding,

it will be cleared up in due course. If there is constant tension and bitterness between our countries, it cannot be good for either India or Pakistan. Fear can never yield good results and so we must not live in constant fear. The Prime Minister of Pakistan is coming here at our invitation just as I went to Karachi at their invitation. I want that the citizens of this ancient and historic city of Delhi should give him a grand welcome and show our large-heartedness and goodwill. It is possible that during his stay here, there may be a reception for him from this very Red Fort and in other places too.

So I want that all of us as a nation must remember the principles and ideals of Mahatma Gandhi on this day. We must think of our success but more so of our failures and the moments when we slipped in the last five or six years, because we have a lesson to learn from them. Let us once again take a pledge under this beloved flag of ours that we shall serve our country and promote unity among the people of various religions because everyone has an equal share in India's freedom. We must get rid of the barriers of provincialism, casteism and communalism and make the country strong. We must harness all our strength towards building a new India and not fritter it away in futile quarrels. We must also pledge that we shall try to establish peace in the world and extend a hand of friendship to all countries. We have to fight one battle, which we shall with all our might, and that battle is against the poverty of India. It is likely to be a long-drawn out battle and will require a great deal of hard work and sweat and tears. But it is worthwhile cause to uplift the millions of Indians and make them better off. This is no small task. This is our goal and we cannot rest till we reach it. You must remember these principles and go ahead. The life of a nation goes on, it is never-ending, and one goal follows another. We may come and go, but India is everlasting. Our only desire is that in the time that is given to us, we should also serve her a little and then pass on the mantle to the succeeding generations so that they may also share the memories of the freedom struggle and the hardships and sacrifices which had gone into the making of a new India.

Please say *Jai Hind* with me three times. *Jai Hind, Jai Hind, Jai Hind.*

7. Building a New India¹

Students,

It becomes a bit of a burden if I am repeatedly asked to give speeches. I am

1. Speech at the prize distribution ceremony at Birla College, Pilani, Rajasthan, 21 September 1953, AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.

not quite sure what I can lecture on. I certainly like to talk to young people. As you know, perhaps, the most revered texts among our ancient literature are the *Upanishads*. What does *Upanishad* mean? It means to sit together and have discussions between the teacher and the taught and to try to understand serious philosophical concepts. To be able to understand a problem, we have to talk to one another and argue and discuss, for merely learning by rote cannot help us to understand the crux of a problem. There are many crucial problems before the world today.

Recently, there was a debate in Parliament, in the House of the People, on foreign affairs. There will be another debate tomorrow in the Council of States and complex international questions will be discussed. Why are the big powers of the world arrayed against one another and preparing for war? The leaders of all these countries are undoubtedly people of high calibre and wish for the good of their own country and the world. Why then do we bark like mad dogs at one another in international forums? It is indeed strange and it would be foolishness for anyone to think that we are superior to the others. In fact, when anyone thinks like that, it gives rise to the suspicion that they are totally lacking in intelligence. The fact is that the problems of the world are extremely complex, and instead of thinking that by learning a couple of slogans we have understood everything, we must try to get to the root of those problems. It is not in anyone's power to solve them immediately or by magic or by chanting a mantra.

Leave the world aside for a moment and look at our own country. The problems are immense and we have to bear a heavy burden. How are we to do it? We can do so only by understanding this ever-changing country of ours with its tremendous length and breadth and its innumerable forms and differences. You take people who come here to Pilani from all over the country and you will find many differences among them. Then, if you go from Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh and Manipur and Tripura and our border provinces to Kanyakumari in the South, you will find innumerable diversities. How are we to integrate them while retaining their beauty? This is a big problem. How are we to progress and remove poverty from the country? These are questions which cannot be answered by merely arguing about them. We must learn from other countries and try to understand why the United States has made such tremendous progress, or what the Soviet Union has achieved by the revolution, etc. These are some of the things that we must learn. What happens generally is that people blindly praise or criticize others without understanding anything. There are very few things in the world which are a hundred per cent praiseworthy or to be wholly condemned. The truth lies somewhere in between just as there is a mixture of good and bad in all human beings. It may not be right to praise anyone too much. We have to select the good points in others and learn from them. There is no doubt that we have become

backward. It is not open to argument. However proud we may feel about the greatness of our country or the fact that we hold high ideals, we cannot deny that we are backward. The broad fact is that other countries have gone far ahead of us in many things while we are left behind. There seems to be something lacking which is not of recent origin. We must try to understand why we have this shortcoming by reading the history of our country. In fact, I am prepared to include the whole of Asia, which is such a large part of the world, when I say that we have become backward during the last 300 years. Why? As I said, read the history of this region and try to form your opinion, as I have myself done. We became backward and practically the whole of Asia was conquered by a few countries of Europe. Now we may rant against imperialism and shout slogans saying it is a bad thing, but the fact is that whether it was good or bad, it showed that the countries of Europe had gone far ahead. They were stronger, more skilled, and so they made great progress and developed military might, made scientific progress and gradually were in a position to conquer the countries of Asia and Africa.

After hundreds of years, Asia is taking a new turn. But it cannot change in a hurry. It is gradually changing and a new chapter of its history is being written. At a time like this, both good and bad things happen and the various countries of Asia are following their own separate paths. But the important thing is that Asia is changing, whether it is India or Pakistan or Burma. In China, there is change of a different kind. But everywhere there is a wind of change and in a sense, the period which had existed in the last 300 years has ended. Now the problem before Asia and India is not to slide back into the mistakes of the past once more and fall into our old feeling of superiority and pride which had prevented us from earning anything new in the past or to think that we can achieve things by shouting and creating chaos. Then again, we must not fall into petty feuds and destroy our strength. These are the big problems before us because if we fall into these errors, we shall become backward once again.

If you read the history of India, you will find that at no time has there been a dearth of high class people in India, or of bravery. But there was always one great weakness among us which was disunity and the tendency to fight among ourselves and the inability to work together in unity and harmony. Our society was so riddled with differences of caste that we lived in different compartments and put up barriers of province, religion and caste and attached more importance to them than to the country. What was the result? The result was that the country could not grow strong and in spite of the great bravery for which the people of Rajasthan were famous, they could not remain free. They frittered away all their energies and bravery in fighting among themselves. Moreover our weapons had become outmoded and we could not face a gun with bows and arrows. We were backward while the world had

progressed. Therefore it is extremely important to understand the world of today and realize the importance of science and, above all, to foster unity amongst us. There are many defects in us and in the country but defects and shortcomings are easy to find anywhere. When I come to Pilani, I like many of the things about it and at the same time, when I see the disparity among the common people, I dislike it. While you are getting the best opportunities for education, there are millions here and elsewhere in the country without proper opportunities for growth. These disparities exist all over the country. What is the remedy? I want that every boy and girl in the country should get the same opportunities which are now available to a few in special institutions because educating a few is not enough. Everybody must be given the opportunity. But nothing can be done by my wanting these things. We have all to make an effort. It cannot be done by passing resolutions.

I have come to Pilani and one gentleman puts up a demand that there should be proper water supply in Pilani and in the entire desert area. It is certainly a good thing to provide water. But how am I to give water to Pilani? I do not have a supply of water with me. You will have to dig tube-wells or make other arrangements for irrigation by building canals and dams. But all this involves hard labour and a great deal of money. We are investing crores of rupees in our river valley schemes. Where is the money to come from for the treasury? It cannot fall from heaven or come from anywhere outside. It has to come out of the people's pockets in the form of taxes. Now, taxes are a burden but we cannot do without imposing taxes. We need money to open schools and colleges and to provide water supply and a thousand other things. If we try to get more money, the burden on the people increases because the money has to come from their pockets. This is the dilemma before us. We have to increase production in the country and make great progress in order to increase the country's wealth. We have drawn up a Five Year Plan and are making a few changes here and there in order to move faster and especially to face unemployment. All these questions require a great deal of thought and planning and hard work. Mere enthusiasm is not enough though that is certainly important.

So I want you, especially those of you who are in schools and colleges, to prepare yourselves by thinking about these things so that later you can participate fully in all these tasks. You must train yourselves for something so that you can play an effective part in the building of new India. You must also try to understand the problems that the country faces today. You can form your own opinions. I am not worried about whether they agree with mine or not. If I think that my views are right, I would like to convince you too, but I am not really bothered about it. What I want is that you should formulate your opinions after serious thought. If you rely on rumours and start making a noise, that cannot be a considered opinion. You must have the

right to change your opinions also, if necessary. The world is changing and with it, we are entitled to change our views as to what we should do and what is proper, based upon our experience and learning. But whatever we do, we must have unity in the country and break down the barriers of caste and province, and in a sense form a big, united caste of all the people who live in the country, irrespective of their religion or language. This is the sort of society that we have to create.

Secondly, though it is not possible to remove the disparity between the rich and the poor immediately, and certainly not by shouting, we must keep it as a goal in front of us and try to bring it about gradually. It is true that everyone is not equal—certainly not physically because some are tall, others short and some fat, some thin; and mentally too, some are more intelligent than the others. So everyone is not alike but there should be equal opportunities for all so that each can grow according to his capacity. Nowadays the unfortunate thing is that there are millions who do not get any opportunities at all which is very bad. If everyone has equal opportunity, then the bright ones can go ahead faster. So this should be done and this is how we have to build our country. All of you must realize what a burden this is. Please do not think that all this can be done by people sitting in Delhi or in Parliament or that you should get into Parliament, though it will be a good thing if you go there. After all, it is from among you—the youth in schools and colleges today—that the future Prime Minister and President of India will emerge. That is certainly true. But it is not enough for a few people to be in high positions. You must understand that at the moment the country needs millions of people who can lead others in their own areas and show them how to work and to help others. Everyone who has the opportunity today to study in schools and colleges has a tremendous responsibility in this, to serve others who do not have similar opportunities. This is how we have to progress and with the full confidence that our country will go far and become powerful—not to fight with other countries or to attack them, but powerful enough to be able to maintain peace in the world and to make the common people progress. *Jai Hind.*

TOWARDS PROGRESS

I. ECONOMIC POLICY

(i) General

1. Social and Economic Programme¹

The Congress has welcomed the first Five Year Plan as the basis of national advancement. The Plan envisages numerous other activities and the AICC, therefore, welcomes the proposal for a National Extension Service² which, they hope, will speedily cover the whole of India and bring relief and opportunity of progress to every peasant and worker.

2. The pace of progress must, however, be quickened, more especially in regard to land reform and industrial growth. The Committee attaches the greatest importance to the introduction of far-reaching land reforms in India. While progress has been made in this direction by several State Governments, much yet remains to be done in order to make the actual tillers of the soil the owners of the land. The State Governments should take immediate steps in regard to the collection of the requisite land data and the fixation of ceilings on land holdings, with a view to redistribute the land as far as possible among landless workers.

3. Every effort should be made to add to the volume of investment for developmental purposes. With this end in view, small saving schemes as well as other methods of saving should be encouraged and, wherever possible, compulsory saving should be progressively introduced. A system of State Insurance should be extended to rural areas and credit facilities for production purposes should be provided on an adequate scale, more especially through cooperatives.

4. The machinery of administration, and in particular the Services, should be reorganized with a view to deal effectively with the problems connected with the establishment of a Welfare State.

5. Economic progress is intimately connected with the social structure and social reform, therefore, should be given priority. The passage of the various parts of the Hindu Code Bill should be expedited.

1. This Resolution drafted by Nehru was adopted by the Congress Working Committee at the AICC Session at Agra, 6 July 1953. JN Collection.
2. In August 1953, the Planning Commission had approved a proposal for National Extension Service in 200 Development Blocks spread over several States. These Blocks, covering about 20,000 villages and a population of 3,200,000, were to become operational from 2 October 1953.

6. The present legal system is expensive and dilatory. It should be revised and made simpler, less costly and more expeditious, so as also to serve the purpose and objectives of a Welfare State.

2. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
July 24, 1953

My dear T.T.,²

...Your note raises many questions of great interest and I can hardly deal with that, in the course of this brief reply. But it is desirable and necessary that we should consider these matters amongst ourselves not only in formal committees, but more so informally.

In the course of your note you have referred to the Insurance Companies. Deshmukh has sent me a copy of his reply to you dated July 3rd on this subject.

I am not quite clear in my mind as to how far your suggestion to have an Investment Board³ would prove helpful in the way you suggest. Personally, I have long been of opinion that Insurance as well as Banking should be State concerns. At the same time, I have felt that if we made Insurance as a whole a State concern now, this would probably come in the way of its development in India. It is very backward at present. Therefore I have felt that, while leaving private companies more or less where they are, we should go fast ahead with State Insurance. As a matter of fact, there will be a little conflict between the two if the State's activities are chiefly carried on away from the larger towns. But I would not be afraid of any overlapping or conflict.

My impression has been that Insurance, privately run, is a bit of a racket.

You mention in your note the Imperial Bank.⁴ I remember the discussions

1. JN Collection. Extracts. A copy of this letter was sent to C.D. Deshmukh, Union Finance Minister.

2. Minister of Commerce and Industry.

3. On the question of providing capital for the development of industries, Krishnamachari, in his letter of 27 June, suggested transfer of the life funds of insurance companies to an investment board and removal of restrictions on the investment of insurance funds.

4. Krishnamachari wanted the Imperial Bank to be nationalized on the ground that though the Managing Director of the Imperial Bank would be an Indian from September onwards, the control would still vest in the foreigners and the Indian officials would be forced to toe the line of the foreigners with "the Indian Managing Director providing the window dressing to hide people who are in effective control."

we had on nationalizing this in 1948. I think we should take steps in this direction and that the progress we are making is rather slow.

You have referred to the case of two development officers who, after ten years' service in Government, were not considered fit to be confirmed by the UPSC, even though you thought they were bad. Such cases do not add to one's faith in the methods of selection adopted by the UPSC. It seems to me that their major consideration is what I would call a service consideration and this has little to do with the work to be done. I am convinced that in regard to any specialized work, we should have some other method of selection. But, selection apart, when a person has been serving for ten years in your Ministry, to push him out without adequate reasons seems to me highly objectionable. I do not see why you need have agreed to this at all.

I agree therefore that some other method should be evolved in regard to recruitment, etc. The UPSC might be associated with that method.

As regards the salaries for technical men,⁵ this matter might be given consideration.

At page 6 of your note you refer to the Penicillin Factory and say:

Their methods of marketing would have landed them in criminal proceedings if the concern was run by a private firm. They have no pricing system. They have no knowledge of competitive trade, and while they produce a fraction of the country's needs, perhaps about one-tenth, they wanted a sheltered market by demanding that imports should be drastically curtailed. It seems to be a case where we can only develop this industry at the cost of the health of the people both in regard to the quantity of penicillin available and in regard to the quality of the product bottled.

I should like you to let me have some facts in justification of the first sentence quoted above. I shall go into the matter then.

The Penicillin Factory is being built⁶ and they have not started production yet. I do not, therefore, understand where the question of methods of marketing comes in, unless these are future schemes. The factory would not begin functioning for another year or two.

5. Krishnamachari suggested a scheme for training technicians in a phased manner by providing them with fees and stipends so that after training their services could be utilized by the industries proposed to be started by the Government of India.
6. As per the agreement between the Government of India, WHO and the UNICEF concluded on 24 July 1951, construction of the factory was started in the latter half of 1952 at Pimpri near Pune. To begin with, the factory was to produce 3,000 billion units a year.

The whole object of having State-owned factories for imported drugs is to protect the health of the people and to supply quality drugs at low cost. It is generally recognized now that it is improper to allow private vested interests to exploit the public through these drugs. They often make enormous profits. Generally speaking, the cost of the drug manufactured in a State factory will be much less than in a private concern, though sometimes owing to a glut in the market the price of the latter may go down.

I should like you to let me have some facts about this so that I can enquire.

You refer to "a doctrinaire approach to the problem of Government management of industry." Let us be practical by all means, but I have often found that being practical means accepting things as they are and not coming in the way of vested interests. Apart from the question of resources in money or technical personnel, there are different approaches to this problem. Both can be justified to a certain extent. Ultimately we have to decide as to what our final objective is and gradually work up to it.

The problem of unemployment is the biggest challenge to the normal orthodox approach. That normal approach does not even pretend to solve it fully. It only goes in that direction rather slowly and haltingly. Because of this that orthodox approach is becoming more and more out of date. It is true that there are no short cuts in dealing with such problems, but the pace can be quickened greatly.

You mention some limited form of conscription.⁷ I like the idea.

We have repeatedly tried to have some mechanism for informal consultation among Ministers. Apart from ad hoc committees, this has not functioned continuously. I wish we could revive this, because circumstances are compelling us to give thought to these pressing problems and policies. Some of the matters that you have mentioned in your note should be discussed by us informally. The whole question of unemployment is being dealt with, I believe, by the Planning Commission.

I think Cabinet Ministers, or some of them, or those specially interested, should have some informal discussions with the members of the Planning Commission.

7. As one of the solutions to mitigate the problem of unemployment, Krishnamachari proposed a scheme for "limited conscription in which, while providing that conscripts should undergo a certain amount of military training, provision is made for training them as semi-skilled artisans for use in industries or training some for the teaching profession or moral extension work...."

Then there is the question of administration and more especially certain suggestions made by Appleby.⁸ I think that this is a vital matter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. See *post*, pp. 153-156.

3. The Economic Situation¹

...Question: About the economic situation, Sir.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not know what to say about the economic situation in the country.

Q: Here is a capitalist paper, and here is a Communist paper, saying that the cost of living has gone up by so many points. We have got large-scale unemployment. We expect you to say something on this.

JN: It is a happy omen that the capitalists and the Communists agree.

Q: They have quoted the *Eastern Economist* approvingly.

JN: I am just coming from Karachi. The picture of India that you see from there is somewhat different from what you see from here—comparatively, I mean. I was terribly pained to see the lot of the refugees there. It is awful: 400,000 or 500,000 persons in camps round about Karachi in broken down shacks or huts. I saw something of the kind that we saw in India in 1948, more than five years ago. Still it is happening. The condition of the refugees round about Karachi is pitiable.

I do not know what you expect me to say about the economic situation. In some ways the economic situation is good. In other ways it is not good. Specially from the point of view of unemployment of the middle classes and the lower middle classes and the large number of graduates and matriculates coming out of the schools and colleges, it is a very big problem. I understand

1. Remarks at a Press conference, New Delhi, 30 July 1953. From *Jawaharlal Nehru, Press Conferences, 1953* (New Delhi, 1954). Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 445-452, 459, 496-497 and 540-542.

that every year we are getting 900,000 extra persons of employable age in India. One must get a grasp of this problem. It is not a question of getting a few men employed here or a few men there. The whole educational problem comes up. There are graduates and others produced in our schools and colleges who expect a type of employment which is just not there. If they are otherwise trained, they may get employment. But, they just do not. It is a mixed question.

It is because of this situation that the All India Congress Committee passed that resolution on unemployment.² The resolution itself may be nothing special or wonderful. But it was the first time that that particular subject was dealt with in that particular way. That is the importance that this question has got in the country; not only because it has been taken up by the *Eastern Economist* or a Communist paper, but otherwise too. The Planning Commission has been requested to review the situation from this particular point of view and revise and extend the plan. It cannot produce some magical remedy. There is none. There has been none in any country. If it is said that some other country suddenly produced some magical remedy, that is not correct. It is important that we should realize the extent of this problem and try to come to grips with it, if necessary by adopting what may be considered unorthodox means even.

Q: I was asking about the increasing cost of living. People are being thrown out of their existing employment.

JN: There have been very few cases of that kind. As a matter of fact wartime employment was an inflated employment. After the war was over, many kinds of works ceased. We have been carrying on people in our own ordnance factories simply because we did not want to throw them out of employment. It is a difficult position. You cannot build up any industry on that basis. Take the case of Visakhapatnam shipyard. We carried the workers for a long period although there was no work. The proper thing, of course, is to find other work, not to keep them there, and every effort is made for that. These are the relics of wartime. Now, there is as a matter of fact more employment in some regions. Unemployment of the type mentioned has not been big and that is forced upon us by circumstances.

Q: Do you think the revision of educational system will solve the problem?

JN: That is one of the things to be worked for in order to produce the right type of persons for the new kinds of work that the country will give....

2. See *post*, pp. 82-83.

4. Mineral Policy of the Government¹

I have received a copy of a note by Shri V.T. Krishnamachari² on mineral policy, and more especially manganese, which has been sent to NR & SR Ministry. This note raises important points. Emphasis is laid on the enforcement and conservation measures in regard to our minerals, the limitation and export of high-grade ore and processing in India itself.

2. Enquiry is made as to why our geological and mineralogical surveys, more particularly the survey of manganese reserves, have been conducted by American geologists. Apparently this is continuing. Is this so?

3. I entirely agree with Shri V.T. Krishnamachari that we should avoid as far as possible the intrusion of foreign experts in these surveys. Even if they come, they should come as advisers for a while. This is particularly necessary in regard to American experts because American policy, as openly stated, is directed to ends which may not be in line with India's aims.

4. We have to be very careful in avoiding the growth of foreign vested interests in India. As it is we have some such vested interests, chiefly British, and they come in our way.

5. I should like to be informed of what the position is now, what policy we have been pursuing thus far, and what we intend to do in the near future. Answers to the questions put by the Planning Commission should also be given.

1. Note to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research, 22 August 1953. JN Collection.
2. Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission.

5. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
August 26, 1953

My dear T.T.,

You will no doubt have observed that there is a great deal of feeling not only in our Party but in other Parties also regarding the import into India of some kinds of luxury or other goods which are not considered quite essential. You

1. File No. 44/48, PMS.

have dealt with this matter in some of your answers and explained that such import is strictly limited and regulated and only amounts to a very small proportion of our total imports. You have further said that this import is permitted, to this small extent, principally for three reasons:

- (1) For revenue purposes,
- (2) to improve standards, and
- (3) because of some deal with a foreign country which insisted on some such import.

These are valid reasons which deserve consideration. Nevertheless, there are reasons on the other side also which are very important. I need not go into these reasons except one and that can hardly be ignored. There is a very strong feeling among almost all circles and parties in India against the import of anything which can be avoided. The whole swadeshi sentiment of the country, built up during half a century or more, is opposed to this, and psychology in such matters counts. However small the imports, if our shops appear to be full of them, they produce a certain impression. Luxury goods or any other super fine goods may not be objectionable in themselves but they cater for a very small class, and I hardly think it is necessary for us to pander to the sensitive tastes of this class in such matters. It creates a bad impression. The import of any kind of cloth from outside is particularly opposed to all that we have been brought up to think and believe during the last 30 years and more. Second-hand clothes again are in the same category.

We talk of austerity and appeal to people to observe it, but that appeal does not carry much weight when foreign luxury goods are seen in our shops. The fact that we have stopped import of expensive cars has been much appreciated. In Kashmir quite a major reason for Shaikh Abdullah's unpopularity recently was the fact that he purchased for the State an expensive Cadillac car.

The question of employment or unemployment dominates our thinking today. Inevitably, people think that the import of some articles from abroad tends, to however small an extent, in closing some avenues of employment. The actual effect of this may be trivial if we think in terms of statistics. But in terms of human beings, even the addition of a few to the mass of unemployed is to be avoided.

But all such reasons apart, the major fact remains that there is a strong feeling on the subject in the country and in Parliament.² I have been asked

2. For example, on 22 August 1953, A.K. Gopalan, leader of the Communists in the House, moved a Resolution in the House of the People which read: "This House is of opinion that immediate steps be taken to arrest the growth of unemployment in the country and to provide relief to the unemployed." This led to a debate on unemployment in the House.

repeatedly to have this discussed at a full Party meeting. I have tried to avoid this because it was obvious what the Party thought about it. Of course, if you so like, we could have a Party discussion in the matter, but I hardly think that is necessary.

My suggestion to you will, therefore, be that you might consider this question of future imports from abroad with a view to restricting them even more than what has been done thus far.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
27 August, 1953

My dear Deshmukh,

I have been reading the telegrams which have come about Black's² reaction to our agreement³ with the German firms about the Steel plant. One of these telegrams has been sent by Shenoy⁴ to the Production Ministry. The other is a personal message to you from Mehta.⁵ I enclose both these.

I confess I am greatly surprised at this angry reaction on the part of

1. File No. 17(144)/49-PMS.
2. Eugene R. Black was the President of the World Bank.
3. Signed between India and the German firms of Krupps and Demag in August 1953, the agreement provided for the construction of a steel plant in India with an initial capacity of 500,000 tons with the technical and financial participation of the firms. The capital investment for the project was estimated to be about Rs 71.25 crores of which Rs 9.5 crores was to be contributed by the German collaborators and the balance by the Government of India.
4. K.N. Shenoy, Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Production.
5. G.L. Mehta, India's Ambassador in USA, in his telegram of 27 August 1953, had informed Deshmukh that Black did not find it satisfactory from the Bank's point of view "as the German firm would contribute only about dollars 20 million out of total dollars 150 million and orders for machinery equipment etc. of the order of 80% would be placed in Germany."

Black. I was under the impression that B.K. Nehru⁶ was kept in touch with these transactions throughout and I presumed that he would keep the Bank in touch too. However, what troubles me most is Black's insistence that we should deal with American industry and we should buy American machinery.

Does the World Bank consider itself the agent of American industry? This does not look well at all.

I remember being told by the Indonesian Government about their dealings with the World Bank. They told me that the Bank would not allow them to make purchases in India and insisted on these purchases being made not only in the US but from a particular firm in the US. I had suggested that the Indonesian Government might well buy road steam-rollers from India which we could easily spare. They said they wanted to do so, but the Bank would not permit them.

As far as I remember, we are not tied down to the Germans to buy our machinery and equipment in Germany except to the extent of their contribution. As regards the rest, we said that we would invite tenders from all over the world and choose the best.

I do not at all like this approach of the Bank and their telling us the exact terms and conditions which American Industry would insist upon.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Executive Director, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Minister, Indian Embassy, USA.

I. ECONOMIC POLICY

(ii) Unemployment

1. Expanding the Opportunities of Work¹

The aim of a Welfare State is to provide full employment to the people. An important test of national planning with a view to realize a Welfare State

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru was adopted by the Congress Working Committee at the AICC Session, Agra, 6 July 1953. File No. G. 39D/1953, AICC Papers, NMML.

must therefore be progressively fuller employment of the people. The AICC recognizes that, as the implementation of the Five Year Plan proceeds, the benefits in terms of employment will grow. Nevertheless, the Committee expresses its concern at the increase in unemployment in certain fields of economic activity, notwithstanding the fact that generally there has been an upward trend of production, both agricultural and industrial, during the last eighteen months. Employment is influenced to some extent by fluctuations in business activity resulting from changes in the international situation and other factors. But the major cause of unemployment is the insufficient expansion of opportunities of work in relation to the increasing population of the country. In view of the underdeveloped condition of the country, this deficiency can be made up only by a vigorous, adequate and many-sided programme of economic development.

2. The situation, therefore, requires a re-examination of the Plan with a view to its expansion, more especially in such directions as would lead to an increase in the volume of employment.

3. The State must accept an increasingly active and positive role in regard to the development of industries. Such obstacles as exist in the implementation of the Five Year Plan should be removed by the Central or State Governments concerned. In particular, the State must assume a larger degree of responsibility in regard to cottage and small-scale industries by developing particular lines of production and channels of distribution, and in providing technical, financial and other assistance. The success of cottage and small-scale industries depends upon constant improvements in the skill of the workers and the techniques of manufacture. Facilities for training should, therefore, be provided, especially in rural areas for this purpose. The success of small-scale industries depends upon the adoption of the cooperative method. Cooperative societies should, therefore, be organized for cottage and small-scale industries.

4. Where unemployment becomes aggravated owing to special circumstances, the State should undertake programmes of work, including public works of different kinds in order to give relief and greater purchasing power to the people.

5. The problem of employment for those who receive education in schools and colleges is also becoming increasingly difficult. The number of such persons has increased out of proportion to the possible openings of the kind sought by them in present conditions, and the quality and kind of education which they receive is, in many cases, not well adapted to the present requirements. The educational system should, therefore, be reorganized from this point of view, and the admission to the public services should depend on special tests and merit and ability and not merely on the possession of degrees.

2. To Vaikunth L. Mehta¹

New Delhi
July 14, 1953

My dear Vaikunthbhai,²

Thank you for your letter of the 12th July. I shall always be happy to meet you or your Board to discuss the problems you mention. It seems to me that neither the normal approach of Government today nor the approach of those who lay great stress on village industries, quite answers the problems of today. The two together plus something added to it might, perhaps, help in understanding these problems. But, in any event, it is quite clear that the development of village industries has an important place in the war against unemployment.

Whenever you are in Delhi you might perhaps get in touch with me.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Chairman, All India Khadi and Village Industries Board.

3. To Shriman Narayan¹

New Delhi
July 22, 1953

My dear Shriman,

... Please give my affectionate greetings to Vinobaji. Tell him that we are paying earnest attention in the Planning Commission to the question of unemployment.² Tell him also that various recent tendencies in the country are very depressing, as they encourage the forces of disintegration and violence.

1. From *Letters from Gandhi Nehru Vinoba* by Shriman Narayan, (New Delhi, 1958) pp. 39-40. Extracts.
2. When Shriman Narayan, General Secretary, AICC, met him in the last week of July 1953, Vinoba Bhave told Narayan that though he welcomed the Resolution on unemployment passed at the AICC Session at Agra, he strongly felt that merely re-examining the Plan and making a few changes here and there would not be helpful. If surplus human labour had to be absorbed in gainful employment, the small-scale industries would have to be given the highest priority. Providing gainful employment in urban areas would not be possible without patronizing goods produced through home industries.

One can see this in South India, in Calcutta and elsewhere. The Kashmir situation is also a very disturbing one. All these factors seriously interfere with our constructive activities.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Steps to Remove Unemployment¹

I have received a copy of a circular letter on "Unemployment"² addressed by the Secretary³ of the Planning Commission to all State Governments. The comprehensive approach made to this problem in this letter is admirable. But it leaves me with a sense of unreality in so far as any practical steps have to be taken in the near future. Of course, all the information necessary has to be gathered and a full survey made so that we can understand the full extent of the problem and then tackle it.

2. But, whatever the extent, there is no doubt about the existence of the problem, of unemployment, more especially among people who are coming out of schools and colleges. Their proper adjustment will take time. Where, however, a person, capable of working, is on the verge of starvation, then the proper adjustment is not so important as some provision which would enable him to supply himself with bare necessities of life.

3. My office here usually gets a number of letters asking for employment and other kinds of help. Most of these are from educated or partly educated persons. There has recently been a progressive increase in these letters and many cases are very painful. Youngmen going for special training get degrees and diplomas and then cannot even find manual work to do. I have a case

1. Note to the Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, 1 August 1953. JN Collection. Also available in File No. 4(89)/53-PMS.
2. The Planning Commission had suggested an eleven-point programme to relieve urban unemployment to some extent. The programme envisaged expansion of training facilities, encouragement to cottage industries, financial assistance to deserving persons to start small industries, road development, slum clearance, encouragement to house-building activity and organization of training camps for the unemployed.
3. Y.N. Sukhthankar.

before me of a man who took his LLB and then passed his MA examination in Public Administration with special reference to Local Self-Government Institutions. I do not know the man at all, but one would imagine that he should be utilized in some way or, at any rate, he should not just starve. He has a wife and children. He asked me to provide some manual work for him on any salary, provided he gets enough to eat for himself and his wife and children.

4. This is one case, but there are numerous such cases. I came across in Lucknow an MSc working in the public garden there on Rs 18/- a day as a manual labourer. A situation like this has to be viewed in terms of urgent action and not merely of long distance enquiry. The long distance enquiry is necessary and has to be done. But we must be prepared to give an effective answer to any person who comes to us and is prepared to do any kind of work that is offered to him, including manual work. Our National Extension Schemes make some provision for this kind of training and work.

5. I am merely sending this note to draw your attention to a matter which is troubling me greatly and which appears to me to have a very special urgency. What I would like is to be able to offer some kind of the simplest type of work at the lowest rate of pay or even without pay with food, etc., supplied to any able-bodied person who asks for it, that is, we might have projects where this could be provided for. Ultimately, we are driven to providing much more gainful work that we are doing.

5. To V.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
August 29, 1953

My dear V.T.,

There is a great deal of talk about unemployment. Generally reference is made to urban unemployment. Sometimes, it is pointed out that rural unemployment is equally bad and much more widespread. The data we have about both urban and rural unemployment appears to be exceedingly limited. The figures that employment exchanges provide only touch a small part of the problem.² Are we taking steps to get more statistical data about both

1. File No. 4(89)/53-PMS.

2. As per the data collected from 135 employment exchanges, the number of registrations had been steadily increasing. While it was 1,066,351 in 1949 and 1,476,699 in 1952, during the first four months of 1953, the number was 450,970. As against 416,858 persons who found jobs in 1951, only 357,828 found employment in 1952.

urban and rural unemployment? This is a big and difficult job, but sample surveys would undoubtedly be helpful.³

Perhaps something of this kind is being done in the urban areas. I think we should have some such surveys in rural areas also.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The National Sample Survey, since its inception in 1950, had completed six rounds of investigations collecting various data bearing on the economic and social life in India. The results of the first round, completed in March 1951, were published in June 1953. Material collected in the subsequent three rounds was in various stages of processing and tabulation. The survey was conducted under the guidance of P.C. Mahalanobis, Statistical Adviser to the Union Cabinet.

6. To G.V. Mavalankar¹

New Delhi
20 September 1953

My dear Mr Mavalankar,²

For the last two days we have been having a meeting of the Congress Working Committee. In the course of our discussions, we considered the present economic condition and the problem of unemployment.³

From this the necessity arose of giving more work and thus having more employment and production. The purchasing power of people generally has gone down and unless money and work are provided, this purchasing capacity does not revive and industry generally deteriorates. The most effective and widespread method of having work is in connection with small schemes and village industries.

This discussion led to a reference to the Gandhi National Memorial Fund and many enquiries were made as to how it was being utilized. I could not give any full or adequate reply. I told them that, so far as I knew, this had been earmarked for specific objects. Nearly the whole of it still remained untouched. There was strong feeling that it was highly desirable to spend this money as quickly as possible, more especially when we had to face these big

1. File No. G-25/1953, AICC Papers, NMML. Extracts. Copy of this letter was sent to Balvantray Mehta and Morarji Desai also.
2. Speaker, House of the People.
3. The meeting was held in New Delhi on 19-20 September..

economic difficulties and productive work was necessary. There was a general feeling in the country that the money was not being spent and was being kept for future use. This appeared to be hardly in keeping with the general views of Gandhiji in such matters. It is now over five years since Gandhiji died and it would be desirable to show some substantial results in the shape of the utilization of the Memorial Fund....⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. In the meeting some members pointed out that there was little connection between the Congress and the Fund as those who were officer-bearers at the start of the Fund had left the Congress. Concern was also expressed by the PCC representatives over the mis-utilization of the Fund earmarked for the States. The question of helping the Gandhi Memorial College in East Africa was also discussed.

I. ECONOMIC POLICY

(iii) Human Resources Development

1. Train the Right Type of Human Beings¹

The name of this periodical reminds one of a great epoch and a great war in India's history.² On that historic plain, where this war was fought, we fight another war of a very different kind. This is a war against our own failings, against poverty and ignorance, and all their terrible brood.

Let us look upon this struggle in the context of history and that of this vast land of India. We face a terrific problem, and yet the potential helpers are also many. We know that we have the human material and other resources to solve this problem, if only we utilize them well.

People talk of money, and money is, no doubt, useful. But it is the human-being that counts in the end and it is human-beings who have made history and who have advanced the cause of humanity, not money. If we train and prepare the right type of human-beings in India, then the rest is easy. Our

1. Message for *Kurukshetra*, a monthly periodical brought out by the Publications Division of the Government of India, 5 September 1953. JN Collection.
2. The periodical was named after Kurukshetra, a place in Haryana, famous as the battlefield where the Mahabharata war between the Pandavas and the Kauravas was fought.

experience of the last few years has shown us both that we can do this and also remove the difficulties in the way.

All over India we have centres of human activity which are like lamps spreading their light more and more in the surrounding darkness. This light has to grow till it covers the land. Among these centres, there is Nilokheri³ which has achieved a good deal of fame in India and outside. That brings a greater responsibility on Nilokheri and on other like centres. They are the examples for others to follow and they must keep up high standards, because it is quality that will tell in the end, not quantity.

I send my greetings and good wishes to all those silent workers throughout the length and breadth of India who are engaged in this tremendous adventure of building up new India.

3. Faridabad, Nilokheri and Etawah were the three places where an experiment in community development work was started. The outstanding feature of Faridabad and Nilokheri townships was that both were developed by refugees from West Pakistan who were provided with small loans by the Centre.

I. ECONOMIC POLICY

(iv) Livestock

1. To P.S. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
August 27, 1953

My dear Panjabrao,²

I received a deputation today led by Seth Govind Das³ and consisting of about a dozen others.⁴ They came to me to urge some action to be taken in regard to cattle protection and, more especially, cow protection.⁵

I have no sympathy with the bare cry for abolition of cow slaughter by law. If this is done and nothing else is done, I am quite sure it will not lead to the protection of cows. Also this cry is usually a political stunt.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Union Minister of Agriculture.
3. President, Mahakoshal Pradesh Congress Committee, and a Member of Parliament.
4. The deputation of Bharat Go-sevak Samaj included Thakur Das Bhargava, J.N. Mankar, Hardeo Sahai, P.A. Mhathra, Janki Devi Bajaj, Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, Gurmukh Singh Musafir, Tajmul Hussain, Achal Singh and some others.
5. Govind Das pleaded for strict implementation of State legislative measures for cow protection. Ayyangar said that arrangements should be made to collect dry cows from all cities and provide them shelter in suitable cowsheds and farms.

But there can be no doubt that the problem of protecting milch cows and improving the breed of cattle generally is of great importance. Various very comprehensive Bills have been drafted for this purpose and have probably lapsed. Some States have gone ahead with measures. Others have taken no steps.

I should like to know where we are now and whether any concrete measures are suggested to stop this deterioration of our cattle and the destruction of good milch cows. The subject must be looked at purely from the economic point of view, and the measures suggested must be constructive, not merely negative. I believe there is a committee functioning to consider these matters.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

II. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

(i) Land Reforms

1. To Jainarain Vyas¹

New Delhi
July 9, 1953

My dear Vyasji,²

...Shri Govind Ballabh Pant handed over to me at Agra three copies of his report³ on the Rajasthan Jagirdari Abolition Dispute.⁴ In a covering letter he

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Chief Minister of Rajasthan.
3. From 30 June to 2 July 1953, at the instance of Nehru, G.B. Pant, Chief Minister of UP, held talks in Naini Tal with the representatives of the Rajasthan Government, Rajasthan Congress Committee, and jagirdars to explore the possibilities for a mutual settlement and understanding with regard to the abolition of jagirdari system in Rajasthan.
4. In the report, Pant had stated that no part of the compensation could be paid in cash nor the mode of payment prescribed in the Act altered and the rate of interest could not be raised beyond 2½%. As regards Khudkasht (land for self-cultivation) by jagirdars, the report stated that there should be no compulsory eviction of cultivators for the sake of providing Khudkasht rights to jagirdars on the grounds that jagirdars had made certain improvements and invested money. At the same time, it was realized by all concerned that the petty jagirdars, who had invested their savings in the lands of the tenants but had themselves not been able to cultivate them on account of being engaged in military service or for other reasons, deserved sympathy.

informed me that his decisions had been arrived at more or less in agreement with the parties concerned. That being so, there should be no difficulty in accepting them in toto and giving effect to them.

I am glad that this agreement has been arrived at and I hope that you will now go ahead with this measure....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
July 15, 1953

My dear Sri Babu,²

I enclose a copy of a letter from the President. This letter refers to a particular case.³ But, as a matter of fact, it raises a larger issue⁴ which deserves urgent and full consideration. I hope your Government will give its consideration to this matter. If we are bringing about a social change, we must be prepared for its consequences and not have a gap period in between which must result in suffering for many. Will you, therefore, kindly have this matter enquired into, both the individual case of Syed Mehdi and the general question?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Also available in File No. 80/53, President's Secretariat. A copy of the letter was sent to Rajendra Prasad.
2. Chief Minister of Bihar.
3. Writing on 14 July, Rajendra Prasad mentioned that Syed Mehdi, a relative of the Nawab of Rampur, had complained that under the Zamindari Abolition Act, his zamindari was taken away by the Bihar Government without adequate compensation, thereby causing him considerable misery.
4. Rajendra Prasad wrote that though the zamindaris had been abolished, the calculation of the compensation was unduly delayed, resulting in reducing those with no other source of income to starvation.

3. To Hamidullah Khan¹

New Delhi
July 22, 1953

My dear Nawab Sahib,²

...I do not know the details of the Bhopal law³ on the subject of abolition of jagirs, but the broad facts came to my notice. I found then that the proposals were more generous than in other States. It seemed to me that special attention was being paid to some of the wishes that you have expressed. I am, sure you will appreciate that in India we have generally gone pretty far in giving generous compensation in such cases. Indeed, there has been strong criticism of Government's action. The fact that there is unemployment on a vast scale and comparisons are frequently made between those who are really badly off and those who are better circumstanced is frequently being emphasized.

This is so in every country now and the major problem in agricultural countries like India is the reform of the land system and the abolition of jagirs, zamindaris and the like. Inevitably this involves discomfort and inconvenience to some. But there are large numbers of others who are slightly better off and a new social order is thus gradually established. That is inevitable, and the only question is whether we can do it peacefully and cooperatively or under extreme stress of circumstances. I am sure that what you have said will be given every attention, but I do hope you will appreciate the circumstances in which we live and the stress of social forces that are working. The whole future of India depends upon our raising the standards of living of the great majority of our people.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Nawab of Bhopal.
3. Introduced in the Bhopal State Assembly by Shankar Dayal Sharma, the Chief Minister of Bhopal State, on 4 August 1953, the Bhopal Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Bill 1953 sought to authorize the State Government to resume all the ninety-nine jagirs in the State against payment of compensation which was proposed to be on a descending scale in respect of higher incomes. The Bill was unanimously adopted by the Assembly on 6 August.

4. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
August 28, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,²

Thank you for your letter of today's date about the Nawab of Bhopal....

My views about compensation for land are very definite. Beyond a certain figure, I do not think any compensation should be given. The whole social purpose of our land legislation is defeated if we give exorbitant compensation.³ In other countries, like in Burma, they have given far less compensation to everybody, Burmese or Indian. The Nawab has a heavy civil list. To that, as to such civil lists, I have a strong dislike. In addition to that, there appears to be no reason why we should add to his wealth at the expense of the public.

We have got into strange ideas of thinking private property sacrosanct, and, unfortunately, our Constitution makes us partly succumb to these ideas. The only thing sacrosanct is the human being and other matters should be judged from the social point of view of human betterment.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Union Minister of Home and States.
3. The jagir of the Nawab had a *sanadi* annual income of about Rs 113,000 which included deduction made by way of *abwab*, a local cess. If the jagir was resumed after the enforcement of the Bill by Bhopal State in October, the Nawab would be entitled to a compensation of Rs 6 lakhs.

5. The Hyderabad Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Bill¹

...5. In view of the fact that the draft Bill was fully considered by the Planning Commission and had their approval, it would normally be desirable for that Bill to be accepted as a whole and no major amendment to be made to it,

1. Note, 29 September 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.

more especially one which was of a controversial nature.² Otherwise the whole point of these previous discussions and consultations, *inter se* in Hyderabad and with the Planning Commission, is lost. It appears from the papers received, that this matter was considered by the Congress Legislature Party on the 24th September and was fully discussed.³ As a result, the majority of Members of the Party were opposed to any changes or amendments being introduced.

6. A request is now made that freedom of expression and voting should be given to such Members of the Congress Party as wish to move amendments. In justification of this request, it is stated that the Members present at the Party meeting were only 45 while the full membership of the House is 92. Further, the amendment is considered so important and affecting the basic economy of the agrarian population that it should be moved.

7. It is in regard to important matters, much more than unimportant ones, that the Party discipline must prevail. Otherwise no Party can function effectively. The mere fact that this particular matter contained in the proposed amendments has been fully argued and discussed *inter se* in the Party and with the Planning Commission indicates the importance attached to it. The final results obtained after these discussions and the majority Party vote must, therefore, hold unless the Party itself wishes to make some variation or some such variation is brought about by consent. It is clear that there is little chance of the Party reversing its previous decision and I do not know of the possibility of any reconsideration resulting in agreement on some variation, within the general principles laid down by the Planning Commission.

8. I have referred this matter to Shri V.T. Krishnamachari, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, and given him the papers relating to it. He will give full consideration to all aspects and send his opinion tomorrow by Air Mail. His opinion, as revised, should be followed.

9. If there was time, I would be agreeable to representatives of the two viewpoints coming to Delhi to discuss fully this matter with the Planning Commission and abiding by their advice.

2. Some members of the Hyderabad State Congress Party were reported to have written to the Central Parliamentary Board about their disagreement with the Select Committee's report on the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Bill and said that the family holding should comprise an area that would fetch a net annual income of Rs 800/- after meeting expenses on cultivation, and the maximum holding would be four and a half times the family holding.
3. The Hyderabad Congress Legislative Party met at Hyderabad on 26 and 27 September under the chairmanship of Ramakrishna Rao, the Chief Minister, to consider the Tenancy Bill as reported by the Select Committee. Seventeen members expressed their dissatisfaction at the quantum of holding fixed by the Bill.

10. While there is some importance in the amendments proposed, I feel that it is far more important to get this belated legislation⁴ through the Assembly as rapidly as possible. This can only be done, as far as I can see, in its present form with some minor amendment by consent. It is always possible to amend a piece of legislation that has been enacted. There is nothing to prevent the Government or the Assembly Party later to bring an amending Bill if that is considered necessary after full consideration and consultation with the Planning Commission.

11. In any event, I think it is entirely opposed to Party discipline for an amendment to be moved on a matter which has been considered and rejected by the Party after full discussion. Nor can freedom of voting be given in such matters. It is open to a Member, however, to express his views about certain desirable amendments, but not to press them forward formally in the shape of amendments and vote for them. He can say that while he holds to a certain view, he does not wish to press it at that stage, in order to expedite the passage of the Bill, with the major changes it contains; but he can express the hope that these matters will be considered later.

12. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that no Member of the Hyderabad Congress Legislature Party should go against the decision of the majority of the Party.⁵ This is subject to any possible variation or change that can be made with consent in the Party and after consultation with the Planning Commission.

4. The Bill was first referred to the Select Committee on 9 April 1953 owing to the Opposition's allegation that the Government was trying to use the Bill for its own political gains. The Speaker, on 15 April 1953, postponed its consideration till August for a second reading by the Select Committee. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, p. 157.

5. On 27 September 1953, the Executive of the Hyderabad Congress Legislature Party decided to issue a whip that the amendments to the measure could be moved only with the permission of the leader of the Party and all those who had tabled amendments without taking necessary permission were asked to withdraw them.

II. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

(ii) General

1. To Lal Bahadur Shastri¹

New Delhi

August 29, 1953

My dear Lal Bahadur,²

Mohanlal Saksena³ saw me today. He referred, among other things, to the land on either side of railway lines, which is at present wholly unused. I suppose if a calculation is made all over India, the area of this land would be very large. In some countries I had visited, cultivation comes fairly near the Railway line and thus they do not keep much areas vacant and unused.

In view of our paucity of land for cultivation, it is worthwhile enquiring how much land is thus occupied and how far it is possible to reduce it and allow it to be cultivated.

Mohanlal suggested that such land where available should be given over to village cooperatives. I do not know how far this would be feasible. But the first thing to do is to find out how much land is available and can be made available in this way.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 31(166)/53-PMS.

2. Union Minister of Railways and Transport.

3. A senior Congressman, former Union Minister for Relief and Rehabilitation and President, All India Housing Association, 1952-55.

III. INDUSTRY

(i) Handloom

1. To Swaran Singh¹

New Delhi
September 9, 1953

My dear Swaran Singh,²

The other day, you will remember, a meeting was held at Rashtrapati Bhavan³ to consider how we can encourage the use of khadi, more especially in government establishments. The President spoke about this,⁴ as also others.

I wonder if you or your Ministry have given thought to this matter since then. I think there is a great deal of scope for this, in big ways and in small ways. One might even make a provisional move that, wherever possible, Khadi should be purchased for Government. Of course, there are limitations to this. We cannot ask the Army or the Police to use it for their uniforms. But the approach should be to purchase this and use it.

I have another thing in mind particularly. Presumably, we are going to have winter uniforms for many of our employees. I understand that normally the stuff is obtained from Kanpur or some other Indian mill. It would be a good thing if we could make purchases from Kashmir for such cold weather liveries. This can either be *pattu* or Kashmir mill stuff, which is quite good. I don't think that the price will be any higher.

I should like you to look into this matter. It would help greatly if we could push khadi, and next to khadi other hand-woven products. We have to buy stuff for curtains, towels, sheets, table covers and for so many other purposes, apart from liveries.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Union Minister for Works, Housing and Supply.
3. An informal meeting of the Central Ministers and senior officials was held on 29 August 1953.
4. Stressing the need for using khadi in Rashtrapati Bhavan and all other Government Departments, the President urged the Government to instruct all the Departments, excepting those of Police and Army, to make "all these purchases from Khadi Bhandars."

2. Khadi—A Symbol of Kinship of Spirit¹

Many of us have believed in khadi and worn it for a large number of years. It was for us the livery of freedom in the days of our struggle and at the same time something that put us on a level with the common man in India, whose welfare was the main object of our endeavour. Our country unfortunately has suffered from a multitude of castes. They still continue and bedevil our politics and our social life.

In addition to these castes of old, we have other divisions in our social life due to economic differences and to get rid of these has been and is our objective. The Constitution of India has emphasized this in its Directive Principles of policy. But that is a big question involving basic changes in our entire social fabric. We move in that direction no doubt, but the pace does not appear to be fast enough.

However that may be, there are some things which each one of us can do, and one of these is to put on and use khadi and thus lessen at least the outward barrier of clothes that separates the well-to-do from the poor. Khadi at least brings an element of kinship with the vast masses of our people. It produces an atmosphere of comradeship and common endeavour.

In addition to this it helps, to some extent at least, in tackling the problem of unemployment. I do not mean to say that this problem will be solved by our wearing khadi, but we do help somewhat in this way and the consciousness that we are responsible for solving this problem of unemployment is ever with us.

This problem of fuller employment has become now a major problem of today for all of us. We have to tackle it on a multitude of fronts. But it is being increasingly recognized that a major way of tackling it is by the encouragement of village and small-scale industries.

Khadi is one of our principal village industries and khadi is a symbol also not only of the freedom that we sought and that we have won, but of that kinship of spirit and removal of barriers among all our people, which is so important.

Therefore, let us wear and use and encourage in every way khadi. This applies to all of us, whatever our grade or function might be and whether we are officials or not.

More especially, let us do this on this anniversary which brings such a host of memories to us—Gandhi Jayanti Day.

1. Message to the people, New Delhi, 11 September 1953. File No. 9/148/53-PMS. It was published in *Economic Review* on 16 September and reprinted in *Harijan* on 3 October 1953.

III. INDUSTRY

(ii) General

1. To K. C. Reddy¹

New Delhi
July 13, 1953

My dear Reddy,²

On my way back to India my plane stopped at Rome for over an hour. During this period Doctor Chain³ had a talk with me at the airport. He was rather exercised about the way we were dealing with our Penicillin Project, that is, that we were not attaching enough importance to the research aspect of it for the development of antibiotics. I told him that, so far as I was aware, we attach great importance to research and we certainly intend giving it a first place in our scheme. I asked him to let me have a note on the subject.

Later, I received this note through our Ambassador and I am sending it on to you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Minister of Production.
3. Ernst Boris Chain (1906-1979); jointly with Prof. H.W. Florey, worked on development of penicillin; received Nobel Prize for Physiology and Medicine, 1945; Scientific Director of International Research Centre for Chemical Microbiology, Institute Superiore di Sanita, Rome, 1948-64; Professor of Biochemistry at Imperial College, University of London, 1961-73; afterwards Professor Emeritus.

2. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
September 10, 1953

My dear Bidhan,²

Your letter of the 8th September.

I appreciate your difficulties and we have tried to go as far as we can to meet them. But I would like you to consider this question in its all-India

1. JN Collection.
2. Chief Minister of West Bengal.

context.³ It is not possible for us to have any exceptions on a provincial basis.⁴ Obviously, if we do that, we cannot enforce any direction in other provinces. The question, therefore, is whether we should change our whole all-India policy or not. To change that policy would involve going back after a few months on a decision deliberately taken after much consultation. The position of the handloom industry all over South is an exceedingly bad one. The state of the weavers is miserable, large numbers of families are starving and there have been a number of suicides. I do not suggest that our policy will suddenly change the situation there, but it is a fact that the situation has improved. If we reverse our present policy, the psychological and political effect of that would be very far-reaching indeed and our Government would have no credit left anywhere.

Therefore two conclusions follow: we cannot reverse that policy as a whole in India and we must wait for the report of the Committee which is considering this whole question. Probably we shall get that in about six months' time. Secondly, any action or relaxation must be according to some rule which is applicable all over India and there should be no discrimination for any State or any particular textile mill.

We must keep these considerations in view and then come to decisions. As you know, we have agreed to your proposal to prohibit export of dhotis and saris from Bengal. That meets one of your major points. As for allowing uncontrolled production, that raises the very difficulties I have mentioned above. There is possibly another way of dealing with this matter and that is to impose the heavy tax, something that might be considered penal, on production above a certain figure.

As it is, I believe that the C&I Ministry is prepared to consider special

3. In a letter (not published) of 12 September 1953, Nehru wrote to Shriman Narayan that "while on one hand there is a definite improvement in the position of handloom cloth...on the other hand, we are getting frantic appeals from most States protesting against the curtailment of production of mill-made dhotis...."
4. On 1 September, after a series of meetings with B.C. Roy, M.L. Shah, President of the Bengal Millowners' Association, said in a meeting of the Association that a scheme had been worked out to make dhotis available to consumers at a reasonable price on the eve of Durga Puja celebrations. The scheme of voluntary price control of dhotis mainly provided for: the West Bengal Mills to produce dhotis during September-November 1953 to their maximum capacity; export of dhotis from the State to be banned upto the end of November 1953; the mills' price would be on the basis of the scheduled ex-mill prices obtaining in September 1952 or those in August 1953 whichever was lower; sale would be through mills retail shops or through the usual trade channels; and the Government would issue a specific general order annulling the former contract that might have been entered into by mills for the sale of dhotis. The scheme was to come into effect from 7 September 1953, subject to its acceptance by the Government of India.

cases, such as small mills, etc. Even generally they have agreed to a 60% additional production or a little more.

We all realize your political and other difficulties, more especially in this session before the Pooja. We have no desire to embarrass you at all and I am sure that our C&I Ministry will go as far as they can to meet your wishes subject always to the major considerations I have pointed out above.

I am sending your letter to T.T. Krishnamachari.

Yours affectionately,
Jawahar

3. Monopoly of Big Firms¹

I agree with Shri K.C. Neogy² that Government should not be expected to advise in this matter. By giving advice, we take some responsibility on ourselves for the consequences.

2. There have been a number of questions in Parliament about the work of Lever Brothers in India.³ There appears to be a feeling that Lever Brothers are gradually pushing out of the market the Indian soap manufacturers. Even now, I believe that their production and sale is greater than that of the others combined. This kind of price-cutting, though it might be advantageous to the consumer for the time being, ultimately might have the opposite effect. When competitors are disposed of, then a kind of monopoly is held by one big firm and prices can be raised easily without danger of competition.

3. There is some considerable feeling in India on this point, that is, Lever Brothers establishing a dominating position in the country. I think, in the circumstances, it might be advisable to mention this matter in the Economic Committee tomorrow.

1. Note to Principal Private Secretary, 21 September 1953. JN Collection.
2. Chairman, Finance Commission, Government of India.
3. For example, on 7 September 1953, in reply to a question in the Council of States relating to the percentage of utilization of the rated capacity of Lever Brothers (India) Limited and that of other groups, D.P. Karmarkar, Minister for Commerce, said that Lever Brothers had been working as per the demand of their products and though the Government had received representations it could do nothing as it was a matter dependent upon the more efficient performance of the sales organizations of Lever Brothers.

4. To Swaran Singh¹

Camp: Ranikhet
September 26, 1953

My dear Swaran Singh,

Please refer to your letter dated September 16th with which you sent me various long notes about petrol prices.² I have read these papers here at Ranikhet.

Reading these papers, I am confirmed in my opinion that this oil business all over the world is one of the biggest rackets that people have to put up with in all countries. During past years I have been interested in this from the political point of view and have read some books on it which have shown the vast extent of this business, the interlockings, the intricacies, and the enormous power that these oil companies wield, because, in effect, they control or influence some big powers. It is indeed one of the biggest empires in the world—this oil empire. It is almost impossible to get at the real facts because of these interlockings and secret arrangements between the companies. Only occasionally, when some major companies fall out and fight each other, do some facts come out. This has happened in the past when some of the big American companies and others fell out....

In the minutes attached to the note of the meeting held on the 5th June, 1953, at which a number of Secretaries were present, the general attitude appears to have been the same, that is, rather apologetic to the oil companies and fear that the oil companies might retaliate if we take up a strong line.³

Let us be clear about the position:-

- (1) As I see it, the combination of the great oil companies is one of the biggest and the most dangerous rackets in the world. It has been, in the past, one of the potent causes of war. Because of the enormous power they have, they influence and sometimes control governments.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Swaran Singh had sent a copy of a note on petrol prices in India that was considered by the Ad Hoc Committee of Ministers set up by the Economic Committee for this purpose and also a copy of the decisions reached by the Committee at its meeting held on 8 September 1953.

3. The note had mentioned that the Government was aware of "the comparatively high profits earned by the oil companies in general, and by the Assam Oil Company in particular, but the magnitude of the profits is nothing as large as would superficially appear, if account is taken of the fact that this is an industry with considerable hazards and there may be quite appreciable amount spent on infrastructure exploration and that the oil-fields are wasting assets."

Because of this power also they can extort much higher prices than can be justified by any reasoning. This is a world problem and we cannot take it up in present circumstances. But we must be fully aware of it and not imagine that these oil companies are working at great hazards for public good. It would be of great advantage to the world if this power of the oil companies was broken and they ceased to function as if they were above the law everywhere.

- (2) Secondly, and that affects us directly, they function in India specially in ways that are disadvantageous to us. We took up this matter with them and have apparently gained some very small benefit.
- (3) As things are, we are not in an advantageous position to get the terms we want. That is unfortunate, and therefore we have often to accept conditions which we do not like. That is so. At the same time, we are not perhaps quite so helpless as might superficially appear. There are all kinds of political and other factors which sometimes help us. Therefore, our general attitude towards the oil companies, while recognizing the difficulties of the situation, need not be a very weak one.

There is reference in the minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet Committee held on the 8th September to the desirability of reconsidering the question of the production of synthetic petrol from coal. This is certainly desirable. We have considered this several times, but the cost of the plant appeared to be very high.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

IV. DEFENCE

1. Minority Communities in the Defence Services¹

I am greatly concerned at the diminishing number of persons belonging to the minority communities in India being in our Services, more especially in

1. Note to Mahavir Tyagi, Minister for Defence Organization, Mahavir Tyagi Papers, NMML. 2 August 1953.

the Defence Services. In particular, I imagine that there are relatively very few Muslims in our three Services as well as in the civil aspect of Defence work.

I think this is bad and is likely to produce unfortunate consequences. We have to work for a balanced structure and for all communities to feel that they have a share in it. As things are going on, the structure becomes more and more unbalanced from various points of view and inevitably a feeling of frustration grows among many.

I should like you to give thought to this matter and to find out quite quietly and without fuss what the position of our armed forces and our civil establishment is from this point of view. Also to devise methods to remedy this defect. This is important from many points of view.

2. Compulsory Military Training to Students¹

I do not know if this Resolution will come up before the House.² Anyhow, we should be prepared to deal with it.

As framed, the Resolution is obviously unacceptable and totally impracticable.³ Personally I am not sure that it is even desirable to give compulsory military training to all our high school and college students. I know that a number of people are totally opposed to this. But we need not enter into this question of principle. From the financial point of view, it is totally impossible for us to undertake any such thing.

There are two approaches to this matter, apart from the one suggested in the Resolution. One is to expand as far as possible the NCC scheme and the Auxiliary Cadet Corps scheme. We have been thinking about that for some time past and have made some proposals. That is as far as we can go now. As

1. Note for Minister for Defence Organization, 3 August 1953. JN Collection.
2. On 7 August 1953, Ram Subhag Singh, a Congress Member from Shahabad District, Bihar, moved the Resolution: "This House is of opinion that immediate steps be taken to impart compulsory military training to all high school and college students."
3. The Resolution was withdrawn on 22 August 1953 after Satish Chandra, the Deputy Defence Minister, announced in the House of the People that the Government had decided to expand the Territorial Army, NCC and ACC.

a matter of fact, even if we wanted compulsory military training for all students, we have not got the technical personnel for this.

Our main problem today is unemployment and we should divert all our energies towards its solution. This unemployment is most obvious in the large numbers of students coming out from schools and colleges. While there is such tremendous unemployment in these young men, there is very little, if any, in technical personnel. In other words, where technical training is given, employment is much easier. This becomes a question of educational change.

Apart from this, there is a possible approach. Students coming out of schools and colleges may be given some practical manual work that is of a useful and constructive variety and, in addition, some drill and like training of a semi-military type.

MDO might deal with this Resolution if this comes up. If necessary, I shall say a few words also.

3. To Mahavir Tyagi¹

New Delhi
August 29, 1953

My dear Mahavir,

You will remember our discussing the term of office of Air Marshal Gibbs.² His term expires on the 31st December. But he wrote to me some time ago suggesting that he might continue till the end of April 1954. You and I were of opinion that this might be agreed to. On the whole it was a good thing for Subroto Mukerji³ to overlap with Gibbs for a couple of months or so.⁴

1. Mahavir Tyagi Papers, NMML.
2. Writing on 2 July 1953, G.E. Gibbs asked Nehru on what date he would like him to hand over charge to Mukerji as the new Air Vice-Marshall. He offered to stay on for another nine months, thereby completing three years' tenure so that it also enabled Mukerji to reorient himself after a long absence from India for his staff course at the Imperial Defence College in London.
3. (1911-1960); received training as service pilot at Cranwale, UK; commissioned, 1932; appointed Squadron Commander, 1939; took part in Miranshah operations; first Indian to command the Kohat Station, August 1943; appointed Deputy Air Commander and Senior Air Staff Officer, Royal Indian Air Force, 1947; promoted Air Marshal, 1 April 1954.
4. Air Marshal S. Mukerji took over as the first Indian Chief of Air Staff on 1 April 1954, and continued in that capacity till his death on 9 November 1960.

Ghosh spoke to me about this matter today. He thought that Gibbs wanted to stay on much longer, that is, even after April. I do not think that would be desirable. But we might agree to his stay here till the end of April.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

4. Writing of History¹

I think it will be desirable to have some record prepared.² The first question to be decided is: whether this record is going to be a public document or for confidential use. I think it should be a public document and written accordingly. We may have a separate volume of appendices or notes which can be treated as confidential. But the main record should be such as can be published.

2. If that is so, it must be eminently readable and relatively brief. A book is written in order that it may be read, not merely to be kept on the shelves for some kind of odd reference. A readable book must not be too long and must be written in a style that makes it readable. This must be borne in mind. If too much detail is filled in, the book becomes heavy and totally unfit for reading. I am afraid the art of writing history has not developed in India sufficiently and there is hardly a readable history of India. History is not a collection of facts strung up together. Facts are the source of history, not history. History deals certainly with major events but, in the main, with forces, influences and the like at work coming into conflict with each other and producing certain results. In writing too factual and detailed an account, the wood is lost sight of for the trees.

3. Therefore, the aim should be to write concisely, without going into great detail, and bringing out the course of events and how they were met.

4. In appendices details may be given. Some of these appendices may be attached to the public book. Some may be printed separately as confidential matter.

1. Note for Minister of Defence Organization, 11 September 1953. JN Collection.
2. The Minister of Defence Organization had proposed to bring out a book on the history of the Indian National Army.

5. Military Engineering Service¹

In the course of our talk today at the Defence Minister's Meeting, reference was made to the Military Engineering Service which is responsible for buildings and constructions. In particular, reference was made to the recent buildings put up for the Air Force at Agra, which had been found to be unsatisfactory in many ways.

2. The Defence Ministry has very heavy building programmes and the greatest care should be taken to check waste and extravagance. The general impression one gets of the MES is that it is extravagant and puts up buildings remarkable for their unattractiveness. Evidently they do not interest themselves much in modern developments.

3. I think that we should have some kind of full and independent consideration of this matter, not only at Agra, but generally, so as to find out what is the best and most economical method of putting up our buildings. A competent architect should always pass our building plans, and there should be a check on performance or rather several checks on performance. Both the Deputy Minister, Satish Chandra, and the Joint Secretary, Shankar,² had been to Agra and reported about the unsatisfactory condition of the recent buildings put up there. It is hardly enough for MES to justify their own work. There should be an independent assessment.

1. Note for Minister of Defence Organization, 14 September 1953. JN Collection.

2. V. Shankar.

6. Travelling by Senior Officers in Air-conditioned Coaches¹

A question arose recently in the Defence Minister's Committee about the travelling allowances of senior officers in the Defence Services. This was in view of the abolition of the I Class in the Railways which will take effect from the 1st October.

1. Note for Cabinet Secretary and Secretary-General, MEA, 20 September 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. The proposal was that officers generally or, at any rate, certain senior officers, should be allowed to travel in air-conditioned coaches. There was some argument as to the grade of officers who should be allowed to travel in this way.

3. I do not react favourably to this kind of special privilege in this matter for almost any one except in an emergency. The Defence people feel that it is embarrassing for officers to travel with others. I have personally found no such embarrassment in my own case at any time, but perhaps it is not fair to judge from this point of view. It could be possible for officers to travel in separate carriages, but that would not be possible for individuals.

4. Whatever rule is made, it should be equally applicable to Defence Services and civil officers of certain grades. I do not know if any rules have been made for civil officers in view of the abolition of the I Class...

5. The whole purpose of the abolition of the I class in Railways will be rather frustrated by allowing large numbers of people to travel in air-conditioned coaches. The cost may well be even more than it was when there was I Class travel....

V. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

1. To A.J. John¹

New Delhi
September 11, 1953

My dear John,²

This is in continuation of my letter of the 4th September in answer to your letter of the 2nd September dealing with ilmenite etc.³

I have had this matter further looked into and I am perfectly clear that the action taken by the Government of India is not only justified but highly desirable. No question of law arises. I shall not go into any details about this matter here. But, if you so wish it, I can have a note sent to you on it.

Your fears that this might cause your Government some loss have no

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to S.S. Bhatnagar.

2. Chief Minister, Travancore-Cochin.

3. In his letter, John wrote that as Ilmenite was one of the most important sources of revenue, the State Government was "reluctant to acquiesce to any enactment of the Centre curtailing the State rights" and "should it, however, be considered that the matter is important enough to be placed before the Courts the Government are wishing to take steps under Article 131 of the Indian Constitution."

basis. As a matter of fact, your State is likely to make a very handsome profit out of our future transactions. In fact, the recent visit of Dr Bhabha and Dr Bhatnagar to the United States has brought us large orders. A good part from these orders will go to your Government. This will be much more than you have ever made from this business. This will grow in future. So, even in the present you will do very well and better than the past. In the future, the prospects are very good. Indeed, Travancore-Cochin State will develop into a major centre for this work, which is so important for the country. It is obvious that this work can only be undertaken by the Central Government with all its resources and its contacts with foreign countries.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Science in Schools and Colleges¹

Ghanshyam Das Birlaji,²

I have come to Pilani for the second time. I had come here earlier to see the work that had been done and today I am here to add something to it.

Just now you learnt from the speeches of Dr Bhatnagar³ and Maulana Azad⁴ about what we have decided to build here.⁵ Shri Birla was scared to give you the translation. But even without knowing the word, I am prepared to say that it is wrong—wrong in the sense that it is artificial. Words cannot be artificially produced. They are created naturally. They cannot be produced by professors. Words and languages are created out of the traditions and actions of the common people. Nowadays it has become a fashion to sit in offices and coin words which are incorporated into the language. If this sort of thing goes on, our professors will only succeed in killing our languages by making

1. Speech at the foundation stone laying ceremony of the Central Electronics Engineering Research Institute, Pilani, Rajasthan, 21 September 1953. AIR tapes, NMML.
2. An industrialist; a close follower of Mahatma Gandhi; Chairman, Birla Education Trust, and founder, Pilani Educational Institution.
3. S.S. Bhatnagar, Secretary, Union Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research, and Director, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research.
4. The written speech of Abul Kalam Azad, Union Minister for Education, was read in absentia.
5. Both Azad and Bhatnagar hoped that the proposed Electronics Research Institute would fill a lacuna in one of the basic fields of modern scientific research in India.

them completely artificial and lifeless, which cannot be spoken by the common people. This is a very dangerous tendency which we have to combat. But the fact is that the word 'electronics' is a new one in English. It is new though it has been incorporated into the old, and is difficult for everyone to understand it properly. But whatever it is, there is no doubt about it that some of the most important things in the modern world are tied up with electronics and the nations which wish to make progress must understand it and instead of they should merely copying others but try to work at it themselves. Therefore this is most essential in many respects. It is extremely important for the defence of the country. Our armed forces must take advantage of the modern techniques. But even apart from that, it is possible to benefit in a thousand different ways from modern electronics. So it is proper that we should pay attention to it in our country and learn from others.

You are studying science in the colleges here and will probably get degrees thereafter. But it is wrong to think that you learn science from your text-books. You are merely clearing the path to learning. We go to schools and colleges and even acquire a degree to prove it though the value of these degrees is going down very fast in India which is regrettable. But what is the meaning of that degree? It is merely something which trains your mind and increases your capacity to learn. It is wrong and absurd if anyone thinks that he has learnt everything by getting a B.Sc. degree. If you really want science to grow in India, it will have to be not merely from text-books but by practical experience. Science is the product of the human brain and a great deal of research has to be done. We cannot hope to learn science by reading about it from text-books as to what is happening in the United States and Germany and Japan and England. If we do that, we shall only be copying others or buying goods and machines produced in other countries. The real power will continue to be in the hands of others and we shall merely follow them. No nation can progress like that. We have to take full advantage of scientific learning in the world for science, it is obvious, does not belong to any one country. But as long as we do not develop the spirit of scientific inquiry and research in our country, there can be no scientific awakening. We shall merely be copying others and that too belatedly while the others march ahead. That is why we have opened large science laboratories and research institutes in order to develop the spirit of scientific inquiry. Otherwise so long as we look to other countries to provide technical knowledge or scientific goods, we shall continue to lag behind.

In this connection, I should like to remind you of the swadeshi movement which had started in Bengal more than fifty years ago and rapidly spread to other places. Later, Mahatma Gandhi laid stress on khadi and cottage industries. I am mentioning this to you because nowadays people tend to forget such facts totally. It has become a thing of history and so nobody remembers that

it is fundamentally relevant and essential to this day. We must rely as little as possible on others to fulfil our needs. I do not mean that we should cut ourselves off from other countries and live in isolation. We must have contacts and trade relations with them. But if we consider ourselves to be an independent country, we must not rely on others for anything which curtails our freedom in any way, for if that help is not forthcoming, we stumble and become weak. The thing is that in the world of today, there are seventy or eighty countries which are counted as free. The really free countries are becoming less and less in number and even those are becoming so tied to the others that their freedom of action is seriously curtailed.

We do not want our country to become like that and therefore it is important for us to be self-reliant. It is certainly not an easy matter in the sense that it is difficult to achieve it in a hurry. The country is a very large one and the progress has to be uniform. We have to go a long way and so we are rushed for time. We shall certainly do it, and even in a short while, we can achieve a great deal. At the root of any kind of progress lie science and scientific knowledge. The modern world is a world of science and nothing can function today without science. Wherever you look, you can see the influence of science. Therefore we have to increase scientific learning in the country. Otherwise we will remain backward and that means remaining in bondage, and even if we are free on the map, we can be strangled at any time for lack of essential goods. Therefore we have decided to propagate science in the country in a big way, so that we may produce fine scientific brains who can compete with the greatest scientists in the world in their fields and cooperate with them. We have some excellent men in the country even now who have made so much possible already. But a handful of such men are not enough. We need thousands of them for the country's progress.

So we are doing all this and different kinds of things are produced in the Pilani college. You cannot take your B.A. and B.Sc. degrees and go out to relax. Everyone cannot be given an office job and those who do not secure it, get frustrated and angry. It is a simple, straightforward matter which you can calculate on paper that the number who would graduate from schools and colleges is going to increase in the future and all of them cannot be absorbed in government offices. If they were to be taken into government service, soon the whole country will become a huge government office, as you can imagine. It is wrong to think that it is practicable. But it is also not proper that our people should remain unemployed. It is wrong in every sense, whether you look at it from the point of view of those boys and girls who are unemployed or from the country's point of view. The unemployed will starve if they have no means of earning their livelihood but, apart from that, they become a burden on society because they continue to consume without producing anything themselves. There are two kinds of unemployed. One is the people

who look for work but cannot find it. The other is the people in the top rung of society who live off the labour of others. Both these kinds of unemployed at the top and bottom rungs of society are worthless and the more their number increases, the greater the damage to the country because they are a great burden on society. There is a third variety too. As you may have seen from the census, this variety consists of people who call themselves *sadhus* and *fakirs*, etc., and there are millions of them. I remember that ten or fifteen years ago the census put their number at fifty-five lakhs. I do not know if they have increased or decreased. They are parasites living off the society and our people put up with such people willingly, which is absurd. I am not referring to top-class religious leaders, for they are perhaps doing some good, but of the large numbers who pose as *sadhus*, and the like. Whoever lives off the land without contributing anything is a burden. It is obvious that they consume something and those who live off the labour of others are thieves. They can be labelled as such, even if there is no punishment for them under the law.⁶

So what will you do after getting your degrees? Government jobs are not available to everyone. So you have to work at real tasks by which you can increase the nation's wealth as well as your own. How can you add to the wealth of a nation? Gold and silver and paper money are not real wealth. They are merely tools of trade. The real wealth is what is produced from land and factories or cottage industries. Anything new that is produced is the wealth of a country, whether it is produced by a carpenter or a farmer or a blacksmith or anyone else. Gold and silver do not constitute the wealth of a country. We have to increase our production from land and factories and cottage industries. Why are countries like the United States so rich? They are rich because they produce enormous amounts of goods from their land and factories. They use modern techniques of production. I cannot understand why there should be unemployment in our country. We have to make adequate arrangements for work to be provided to every individual in the country so that he can earn his livelihood and at the same time add to the country's wealth. All this is no doubt possible on paper but when it involves millions of human beings, then it becomes difficult. That does not mean that it cannot be done but it is a question of human beings and they have to be educated. They cannot be handled like bricks and mortar. Their thinking has to be influenced and given a certain direction. So all this is complicated. We often

6. On 29 September 1953, in a note to the Principal Private Secretary, Nehru wrote: "Please reply to Swami Bhaskaranand and inform him that what I said at Pilani was that while there were many good and worthy men among those who called themselves *sadhus*, there were many people masquerading under that name without any virtue and they were thus a burden on the community. There was no question of my condemning every one who was a *sanyasi* or a *sadhu*. I was laying stress on those who were productive people in the world and those who were not."

have great debates and arguments, slogans are raised, processions taken out demanding this and that. All these things are all right in their own place and I have no objection if they are for the right cause. Ultimately any political or economic policy needs to be backed by solid work. Nothing can be achieved by shouting slogans. Slogans may raise the people's enthusiasm. But it is strange that people have now begun to think that slogans and hooliganism can achieve things. If you wish to build a bridge and go and shout slogans from morning to night, the bridge cannot get constructed. However much you may leap and jump, the bridge will not get constructed until you have the knowledge to do so. If you know some engineering, you can hope to build a bridge. The world can go ahead only with the help of skilled workers and not by shouting slogans. It is trained and skilled workers like carpenters, farmers, blacksmiths, etc., who run the world, not agitators.

Nowadays, the weapon of hunger-strike is being resorted to more and more to influence people and to draw their attention. All sorts of demands are accompanied by fasts unto death and the whole thing is given wide publicity. If we indulge in such foolishness, do you think the country can make any progress? It seems to be some kind of a joke. People threaten to go on hunger strike for every little thing. We must try to understand where we are going and what we are trying to achieve. Our young men, especially, must realize that it will be their responsibility to run the country in the future. It will be the boys and girls who are in schools and colleges today who will one day assume the reins of governing the country. People of my generation may be able to work for another seven or eight years. Then others will have to take over and if our young men and women are not prepared to take on this responsibility or lack the capacity to hold the country together, it is obvious that the country will suffer. Ultimately a country's performance depends on the quality of her people. Mere numbers are of no account. What is important is the number of high class people in every sense of the word, in character and ability and scientific training. The higher the number of such people in a country, the greater it becomes. It is absurd to sit down and criticize and condemn the British or the Americans or the Russians and Chinese for being imperialists or something else. The fact is that all these countries are making progress because of their hard work and not by shouting and creating disturbances. Behind every policy, there is hard work. You argue about the policies and forget the hard work which accompanies them. If we want India to progress, we need to work very hard and train people well. It is of fundamental importance to develop habits of self-reliance and hard work and confidence in ourselves. Too much reliance on other countries is bad and weakens us.

While on the subject, I would like to tell you about something good that has happened in Rajasthan and Madhya Bharat. As you know, we have started

many river valley schemes like Bhakra-Nangal, Hirakud, Damodar Valley and many others in the South. They are very large—there are very few schemes in the world which are as large—and we have spent an enormous amount of money on them. There was an old demand for a similar scheme on the Chambal river from Rajasthan and Madhya Bharat but the Planning Commission was helpless for there was not enough money. Then both the provinces offered to take on much of the burden themselves. So it has now been included in the Plan by the Planning Commission. The money will come from somewhere or the other, but this kind of self-reliance and willingness to take on responsibility adds to our strength. Such habits should be encouraged and we have opened various schemes like the Post Office Savings Certificates, etc., to help us with the Chambal Project. In this way every individual can help in the construction of the dam, if he so wishes. But even more important is the fact that the people are determined to stand on their own legs. This will make them stronger for they are not out to beg or depend upon others. Therefore this Chambal Project is a very good thing and wherever I go, to any part of the country, I cite it as an example of how the people of Rajasthan and Madhya Bharat have come forward to help themselves.

The fact of the matter is that there is a strange problem in the world today. The work that is done easily and without any difficulty does not do much good and what is achieved through hard labour adds to our personal worth. If we are short of money and somehow manage to get crores of rupees from the rich countries, I can tell you quite clearly that our country will be ruined. I do not want crores of rupees from other countries. I may ask for their help occasionally but if that help makes us dependent upon them and less self-reliant, then we become weakened to that extent, which is not good. What we achieve through our hard work makes us stronger. That is real progress. I want you to help as much as you can in the Chambal Project, for it has become a symbol.

Rajasthan is a difficult province. Its deserts make life very hard but if there is proper irrigation, perhaps the State can become completely green and I hope that we shall be able to bring that about gradually. We can ensure the supply of water either by digging wells or building canals. If you read our ancient history, you will find that Rajasthan was not a desert a thousand or fifteen hundred years ago. It has gradually become so over the years. As to why it happened or is still happening in some places and how it can be stopped is something to be considered for there is no doubt about it that in the last thousand years, the desert has advanced a great deal. Most of these areas were well populated and green earlier. So we must try to stop it from becoming a desert. It is not something that is hidden. We can easily understand it and prevent it from advancing. It has been done in other areas in the world and there is no reason why it cannot be done here.

As I was saying, Rajasthan is an extremely hard place to live in, because of scarcity of water and other things, and yet it has produced innumerable great and brave men in the course of history. It was perhaps because the hard way of life produced strong men. When the living is soft, it makes people soft and useless. Generally mountain-folk are more hardy than the people living in the plains because life is more difficult in the mountains. Then again people in rural areas are harder than the city-folk. These comparisons can be made, but that does not mean that all the people living in cities must necessarily be soft. There is no reason for them to become soft except that the force of circumstances makes them so. We have to build a strong nation consisting of people of strong bodies, strong minds, and strong character, with the will to work. We want all the people in the country to be like that. Let me tell you that what bothers me most is the fact that there are innumerable little children in India who are not properly looked after. I do feel bad about the needy adults too, but I can put up with the fact that they do not get everything. But when I see the children, who will have to shoulder the responsibilities of the country in the future, going without even the basic necessities, when I see the future of India going hungry and naked, I feel very sad. It is a deplorable shortcoming of our government, or any government, if it is not able to provide all the children with adequate food and clothing and education. It is the first and foremost duty of government. As you know, we have good schools and colleges, but there are innumerable boys and girls who do not get the opportunity to attend them which is a sad thing.

These are some of the problems that confront us all the time. We are gathered here today for an auspicious task with which the entire future of India is tied up. We are doing this for the future of the country. It is not like your going to schools and colleges so that a degree may help you get a government job. Once it becomes clear that a degree does not automatically give you a job, perhaps the value of a B.A. or an M.A. degree will go up, because you would be studying this for the sake of knowledge and training for life in future, instead of being merely a licence for a job.

The new electronic centre that we are building seems like a piece of India's future to me because if there is to be progress in the country, we have to advance in these new fields. We may not be able to see the benefits immediately but we shall be laying the foundations of the basic skills which will be of great benefit in the future. The question that we are constantly facing is whether we should work for the well-being of the people now and strive for their future prosperity. If we spend whatever now we have for immediate relief, we shall certainly get some benefit but it will create difficulties in the future. It is far better to lay the foundations for a better future, even if we have to face some hardships and difficulties today. We must be prepared to bear some burdens today so that the next generation may

have a better life. We are building a nation and the life of a nation is undying, though individuals may come and go. So we have to lay the foundations firmly. The task of nation-building is never-ending but unless the foundations are laid properly, the edifice cannot be a stable one.

So it is with great pleasure that I have come here. When I came to Pilani earlier, I remember I was very happy to see that a desert area like this had become such a large centre of learning of various kinds. I would have gladly come here willingly anyhow, but I am doubly happy to be here to perform this special task. I am sorry that Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who was to have been present, could not come. This concerns his Ministry specially but unfortunately he developed fever. Otherwise he would have come and been very happy to see this. But you must remember that whether schools or colleges or electronics or whatever come up, ultimately their aim is the welfare of the people of India, and the progress and well-being of the millions who live here. *Jai Hind*.

3. Development of Atomic Energy¹

Ministers will be interested to read an article which appeared in the American magazine *Look* of July 14th, 1953.² This article deals with atomic energy developments and is by Gordon Dean,³ who for three years was head of the American Atomic Energy Commission.

2. Atomic energy work is top secret in every country and little is known about it. Occasionally, we hear of some experimental explosion of an atomic bomb. Some months ago, it was announced that the USSR had developed a hydrogen bomb.⁴ The work of atomic energy is so secret that even allied countries seldom trust each other fully. The USA, in particular, has tried to

1. Note, 25 September 1953. File No. 17(30)/47-PMS.

2. In his article entitled 'We Are in a Life and Death Atom Bomb Race', Gordon Dean dealt with the development of atomic energy in various countries.

3. Gordon Evans Dean (1905-1958); Master of Law from Duke University, US, 1932; Chief of the Appellate Section of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, 1936; commissioned as Lieutenant in the Navy, 1943-45; appointed Chairman, US Atomic Energy Commission, 1950; contributed to various publications on law.

4. On 8 August 1953, Malenkov, Soviet Prime Minister, had announced at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet that the Soviet Union had exploded the hydrogen bomb somewhere in the country.

keep its secrets to itself in the belief that it was far ahead of other countries and should maintain this lead.

3. The importance of these developments in atomic energy is obvious. They are thought of chiefly in connection with war and the use of the atomic bomb, as well as other weapons involving the use of atomic energy. Even the atom bomb is somewhat put in the shade by the hydrogen bomb. But, apart from use in war, atomic energy is of great significance as power for civil use. In countries where power is cheap and abundant, as in the USA, this aspect is not important. But where power is neither cheap nor easily available, this civil use of atomic power is of the greatest importance. Thus, in India, atomic power might well be of great importance in developing the country, and more especially certain regions where any other method of developing power might not be feasible or might be far too expensive. Even now atomic power can be used for civil purposes, though it is rather expensive. But it is highly likely that in another ten or fifteen years this expense will go down and the use of atomic energy as power will become completely feasible.

4. It is from this point of view that we have been considering the development of atomic energy in India. We are not interested in atomic bombs, and, indeed, we are not in a position to undertake any such manufacture. Many countries in Europe, and some elsewhere, are also interested in atomic energy for civil use and have made considerable progress in experiments and in building up what are called "reactors". A country which wants to use atomic energy for civil purposes cannot rely on other countries making this knowledge and know-how and technical apparatus available. It has to develop its own scientific competence and industrial know-how and capacity. It should, of course, have the raw-materials and it must have the determination to unite these various elements in a coordinated programme.

5. The article by Mr Gordon Dean gives a survey of world developments as they were about three or four months ago. Even during this intervening period, other developments have taken place, notably the hydrogen bomb explosion in the Soviet Union. The article, however, gives a fair picture of world developments. The USA is still probably the most advanced country in this respect. But the USSR is close behind, and these two countries are followed by the United Kingdom. It is these three countries which have thus far produced atomic bombs.

6. It is worth noting, as Gordon Dean points out, that the development of atomic energy was largely conceived outside the United States. The first beginnings were in Germany in 1939.⁵ Subsequently a number of eminent

5. Arriving in New York on 16 January 1939, Niels Bohr, an eminent Danish Physicist, announced that two scientists of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, namely, Hahn and Strassmann, had split the uranium atom.

scientists from Europe went to America either as refugees from the Hitler regime or because of other reasons, and it was they who supplied the foundation for atomic development in the USA during war time. It has to be remembered, therefore, that the basic science for this purpose has come from Western Europe, although others in America and elsewhere have trained themselves and are playing an important part now.

7. The USSR knew nothing about this till the end of the last world war. It was only after the Hiroshima bombing in 1945 that the USSR woke up to the importance of this new and terrible weapon. They then directed their energy to developing atomic weapons. The fact that within a few years they produced an atomic bomb,⁶ and later the hydrogen bomb, indicates the rapid progress they have made and the fact that they have the scientific competence and industrial know-how and capacity. It is now a race between them and the USA in which the Soviet Union is only about two or three years behind. There is thus not very much difference between the two and this period may be shortened or lengthened according to developments in either country. Both are going full steam ahead.

8. In this connection it is interesting to read what Gordon Dean has to say about India. He says: "India has the most advanced atomic-energy programme in all Asia outside that of the Soviet Union. She should have her first reactor within two years⁷ and with no help so far from the US. She has the necessary natural resources, some good talent and ambitious plans."

9. France and Canada also make fissionable material. They have not tried to make atomic bombs, but if fissionable material can be made, so can bombs later on. Other countries which are developing atomic energy for civil purposes and usually have reactors are Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy.⁸ Switzerland is going to build up a powerful atomic research centre in cooperation with several Western European countries. Germany has been prevented from developing atomic energy, but there is no doubt that she has great scientists and, given the chance, can make rapid progress.

10. Outside Europe, including the Soviet Union, and North America, the only other countries which are proceeding with atomic energy programmes are Australia and Brazil. About Brazil, Gordon Dean says: "Brazil is to South America in atomic energy, what India is to Asia—the most aggressive country

6. The Soviet Union tested one atom bomb in the summer of 1949 and two more in the fall of 1951.

7. 'Apsara', the first reactor in Asia located in Trombay in Mumbai, became operational on 4 August 1956. This is a 'swimming pool type' reactor using enriched uranium as fuel.

8. At this time while Norway and Netherlands jointly operated a reactor near Oslo, Sweden was making progress with her first nuclear reactor and had plans for another.

on the continent. Bombs are not her end product. She is determined to find the answer to cheaper power from atomic fission."

11. In India we have decided to build up a reactor on a small scale to begin with. Other developments are also taking place in Travancore-Cochin and in Bombay. There is some cooperation with the French Atomic Energy Commission, and we have maintained contacts with the UK and some other countries in the continent. The USA did not encourage such contacts with any country, but since the realization that India is making some marked progress, there is a tendency in other countries, including the USA, to have contacts with Indian atomic energy work. We have valuable deposits of uranium and other minerals which are necessary for this work. We can trade them in exchange for help in various ways.

12. The importance of developing atomic energy for civil use in our country is patent.

VI. ENVIRONMENT

1. Planting of Trees¹

There is a great deal of talk about planting trees, Vana Mahotsava,² etc., and no doubt many trees are planted. At the same time, many other trees are being cut down and many of those that are planted do not survive. It seems to me that we are not directing our minds to this question in a scientific and practical way.

2. One of the biggest dangers to India is the spread of the desert and the rapid erosion of the land. Instead of our planting trees all over the place, I think that we should concentrate and deal with this basic problem. I know that something is being done, but I do not think it is nearly enough. For the last five or six years I have heard talk about this problem and have been told that it is being tackled. I do not know what the results are, but so far as I know they are not appreciable.

3. I should like to know precisely what is being done in regard to this basic problem and soil erosion. I am not referring to soil erosion generally,

1. Note for Minister of Food and Agriculture, 24 July 1953. File No. 31(81)/49-PMS.

2. The Vana Mahotsava festival was first held on 1 July 1950.

although that is important, but rather to the erosion bordering desert belts. That becomes a part of the desert problem.

4. This is eminently a question for the Planning Commission to consider. They have said something about it in their report. But the Ministry of Agriculture and the Planning Commission should give their joint attention to this matter and evolve some really big scheme to meet this menace.

5. I enclose a copy of a letter that Shri B. Das, MP, has sent me³ in which he suggests that an expert committee might be appointed. This might be desirable, but before any step of this kind is taken, I should like to know what exactly is being done and what results have been achieved in the course of the last few years.

3. In his letter of 21 July, B. Das had suggested appointment of an expert committee to suggest methods to fight the menace of locust invasion and for prevention of the spread of desert and consequent problems of duststorms and water scarcity in the western parts of India.

2. Vana Mahotsava Campaign¹

I did not doubt the value of the Vana Mahotsava Campaign, but it seemed to me that it was far more important to stop the desert from spreading. It is obvious that this is going on spreading. For the last six years, to my knowledge we have been discussing this matter, but little seems to have been done. Apparently a scheme has now been produced and a Research Station established at Jodhpur² and it is proposed to set up what is called a Central Organization for Soil Conservation.³ Somehow everything leads up to the setting up of a fresh Government Department. I am beginning to be very nervous about these additions.

1. Note to Minister of Agriculture, 13 August 1953. JN Collection.
2. It was set up to deal with the question of immobilization of the Rajasthan desert under the aegis of the Forest Research Institute, Dehra Dun.
3. The Government of India proposed to set up the organization: (1) to organize and initiate research in soil conservation on various types of lands used for different purposes like forestry, agriculture and grazing; (2) assist the States in the enactment of suitable legislation; (3) facilitate the formation of cooperative association of farmers; and (4) coordinate inter-State soil conservation projects.

This organization for soil conservation is supposed to lead to the creation of an all-India organization coordinating the Rajputana Desert Scheme with other things. All this sounds excellent, but it also means more officers, more bureaucracy, more delays, more noting and more conferences and less results.

I was not nervous because of what Shri B. Das wrote, but I wanted to know something about this matter and I have been concerned about it for the last five or six years.

If we are told that progress cannot be made because of the difficulty in acquisition of land, all I can say is that we are not serious about this matter.

3. The Bharatpur Bird Sanctuary¹

Mr Horace Alexander² came to see me today. He told me that there is a famous bird preserve (heronry) in Bharatpur State. He himself went to see it, but to his surprise found that the place was deserted and the herons were not there. Something had happened to prevent them from following their usual practice. There was some suspicion that some people had deliberately done this to prevent the birds from coming. Possibly, the water supply had been diverted.

2. This matter has been referred both to the Rajasthan Government and to the Inspector-General of Forests here. I enclose a note by Mr Horace Alexander.³

3. I should like you to write to the Rajasthan Government about this and also to the Food and Agriculture Ministry. There is just a possibility that they might not pay attention to this matter and that would be a tragedy and this famous preserve will be spoiled as the birds will then go elsewhere. In fact, the Rajasthan Government has declared this preserve as a bird sanctuary. But, it can only remain a bird sanctuary if it is looked after properly. I want you to write in order to make both the Rajasthan Government and our Food and Agriculture Ministry realize that we attach importance to this.

1. Note to Principal Private Secretary, 8 September 1953. File No. 7(277)/53-PMS.
2. An English Quaker who was close to Mahatma Gandhi.
3. Writing on 3 September, Horace Alexander suggested that in order to facilitate a large-scale breeding of birds that year, Kevladeo Ghana, the bird sanctuary near Bharatpur, might be flooded immediately.

VII. EDUCATION

(i) Visva-Bharati

1. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
July 24, 1953

My dear Maulana,

You know that Rathindranath Tagore has resigned from his Vice-Chancellorship of Visva-Bharati University. He has written a letter² to me, a copy of which I enclose.

In this letter he complains about the constant interference of the Ministry of Education and the "hectoring" attitude of the Ministry in regard to many matters. He gives some instances of this. I do not know all the facts, but *prima facie* I feel that Rathin Babu's complaint may have some justification.

I shall be grateful if you will kindly look into this matter. I think that it should be almost a rule that any important communication to a university should be sent by the Secretary himself.

During the five or six years I have been here, I have constantly been surprised at the tone and content of official communications that are sent from our Ministries. There is a lack of courtesy in them and sometimes an aggressiveness which irritates the recipient. I have found this kind of thing in some letters from the Education Ministry. It is not the fault of those who write those letters, because they are merely carrying on an old practice, but the old practice is not good enough and creates trouble.

I think that the Ministry should interfere as little as possible in the functioning of the University.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 40(117)/50-PMS.
2. Tagore, in his letter of 18 July, expressed regret that the Ministry of Education had "promptly challenged the appointment" of Roy B. North to the Chair of English at the University for a period of five years and "demanded explanation." He resented the "Ministry's hectoring attitude and their insistence to treat the Chair as a thing separate from the academic set up of the University."

2. To Rathindranath Tagore¹

Camp: Ranikhet
September 28, 1953

My dear Rathin Babu,

Thank you for your letter of the 24th September.

You need not worry yourself about this matter any further. I think that it would, perhaps, have been better if I had not written to you at all on this subject. It was not my intention, and it is not my intention now, to press the Karma Samiti to accept any particular name. That would be improper in any case for me, more especially when I do not know the others. My suggestion was entirely a suggestion only.² What worried me was that after your telling me that my letter would be placed before the Karma Samiti, you did not do so. But you have explained that and there is nothing more to be said about it.

I have made it clear to some friends in the Karma Samiti that they have perfect freedom of choice in this matter and they need not think that I wish to press them to do something against their will. Naturally, I am anxious that a good person should be chosen and, more especially, a person not involved in the internal politics of Visva-Bharati.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Nehru regretted termination of Rathindranath Tagore's association with Visva-Bharati for reasons of health and suggested the appointment of K.C. Sen, ICS, to succeed him as Vice-Chancellor.

VII. EDUCATION (ii) General

1. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
July 11, 1953

My dear Maulana,

Your letter of the 11th July about the University Grants Commission Bill.

As the Cabinet has already considered this matter and suggested that the

1. JN Collection.

draft Bill be sent to the universities, I do not see how we can go behind that decision without a fresh consideration by Cabinet. On the merits also, I feel that it will facilitate the passage of the Bill if it is previously sent to these people.

I would suggest that you should send the Bill to all of them for their information. You need not specifically ask them for their opinion about the draft. That is a courtesy which is due to them anyhow. In this matter, as in most others, little progress can be made without the cooperation of the universities concerned. Therefore, an act of courtesy of this kind will be appreciated by them and will lead to a more cooperative approach.

There is no question of the power of the Central Government in regard to such a legislation. Nor is there any question of the Government waiting till every vice-chancellor approves of the step. As far as I can see, there is no chance of this Bill being considered at the next session of Parliament. Therefore there is no delay involved.

I suggest, therefore, that the draft Bill should be sent to these vice-chancellors for their information. You need not state in it that they should convey their comments on it by a certain date, etc. If any chooses to write to you about it, naturally you will consider what they say. But the final decision will be yours.²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. On 9 November 1953, the Government of India announced the setting up of the University Grants Commission with S.S. Bhatnagar as Chairman.

2. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
September 11, 1953

My dear Maulana,

I received your letter about the Education allotment two days ago. I am enquiring about this and shall write to you again.

1. JN Collection.

Meanwhile, I am greatly troubled over the state of education all over India. No doubt, this is largely a State matter and universities are autonomous. But if we have any concern with this, as of course we have, then we are partly responsible also. Anyhow, we cannot see the whole system go to pieces. What has happened in Allahabad² and Lucknow³ and is happening elsewhere appears to me to be full of dangerous potentialities.

Something has to be done about this. Apart from dealing with a particular situation, we have to create a positive and dynamic approach in the public mind to education. I have a feeling that we have been wholly unable to do so and that our work is rather of a static character. We have put up some good institutions. That is to our credit. But the general system of education, whether university or secondary, goes from bad to worse. I do not think this is a question of money, although money is required of course. There is something inherently wrong about it.

Another difficulty that I have noticed is that we move so slowly that even the monies allotted for education are not spent. We claim more money, but cannot spend what we have, and it lapses. Sometimes this is partly due to delays in the Finance Ministry. But I have found, as I wrote to you sometime ago, that often nearly nine months of the financial year are over before steps are taken to spend the money.

This leads me to think that the real difficulty is not of lack of money but that there are other hurdles and obstructions. It is easy enough, of course, to spend any amount of money by giving grants. But that might well mean a complete waste of that money because universities, etc., today are not being run properly. The basic question is ultimately not of money, but of creating that dynamic new conception which gradually changes the whole of our educational system.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. The Allahabad University was closed for three weeks from 14 August 1953 when the students started an agitation to press their demand for maintaining the autonomous character of the university.
3. Agitation on similar lines was started by the students of Lucknow University on 20 August leading to closure of the university on 29 August and expulsion of fourteen students on charges of "gross indiscipline and misbehaviour". The university reopened on 5 October.

VIII. SPORTS

(i) Mountaineering

1. To Tenzing Norgay¹

New Delhi
August 26, 1953

My dear Tenzing,²

Thank you for your letter of the 18th August, which I was glad to receive.

It is clear that you must have another house to live in. You can either build this new house or buy an old house. Dr B.C. Roy told me that he had reserved a good plot of land for you. Even so, it will take some time before a new house is built. Till then you should have another house to live in. I have written to Dr B.C. Roy about this³ and I am sure he will give you every help.

I have not yet received the stone from Mount Everest, which you collected and which you have sent me. I shall indeed be very happy to have it.

It is not surprising that many of your friends should come to visit you. But one cannot always live without doing some kind of work. I hope that Dr Roy's scheme to establish a mountaineering school in Darjeeling will take shape and you will be associated with it.⁴ Our Defence Ministry will also be interested in such a school.

You ask me about the invitations you are getting from all parts of India and from abroad. It is good to visit some places from time to time, but too much travelling about from place to place is not very good. I think that visits outside India should be avoided for the present. In India, an occasional visit may be made. But, to begin with, it would be better to settle down in

1. JN Collection. Also available in File No. 2(707)/53-PMS.
2. Tenzing Norgay, a Sherpa, and Edmund Hillary, a mountaineer from New Zealand, were the first to successfully climb Mount Everest on 29 May 1953.
3. Appreciating the difficulty of Tenzing living in a one-room house, Nehru asked B.C. Roy on 26 August to instruct the District Magistrate at Darjeeling to find a suitable house for him to live in till such time as more permanent arrangements were made.
4. The West Bengal Government had drawn up a scheme for the establishment of a mountaineering institute at Burchill, near Darjeeling. Tenzing was to be the Chief Instructor and six Sherpas were also to be on the staff.

Darjeeling, that is, to fix up your new house and to get going with the scheme for the mountaineering school. That school will take some time to be built. But we can start drawing up the scheme. I am writing to Dr B.C. Roy about it.

You will remember leaving some letters with me about the writing and publishing of a book about you. I shall deal with these matters soon and write to you about them.

You can always write to me for any advice or help of any kind. You need not trouble to write in English. If it is easier for you to write in Hindi, you can do so and I shall also reply in Hindi.

With all good wishes to you, your wife and your children.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
September 15, 1953

My dear Bidhan,

Thank you for your letter of the 14th about the Institute of Mountaineering. I have not read all the papers that you have sent, but I shall go through them and have them examined. I quite agree with you that we should help the Sherpas in every way.

As for the Institute of Mountaineering, it was suggested by you I think that this should not be a purely official organization. It should be more or less non-official but receiving Government help and having Government representatives on it. I think that, if we made an appeal for membership of such an organization, we will get a considerable response from all over India.

It should not be difficult to find the money you have mentioned, either the capital cost or the recurring cost.² Part of it should come from private sources mentioned above. The rest could be shared between the Government of West Bengal and the Government of India. Two Ministries

1. File No. 40(3)/56-PMS.

2. The initial expenditure of the institute was estimated to be Rs 625,000 and the recurring expenditure about a lakh annually.

of the Government of India are interested in this: the Defence Ministry and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research. Both could share.

I do not think the financial aspect will offer any considerable difficulty.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

VIII. SPORTS

(ii) Cricket

1. Charity Cricket Match¹

I am Jawaharlal Nehru speaking, rather a bogus captain of the cricket team. The captain may not be good but the team is good. Anyhow I hope that both the captain and the team play cricket in the correct sense of the word whether the cricket is high class or not.

We have had this match since yesterday² and I think that those who have come here to watch it have had a good time, and we who have played it have also had a good time in playing a good game in the spirit of the game. We have had hard hitting, hurricane scoring, and we have had slogging for hours, and everything in between. And we have had, I think, also on both sides, a desire to play the game in the best way possible. We are out to play the game, not to win or lose so much. You will see that those who are playing here belong to all parties in Parliament, from the extreme Right to the extreme Left, but we are playing here in a spirit of comradeship, and I hope and believe that we can extend this spirit of comradeship to the wider game that we play, for the good of India.

Now, you know, or perhaps you do not, that I have come on the cricket

1. A running commentary given by Nehru at a Charity Cricket Match between the Prime Minister's XI and the Vice-President's XI, played in Delhi, 13 September 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.
2. The Prime Minister's XI declared after scoring 220 for 3 in the first innings and 169 for 3 in the second innings. In reply the Vice-President's XI scored 233 for 6 declared in the first innings and 95 for 5 in the second. The match ended in a draw.

field with the intention of playing after more than four decades. I have not handled a bat or a ball on the cricket field for all these long years.

I have not even had any practice of any kind at the nets or elsewhere. But when I saw this crowd and the eagerness of everyone here I had to give up my resolution not to play myself and I had to go into the field and even attempt yesterday to bowl, and possibly today I might also try to bat. Of course both my batting and bowling will not be of what might be called a high standard. But that does not really very much matter. We will try to do our best.

I think that we Members of Parliament have set a good example to ourselves first of all, and to others by having this game. We are having it, you know, for the relief of the innumerable people in India who are suffering from floods. It is a noble cause. People really do not know even in India, and much less outside, how terrible the floods have been and what enormous damage the people have had to suffer in Bihar, in Andhra, in the Godavari area, and in some districts of UP. It is enormous, colossal, the suffering and the damage. So it is a noble cause and I hope all of you will remember those people who are suffering there and help them not only through this cricket match but otherwise too.

Well, as I was talking to you there was a huge shout because somebody was run out—Viswanatha Reddy has just been run out. That means one wicket down in the second innings of my team with five minutes more to play.

2. Aid for Flood Victims¹

Auctioneering is a new business for me. So if there is any shortcoming on my part I want you to make up for it.

There was a five-day cricket match between India and West Indies in Delhi in 1948, between the 10th and the 14th of November.² Many of you may have watched the match. The West Indies had sent a very good team and

1. Speech at a public meeting while auctioning cricket bats and the score book on conclusion of a two-day Parliamentarians' cricket match, New Delhi, 13 September 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.
2. The West Indies team was captained by J.D. Goddard. Lala Amarnath was the Captain of the Indian team.

a match was played for five days. I do not remember what the result was. Perhaps the West Indies won. Was it a draw?³ Well, whatever it was, the West Indies and Indian teams jointly presented me with a beautiful bat with their signatures on it and it has been with me for the last five years. So that is the first bat. Another team—the Commonwealth team—visited us three years ago or perhaps three and a half years ago,⁴ in 1950, and there was a test match between them and the Indian team in Kanpur.⁵ Both the teams had presented me with this other bat bearing the signatures on it. I would first take the bat bearing the signatures of the West Indies team and put it up for auction.

You have heard the announcement that the price has gone up to three thousand rupees. Now if there is anyone generous enough to offer more, he must raise his voice and he shall get it. There seems to be no bid from anyone.

If it is to be deducted from the compensation, I shall offer ten thousand. I am also a refugee, after all. Speak up anyone willing to give more than three thousand? Somebody said three thousand five hundred but someone else has offered four thousand. Perhaps it was Bawa Bachittar Singh⁶ who made the first offer and the Rajmata of Tehri-Garhwal⁷, the second. Now, Bawa Bachittar Singh says 4,500. What? The Rajmata offers 5,000. Wait, let me hear. What? Bachittar Singh says 5,500. Please remember that the money is for flood victims. It is not a great price to pay. Everyone should contribute and in this case you will get a beautiful memento. Now the bid is 5,500. 5,500 once, 6,000, 6,000 once, 6,000 twice, 6,000 thrice⁸.

The cap seems to be held in great respect. Yes, what did you say? 500 for one *topi*. Please remember, I shall auction only the cap. I shall not remove any of my other garments. Do you know, once my handkerchief was auctioned for 6,000. Anyhow, 500 for the *topi*. Rajmata has said 700, Mani Bhai, 1,000. Many of my colleagues here are objecting to my auctioning my cap because they feel that my honour is tied up in it. All right.

3. The match ended in a draw.

4. The Commonwealth team under the captaincy of L. Ames of England came to India in October 1950 on a five-month tour.

5. From 8 to 12 February 1951.

6. Chief of the Delhi State Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee and Vice-President, Delhi Municipality; owner of a crockery house in Delhi; died 1976.

7. Kamalendu Mati Shah (b.1903); Rajmata of Tehri-Gerhwal, UP; Member, House of the People, 1952.

8. The Rajmata bid Rs 6,000.

Now, this is the score book which records yesterday's and today's scores. This is also going to be auctioned. In the beginning, Sardar Surjeet Singh Majithia⁹ had offered 250 for it as he said it contained his name. 250. I can also autograph it. The two captains will also sign. 250? 500. Gone.

Now, is that over? I wanted to mention one thing which has no particular bearing on this occasion. These cricket matches have been organized because of the enthusiasm of the sports lovers and rightly so. But perhaps if the occasion had not been provided by the need to help the flood victims, the matches would not have taken place because the weather is not quite right for cricket. A month or two later, the season would have been more appropriate. It was difficult playing in this heat. But the matches were necessitated by the floods in Bihar and the Godavari region and in eastern UP. Perhaps many of you may not have realized their full implications. These were extraordinarily virulent floods in which thousands of villages were washed away in Andhra, Bihar and the UP. We are deeply moved when we read about natural calamities in far-off Japan and Asia and Europe. But these floods were of a much larger magnitude and they have affected millions of lives.

Anyhow, we have been able to help a little through these matches. Shri Poddar¹⁰ tells me that apart from the money received through these auctions, he has donated Rs 1,000. All of you must contribute generously. I should like to mention one thing more in this connection. I have had something with me for the last three years which has been a real burden to me. Three years ago, when I returned from Europe, a "welcome home" committee was formed and it presented me very lovingly with a replica of an Asoka Pillar, studded with precious stones. Now, what am I to do with such a thing? I cannot understand what I should do, for I am scared of precious stones and metals. It is extremely heavy and I was told that its price is eighty or ninety thousands or a lakh. It is lying in my godown for the past three years and I propose to put it to some use to help the flood victims. The question is how to utilize it because it would be useless to auction it. Perhaps it could be put on display and the ticket to view may fetch some money. I am informing you about it.

9. Deputy Minister for Defence, Government of India.

10. Ramanath Anandilal Poddar (b. 1910); an industrialist and businessman; Councillor, Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1934-52; Member, Constitutional Reforms Advisory Committee, Jaipur State, 1943; became a Member of Parliament, 1952.

IX. ART AND CULTURE

1. To U Nu¹

New Delhi
August 23, 1953

My dear U Nu,²

I was surprised to receive your letter of the 3rd August and a copy of your play "The People Win Through."³ I was surprised because I did not know that you had written a play. I read this play with great interest and found it quite gripping in its flow of events and the manner of presentation. I had no idea that among your many remarkable qualities was this capacity for writing a good dramatic piece. I congratulate you upon it.

I shall very gladly see the film of this play⁴ when it comes to Delhi. It is very seldom that I go to the cinema here, but I shall certainly try to go to this performance when it takes place in Delhi.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Prime Minister of Myanmar.
3. The play depicted the actual happenings when the Burmese Communists staged an insurrection. It was translated into English by Edward Hunter and published by Taplinger Publishing Company of New York in 1957.
4. The Cascade Pictures Corporation of America filmed it in Myanmar in 1953 with an entirely Burmese cast under the title 'Rebellion'.

2. Delhi—A City with an Inner Spirit¹

Sadr Saheb, sisters and brothers,

I had come to have some fun but that seems a little difficult. When I am

1. Speech at the inauguration of "Phool Walon Ki Sair" (Festival of Flowers), Delhi, 23 August 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi. The fair having been started during Mughal period, was revived in 1953 with great fanfare under the patronage of the Delhi State Government after it remained suspended during World War II and the partition days. The fair symbolizes the secular character of the city of Delhi as members of the Hindu and Muslim communities join the fair which is marked by offering of worship at an ancient Jogmaya temple in Mehrauli on the outskirts of Delhi and singing of qawalis at the Durgah of a sufi saint near the temple.

bogged down by my problems and immersed in work, it is difficult to have whole-hearted fun. When Shri Sham Nath² invited me to come here I accepted the invitation happily because gradually I too am acquiring the right to be called a *Delhiwala* though unfortunately I live in New Delhi. New Delhi has a great many new buildings but it is a city of brick and mortar, without character. It is said that what is known as Old Delhi or Shahjahanabad today is the seventh city to be founded here. New Delhi is the eighth. The foundations are thousands of years old and this soil has witnessed a great deal. If someone were to sit down and write the history of Delhi in full, it will perhaps reflect the history of the whole of India in a sense. I am not talking merely of kings and emperors though there have been great and powerful emperors here. I am talking of Delhi's culture, its traditions and civilization which go back into its ancient past, and of the streams of thought and philosophy which flowed in from outside and intermingled with Indian thought and philosophy, influencing and being influenced in turn, and ultimately merging completely with the indigenous culture and tradition. Perhaps Delhi is the biggest example of the external influence on India's life and thought. The last to come was European civilization, bringing new ideas and thoughts with it in the last 150 years and that too was absorbed in the Indian mainstream to some extent. Thus Delhi has always stood as a symbol of synthesis, of maintaining its own character firmly and at the same time throwing the windows of its mind wide open to receive new ideas and thoughts. The moment a nation closes its mind and is no longer receptive to new ideas and begins to live in its own narrow grooves, it stops growing. It shrinks within itself and perhaps this is how Delhi and India too shrank within themselves and began to live within their own narrow grooves. Delhi is a large and ancient city and yet, as it often happens with large and ancient cities, it is something more than a city. It is a city not merely of buildings, but of ideas, of historicity with an inner spirit. Who knows how many ideas have flowed through its mind and the number of upheavals and ups and downs that it has seen in the last thousands of years? It has been through innumerable experiences, good and bad. It has faced great adversities and also seen days of happiness. All these have settled down layer by layer upon the consciousness of Delhi from which has emerged the present city of Delhi. If you try to define its boundaries, you will belittle its greatness.

These thoughts crowd into my mind, when I leave New Delhi and come to Old Delhi or when I come out and gaze upon these broken-down ruins. But in the same train of thoughts, I should like to mention that when I look around me, I find certain things which make me rather uncomfortable. It is these posters advertising various drinks—and their exhortations make me more

2. A prominent Congressman and the Mayor of Delhi.

than ever determined not to taste them—which ruin the facade of these ancient buildings. Who are the people who permit all these lurid-coloured posters to be put up? If they wish to put up posters, let them go and do it somewhere else. They should at least spare our ancient historical buildings.

I was talking about Delhi. Perhaps it is not quite proper that I should object to these things for they too are the symbols of a new world. I try to get away from them but there is no escape. This is the influence of British rule and rightly so, for England and Europe had made a tremendous progress which is how they conquered India. They had made progress in science and fine arts, and were ahead in military might and wealth. We had to learn from them or we would have remained backward. Unfortunately what we often seem to be learning is not their science and arts, but a superficial veneer of modernity which does not add to our strength in any way but makes us poor imitations of the British. We must learn not to copy others blindly in superficial matters but in the real things which have contributed to Europe's might. We have to learn the techniques by which many countries of Europe have managed to eliminate poverty and unemployment. We can learn a great deal from Europe and America and other countries in this regard. We must learn from others and at the same time not forget our old traditions, especially our old sports and dance and music and sense of fun, because ultimately life does not consist merely of sitting in an office the whole day. There are other things in life which are equally important. Therefore such fairs are good and very welcome for many reasons. For one thing, they gladden the heart and provide an opportunity for the various facets of Delhi to come together. Various traditions intermingle which is the glory of Delhi. Delhi does not have one facet but hundreds of different facets, all of which have to be understood and respected and cherished. Only then can you be a true citizen of Delhi, and not if you hide yourself in one corner and refuse to look at its other aspects and understand them. Therefore I was happy to hear that efforts were being made to revive the "Phoolwalon Ki Sair" fair. But I see that it is being conducted like a public meeting with speeches and lectures. We seem to have forgotten the art of amusing and entertaining ourselves except by giving and listening to speeches. This is indeed strange. I come to this fair and find that it has also been turned into a public meeting. When I asked Shri Sham Nath yesterday about it, he evaded the issue. I do not know where and when the other things will follow. You are welcome to them for I shall not see them. I only find that I am expected to address a public meeting. I have no objection to speaking at a public meeting. But as you know, after all, there is more in life than speaking at public meetings. There are other ways of entertainment and amusement. We must learn a little that way. So please do not have speeches and lectures at these fairs in the future. Let there be poetry reading and dancing and music or sports and games and swimming competitions or

whatever it is, instead of sitting in rows listening to speeches. I request Shri Shamnath and Chaudhri Brahm Perkash³ to see that such mistakes may not occur again and if a mistake has been made this time, let us put an end to it as quickly as possible. So I shall end my speech. *Jai Hind*.

3. Chief Minister, Delhi.

X. SOCIAL WELFARE

1. To V.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi

15 August, 1953

My dear V.T.,

I enclose a letter from G.C. Sondhi together with a report on the Punjab Youth Camps Project.²

According to this report, this whole scheme has failed because the organizer went from pillar to post and nobody seems to be responsible for the work to be done. There is the Planning Commission, of course, the Education Ministry, the Bharat Sevak Samaj and may be some youth department. There is also the Punjab Government and its various departments. As a result, somehow, decisions are not taken.

I do not know whose fault all this is. But it does appear to be a bad example of how things are not done simply because of division of responsibility.

I do not quite know how one can tackle this. I am sending you this letter. I am sending also a copy of the report (not Sondhi's letter) to Durgabai Deshmukh and the Education Ministry.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(284)/53-PMS.

2. In his letter of 13 August 1953, G.C. Sondhi wrote that he had to report "failure" of the Punjab Youth Camps Project, as he felt that "the lack of coordination and an integrated policy and programme and authority" was "really amazing in this brain trust institution, and calls for energetic new measures." He added that there was no agency and material to inform and inspire the workers and the people about the Plan.

2. To C. C. Biswas¹

New Delhi
15 September, 1953

My dear Biswas,²

I am receiving complaints from some Members of Parliament about the delay in giving effect to Bills relating to Hindu law reform. I am myself rather worried about this delay.³ A year and a half has passed since this Parliament began and we have not gone far with any of these Bills. I know you have given an undertaking that you will get them through. But it is risky to delay these matters. I should like them to be given top priority now. Could you give me some idea of what your time-table is for them?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Union Minister of Law.
3. The Hindu Code Bill was introduced as far back as 1949 with a view to reform the Hindu personal law relating to property, marriage, inheritance, divorce, guardianship and adoption. The codified Bill could not be passed until 1956 because of stiff resistance both in Parliament and outside.

3. Telegram to Vinoba Bhave¹

Pained and distressed to learn of attack on you and your colleagues by *pandas*.² I hope that you have received no injury and that others assaulted are recovering.

This stupid and brutal assault brings out forcibly the degradation of those who claim to serve religion and want to make it a vested interest of their own. It is a scandal that this kind of thing should continue.

With affectionate regards,

Jawaharlal

1. New Delhi, 21 September 1953. File No. 2(600)/51-PMS.
2. Three colleagues of Vinoba Bhave were injured at the entrance of the Baidyanath temple at Deoghar in Bihar when about fifty *pandas* attacked them on 18 September. Bhave, who was pleading for Harijans' entry into the temple since his arrival at Deoghar on 17 September, was also manhandled by the miscreants.

XI. MINORITIES

(i) Muslims

1. Attitude towards Muslims in India¹

A certain discretion has to be exercised about these matters and no hard and fast rule can be laid down. Normally it would be better to refer the case to the Rehabilitation Ministry and then, if necessary, to put it up before me. But sometimes it would be as well to consult me. Sometimes also I give an interview to a person without even knowing what he wants to say to me and then learn of his complaints.

It is difficult to judge what is a small matter and what is a big matter. Money is no criterion. It is the effect on an individual. If we can remove the unhappiness of an individual, that is something gained. In regard to the Muslims in India, I am particularly anxious that not only a legally correct but an equitable and generous attitude should be taken up. This, I think, is right. It is also politically highly expedient. Hence I take particular interest in individual cases if they come up before me. Normally of course it is better for them to go to the Rehabilitation Ministry first.

1. Note to Principal Private Secretary, 13 August 1953. JN Collection.

XI. MINORITIES

(ii) Sikhs

1. To P.S. Rau¹

New Delhi
July 23, 1953

My dear Rau,²

Thank you for your letter of July 22 giving me an account of Gian Singh

1. JN Collection.
2. Adviser to the Pepsu Government.

Rarewala's activities.³ To some extent I have been following them and come to the conclusion that he is completely irresponsible.... In private interviews he is all honey and submission and then he makes wild statements outside. He came to see me this morning with SGPC deputation about gurdwaras.⁴ I had half a mind to tell him what I thought of him, but I decided not to do so because others were present and the subject was gurdwaras.⁵ I have received a letter from Master Tara Singh about the demands and the threats of the Akali Dal. I have sent no reply to it, but my Secretary has briefly acknowledged it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. On 27 July, Gian Singh Rarewala, former Chief Minister of Pepsu, reiterated at a press conference in New Delhi the Sikh demand for 'territorial adjustments' between India and Pakistan to bring three important gurdwaras at Kartarpur, Hudiara and Bundana, situated on the Pakistan border, within Indian territory.
4. A four-man deputation comprising Pritam Singh Khuranj, President, Sarmukh Singh Chamak, Vice-President, Harnam Singh, Secretary of the SGPC, and Gian Singh Rarewala met Nehru.
5. After going through the memorandum submitted by the deputation, Nehru sought clarification as to how could Pakistan Government recognize the SGPC as a Trustee for the management and control of gurdwaras left in Pakistan.

2. Sikh Shrines in Pakistan¹

I received a deputation of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee this morning and they gave me the attached memorandum. Sardar Swaran Singh was also present at my request.

The memorandum is mixed with some legitimate demands and others which are hardly feasible. Anyhow, this is a matter of importance to the Sikhs and we have to take it up with the Pakistan Government.² The general principle is that we should protect shrines and sacred places both in India and Pakistan. Also that where properties are attached to them, they should not be wholly deprived of them, or, at any rate, some provision should be made for the maintenance of the shrines. Further, that access should be given to the shrines.

1. Note to the Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 23 July 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. See also *post*, pp. 427 and 434.

3. This matter has been raised previously and representations made on behalf of the Sikhs, I gather that there is a considerable file on this subject in the Commonwealth Section of this Ministry. This should be traced.

4. In Karachi I should certainly like this question of gurdwaras to be mentioned, but we can hardly go into any detail. This is a kind of thing that should be taken up in some detail by the Steering Committee or the Ministries concerned later. But it would be desirable for some general principle to be agreed to as a guide for further consideration....

3. To Bhimsen Sachar¹

New Delhi
August 3, 1953

My dear Sachar,²

I have seen a report from Amritsar about a meeting of the SA Dal held at Tarn Taran³ on July 27 and 28. At this meeting, various decisions were made about holding a Panthic Convention and later starting a big agitation, *morchas*, etc.⁴

You are no doubt keeping in touch with these developments. We cannot submit to this kind of agitation and we must be prepared to meet it with full strength. Therefore, we must chalk out our own line of action right from the beginning.

About one matter, I have already made it clear to you. This is in regard to certain Sikh depressed classes being included in the Scheduled Castes list. We are perfectly prepared to do so if your Government recommends it.

In this matter of the Akali Dal agitation, your Government and the Punjab PCC must cooperate as much as possible.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Chief Minister of Punjab.

3. The meeting of the Shiromani Akali Dal was held at Tarn Taran, near Amritsar, from 25 to 28 July 1953.

4. On 27 July, the Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal, in a resolution, decided to call a convention of the representatives of the Panth on 19 September at Anandpur Sahib to decide the future course of action in regard to its demands and gave an ultimatum to the Central Government that if their response was unfavourable the Akali Dal would start an agitation by sending seventy to eighty group of volunteers from Punjab and Pepsu to Delhi to court arrest.

XII. COMMUNALISM

1. To Bhimsen Sachar¹

New Delhi
August 4, 1953

My dear Sachar,

I have already written to you about the attacks on Kashmiri Muslim porters in Simla. I am enclosing a letter I have received from Mohammed Obaidullah². Probably you have received a copy of it already.

This is a very serious matter and your Government must deal with it firmly and with speed so as to make it clear that you will tolerate no communal nonsense. Every attempt should be made to get hold of the man who stabbed. The young man who is stabbed should be helped in every way.

In Mr Obaidullah's letter, reference is made to an Arya Samaj school being held in the Jama Mosque. I am surprised to learn of this. We have just been discussing in Karachi the question of shrines, gurdwaras, mosques, temples, etc., and the general principle we have accepted is that all such shrines should be protected and looked after properly. For the Arya Samaj to occupy a mosque is highly improper. I hope you will immediately look into this matter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. He was officer-in-charge, refugee camp, Chiniot, Shimla.

2. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
September 11, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

At my request the DIB has sent me a report on the Jamiat-i-Islami.² You will remember there was a question about it in Parliament.³

This report is interesting. I do not attach much importance to this utterly bigoted organization from the larger point of view. Similar organizations have created trouble in Islamic States like Indonesia, Egypt and Pakistan. They have been banned there. Nevertheless, one should be watchful. I do not know if we can ban it under our law. Certainly we should proscribe their books and pamphlets. Some of their well known leaders should be warned about their activities. It might be a good thing even to take one or two important ones under detention.

The States chiefly concerned might be informed of this so that they can watch their activities. Uttar Pradesh appears to be the chief State. Other areas are Hyderabad, Bihar, Malabar, Delhi, Bangalore, Calcutta, Nagpur, Jaipur and Tonk.

Perhaps the legal position might be examined.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection.

2. The report of B.N. Mullick, Director, Intelligence Bureau, had mentioned that the Jamiat-i-Islami, functioning under Syed Madoodi of Lahore, had its headquarters in Rampur. They had issued over 150 books and pamphlets about the widespread "dominance of Islam" through *jehad*. They had seventy-two centres in India to train a band of workers and propagandists. They owned newspapers like *Ajmal*, a daily from Mumbai, *Zindagi* of Rampur, *Al Insaaf* of Allahabad and *Miyan* of Delhi.

3. On 1 September, the activities of the Jamiat-i-Islami were the subject of an interpellation in the House of the People by Raghunath Singh, a Congress Member from Varanasi. K.N. Katju, the Home Minister, said in reply that the Government were keeping themselves informed of the activities of the organization and "appropriate action would be taken whenever it becomes necessary."

3. To Chief Ministers¹

New Delhi
September 20, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,

My colleague, the Home Minister, Dr Katju, is sending you separately a note on the reform of judicial administration in India. This note is a preliminary approach to this problem and we should like to have your comments on it before we consider it in detail. We shall also consult judicial authorities and others concerned. We do not, however, wish to go through any lengthy process of consultation. That would delay matters too much and we are anxious to go ahead. We shall make every effort to produce a Bill for Parliament next November.

2. I want to share with you a certain apprehension that is growing within me. I feel that in many ways the position relating to minority groups in India is deteriorating. Our Constitution is good and we do not make any distinction in our rules and regulations or laws. But, in effect, changes creep in because of administrative practices or officers. Often these changes are not deliberate, sometimes they are so.

3. In the Services, generally speaking, the representation of the minority communities is lessening. In some cases it is very poor indeed. It is true that some of the highest offices in the land are occupied by members of these minority communities. They occupy high places also in our foreign missions. But in looking through Central Government figures, as well as some others, I am distressed to find that the position is very disadvantageous to them, chiefly to the Muslims and sometimes others also.

4. In our Defence Services, there are hardly any Muslims left. In the vast Central Secretariat of Delhi, there are very few Muslims. Probably the position is somewhat better in the provinces, but not much more so. What concerns me most is that there is no effort being made to improve this situation, which is likely to grow worse unless checked.

5. It is all very well for us to say that we shall not pay any attention to communal and like considerations in appointments. I am no lover of communalism and its works. Indeed, I think it is the most dangerous tendency in India and has to be combated on all fronts. But, at the same time, we have

1. File No. 25(6)/53-PMS. This letter has also been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.) *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol. 3, (New Delhi, 1987), pp. 375-81.

to realize that in a vast and mixed country like India we must produce a sense of balance and of assurance of a square deal and future prospects in all parts of the country and in all communities of India. If the tendency is to upset any balance or to emphasize one aspect at the cost of another, the result is a lack of equilibrium and dissatisfaction and frustration among large groups.

6. This is exactly what is happening and it is not a good thing. I think we should make a very special effort to check this wrong tendency in so far as the Services are concerned. The question is a wider one than the Services, although the Services are an important part in the texture of India. We have to create a sense of partnership in every group and individual in the country, a sense of being a full sharer in the benefits and opportunities that are offered. It is only then that we produce the right attitude of mind. Nothing seems to me so unbecoming as to preach loyalty to others, meaning by that word "loyalty" that everyone should fall in step with us. This is very much like the approach of the Communists in some parts of the world and of the Americans in other parts of the world, each of whom demand uniformity and submission to their way of thinking and life. That brings conflict in the international sphere, and a like approach in the national sphere must inevitably lead to conflict also, apart from being intrinsically wrong.

7. I have referred to Muslims above, but this applies to Christians and others also. Unfortunately there is a feeling of apprehension among large numbers of our Christian countrymen and countrywomen, and many of them feel uncertain of their place in India in the future. We have always to remember India as a composite country, composite in many ways, in religion, in customs, in languages, in ways of life, etc. An attempt by the majority group to impose itself on others can only lead to inner conflicts, which are as bad as outer conflicts. The basic problem for us today in India is to build up a united India in the real and inner sense of the word, that is, a psychological integration of our people.

8. I find the language approach is often not very happy, though I think there has been an improvement in it lately. We want Hindi as the National Language and I think it is quite essential that this should be so. We have to work for it. But the method of working for it is of the highest importance. If that method is not the right one, then we get further away from our objective. The appeal of language is a very intimate and far-reaching one and has to be dealt with the greatest care. Anyone who has studied the history of Europe will find that language conflicts have created more difficulties than almost anything else. He will find that every attempt at the suppression of a language has had the opposite effect. With this experience behind them, Europeans now tend to accept even a variety of languages in order to avoid any

appearance of suppression or conflict. Small countries recognize officially several languages and sometimes even more than one script.

9. The right approach should always be a positive approach of encouraging a language, such as Hindi, never of discouraging any other or discriminating against any other. The whole question of linguistic provinces would lose part at least of the passion that accompanies it, if we are fair to every language and give it freedom of growth.

10. The question of Urdu and the way it is being treated in many parts of India, has distressed me greatly. This is not only for cultural reasons but even more so for basic political reasons. I could enter into the merits of this question and I think these merits are very substantial. But in such matters it is not merely merit that counts but a psychology that is created and the mental reaction that is produced among large numbers of people. There is no doubt at all that there are large numbers of people who speak and write Urdu. In the Punjab, in Delhi, and in the Northern UP, a very considerable number do so. In many other parts of India there are large groups, especially in the big cities. In fact, there are such groups all over India and sometimes the numbers are fairly large. I was surprised to find the number of people speaking and writing Urdu in the South, especially in the border regions of Hyderabad and Andhra. When I go there, my language is easily understood by most of the people.

11. That fact alone is important as showing that Urdu has a certain vitality in India, and creating an impression that we are against it must hurt those large numbers of people and make them feel that we are against something that they cherish. The test of this, as of other matters, is not what we feel about it but what those concerned feel; not what a majority thinks but how a minority reacts, for our objective always is to produce a sense of fulfilment in the minds of minority.

12. When I speak of Urdu, I include the Urdu or Persian script. This may be alien to us in some historical sense, but it has been in use in India to a considerable extent for many hundreds of years. It has been and is today a link with the world of Western Asia and partly Central Asia. It connects us politically and otherwise with countries whose friendship is important to us.

13. From the cultural point of view, Urdu brings in some trends which have in the past strengthened Hindi and in future might well do so. It is of course not a rival of Hindi; it cannot be. It may even gradually lessen in significance in India. That will be a historical growth. Gradually Hindi and Urdu might well approximate in phraseology and structure. The Nagari script is bound to become much more widespread as it should. But to endeavour to do this by creating an impression of suppressing Urdu and its script is a bad

policy and is a narrowing of our cultural outlook. Incidentally, it is opposed to the scheme of our Constitution.

14. But I am most concerned with the effect produced on large numbers. Even if that effect appears to us to be unreasonable, it is nevertheless a fact to be reckoned with from the political and the cultural points of view. We have to meet that situation wisely. There can be no doubt that there is a very strong feeling of distress and frustration, which is not confined to Muslims alone, but which is shared by a considerable number of Hindus and others, in regard to present policies being pursued relating to Urdu and its script. In some provinces, Government has taken definite steps to discourage Urdu and have stopped giving aid to schools where Urdu is taught. Many children and their parents who want to learn Urdu have no opportunity of doing so. Active and aggressive campaigns against Urdu are in progress in many places, as if Urdu was some dangerous enemy in our ranks. If that is so, then we tend to make those who believe in it also feel not only unhappy but rather hostile. I feel strongly on this subject because all my cultural standards are affected by it. Even more so, the future integration of India appears to me to suffer. Most of us seem to have forgotten the wisdom that inspired Gandhiji in his approach to some of the vital problems of our country. Among them was the language problem and he laid the greatest stress on our encouraging Urdu. Conditions have changed since then and perhaps we cannot go as far as Gandhiji wanted us to go in this respect. But the basic approach must still be the same and it would be an ill day if we surrendered to popular clamour and prejudice in this or any other matter.

15. The feeling of nationalism is an enlarging, and widening experience for the individual or the nation. More especially, when a country is under foreign domination, nationalism is a strengthening and unifying force. But a stage arrives when it might well have a narrowing influence. Sometimes, as in Europe, it becomes aggressive and chauvinistic and wants to impose itself on other countries and other people. Every people suffer from the strange delusion that they are the elect and better than all others. When they become strong and powerful, they try to impose themselves and their ways on others. In their attempt to do so, sometime or other, they overreach themselves, stumble and fall. That has been the fate of the intense nationalism of Germany and Japan.

16. But a more insidious form of nationalism is the narrowness of mind that it develops within a country, when a majority thinks itself as the entire nation and in its attempt to absorb the minority actually separates them even more. We, in India, have to be particularly careful of this because of our tradition of caste and separatism. We have a tendency to fall into separate groups and to forget the larger unity.

17. Communal organizations are the clearest examples of extreme narrowness of outlook, strutting about in the guise of nationalism. In the name of unity, they separate and destroy. In social terms they represent reaction of the worst type. We may condemn these communal organizations, but there are many others who are not free from this narrow influence. Oddly enough, the very largeness of India, which is a world in itself, tends to make the people living in it complacent; rather ignorant of the rest of the world, and narrow-minded. We have to contend against these forces.

18. The recent developments in Kashmir have been welcomed by many people who perhaps do not realize that they have added to our difficulties very much in the future. Those developments were inevitable. In analyzing them, however, we can trace, as one of the principal causes, the reaction on the people of Kashmir of the narrow and communal outlook of many people in India. I am not merely referring to the agitations conducted by the Jan Sangh or the Praja Parishad, though they played a very important role. If India is to be really great, as we all want her to be, then she is not to be exclusive either internally or externally. She has to give up everything that is a barrier to growth in mind or spirit or in social life.

19. There is another and different matter to which I should like to draw your attention. That relates to women. During the last general election, I laid great stress on having women candidates. In spite of my efforts, relatively few women were put up as candidates or were elected. In our political organizations today there are not many women functioning, and yet the standard of Indian womanhood is high, and Indian women have brought us more credit in the world than perhaps the men. A nation cannot go far ahead unless it gives full scope to its women. The Chinese revolution was important in many ways, but an aspect of it, which is perhaps not so well-known, was the great change it brought about in the status of women. This was the basic revolution.

20. Apart from these reasons, there is the strictly political reason of women forming roughly half of our electorate. Having given them the vote we must follow it up by opening out other doors to them. If we do not give them these opportunities, then we ignore half the electorate which obviously is the height of unwisdom.

21. I have ventured to write to you frankly about some ideas in my head and I would like you to think about them. These are important matters affecting our future.

22. I am afraid I have been remiss in sending you my usual fortnightly letter. This letter is a special one and does not take the place of the fortnightly, which, I hope, will follow soon.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

XIII. LANGUAGE

1. Growth of a Language¹

I enclose a Hindi letter from a number of persons. Please have a reply sent to it in Hindi acknowledging it and saying that I hope to reply to it more fully later. At present I am terribly occupied and I am going to Karachi. It might further be said that I have dealt with some of the matters raised in this letter in the course of my speeches in Lucknow and Allahabad recently. I am anxious that not only Hindi should be given its proper and dominant place as a language in India but that it should progress in every way. There can be no question of any competition with Hindi by Urdu or any other language. In fact I feel that the present argument going on about Hindi rather pulls it down by making it almost a competitor with other languages in India.

I have studied a number of languages and I am interested in their growth. I am convinced that a language grows by its internal strength and not by opposition to other languages. Hindi faces a difficult situation in the south of India. This difficulty is created by an impression that Hindi is being imposed there.

I am sure that Urdu cannot come in the way of Hindi. Indeed it can strengthen it. There is no question of Urdu being a rival or equal to Hindi in Uttar Pradesh or elsewhere. But if many people are used to Urdu, they should be given perfect freedom and in fact we should encourage it as we encourage any provincial language.

This Hindi letter should be placed before me for further reply.

1. Note to the Private Secretary, 23 July 1953. JN Collection.

2. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
August 2, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

Shivaji has jumped in where others have hesitated.² It is all very well for him to talk about Urdu not being a rival of Hindi. Nobody has suggested it for an instance. He criticizes Dr Zakir Husain. I am in almost complete agreement with Dr Zakir Husain in this matter³ and I think the attitude taken up by Tandonji⁴ and those who support him is exceedingly narrow-minded and harmful to Hindi.

Shivaji talks about Urdu being kept away from politics. Where is the politics here? Millions of people want their children to be taught in a particular language and in a particular script. They want facilities to use that script otherwise too. If our Hindu friends had their way they would split up India into bits with remarkable rapidity. The South of course would cut itself off first of all.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection.

2. In an article published in *The Leader* of 30 July 1953 under the title 'Urdu can't be Rival of Hindi', Shiva Nath Katju, Member, UP Legislative Assembly, commented that "it has fallen on Dr Zakir Husain to guide the activities of Anjuman Taraqi-e-Urdu (Hind) as its President. It is not for me to offer any advice to him. But it must be realised that Hindi is now the national language. Any attempt to supplant it by Urdu or by attempting to make it a rival of Hindi in Uttar Pradesh is bound to be strongly resented by the people of this State."

3. Presiding over the opening session of the UP Urdu Conference held at Lucknow on 26 July 1953, Zakir Husain, President, Taraqi-e-Urdu (Hind), and Vice-Chancellor of Aligarh Muslim University, had declared that the struggle for official recognition of Urdu in UP was in essence a step towards redressing the wrong done to the total concept of a secular and democratic order in India.

4. Purushottamdas Tandon, a senior Congressman, closely associated with the All India Hindi Sahitya Sammelan.

3. Hindi and Regional Languages¹

If Hindi is sought to be thrust upon non-Hindi speaking areas of the country, it might create a reaction which would be dangerous to the unity of the country.

Language is a unique thing, which can bring about the unity of head and heart among a people or which can also result in terrible misunderstanding among members. But it is clear that English is, therefore, essential and not even one false step should be taken in this delicate matter of language.

The use of English at some places like Parliament becomes unavoidable because Hindi is not understood by all the members. But it is clear that English cannot be the national language of the country. It will not only go against the prestige of the country but will also create a barrier between those who use it and the mass of the people.

To become a living and growing language reflecting a growing and not a static society, Hindi has to open its doors to other languages and absorb their words. It has also to develop a vocabulary in consonance with the needs of the present age. At the same time, it has to accommodate the growth and development of regional languages, even the smallest of them, so that there is no hostility against it but willing acceptance by the people.

1. Presidential address at the first annual meeting of the Hindi Association of Parliament, New Delhi, 28 August 1953. From *National Herald*, 29 August 1953.

4. To Ravi Shankar Shukla¹

New Delhi
September 21, 1953

My dear Shuklaji,²

Thank you for your letter of the 14th September. In this you refer to the adopting of Hindi and Marathi as the official languages of the State.³ That is

1. JN Collection.
2. Chief Minister, Madhya Pradesh.
3. On 4 August 1953, the Madhya Pradesh Government had decided to introduce Hindi and Marathi as the languages to be used in official communications, with effect from 15 August 1953.

of course the right step, but I do hope that your Hindi will not be of the kind which is not easily understood by most people. There is a tendency to develop this kind of artificial and official Hindi which I think should be discouraged.

There is another matter about which I should like to draw your attention. In a recent letter to Chief Ministers, I wrote about Urdu.⁴ I understand that your Government has withdrawn aid from some Urdu schools. This I think is unfortunate and perhaps not even in keeping with our general policy in educational matters. Urdu, of course, is no rival of Hindi or Marathi in your Province. It has to be treated as a language of a considerable number of persons and the State should help it from this point of view.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. See *ante*, pp. 142-146.

MATTERS OF ADMINISTRATION

I. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

1. Reform of Public Administration¹

Some days ago a note was put up before the Cabinet by the Cabinet Secretariat on the reform of public administration. After some discussion, it was decided that this question should be further considered by the Cabinet in an informal way first and then more formally. We are having a meeting for this purpose soon.

2. I think that this question is of vital importance and affects our entire work. I agree generally with the proposals made in the Cabinet Secretariat's note and I think that we should accept the recommendations and give effect to them. I do so in spite of a certain hesitation I have in increasing and elaborating the machinery of Government. I have a feeling that we should avoid, as far as possible, any development which leads to this increase in and the intricacy of the administrative machinery. As it is, it is far too unwieldy and difficult to control. It works, as all large organizations tend to do, with motive force and, even more so, with an inertia of its own. An occasional direction is given to it from time to time, but essentially it remains in its original grooves.

3. In spite of this feeling that I have, or partly because of it I think that we should agree to the proposals made in the Cabinet Secretariat's note. Something in that direction has become essential. While it may be possible to simplify the administrative machinery here and there, we must, I suppose, resign ourselves to the fact that the administration of a modern State is a highly complicated procedure and there is no going back from it.

4. Accepting these recommendations, I feel that they do not go far enough. Mr Appleby's report² is, I think, a very remarkable document. I have read it more than once and referred to passages in it on many occasions. The more I read it, the more I am struck by the ability and wide experience of the writer and, what is more, the wide vision with which he has viewed and understood our administrative problems. It is not necessary for us to agree with everything that he has said, or to recognize that here we have a first-rate appraisal from a completely impartial and expert authority on our administrative

1. Note, 14 September 1953. JN Collection.

2. Paul H. Appleby, an expert on Public Administration from the United States, who was invited by the Government of India to give advice on Public Administration, submitted his report in January 1953. The report while giving an appraisal of Indian Administration and its salient features also pointed out several failings of the administrative system.

machine. I think, therefore, that we should go much further in considering his criticisms, suggestions and proposals than the Cabinet Secretariat's memorandum takes us.

5. It is well to remember that many of the inherent difficulties that crop up from time to time are greatly lessened by the fact that a single party controls the Central Government and the State Governments. Many people do not realize what a tremendous help this has been. Without it, it is quite possible that our new Constitution might have begun to crack up or to lead to deadlocks. Constitutions are good and have to be honoured. But Constitutions in a democratic State can only function effectively if they have a large body of public opinion and public cooperation behind them. The mere letter of the law by itself does not take us far.

6. Apart from minor issues, two major questions arise in regard to the Constitution: one is the power of the Central Government vis-a-vis the States, and the other is how far some of the provisions of the present Constitution help us to realize or come in the way of such realization of the objectives laid down in the Directive Principles of this very Constitution, that is, how far we can carry out sweeping social and economic reforms without coming in conflict with some provision or other of the Constitution.

7. Both these questions are intimately connected with any scheme of National Planning. There can be no National Planning unless there is a certain national cohesion in broad policies as between the Centre and the States. Also National Planning cannot go far if we are restricted in many ways by the Constitution.

8. There is a tendency already visible for some of our great States to tend to function as satrapies. This has been checked partly by the control of a single party, partly by the dependence on the Centre for financial help. The question of an amendment of the Constitution, therefore, arises. Obviously, this is a difficult matter. But we shall have to face it sooner or later. The best way to do that is to have it considered by an able and high-powered committee or commission. In fact, this question is in a way related to the other question of reorganization of States to which we are committed, to the extent of appointing a commission soon. I do not suggest that the same commission should do all this work; but by the time we consider the report of this Re-organization of States Commission, we should be ready with our suggestions for the amendment of the Constitution and the two might well be considered together.

9. I do not like the idea of what might be called full centralization. I do not think that a completely unitary form of government can function satisfactorily in a large country like India, and certainly it will not suit India as it is. I believe generally in decentralization. I think that helps much more in developing a country by the diffusion of responsibility, by bringing a much

larger number of persons in the sphere of responsibility. Nevertheless, I feel that a certain effective measure of centralization is quite inevitable for the unity of India and for proper planning. I think it should be possible to have that measure of centralization, and, at the same time, to have a great deal of decentralization. Centralization is bad if it means continual interference and reference to the Centre. That stops all work. Centralization is good if it means the power to plan and give effect to the plan effectively.

10. Mr Appleby lays considerable stress on the Indian governmental structure being based essentially on conditions prevailing prior to Independence. He points out the virtues of this structure and at the same time emphasizes the obvious drawbacks and weaknesses which are bound to grow. In other words, he thinks that this structure, and more especially the outlook governing this structure, requires a basic change to suit a modern democratic State. He points out that personnel administration is far too feudal and academic, lacks the human element, and is too much concerned with the rights and privileges of the existing personnel. He criticizes the selection of personnel by the Public Service Commissions and says that this method is completely out of date as it is too much in terms of academic records and far too little in terms of many other considerations which are highly important in public administration. In fact, this method of selection tends to be by one type of persons, which naturally perpetuates its own type. Assignments of personnel to particular kinds of work are made impersonally and without much attention to the kind of work; it being assumed that all members of the public service belonging to a certain class can do any work allotted to them.

11. This reference to class is important and it is significant that a man like Mr Appleby should draw attention to this class consciousness in our Services where status and rank count for a great deal—and are greatly exaggerated in their importance.

12. I think this is a very important matter. I realize that it cannot be easily dealt with by rules and regulations and that essentially it represents a certain psychological approach. Nevertheless, I think that we must make it clear that our approach is different and that we are opposed to this conception of class and rank in the Services which assumes almost a caste character. Caste in Services is even worse than caste in our religious or social structure. In a democracy, it is totally out of place and can only lead to conflict. Therefore, this class, rank and prerogative consciousness must be put an end to.

13. This leads one to a reform of the methods and selection by Public Service Commissions, the criteria required for the promotion and the general internal character of the Services as well as their relation to the rest of the people.

14. Mr Appleby points out that "The result is an excessively and probably modernly unprecedented federal or collective kind of administrative system,

cumbersome in manner, requiring too many inter-hierarchical conferences and utilizing paper in an unnecessarily burdensome way. Clearance is slow and laborious. Responsibility is diffused and concealed rather than concentrated and clearly identified. Action is retarded before the fact, and insufficiently evaluated in course and after the fact.”³ The mere fact that our Services are divided into Class I, II, III and IV is an unhappy approach. Promotion must depend on merit and not on seniority, except perhaps in the lowest grades. That, I believe, is the rule in most modern States, certainly in the United Kingdom.

15. I do not like the idea of a number of officers being more or less permanently attached to the Centre. I think there should be a great deal of interchange between the Centre and the States. People in the Centre, whether Ministers or officers, get rather out of touch with local problems and difficulties, and are apt to judge everything from a superior point of view which may have little relation to fact and, more especially, to the human equations involved. Indeed, I would like officers, from time to time, to have some definite touch with local administrations meaning thereby actual touch with the people and not merely secretarial work. I am beginning to think that, even in the Foreign Service, it would be a good thing for our officers to have some knowledge of district work in India. Otherwise right from the beginning of their career, they function quite apart from the realities of India.

16. Mr Appleby points out that our system is not flexible enough and that we spend far too much time over petty details, financial or other, and very little on checking performance. Normally this would have a deadening effect. When we deal with a development programme, this may well prove fatal. As Mr Appleby points out, “The dimensions and urgency of the development programme, and to some extent its novelty, throw into high relief all of the creakiness and cumbersomeness of an administrative system designed to serve the relatively simple interests of an occupying power.”⁴

17. I have mentioned only a few points that have struck me in the Appleby Report. There is much else which I have in mind as the Report is full of thought-provoking suggestions, but I do not wish to add to the length of this note. I think that a much closer study of this Report is necessary by the Cabinet than has thus far been made.

18. The whole system of public administration is changing and growing under the impact of democratic institutions and the urgent necessity of development. I think that there should be continuous study of this, and, for this purpose, an Institute of Public Administration should be established.

3. See *Public Administration in India, Report of a Survey* by Paul H. Appleby, 1953, p. 21.

4. *Ibid*, p. 40.

II. LABOUR

1. To Mahavir Tyagi¹

New Delhi
July 10, 1953

My dear Mahavir,

During the last few days I have occasionally expressed my concern to you about the labour situation in the Defence Services, that is, the Ordnance Factories and the like. Having been away for about a month from India, I have not been in touch with developments. But occasional bits of news and, more particularly, the token strike, have disturbed me.² That token strike was a remarkable success and the result is, as always happens, that the workers concerned are more militant and have a sense of greater confidence in any action they might take.

We must examine this question fully and not be taken unawares by any development. Merely to be passive is never a wise policy. No Government dealing with industrial labour can adopt that policy today whether it is America, England or any other country. A false step often leads to grave trouble. Recently a relatively petty dispute in Asansol, which was on the point of settlement, suddenly became a very serious one because of a wrong step that the Bengal Government took.³ They arrested some leaders, there was a demonstration which grew bigger and bigger, there was some violence, there was shooting and seven workers were killed and a large number injured. The

1. Mahavir Tyagi Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. On 30 June 1953, the civilian workers of the Defence establishments went on a one-day token strike, called by the All India Defence Employees Federation, demanding immediate implementation of the Kalyanwala Committee report, alternative employment for retrenched workers; reinstatement of victimized workers and establishment of a negotiating machinery to settle disputes. The strike was called in pursuance of the decision taken by the Federation on 21 May at Kanpur.
3. The trouble started at the Hot Mills section of the Indian Iron and Steel Company (IISCO), Burnpur, on 18 January 1953, when the workers, on the refusal of the management to recognize their Action Committee, resorted to a lightning strike and a "go-slow." Repeated interventions by the Government of West Bengal could not resolve the issue and in May the management removed from service 322 persons, including six labour leaders. On 5 July, the Government invoked the West Bengal Security Act and arrested these leaders. In the police firing on a mob of 3,000 workers, which was advancing towards the SDO's house to demand release of the prisoners, 6 persons were killed and 17 injured. On the next day the Government declared the Kulti and Burnpur Works of IISCO and the Santa Works of Indian Standard Wagon Cos as public utility services and ordered an executive-level enquiry into the firing.

whole incident has become a major issue and has powerfully affected the situation in Calcutta, where an entirely different agitation is going on in regard to tramway fares.⁴ For the last week or ten days there is continuous trouble in Calcutta. No doubt this is encouraged by anti-social and other elements. The fact, however, remains that the Government and the people generally have to suffer for it, and the credit of the Government goes down.

So far as I know, the firing at Asansol became almost inevitable because of violence of the crowd. But why should a situation arise when we are faced with this dilemma? It is at an early stage that Government have to be careful.

Obviously, anything connected with Defence is far more important than the Civil factories and workers. Defence very much so is a public undertaking. The employers are the Government. Government has great strength behind it, but there are limits to its exercise.

Recently a tremendous upheaval took place in East Germany.⁵ This was almost a workers' rebellion against the Soviet dominated Government, which called itself a Workers' Government. The Russian Army had to be called in with tanks, etc., to suppress it. That indicated a complete failure of the governmental apparatus there and Soviet credit has suffered very greatly. The Soviet Government was wise enough later to reverse its policy completely and give in to numerous demands made by the workers.

I am giving you these instances so that we might be very careful in our dealing with the situation at this stage and not allow it to develop in a wrong way in future. Merely to think that we can deal with it effectively is not quite enough.... Merely a governmental approach is not very helpful. Also I think that, as in the Railways, we should not avoid meeting proper representatives of the workers. I gather that there is a strong union of the workers now called the Amalgamated Defence Workers' Federation. Even if we do not meet them in an official way, some informal ways of dealing with them should be found. This strengthens Government's position even if there is no agreement.

I am concerned with all this matter and I want to go into it more thoroughly with you and others a little later. Meanwhile, I suggest to you to discuss this position with Khandubhai Desai.⁶ Knowing how to deal with

4. See *ante*, pp. 42-43, 50, 55-56 and 85.

5. On 17 June 1953, 40,000 East German workers marched through the Russian sector of Berlin, demanding lowering of work norms announced three weeks earlier, which increased the production quotas by ten per cent. The anti-Communist demonstrators were ruthlessly suppressed within three days by the Russian army.

6. Member, House of the People, and President of the INTUC.

industrial workers, he can give us good advice. I should like you to tell him of our decisions on the Kalyanwala Report,⁷ which goes a good way to meet many of the workers' previous demands...

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, p. 295.

2. To Jayaprakash Narayan¹

New Delhi
12 August, 1953

My dear Jayaprakash,

Thank you for your letter of August 8 about Burnpur.²

What has happened in Burnpur is certainly most unfortunate. Whatever disputes there might be, it is tragic to see a great industrial plant suffering serious damages. No one yet knows the extent of this damage because of the go-slow policy,³ but it is feared that this might be very serious indeed. Certainly if this continues, the plant is doomed.

To adopt any policy which may result in such serious damage to a plant which has cost a vast sum of money and which produces something of basic importance seems to me completely wrong.

You say that the dispute is one of domestic adjustment within the Congress. I am not quite sure if it can be entirely described as such, though partly you may be right. Anyhow there can be no two opinions about the desirability of a fair election. Such an election must be held and John, the President of the Union, has said so quite clearly. Obviously it cannot be held suddenly and in this excited atmosphere, but it should be held as early as possible.

You have sent me a copy of a telegram from Chhotelal Vyas, the President of the Action Committee at Burnpur. He is also the President of a Congress Committee. I do not know him personally, but I confess that I have formed

1. File No. 26(111)/53-PMS.

2. Jayaprakash Narayan wrote that the "whole issue at Burnpur is one of domestic adjustment within the Congress Party" and "the dispute is between two groups of INTUC (i.e. Congress) workers." He felt that as the vast majority of the workers were opposed to Michael John, the President of the Union, Nehru should act in the matter not so much as Prime Minister but as President of the Congress.

3. As a result of the go-slow strike the company suffered a loss of three crore rupees in terms of sale, and the loss of production amounted to 100,000 tons of steel.

no good opinion of him from such reports as I have had. He is a share broker exploiting labour and possibly even profiting by this. What is called his gesture amounts to his kindly agreeing to workers doing 35 per cent of their normal work.⁴ Why should they do 35 per cent when both from the point of view of the plant and the wages they get, they are supposed to do 100 per cent. This can hardly be called any kind of a gesture.

So far as I am concerned, both as Prime Minister and as Congress President, I have tried to do my best.

I have communicated with Sri Babu on this subject, with Dr Roy who is directly dealing with it as well as the Ministries here.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

4. As advised by the Action Committee, the workers had agreed to raise the production from 20% to 35% from 1 August 1953.

3. To Bhimsen Sachar¹

New Delhi
August 23, 1953

My dear Sachar,

I have previously written to you about the relations of the INTUC and the Congress and Government in your State. INTUC is our chief adviser in labour matters and it is essential that we should cooperate with it fully. That is our firm policy. Indeed, the Congress itself has always been pro labour.

I asked recently Shri Khandubhai Desai for his views. He has sent me a letter in which, while expressing his appreciation of the cooperation that the Congress gives to the INTUC in most States,² he has pointed out a few States where this is lacking. Among these is Punjab. I give below what he says about the Punjab....³

1. File No.G-42(ii)/1953, AICC Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. Regarding Hyderabad and West Bengal, Desai regretted the differences between the State Governments and the INTUC. He noted that this had sullied the Congress image in the States.
3. Referring to the deteriorating labour situation in the Punjab owing to Ujjal Singh, an industrialist, exercising an undue influence over the labour and the industrial policy of the State, Khandubhai pointed out that even mediation by Nehru between Sachar and Ujjal Singh had not improved the situation. If the INTUC had been able to have some hold "it is because it has not reconciled itself to the policy of the State Government and taken an independent stand."

It is a frank opinion which may be kept to yourself, but the fact remains that there is grave dissatisfaction among all our labour leaders about the labour situation in the Punjab. I should like you to pay particular attention to this.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To Mahavir Tyagi¹

New Delhi
7 September, 1953

My dear Mahavir,

You will remember my speaking to you and writing to you, about two months back, about the Industrial Relations Bill and how far Defence establishments should come within its scope, of course, with suitable provisions to protect them against strikes, etc. This Bill has been hung up for a long time and we want to proceed with it. Have you discussed this matter with Giri as suggested?² I should like you to do so and then we can ourselves discuss it.³

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. Mahavir Tyagi Papers, NMML.
2. On 25 June 1953, V.V. Giri submitted a memorandum for the consideration of the Union Cabinet, proposing an Industrial Relations Bill to safeguard the interests of the workers against arbitrary retrenchments in Government and private establishments. The Bill proposed that no employee who had been in continuous service for not less than one year, should be retrenched until he had been given one month's notice in writing or wages for the period of notice and gratuity at the rate of not less than 15 days average pay for completed years of service.
3. The Ministry of Defence wished to be left out of the purview of this Bill since till the end of April 1953, it had declared some 1,362 persons as surplus in its ordnance depots and retrenched about 400 employees.

5. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
September 10, 1953

My dear T.T.,

I had a fairly long talk with Jayaprakash Narayan this morning. Later I sent for Tripathi² of INTUC and he had a talk with Jayaprakash.

We decided, of course, to wait for the next two or three days till the strike notice expires and I hope that, as you expect, it will be possible to start the plant working again on Monday next.³

Even if that happens, it seems to me that we should not rest content but take some active steps to smoothen things. It is never a good policy to leave a feeling of deep dissatisfaction and frustration in the minds of a large body of workers, more especially in a vital industry like this. Frustrated people create trouble from time to time and some of them may even do mischief. Therefore, we should try to improve the atmosphere generally.

So far as the dispute between the employees and the management is concerned, it has been referred to an industrial tribunal for adjudication. The other dispute between two sections of workers *inter se* might possibly be decided by a fair election in the trade union. The steps that John is taking in this matter now, which give an opportunity to others to come in, appear to me to be fair. But there is just one small snag. Undoubtedly John has become very unpopular in a large section of labour there. Who is at fault I cannot say. The result is that that section of labour which mistrusts John hesitates to pay their dues lest he might make improper use of the money during the election. Is it possible to keep the money so paid in apart till the election is over? I do not know whether this kind of thing can be done. Perhaps you could consult Giri⁴ about it. If the Chief Labour Commissioner⁵ could make some suitable arrangement for this, then there should be no difficulty whatever. I am only referring to the new moneys, that is, payment of arrears of subscription and not to the other funds of the Union. Perhaps one could say that such money could be paid either to the Union Office or to someone appointed by our Labour Commissioner.

Giri writes to me that it might be advisable for the principal parties

1. File No. 26(111)/53-PMS.

2. K.P. Tripathi.

3. Twenty-five days old lockout of the company was lifted on 18 September 1953 and on 24 September a settlement on the main issue of elections to the Union was reached between B.C. Roy and C.L. Vyas.

4. V.V. Giri.

5. S.C. Joshi.

concerned in this dispute at Burnpur to be invited to New Delhi where you and he could meet them and try to bring about a lasting settlement. The Labour Minister of Bengal⁶ could also be invited.

I am inclined to think that it would probably be better for such a meeting to take place at Burnpur itself, that is to say that you and Giri might go there and invite the Labour Minister of Bengal or Dr Roy himself. There would be several advantages in this. This would avoid special invitations to Delhi of various people, some good some not so good. Such an invitation itself might perhaps be exploited by some people. If, however, you are at Burnpur, it is much easier to see anybody you like without much fuss.

I should like you to think over this. I am sending a copy of this letter to Giri, and also to Dr B.C. Roy.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Kalipada Mukherjee.

III. HEALTH

1. Prohibition Week¹

I understand that Madhya Pradesh is observing a Prohibition Week. I hope that success will attend their efforts. The policy of prohibition, which is our national policy, is not just a doctrinaire approach to a practical problem. Indeed, to deal with it in a doctrinaire way is not to deal with it effectively. Prohibition is a practical approach and should be given effect to in a practical way so as to make it progressively more and more effective.

In some of our larger cities and among some groups there is a curious background of thought which induces some people to believe that it is fashionable to indulge in alcoholic drinks. In the Indian context, there is a certain vulgarity about this thought and the sooner people give it up, the better.

1. Message sent to Brijlal Biyani Minister of Finance, Government of Madhya Pradesh, New Delhi, 24 July 1953. File No. 2(244)/48-PMS. The week was observed from 15 August.

2. To Amrit Kaur¹

New Delhi
6 August, 1953

My dear Amrit,

Sometimes in your earnestness and enthusiasm for improving the Health Services of the nation, you condemn the Government of India generally and more particularly the Finance Ministry for not providing enough funds. It is odd for a Minister to condemn another Ministry or the Government. The funds that we provide ultimately are determined by some planned approach to the various problems of India. It is clear that advance has to be on all sectors. Thus, the Health Services may be absolutely useless if there is not enough food available in the country and food becomes the primary factor for health. Also no services function adequately if there is anarchy in the country.

One may say with complete assurance that the progress of a country ultimately depends upon the human beings. The human beings depend certainly on physical health, but at least as much on mental health, that means education. Therefore, education is far the most important thing. Finally it is obvious that a country cannot spend more than it earns by productive activity. One may borrow a little here and there, but ultimately it is not possible to go beyond the means at one's disposal.

It is the business of Planning to make allotments in a balanced way and, more particularly, to plan for an increase of wealth, and that is of production in various ways, because without this increase in the productive wealth of the country no progress is possible.

Therefore, it is unfair, apart from being odd for a Minister to criticize the policy of Government or of another Ministry. It would be perfectly right for that Minister to argue a particular case in Cabinet or in Planning Commission, but not in public.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Union Minister for Health.

3. Indian Institute for Medical Research¹

I met Professor Mahalanobis² this afternoon. Among other subjects, he spoke to me about Dr J.C. Ray³ and his Indian Institute for Medical Research. This matter has come up before us in various forms previously and it was proposed that this Institute should be absorbed in the big new Medical Research Institute which is being built in Delhi.⁴ There were, however, some difficulties in the way. A Committee was appointed, that Committee reported, and then, as far as I remember, you, Professor Mahalanobis and Dr Pandit⁵ were asked to go into this matter. Some provisional grant was also sanctioned for him.

Professor Mahalanobis told me that he had now come to the conclusion that it would be desirable for Dr J.C. Ray to continue his work in Calcutta and his Institute. He further told me that there was a possibility of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research helping this Institute provided it extended its work in the field of biology.

I met Dr J.C. Ray later in the afternoon and had a fairly long talk with him. I was impressed by his earnestness and enthusiasm and the record of work that his Institute had done, and the considerable numbers of good scientific workers that he had produced impressed me also.

I feel that it would be desirable to allow him to continue his work in Calcutta. There is sometimes an advantage in having large up-to-date institutes and laboratories. But there is also some advantage in smaller institutes to continue to work on their own special lines. Moreover, when there is such an

1. Note to S.S. Bhatnagar, 23 September 1953. File No.28(54)/50-PMS. A copy of this note was sent to P.C. Mahalanobis also.
2. P.C. Mahalanobis, Founder Director, Indian Statistical Institute of Calcutta, and Member Planning Commission of the Government of India.
3. Jyotish Chandra Roy (1899-1975); educated in Santiniketan, Calcutta, Heidelberg and London; received doctorate for research on 'Oral Cholera Vaccine' from Berlin University, 1926; officer-in-charge, Protological Survey of Indian Central Research Institute, Calcutta, till 1934; credited with building up the first Medical Research Institute in Calcutta and was its founder Director from 1934 to 1964; awarded Padmabhushan, 1969; published a journal, *Annals of Biochemistry and Experimental Medicine*.
4. The scheme for the establishment of an All India Medical Institute in Delhi, involving a non-recurring cost of about rupees two crores during seven-year period from 1952, had been sanctioned by the Government of India. The Government of New Zealand had promised assistance under the Colombo Plan to the extent of one million pounds.
5. C.G. Pandit, Secretary, Indian Council of Medical Research.

institute which has done good work, though it may not possess an imposing building, it seems to me a pity to put an end to that work.

I think, therefore, that we should look at this matter from this point of view and try to keep this Institute working in Calcutta but with the scope of its work enlarged in so far as the field of biology is concerned.

If you agree and can make the necessary arrangements, we can then approach the Ministry of Health.

IV. HOUSING

1. To Swaran Singh¹

New Delhi
September 17, 1953

My dear Swaran Singh,

Amrit Kaur has written to me a letter which I enclose.

I confess that I do not like the idea of our building one-roomed tenements. I know the argument in favour of these one-roomed tenements. We can build more of them than of the two-roomed ones and thus provide more accommodation. But, at the same time, we perpetuate something that is essentially bad. No family should be asked to live in one room. Indian families are apt to be big and all kinds of cousins and aunts turn up and live there. I think, therefore, two rooms should be the very minimum. This may cause inconvenience to begin with and may possibly even be hard on some people, but we have to set some kind of a standard. If we maintain our present terribly low standard, we shall never go ahead.

I think that we should only build two-roomed tenements. In an emergency, we may utilize the extra room for another person, but the rule should be that each family should have two rooms at least.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 28(78)/53-PMS.

V. TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. To Lal Bahadur Shastri¹

New Delhi
July 10, 1953

My dear Lal Bahadur,

It has become quite common for us to open the newspaper and read about a railway accident. There is derailment or collision or long delay. If an accident leads to death of passengers, then it is given publicity. Otherwise, it almost passes unnoticed.

All this is very distressing and one can only come to the conclusion that everything is not all right on the operation side of the Railways.

There is always a danger in the high officials of the Railways, the Railway Board, etc., sitting snuggling in their offices and taking a complacent view of the situation. I think that they should be told that recent reports do not reflect credit on the working of the Railways and something has got to be done about it. We may even consider some kind of a committee to look into this or a Cabinet Committee.

Anyhow, I want you to give thought to this and tell your Railway Board that we are all disturbed at these frequent news of disasters.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Airlines Corporation¹

Mr. President,² ladies and gentlemen,

You have invited me here for an auspicious purpose and I have come very gladly. Perhaps there would not be many people who have travelled by air in the last six years as much as I have. In fact, almost all my journeys have

1. Speech at the inaugural ceremony of the nationalized airways at the Safdarjang airport, New Delhi, 1 August 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.

2. Jagjivan Ram, Union Minister for Communications.

been by air and seldom by train or ship. Apart from this, ever since I was a child, I remember being very fascinated by air travel. That was a long time ago. But now everyone is aware of the importance of aeroplanes in the world of today. So when we look at a country's progress, one way of measuring it is how well developed its airlines are and what the arrangements for air travel are. This has become quite a common yardstick of measurement in the world today. I cannot say off-hand how well our country compares with others but it is perhaps among the better ones in this respect.

My thoughts go back to the old story of how air travel was started in our country and by whom and the developments of the last twenty or twenty-five years. I think it was a little over twenty years ago when flying was going to be started in our country that the people who were the pioneers in the field came to Allahabad to my house in a small plane. I was terribly interested because there were very few planes in those days. Anyhow, a year later the Indian National Airways started their operations and these are the two big institutions who laid the foundations of airlines. Many others followed. So, as a matter of fact, the task that we are about to begin today is not really new but merely a continuation of an old tradition and we must take advantage of the work that has been done in the last twenty to twenty-two years.

First of all, I should like to congratulate all those who contributed to the founding of air travel in our country because our airlines has become quite famous in the world. And even though it is not very big compared to some of the others in the world, it is good. So I want to congratulate them. But I am thinking today about the future and not merely about the past. We have taken a new turn which was necessary and I am happy that it has been done by mutual discussions and agreement. It has always been our weakness that we often fight among ourselves. But it is strange that we are able to undertake great tasks, which could be considered even revolutionary in a sense, in a peaceful way and by mutual discussions. We achieved freedom in India—which was a revolutionary event—by peaceful methods and by mutual agreement and so people do not think that anything momentous has happened. People have got used to the old way of thinking that great tasks must be accompanied by a great deal of noise and turmoil. The problem is that the people who think they are modern are very old-fashioned in their way of thinking in this matter. But it is obvious that work gets done well if there is as little noise as possible so that we can consider the issues calmly. This is how we do things in India, peacefully and by mutual agreement.

Today we are beginning a great task. In the last few months we have held talks with those companies which have been running the airlines so far and come to certain agreements. It is obvious that some of the things were not to their liking. They did not like the idea of cutting off ties with an institution which they had nurtured like a baby and seen it grow. All this was

obvious but a time comes when a child has to leave its home and stand on its own feet or find another home. If this is not accepted, the country shrinks into itself and does not grow. So though certain matters were not liked by them, everything was settled after discussions. The outcome of deciding things by consent is that their cooperation for the future has been ensured and we have gladly accepted their help. After all the people who will do the work remain the same, by whatever name they may function. The workers are trained Indians, whether they are in those companies or they are pilots and airmen in our airlines and on them rests the responsibility of running this institution. The name is also certainly important because it conjures up an image of the type of service that is obtained and whether it benefits the entire country or only the company. That is also important. But ultimately the people who work in it are the same for they have been trained and will bear the responsibility now and in future. So we have to realize that the time has come when the old order in which good work was done, must change and a new direction has to be given as well as fresh opportunities to grow and undoubtedly the people who work for it will also grow.

So I hope that those of you who are specially concerned with this task in any capacity from top to bottom will take on this new responsibility with strength and dignity. Your responsibilities, which were numerous to begin with, will become heavier in many ways. It has become a matter of pride for us to show how well we can discharge our duties and responsibilities. We must make India great in the eyes of the world. Therefore I am very happy to be here today and congratulate you on this auspicious occasion.

3. To Jagjivan Ram¹

New Delhi
7 August, 1953

My dear Jagjivan Ram,

A recent passenger by the Air India International, who has often travelled by that and other lines previously, told me that there was some slight deterioration in the Air India International service. It was still good, but it was not so outstanding as it used to be. It was not so punctual, the food had lost quality, the spoons and forks were not quite clean, and so on.

All this may be due, of course, to the fact that the organization was

1. JN Collection.

changing hands and the old company was not interested in it any longer. However that may be, it is most important that in the early days of nationalization, any impression of deterioration should not spread. Every effort should be made to keep this service at the topmost level. Obviously the first thing to be certain about relates to security. Then come other matters like punctuality, etc. Air India International was particularly known for the high quality of its service, in small things as well as big. Every care must be taken to maintain that and no sloppiness should be tolerated.

Much depends on the kind of start and push that is given to this service after the change-over. I am, therefore, writing to you about this. You may, perhaps, send on a copy of my letter to the Chairman of your Board of Directors or to the General Manager of the Air India International and tell him of the complaint I have received. To have spoons and forks and plates which are not quite clean may not be a vital matter, but it is very important for judging of the service provided. Everyone connected with the service must keep wide awake and try to keep at a level of alertness.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To Lal Bahadur Shastri¹

New Delhi
August 21, 1953

My dear Lal Bahadur,

I enclose copy of a letter from the Lieutenant-Governor of Himachal Pradesh² to the President. In this letter he has proposed a road, right through Himachal Pradesh, opening out many areas and linking up Delhi by another route to these areas, and finally to the Jammu and Kashmir State. Prima facie, there is much in what he says. I think it would be desirable for you to have this examined from the point of view of feasibility in finance. If it is a worthwhile scheme, we might proceed gradually to put it through by linking up various roads that are already in existence.

I am particularly attracted to the idea of joining up the Kashmir State by another route, which is very far from the Pakistan frontier or the ceasefire line.

1. JN Collection.

2. Major-General Himmatsinhji.

There is reference also in this letter to the route to Leh via Manali and over the Rohtang Pass. This has been discussed and noted upon in the past. From the military and political points of view, this road is also important. I should like to know how matters stand in regard to it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

VI. POLICE AND SECURITY

1. Security Arrangements¹

I have read both these notes and I am wholly dissatisfied with them.² In no event should any change have been made affecting me without reference to me, more especially when previous arrangements had been made in consultation with me and I was expecting something which, at the last moment, I did not find there.³ No reference of any kind was made to me. This is most extraordinary. Nothing is more irritating than to be faced with a new situation at the last moment.

As for security reasons, I have a sufficient understanding of the necessity for security and I do not wish to come in the way of proper arrangements being made. But the ideas of security, which some of our police officers have, are not always remarkable for an intelligent understanding of a situation. Security does not merely depend on masses of policemen and the like but on other factors also. It would have been exceedingly easy to make arrangements without any additional police and with the certainty almost that there would be no pushing.

Reference is made in the note to a police jeep coming in front of my car. What happened was something even worse. A military escort of 8 or more

1. Note to the Home Secretary, 15 August 1953. JN Collection.
2. The notes by the senior officials in the Ministry of Defence explained the circumstances necessitating change of location of the Guard of Honour ceremony and the route of Prime Minister's arrival at Red Fort, Delhi, for the Independence Day function.
3. The earlier change in location and route was approved by the Prime Minister on 4 July. On 10 August, IG Police raised an objection for reasons of security. After discussion with officials of the Ministries of Home and Defence and B.N. Mullick, DIB, it was decided to revert to the previous year's arrangements, and B.N. Kaul, Principal Private Secretary to Prime Minister, was informed on phone.

motor-cyclists was provided for me, half in front of my car and half behind. Such an escort, if it has any value, must immediately precede my car or go behind it. What happened was that in front of my car was a police jeep and behind it a police trailer car. The escort, therefore, had nothing to do with me and might be presumed to escort the police cars.

The car that came behind me, which is inflicted upon me all the time and which normally contains some shabby-looking individuals, spoiled the whole effect. Apart from this, was the police car better for any security reason than the military escort provided?

I am tired of this police trailer car which does nothing except to make a nuisance of itself. I do not think it has been of the slightest use in the last three or four years. If it is to follow me, it must follow at a big distance and come nowhere near my car.

2. Police Conference of South Asian Countries¹

Prima facie, a routine conference of the type suggested might take place, presumably to discuss some of the problems which are mentioned in Shri Mullick's note of the 19th August,² such as, smuggling of gold, smuggling of illicit drugs, etc. But I am not attracted to this proposed conference in the present context³ and, more especially, I do not fancy the idea of India taking a lead in this matter. Police Chiefs are surely not going to meet to consider smuggling. They will consider many other problems and, inevitably, they will be drawn into a discussion as to how to deal with Communists and the like. That problem is not only a police one but a political one. In this matter, from the political point of view, I should not like India to line up with Malaya. Of course, we should have nothing to do with Viet Nam, and Nepal also has to be left out. The remaining countries are Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, Thailand

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, 28 September 1953. JN Collection.
2. B.N. Mullick, Director of Intelligence Bureau, referring to the decision of the twenty-second General Assembly of the International Conference of Police Chiefs held at Oslo from 24 to 29 June 1953 to hold regional meetings to discuss common problems of bordering countries, had made his proposals in the note.
3. Mullick wrote that the proposed regional meetings would encompass four regions consisting of the countries of Europe, Western Asia, South and South East Asia and America.

and Indonesia. Thailand is politically controlled almost wholly by the USA. Indonesia has been facing some kind of a rebellion in Sumatra. With Ceylon, it is stated that we have bilateral conferences. I would welcome a bilateral conference with Burma for a variety of reasons. The DIB will, however, remember that when we went across the Burma border the Burmese officials were very reticent and reluctant to discuss any matter with him.

2. As a matter of fact, of all the countries mentioned, probably the Indian Police is the most efficient and well informed. We gain little by way of information from others. We may have to give them information.

3. I would not like any impression, direct or indirect, to be spread that such a police conference of various countries in South Asia is another anti-Communist front. That would be politically wrong and I do not see any particular gain from it.

4. I would suggest that the DIB should write to the IGP, Burma, rather generally, on this subject referring to the Oslo Conference and enquiring what the Burmese reaction to that conference's proposal is. He should not commit himself in any way. He might, however, say that perhaps it might be advisable, before further consideration is given to this question, for the matter to be discussed as between India and Burma. If the Burmese Government is agreeable, a representative of ours could go to Rangoon for this purpose. In effect, that would be some kind of a bilateral arrangement between the two countries. The larger conference could be discussed without any commitments and the pros and cons of it considered.

5. We should not appear too eager for this conference.

VII. CORRUPTION

1. Alleged Acts of Corruption Should be Examined¹

... 2. The position is quite clear, so far as I am concerned. Any allegation, whether made in a newspaper or in a letter and whether it is anonymous or not, if it contains any details of an alleged act of corruption, should be examined. The examination should be, to begin with, intended to find out if there is anything *prima facie* in the allegation. If there is no *prima facie* substance, the matter drops there. If some facts are discovered which indicate a further investigation, this should be carried out.

1. Note to Principal Private Secretary, 21 July 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.

3. Anonymous letters of course should not be encouraged. There are far too many making vague and often baseless allegations. But, where an anonymous letter gives specific facts, then this should be enquired into. A vague and general allegation does not deserve enquiry as there is nothing to grip or enquire into.

4. Where a considerable number of reports of corruption are received in regard to a particular officer, even though those reports may be vague, one has to put in some enquiry.

5. In forwarding letters containing allegations to Ministries, this general rule should be observed. Does the allegation contain any specific charge which is capable of investigation?

6. Where a senior officer is concerned, a little more care is necessary and the matter should normally be referred to the Minister concerned for his advice.

2. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi

August 13, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

... It is obviously necessary to protect public servants, but it is also necessary to protect the public from them. At the present moment, as you know, it is very difficult to deal with a public servant about whom we are certain that he has misbehaved and yet we have not the legal proof and the procedure is terribly long. This is a major problem for us and has been discussed both in the Planning Commission and in the Working Committee on several occasions.

I do not know anything about the particular case² that was mentioned in the question this morning relating to Modi, but, as I listened to the answers, they left a rather bad taste in the mouth.³ In a matter of this kind where public accusations have been made and, as you stated, the police thought

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. In the House of the People, A.K. Gopalan, Communist Member, had referred to the investigation by the Special Police Establishment into the alleged theft from Government stores by Modi Industries Limited.

3. Replying to the question, K.N. Katju admitted that towards the end of 1951, certain railway employees and a number of persons connected with Modi Industries had caused the theft of the contents of 26 wagons for the benefit of the firm. Though the police, after two years of investigation, had concluded that there was enough evidence for initiating a prosecution, the Solicitor General when asked to give his legal opinion had said that there "could not be even a superficial presumption of a criminal offence."

there was a case for prosecution, for us to remain quiet is difficult to explain. It is true that the Solicitor-General thought that there was no case. I should imagine that it is due to the public to place all the facts before them, even though we may not go to a law court. Some small committee could go into the facts and state that these are the facts. Otherwise, suspicion lingers that we are trying to suppress something or protect someone.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

VIII. THE PRESS

1. Police Attack on Newspapermen in Calcutta¹

I am deeply concerned at reports in newspapers as well as personal messages about attack by police yesterday in Calcutta on many journalists and newspapermen.² I hope you will deal with this matter yourself and take such steps as may help in soothing resentment aroused by this very unfortunate incident.

1. Telegram to P.C. Sen, Acting Chief Minister, West Bengal, New Delhi, 23 July 1953. JN Collection.
2. A number of press photographers were injured and six reporters arrested when police lathi-charged the crowd who in defiance of Section 144 had gathered at the Calcutta Maidan on 22 July to protest against increase in the tramway fares.

2. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
August 13, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

I mentioned today at the Party meeting² that a Calcutta paper had published some news about troops movements in East Pakistan which, according to our

1. JN Collection.
2. Congress Parliamentary Party meeting held in New Delhi.

information, were quite untrue. This paper is the *Hindusthan Standard*. Dr Roy had specially enquired into this matter and told them not to publish it. Nevertheless, they did so. Dr Roy told me on the telephone that he was going to take strong action against them.

I am told that the *Tej* newspaper of Delhi has come out with the same piece of news and has given big headlines today. I do not know whether they have got it from the *Hindusthan Standard* or some other source. Anyway, I think that we should take some immediate steps about this matter against the *Tej*. The least they can do is to apologize and withdraw.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

IX. FLOOD RELIEF

1. To V.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
August 13, 1953

My dear V.T.,²

A number of Bihar people came to see me a short while ago. Some of them were MPs; some had come specially from Bihar. They spoke about the havoc brought about by the Kosi floods which had been on a much vaster scale this year than ever before. They gave me a memorandum which I am sending you. In fact I told them to see you and find out what the position was.

As a matter of fact, I am a little confused myself about the present position. It does seem very sad that we cannot do anything effective to meet this annual menace which brings devastation in its train to vast numbers of human beings. I suppose the annual loss itself amounts to a very big figure.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 7(274)/53-PMS.

2. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
August 21, 1953

My dear Deshmukh,

I have received a number of telegrams about the Godavari floods. Among them is one from Prakasam,² which I enclose. It appears that the damage done has been heavy and large numbers of people are homeless.

Prakasam suggests that we should send someone there to report to us. That can easily be done. I can ask one of our Deputy Ministers to go there, accompanied by an official, say, from your Ministry. But I am not sure if this is necessary.

But the question is what we can do about it. Obviously we cannot pour out crores of rupees as Prakasam suggests. At the same time I suppose we should give them as much help as we can.

I can send them a small sum from the PM's Fund. There is not much left in it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. T. Prakasam.

X. GENERAL

1. Assignment to Nirad C. Chaudhuri¹

I am surprised to read CS's note. I have no objection to Mr Chaudhuri finishing the work in regard to the Canal Waters issue² that has been entrusted to him and which apparently he has partly completed.

But no one, however good his penmanship, can do effective work for us unless he is in tune with modern India and what it stands for. A person who has contempt as it is today and who hankers for the British days in India, cannot possibly view any Indian question in the proper light.

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, 8 July 1953. JN Collection.
2. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, earlier employed in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, was at this time working in the Ministry of External Affairs.

This is not a question of having written a book³ where certain opinions were expressed which may undergo a change or not. It is a basic question of how one feels about India.

I do not mind a person who differs from me, nor do I even mind if his views are irritating. But if a person works for the Government of India, he must have some loyalties. If these loyalties are absent, then he is not a suitable person for that work. For Mr Tyabji⁴ to say that we should not mind because he has rubbed somebody the wrong way is rather extraordinary. If a person has rubbed up a Minister the wrong way by being impertinent to him, it does make a difference. In this matter he has not rubbed up any individual, but many people who have been astonished that any Indian should express himself in the way he has done in his book. I have not met Mr Nirad Chaudhuri and have no personal feeling about him this way or that way.

As I have said above, Mr Chaudhuri may continue and complete his note on the Canal Waters dispute. But I do not think he can possibly write with any true appreciation or awareness of India's position in foreign affairs generally because he just thinks differently.

3. Reference was to Chaudhuri's book *The Autobiography of An Unknown Indian* (Macmillan and Company Limited, London, 1951), which gained the approval of the British press.
4. Badruddin Tyabji, Commonwealth Secretary, MEA.

2. To V.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
August 2, 1953

My dear V.T.,

...While I feel attracted to this idea of the Planning Commission having a suitable and worthy abode, at the same time I feel also that it would be a good thing if the Planning Commission or parts of it moved to a village and lived in village surroundings. I greatly fear that we are becoming just a branch of Government with all its virtues and failings of such a branch.

As a matter of fact I do not know what the Planning Commission is doing. I am almost completely out of touch. Occasionally some paper may come to me. But the real job of planning is to think and discuss vital matters.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

Either this is done without my knowledge or this is not done at all, because I have no information about it. I suggest that there might be a weekly meeting to consider basic matters as well as the progress made in Community Centres, etc. At this meeting I shall try to be present.

In particular, I should like the problem of unemployment to be discussed both from the temporary and the long distance point of view.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Acceptance of Foreign Titles and Awards¹

... 3. Our Constitution abolishes titles. It lays down in Article 18 (1) that no title, not being a military or academic distinction, shall be conferred by the State. Article 18(2) follows. This refers to foreign titles not being accepted. It is clear that 18(1) and (2) between them exclude all kinds of titles.

4. In the summary, however, a fine distinction is made between foreign States and Commonwealth States because by virtue of a certain order, Commonwealth States were to be in a different class.

5. So far as titles are concerned, this distinction cannot be made and it is not correct to say that private citizens can accept titles from countries within the Commonwealth. It is true that there is no penalty attached to a person accepting such a title from a Commonwealth or other foreign country. Government officials can be prevented from accepting such titles by rules and regulations. Private citizens are not bound by such rules and regulations and it is not desirable to have a penalty about such matters. It is enough that such titles are not recognized by us and are not used, and for a private citizen to feel that by accepting a foreign title he is not bringing any special credit to himself.

6. Decorations, honours and awards stand on a separate footing and are not banned by the Constitution. So far as Government servants are concerned, such acceptance should be, and is, regulated by rules and regulations. Normally, permission will not be given.

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, 12 August 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.

7. So far as private citizens are concerned, there is no bar and they can accept such decorations even without reference to Government. But we should not encourage this and we should develop a practice of reference being made to Government whenever such a decoration or award is offered.

8. I should like it to be clearly understood that in the matter of titles or decorations, honours and awards, no distinction should be made between a Commonwealth country and any other foreign State. It would be quite absurd for titles to be banned, both in India and from foreign States, but not banned from Commonwealth countries.

9. The position, therefore, is that no titles can be accepted by a national of India from any country. If a private citizen, however, is given such a title and accepts it, all that Government can do is not to recognize that title and, perhaps, to express its disapproval, if necessity arises. So far as decorations, awards, etc., other than titles from foreign countries, including Commonwealth countries, are concerned, there is no ban, but by rule and convention they should only be accepted after Government's permission is taken. Such permission, as I stated once previously, will be very rarely given. A difficulty arises in regard to a large number of Indians who live in British colonial territories and whose nationality might be doubtful. We need not say that we do not want them to return to India or to adopt Indian nationality. It is true that in most such cases we encouraged them to remain in the country of their adoption. When the time comes for them to make a final choice of their nationality, such as in Ceylon or even in Burma, that choice has to be made by the individual and our advice, after all, remains advice and will depend on the circumstances of the case. Where there is this doubt, we cannot apply our constitutional ban or our other rules strictly. The choice must ultimately lie with the individual. Even in such cases it would be desirable for a reference to be made to our Government and we can judge each case on merits and advise accordingly.

4. Conventions in Diplomatic Service¹

General Cariappa's² letter does not exhibit any appreciation whatever of the impropriety which he had committed. I think you should write to him again

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 21 August 1953. JN Collection.

2. K.M. Cariappa, High Commissioner-designate to Australia and New Zealand.

and tell him that this could not be treated merely on the personal level as it raises important issues as to how our Ambassadors should function.

2. For the last year or so, the Bombay Government have been proceeding against the Editor of the *Blitz* on a charge of forgery to humiliate the American Ambassador.³ This had become an international issue. For any person to accept a party from the Editor of *Blitz* when such an action has been taken against him would have been unwise. Therefore, we are a little surprised to learn that General Cariappa had committed himself even before his choice as High Commissioner. However, after his choice as High Commissioner, this attendance at the party became a public event of importance and almost a public exhibition of disapproval by General Cariappa of the activities of his own Government.

3. This matter, therefore, assumed importance from the public point of view and has been much criticized.

3. Between 15 to 18 September 1952, R.K. Karanjia was alleged to have abetted the forging of two documents: purportedly the letters of 17 July 1952, exchanged between him and Chester Bowles, the US Ambassador in India. Karanjia was finally acquitted by the Bombay High Court on 25 July 1953. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 21, pp. 424-425.

5. To B.G. Kher¹

New Delhi
August 22, 1953

My dear Kher,²

... I have received your letter of the 18th August also about D.N. Chatterjee.³ I shall certainly look into this matter as you suggest. In fact, in a way, it did come up before me.

I quite agree with you that promotion should depend on merit and not merely on seniority. But merit in this connection has to be judged in relation to a number of officers and not only one. Naturally you will not have before you the records of all such officers spread out in various places and will thus find it a little difficult to judge of their relative merits. To some extent, we

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. High Commissioner for India in United Kingdom.

3. Principal Private Secretary to B.G. Kher.

are in possession of reports as well as personal data about the work of our officers spread out everywhere. We receive from time to time recommendations from some of our Heads of our Missions about individual officers working with them.

We attach importance to these recommendations. But we have to view them in the larger context of others also. Otherwise, there would be no uniformity and no relative test of merit even. What might well happen is that a number of people are promoted for local reasons and local work without considering the larger picture of others and their work.

However, I shall go into this matter, as suggested by you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
August 22, 1953

My dear Sri Babu,

I enclose a cutting from the *Times of India*.² If there is any truth in the story given in this paper, it is a matter for deep shame for all of us and more especially for the Bihar administration. It appears that this matter was even raised in the Assembly. There must be something completely wrong with any Government or any department of Government which functions in this way. Somebody must be made responsible for this and punished. The smallest punishment that one can give a person in such a matter is dismissal.

This is just an individual case. But such cases throw a light on the entire administration. I suggest, therefore, that you should appoint a small committee of enquiry in this particular case as well as the working of your Education Department which can suffer such things to happen. The whole history of this case should be enquired into and the responsibility of each person concerned in the Education Department at every stage should be noted. Apart from this

1. JN Collection.

2. On 21 August, the paper reported the death of a teacher on 16 August in Bhagalpur, Bihar, owing to starvation. The teacher had waited in vain for nearly seven years for the Education Department of the Government of Bihar to sanction his pension.

case, the whole system under which such a tragedy occurred must be enquired into. It would be a good thing if you make an announcement that you are taking these steps.

Meanwhile, relief should be given to the dead teacher's family. If there is some difficulty in the Bihar Government doing this, I shall send the money myself.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Expenditure by the Indian Delegation to the UN¹

Yesterday I saw the list of our Delegation to the UN General Assembly Meeting. I also saw a file about calculation of expenses for room rent and daily allowances. I was a little taken aback by these estimates. I signed the file, but the more I have thought about it, the more worried I feel.

2. It seems that there is a progressive rise in our expenditure. Every year there seems to be a change and we pay more and more. I am all for our delegates living decently and with dignity and working in comfort. But, for my part, neither personally nor in my official capacity, do I like display or wasteful expenditure. I have an idea that our Ministry does not pay particular attention to economy in these matters. Dignity does not consist in display. I do not know if conditions in America are becoming more expensive to live in or if rents are going up. Our capacity to pay certainly is not going up, and we talk of austerity all the time here without paying much attention to it.

3. I should have thought that a little care in this respect in sealing needless expenditure would not have resulted in any discomfort or even in lack of dignity.

4. In a note by FS, it was stated, on the authority of our Representative in New York, that the President of the UN has to spend 6,000 dollars on one entertainment together with the Secretary-General, that is, the entertainment costs 12,000 dollars in all, apart from other entertainments. I am alarmed at this standard of expenditure and I do not think we can justify all this. If I went to New York, again, which I am not likely to do, I should like to stay

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, 28 August 1953. File No. 15(45)/49-PMS.

in a quiet and inexpensive place. There may be some perversity in that, as I want to show that we are simple folk living simply and not competing with others in display.

5. I should like you to pay some attention to this matter and discuss it with FS first. Then you might talk to Mrs Pandit and the Deputy Minister.

8. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
September 1, 1953

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Thank you for your letter of the 1st September about the Patna Medical College.²

I do not like changing of names of old institutions except when this is necessary. I confess that names such as Prince of Wales or King George's are not very appropriate and should be changed. But, in changing them, it would be preferable not to have a personal name.

In Lucknow, there was the King George V Medical College. They changed this to Mahatma Gandhi Medical College. I did not like this at all. It was not a particular honour to Mahatma Gandhi to have his name associated with the College. It seemed to me rather a cheap way of trying to honour Gandhiji. He was not particularly associated with the College. I would have preferred some impersonal name, whatever that might be, such as the Uttar Pradesh Medical College or simply Lucknow Medical College.

In the same way, I would prefer the Patna Medical College to have some neutral and impersonal name, whatever is considered suitable. I do not think it is any special honour to you for your name to be attached to it.

Having said all this, I would add that I do not think there is any particular objection to the change suggested, that is, your name being associated. Only I do not think it is very fitting to do so in all the circumstances.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Also available in File No. 27(2)/G/53, President's Secretariat.
2. In his letter of 1 September, Rajendra Prasad, referring to a request by V.K.N. Menon, Vice-Chancellor of the Patna University, for changing the name of Patna Prince of Wales Medical College and naming it after the President, sought Nehru's opinion in the matter.

9. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
12 September 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

I have just received the following telegram from Mrs Qasim Razvi from Karachi:

My husband, Qasim Razvi,² on death bed in Hyderabad Jail. Treatment by doctors outside jail not allowed by authorities. Condition worsening. I appeal to you in name of humanity to transfer him to hospital for treatment or release him on parole and allow private doctor to examine him and save his life.

If the facts stated are true, then I just do not see why outside doctors should not be allowed to treat him or why he should not be transferred to a hospital.³

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection.
2. A militant leader of the Razakars, arrested during Police action in Hyderabad in September 1948 for having led an insurrectionary movement in the State.
3. After serving his sentence in Hyderabad jails, Razvi eventually migrated to Pakistan.

10. Conventions in Civil Services¹

It surprises me how some of our officers behave. It is bad enough to lay stress always on status, but it is much worse to come in the way of Government decisions by refusing appointments offered to them. I can understand an officer pointing out his difficulties and Government considering them before coming to a final decision. But an officer should be prepared to serve anywhere at any time if the needs of public service so require.

1. Note to Minister of Defence Organization and Defence Secretary, 23 September 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

I am not personally acquainted with either Dr Sarwate or Mr Baliga.³ Nor do I know any particular reasons which actuated them in doing what they did. From reading these notes, however, I do not get a good impression of what they did, more especially of Mr Baliga's insistence of a higher salary. The amount may not be much, but the insistence was bad and does him little credit. He should be told so. The services are meant for the public good and not for individual advancement. The latter is incidental to the former....

2. The case related to the appointment of a Senior Technical Officer in the Bharat Electronics Factory. An offer was first made to M.B. Sarwate, an officer in the Ministry of Communications, but he was not prepared to accept it. When the offer was made to B.V. Baliga, another Government servant, he demanded a higher salary than what was offered to him. Finally, on 23 September 1953, Nehru wrote to Jagjivan Ram to transfer Baliga to the Bharat Electronics Factory.

11. To Rajendra Prasad¹

Camp: Ranikhet
September 26, 1953

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Thank you for your letter of the 23rd September about M.N. Roy,² and the note you have sent.

As for M.N. Roy, my attention was drawn to his illness recently. Only a few days ago I wrote to his wife to enquire what we could do to help her. I hope to get her reply very soon and I shall endeavour to send her some financial help. This may be either from Government fund or some Congress fund or both.

As for the larger question you have raised³ need I say that I entirely agree with you. There have been, however, some difficulties, though, I think, we ought to be able to surmount them. This matter was discussed at least on

1. File No. 33(51)(A)/48-PMS.
2. Rajendra Prasad wrote that he was "disturbed and distressed" to learn that M.N. Roy, an eminent radical political thinker who had been living in Dehra Dun for some years, was suffering from coronary thrombosis, and that it was not possible to make adequate arrangements for his treatment due to lack of resources. He asked Nehru to consider doing something for Roy's proper treatment.
3. Rajendra Prasad also wrote that M.N. Roy's case had "started a train of thought in my mind" about the condition of political workers and sufferers about which the Government might think and take steps.

one occasion previously, rather informally, by Members of the Cabinet.⁴ As far as I remember Rajaji at the time felt that help should be given but this should be left to the State Governments, as well as to the Congress. He was rather against the Government of India undertaking this responsibility. It was felt that, whatever our approach might be, a large number of people desiring such help would be Congressmen and it would thus appear that we were trying to help Partymen.

I know that this is not an adequate reply, and I wish we could do something more. We have helped individuals from time to time. We can enlarge the scope of our help. I think it will be rather difficult for us to invite applications and the like. Large numbers of people would apply and it would be very difficult to pick and choose. Unfortunately, there are vast numbers in this country, apart from political sufferers, who are in great difficulties.

As you have sent your note to all Members of the Cabinet, we shall certainly give it full consideration.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS

1. To Satyapal¹

New Delhi
July 15, 1953

My dear Satyapal,²

Some days ago the Governor of the Punjab wrote to me about a matter in which you were concerned as Speaker. This related to the question of the Autumn Session of the Legislature being held at Chandigarh.³ Copy of the letter you had sent to the Governor on this subject as well as copy of some kind of a circular letter which you had sent to all MLAs also reached me.

I read these papers with some surprise. I do not wish to enter into the merits of this argument and as to how far Chandigarh is adequately advanced for the purpose in view.⁴ Generally speaking, it would be desirable for Government to start functioning there as early as possible because this in itself will have a good effect on the progress of Chandigarh. In a rather similar case in Orissa, where a new capital has been built, we encouraged the Government to move there even when only partial accommodation was available.⁵ We are now facing the Andhra question with a capital where there is very little of accommodation.⁶

Chandigarh stands on a somewhat different footing. It is an attempt, and the first of its kind in India, to erect a finely planned city which should be an example to others.⁷ This has already received a great deal of publicity in other countries⁸ and it may well become a model for India. It is important, therefore, that there should not be any delay in the building developing and

1. JN Collection.

2. Speaker, Punjab Legislative Assembly.

3. The session starting from 28 September was adjourned *sine die* on 14 October 1953.

4. The Chandigarh city development project involved a total outlay of Rs 16.75 crores. Of this, Rs 8.60 crores were to be spent on development of the city and for providing civic amenities and the balance on government buildings and water supply scheme. As Rs 8.51 crores were expected to be recovered from the sale proceeds of the residential and industrial plots, the net expenditure amounted to Rs 8 crores.

5. Nehru had laid the foundation-stone of Bhubaneswar, the new capital of Orissa, on 12 April 1948.

6. Andhra State was inaugurated on 1 October 1953 with Kurnool as its capital.

7. Headed by le Corbusier, a Swiss-born French architect, the city was designed by a team of four foreign experts.

8. For example, James Cameron, a well-known journalist, in a series of articles in the *News Chronicle* (UK), wrote about Chandigarh at this time: "It is a superb try. It brings the very new to the heart of the very old; the restless mind of the West to reinforce and stimulate the timelessness of the East."

using of Chandigarh.⁹ But it is not about the merits that I wish to write to you as I am not fully acquainted with the present position. It has, however, seemed to me very odd for you to address by circular letter the Members of your Assembly and in effect to suggest to them to object to or oppose the decision of the Punjab Government in this matter. This inevitably would produce a sense of conflict which obviously is neither desirable nor in keeping with his dignity. Any such matters that arise should be dealt with as between the Speaker and the Chief Minister or the Governor.

A decision to hold the next session of the Assembly at Chandigarh should certainly have been made after consulting you. I gather that you were consulted when the general principle was agreed to.¹⁰ It was an error on the part of the government not to consult you at a later stage also. They should have done so. But this does not seem to me a very important matter considering that the principle had been accepted, and indeed had to be accepted in the circumstances.

In any event, whenever there is any difference of opinion or possibility of misunderstanding, the right course is for a private talk with the Chief Minister or the Governor. To send circular letters to the MLAs criticizing Government action does not appear to me to be fitting and cannot lead to a friendly discussion and settlement of the problem. It is obvious that in the democratic procedure that we follow there must be a good deal of cooperation between the various responsible heads of the governmental machinery.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. Chandigarh, the new capital of the Punjab, was inaugurated by the President of India on 7 October 1953.
10. On 13 March 1953, Bhimsen Sachar, the Chief Minister, announced in the Punjab Legislative Assembly that the Assembly would be shifted to Chandigarh after the conclusion of the budget session in consultation with his cabinet colleagues, the Speaker, and the Chairman of the Legislative Council. On 20 June, when Sachar suggested an early meeting between himself, the Speaker, and the Chairman, that Satyapal, expressed his doubts about the desirability of holding the session in Chandigarh and complained that he had not been consulted in the matter.

2. To Bhimsen Sachar¹

New Delhi
August 1, 1953

My dear Sachar,

I enclose copy of a letter I have received from Dr Satyapal, together with my reply to him.

I get the impression from his letter that he was not shown the courtesy which normally a Speaker has a right to expect. Here, in Delhi, whenever there is any matter affecting Parliament, I go immediately to the Speaker and take his advice. I am in constant touch with him as well as with the Chairman of the Council of States. Practically everything in Parliament House is done after reference to them. Therefore, I can understand your Speaker feeling hurt at his being bypassed in such an important matter.

This particular incident is over. But care should be taken to make the Speaker and the Assembly feel that they are consulted whenever any occasion arose affecting their work.

Dr Satyapal has sent me a copy of a letter sent by your Chief Secretary² to the Punjab Assembly Secretary.³ This letter is dated 20th July. It says: "I am directed to request you to intimate the authority for the averment that the Speaker is entitled to receive the same courtesy as is extended to the Ministers, Judges and other high officers of the Punjab Government." This letter is an extraordinary document and is worded in a peculiarly discourteous way. I do not know what exactly it means. The Speaker's position here is very high and I should imagine that a Speaker's position in a State is certainly not lower, from the point of view of precedence, to that of the Ministers. I am not quite sure of this, but the matter can be verified. But, in any event, this kind of controversy about the courtesy to be given to a Speaker seems to me extraordinary.

I think you should look into these matters and pull up your Secretaries who presume to write such letters.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Nawab Singh.
3. Kuldip Chand Bedi.

3. To Bhimsen Sachar¹

New Delhi
August 23, 1953

My dear Sachar,

I wrote to you yesterday about the motion for the abolition of the Upper House that is likely to be brought up in your Legislative Assembly. I suggested that your Party could consider this matter, and, if it comes to some decision, the other members should be expected to support this decision.

There is one aspect of this, however, that had not struck me then, and I should like to clear that up. Under our Constitution, it is the Legislative Assembly only that has the right to decide about the continuation or abolition of the Upper House. It would, therefore, be rather anomalous for the members of the Upper House also to vote on this issue, even in the Party. Therefore, when you put this up in your Party, if you do so, you should ask only the Legislative Assembly members to vote. Their decision should be binding.

It is quite likely that we might consider this question of second chambers in our Working Committee² and later in the AICC and the Congress session itself. Opinion is gaining ground that there is no use for the second chambers and that they are an expensive luxury. I think it is probable that the Working Committee will recommend that the second chambers should not continue after the next general elections. That means that, prior to the general elections, this change should be made. I do not think they will force down this decision on every State. If a state wants it, it will be open to it to have it. But our general view is likely to be that it is better not to have them.

If the motion in your Assembly is postponed, well and good. If not, the proper recommendation would be that the change should take place at the end of the present term.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 32(11)/56-57-PMS.

2. The Congress Working Committee reiterated on 19 September 1953 its previous decision that abolition of Upper Houses in State Assemblies should be decided by the parties in the State Assemblies. If members of the Assembly decided to abolish it and if necessary resolution was adopted by the Assembly, the Centre under the Constitution would take steps for abolishing the second chamber.

6
STATES

I. REORGANIZATION OF STATES

1. To R.K. Patil¹

New Delhi
July 20, 1953

My dear Patil,²

Thank you for your letter of the 18th July.

I do not think it is right or possible to lay down any general rule in favour or against linguistic provinces. To say that linguistic provinces are essential everywhere, regardless of other considerations, is I think bad. To say that the very principle of linguistic provinces is objectionable is also, I think, bad. Ultimately one should judge keeping in view all relevant factors. The objectionable feature in the demand for linguistic provinces is not that demand, but rather the background and the manner it is put forward.

Anyhow, since we have decided to appoint a high-powered Commission to go into all these matters,³ there should be no further argument about it at this stage. That Commission will, I hope, consider all factors including of course the linguistic factor.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 7(57)/48-PMS.
2. Minister in Madhya Pradesh Government.
3. On 22 December 1953, Nehru announced in the House of the People that the Government had set up a Commission to enquire into and report by 30 June 1955 on the reorganization of States in India.

2. To Shriman Narayan¹

New Delhi
August 3, 1953

My dear Shriman,

Thank you for your letter of August 3 and the note on your talks with Vinobaji. I have read all these with great interest.

What Vinobaji has said about the Commission on the Reorganization of

1. File No. 7(98)/48-PMS. This letter is also published in *Letters from Gandhi Nehru Vinoba* by Shriman Narayan (New Delhi, 1968), pp.43-44.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

States has a great deal of agreement with my own thoughts on the subject.² We shall keep it in mind.

As regards other subjects dealt with in your talks, we should discuss these matters in Planning Commission and otherwise. I am afraid I do not wholly agree with what Vinobaji has said about some matters. But undoubtedly what he has said requires careful consideration.

I am sending a copy of your note to the Planning Commission and to some of the Ministers concerned.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Referring to his meeting with Vinoba Bhave in July 1953, Narayan wrote that Vinoba Bhave, while welcoming the announcement of the appointment of the high-powered commission, had suggested that the commission's recommendations should be based on three considerations: (i) homogeneity of language, as far as feasible; (ii) economic solvency; and (iii) national security specially for the frontier areas, and once the recommendations were accepted there should be no further agitation.

3. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
September 8, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

Your letter of the 8th September about Hyderabad and Karnatak.

Generally speaking, our attitude in regard to the so-called linguistic provinces is that we are not going to consider any single case by itself, nor indeed are we going to consider this question except by appointing the promised high-powered Commission. It is for that Commission to see the picture of India as a whole and make such recommendations as they choose. The approach even then should not be confined to linguistic areas as such but should keep other matters in view. In fact we ought to give up talking about linguistic provinces and refer to this question as the redistribution of States, wherever found necessary. The factors to be considered in such redistribution are: cultural (including linguistic), geographical, economic, financial and those relating to security and defence. An overriding consideration is the unity of India as well as the economic development of the country as a whole.

1. JN Collection.

This is the general approach. It is clear that we cannot take up a single case or consider a single demand by itself because it affects other areas immediately. We have had considerable trouble even in regard to a simple case like Andhra. Mysore has come into the picture, Bellary, etc. If we took up Karnatak, which is probably the strongest case now, this would mean the disintegration of Bombay State and immediately we have to consider the question of Maharashtra, Gujarat, Mysore, etc. Thus no single demand can be isolated and considered separately.

The case of Karnatak is certainly the strongest from many points of view, and I have no doubt that a Kannada province will emerge later. Maharashtra would be relatively simple but for the city of Bombay, which is a very difficult and controversial question. Again, there is no unanimity whether a Maharashtra province should include Berar and the Marathi-speaking areas of Madhya Pradesh.

As regards Hyderabad, I have in the past, taken up the strongest attitude against its disintegration. Speaking in Hyderabad itself before a vast audience, I have said that I would oppose it tooth and nail.² I added, of course, that, ultimately if the people concerned insisted upon it, their wishes would have to be accepted. But, in any event, I was convinced that the disintegration of Hyderabad would upset the whole equilibrium of South and Central India and would be bad from the point of view of India's progress, political or cultural.

This is not a question of the Urdu language but of the development of what is called a composite culture which is always desirable where it may be possible. It broadens the mind and leads to greater progress in the end. We are, I am sure in spite of professions to the contrary, one of the most narrow-minded of races, content to live in its own confined shell. Even our religion, which is magnificent in some respects, has encouraged this narrow-mindedness. Religions are often international, in fact usually so; Buddhism, Christianity, Islam are all international, although they may take a national colour occasionally. Hinduism is definitely a national religion in spite of its philosophy which is all-embracing. So Hinduism in its normal practices makes us narrow-minded and intolerant of other ways.

Hyderabad, in spite of its unfortunate past in many ways, is an oasis of a certain broad-mindedness, surrounded by narrow national groupings. It serves a very important purpose from the point of view of Hindi being the national language. It brings that language to the South in a natural way.

I am quite sure, therefore, that we should discourage in every way the disintegration of Hyderabad. It will, I suppose, ultimately take place. But for the present at least it should not be encouraged.

2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.19, p. 25.

I know that your Deputy Minister³ has been talking much too much about a Kannada province. I think he should be pulled up. I know also that Punjab Rao Deshmukh has grown eloquent about Maharashtra including Bombay City.⁴ I have pulled him up for this.

The general attitude we have taken up about the all-India Commission is to say that it will be open to it to consider almost any reorganization of States and that we do not wish to limit its discretion in this matter. No other attitude is possible, if we ask them to look at India as a whole. Therefore, we cannot tell them not to consider the case of Hyderabad State. We should not indeed mention any State in our terms of reference. But, otherwise, I shall certainly point out, whenever an opportunity arises, that the disintegration of Hyderabad will be most unfortunate. I am quite sure that the Hyderabad city would deteriorate greatly if such a dismemberment took place.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

3. B.N. Datar.
4. For instance, on 30 August 1953, addressing a public meeting at Kopergaon, near Ahmednagar, Punjab Rao Deshmukh said that the separation of Bombay City from the proposed State of united Maharashtra was simply inconceivable in view of the predominant position of Marathi-speaking people in the city and added that the Maharashtra State without Bombay City and the Berar districts would not be acceptable to the Marathi-speaking people.

4. To Governors and Chief Ministers¹

New Delhi
September 19, 1953

My dear Governor/Chief Minister,

As you are aware, it has been announced on behalf of the Government of India that a high-powered Commission will be appointed to consider the question of redistribution of Provinces. The Hyderabad Congress passed a resolution to this effect² and the Government of India accepted that approach

1. JN Collection. Copy of the letter was sent to Chief Ministers of UP, West Bengal, Bihar, Madras, Bombay and Orissa; Governors of Bombay, Orissa and Madras, and C.M. Trivedi, the Governor-designate, Andhra State, and C.D. Deshmukh.
2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 21, p. 247.

to this question. We had said that we would take action after the establishment of the Andhra State. There is no immediate hurry to appoint this Commission, but I do not think it will serve any useful purpose to delay this. I should like it to be appointed before the end of the year, preferably some time in November, so that it might start work with the beginning of the New Year.

Two questions arise:

- (1) Composition of the Commission, and
- (2) Functions and terms of reference.

The composition is important. Most of those with whom I have discussed this matter are of opinion that there should not be more than three members. These three persons should be outstanding and impartial. Those connected in any way with linguistic provinces agitation should of course be excluded. I should like you to think over this matter and to suggest possible names. Should we have a Judge of the Supreme Court in this Commission or other Judges?

As regards the functions and terms of reference, I think that they should be general and that we should not go into any detail. We should not mention any particular demand for a new province or for the alteration of the boundaries of any province. We should leave all these matters to the discretion of the Commission.

I would suggest that the Commission should not take any public evidence. They can consult any individual or group privately. They can receive memoranda. As far as possible, all this should be on the confidential basis. It is desirable to avoid public agitations on these issues.

I would suggest to the Commission to consider this problem of redistribution of States in the broadest way without going into specific details about boundaries, etc., to begin with. Having come to some broad conclusions, they should present an interim report to Government. This report should also be published and public reactions noted. The Government might then give their own views on this subject to the Commission.

The second stage will be for the Commission to consider the problem in greater detail and perhaps give some priorities.

This is the general line of my thinking at present. Before we consider this matter further, I shall be grateful to have your views and advice. I am enclosing a copy of the Congress resolution as passed at Hyderabad.

May I expect a reply from you, say, by the first week of October? That reply will, of course, be rather general at this stage.

I would request you to keep this matter secret.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. To S. Nijalingappa¹

New Delhi
20 September, 1953

My dear Nijalingappa,¹

Your letter of the 17th September. If you wish to issue some kind of a statement, it should be on the following lines, in so far as I am concerned:

The Prime Minister said that the case of Karnataka being made into a separate province was probably easier than any other case. It had been generally conceded. Owing, however, to certain obvious difficulties, it had not been possible to take any step in that direction. There was previously the question of Mysore's attitude. That particular difficulty had been largely surmounted.

But it was clear that the creation of a Karnataka State, as indeed of any other State now, could not be considered by itself as it had far-reaching consequences and affected other States. Thus, the formation of a Karnataka State immediately resulted in the break-up of the present Bombay State and all manner of new questions had to be considered then. Thus, no single question now could be considered in isolation. It was for this reason that a high-powered Commission was going to be appointed which could consider the picture of India as a whole and make suggestions. These suggestions would be placed before the public, so that the public could also keep this entire picture in view.

The Commission was likely to be appointed before the end of the year. It would be for the Commission to decide how they would work and a large discretion would be given to them. It was not proposed to have public sittings of the Commission. The whole idea was that their work should be carried out in an atmosphere conducive to calm consideration. The Commission might give an interim report dealing with their broad conclusions, without going into any details. The next step would be to go into details and consider each question perhaps in some order of priority.

The Prime Minister said that now that this major question of the appointment of a Commission had been decided, Government did not want to delay consideration of this matter, but a proper consideration could only result if the atmosphere was free from acrimonious discussion and the problems were approached in a constructive spirit.

1. File No. 7(99)/48-PMS.

2. A senior Congressman from Karnataka and a Member of Parliament at this time.

You will see the resolution³ passed by the Working Committee on this subject.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The resolution passed by the Congress Working Committee on 20 September 1953 stated that in view of the Government's decision to appoint a Commission at an early date to consider the problem of the reorganization of States and the need to ensure a calm atmosphere for the full consideration of the problem, "public agitation for the formation of new States or for any changes in the boundaries of the existing States is undesirable and uncalled for."

II. FORMATION OF ANDHRA STATE

1. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
July 5, 1953

My dear Mr President,

You will remember perhaps my telling you that we intended to invite Shri Chandulal Trivedi to be the first Governor of the new Andhra State. I had mentioned this to him some time ago and he had agreed to accept this post. I had suggested then that he might go there for about a year.

Shri Chandulal Trivedi has already served more than a full term in the Punjab and was previously Governor of Orissa.² According to our convention, he should not continue as Governor, but in view of the peculiar circumstances of the new Andhra State, we came to the conclusion that it was desirable to have an experienced person there to begin with. Shri Chandulal Trivedi has that experience as he went to the Punjab immediately after Partition.

It is proposed to inaugurate the Andhra State on the 1st October. The Governor will then take his oath of office and start functioning. But we feel that it would be helpful if we appointed the Governor-designate as a Special Officer to assist in every way the preliminary work in connection with the

1. JN Collection. Also available in File No. 1(4)/53, President's Secretariat.
2. He was Governor of Orissa from May 1946 to August 1947, and of the Punjab from August 1947 to May 1952.

formation of the Andhra State. It is therefore our intention to appoint him as a Special Officer for this purpose fairly soon, probably from the middle of July, or any other convenient date. I have informed him accordingly.³

I trust you agree with this.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Nehru had written to Chandulal Trivedi on 4 July that he could assume the charge as Special Officer of Andhra State by the middle of July. He added that "as Special Officer, you will be functioning under the Government of India directly, but will keep in close touch with the Madras Government and the Andhra leaders."
4. In his reply of 6 July 1953, Rajendra Prasad gave his assent to the proposal.

2. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
29 July, 1953

My dear Rajaji,

On return from Karachi, I have seen papers about the new controversy regarding the capital of Andhra. I believe that Kailas Nath Katju is writing to you on this subject.

I do not myself see how we can decide in favour of any place other than Kurnool, on the facts before us. We left the decision to the Andhra members. They decided in favour of Kurnool.² I agree that this was not a happy decision, but there it was.

Now it appears that many of these members have changed their minds and probably wish some other place. If it was clear that the majority of the Andhra members wanted any other place, we would accept that. But where there is doubt we have to adhere to the previous decision or give a right to them to change their minds. That is to say, we can ask the Andhra members by themselves to meet again and either confirm their previous decision or revise it. The responsibility must be cast upon them. It is easy enough for them to meet at short notice.

1. JN Collection. Similar letters were sent by Nehru to Balvantray Mehta on 1 August and to K. Raghuramiah and K.N. Katju on 2 August 1953.
2. On 5 June 1953, at a meeting, the Andhra members of the Madras Legislature had decided that Kurnool should become the temporary capital of the State. They rejected by seventy nine to fifty three votes a Communist resolution in favour of Vijayawada.

Obviously we have to consider not only geographical factors but political ones also. Any decision based on convenience and geography might not be accepted by a number of members for other reasons. If we change the Kurnool decision, the Rayalaseema people might start shouting and agitating. I do not like a government to change about its decisions soon after they are made, unless there is special reason for it.

I would, therefore, suggest that a meeting of the Andhra members be held as soon as possible for them to consider or reconsider this question. After all whatever they choose will be the temporary capital and the final choice will be made by the Andhra Assembly later. The main point that arises is that money should not be wasted in developing a place which might not be needed later. I would, therefore, avoid spending any money on a new place till this matter is more firmly decided. Of course, the best course would be to find some temporary place where no money need be spent at present or very little.

I understand that Sanjeeva Reddy³ is coming here in a day or two. We shall ask him about it.

It is unfortunate that Trivedi has fallen ill. I hope he will be well soon.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

3. President, Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee.

3. Hunger-striking for Political Ends¹

Sir, the simple question before the House is as to whether, in view of a gentleman undertaking a hunger strike for a political object, a decision of the Government of India communicated to this House long ago should be upset.² Now, the gentleman in question, Mr Kami Reddi, I have no doubt, is an

1. Statement in Parliament, 6 August 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, 1953, Vol. VI, Part II, cols. 204-208.
2. Lanka Sundaram and K. Subrahmanyam requested Nehru to save the life of Kami Reddi who had been on a fast unto death for 49 days to protest against the decision of the Government to give certain portions of the Bellary district to the Mysore State, and against its declaration that the issue would be settled either through a plebiscite or by a boundary commission.

estimable person and has been moved by the best of intentions. But I really cannot understand how any Member of this House can suggest that Governmental decisions taken after as careful an enquiry as possible should be changed, varied or upset because of an individual indulging in hunger strike. As a matter of fact in this particular matter, as much care as possible was taken through enquiries by competent impartial individuals to find out what was the right course to adopt. It was declared and adopted. I would commend to such of the honourable Members as have not read the report of Justice Misra to read it to see how carefully he went into this question. He had no prejudice in the matter. He had no predilection in the matter. He went into the question and made his report, and Government after considering had accepted it. Now, apart from the fact that Government think that their decision was absolutely correct and the right one, they are still more convinced that no action of the Government is going to be allowed to be influenced in this way by hunger strikes. Otherwise—it does not matter what Government functions here—no Government will function.

In the present case, my colleague, the Home Minister, was telling me that he has received a large number of telegrams. Probably, I have received some but he has got a bunch of them. Telegrams come in exactly what proportion I do not know, some urging one thing and the others urging the other thing, both sides threatening hunger strikes if their wishes are not adhered to and they are contradictory wishes. Some send us telegrams or letters supporting Mr Kami Reddi's fast; others threaten the Government, 'If you give in to Mr Kami Reddi's fast, you have to deal with our fast after that.' So that, politics is reduced to a strange level and this House becomes powerless, if I may say so, before external happenings of this kind. I have great sympathy for Mr Kami Reddi. I do not wish to criticize him because I know he has been a good constructive worker in the past. It is a pity that a man who has done good work in the past and can do very good work in the future in the new State of Andhra that is coming up should associate himself with something which can only lead to bitterness on the eve of the formation of this Andhra State. I might inform the House that not in my capacity as Prime Minister but in some other capacities, I sent a telegram to Mr Kami Reddi last evening, telling him frankly my opinion that what he was doing was very wrong, that it was a wrong method, that the question of Bellary could not be re-opened in this way, that it would lead to trouble, that the question remained as it was, that I would be glad to see him if he wants to see me later and asking him to give up his fast.³ Which commission?⁴ The Andhra State Bill which

3. Lanka Sundaram interrupted to say that Rajagopalachari had made a statement in Madras on 17 July that Bellary issue might be included in the proposed boundary commission.
4. Lanka Sundaram replied: "Commission to settle the disputed areas."

would be coming up before this House presently, I believe, has some clauses about the appointment of a boundary commission or commissions. The idea is, I believe, that each of the two States concerned, that is, the Andhra and the residuary State of Madras, or Andhra and Mysore, should appoint boundary commissions—not so much the Government of India, but they should appoint boundary commissions—to deal with minor rectifications of the border. It is up to the States to give such directions as they like to their boundary commissions. Anything they agree to, we are completely agreeable.⁵ If I may say so, I do not wish to contradict the honourable Member. That is not exactly what Justice Misra has said. He has come to firm conclusions about certain matters. He says, “If anybody asks how many feel this way or that, only a plebiscite can give that. I cannot state precisely without counting of heads; this is my firm conclusion.” He has not recommended a plebiscite. Casually he has mentioned about it.⁶

The honourable Lady Member would have realized that first of all this is not a matter between the Government of India and anybody, any party or any State or the protagonists of any State. The Government of India being, I hope, an impartial adviser, helper, friend and counsellor—call it whatever you may like—whatever we do leaves an imposition on one State or the other. We have, therefore, sent judicial officers of high standing to go into it and when we consider their report we think it is a fair report. And it has reference to a boundary commission. The boundary commissions were not in terms of disputes originally, when we discussed about them, but in terms of minor rectifications of the border. We do not at this stage want to trouble this House with these minor points but to take the districts in one or the other as they were and then constitute the Andhra province and then go in for greater details in the matter of minor rectifications. I say we have no hand in this as to whether the dispute is between the Madras residuary State and Andhra or Andhra and Mysore, the parties concerned can refer anything they like in detail to the boundary commission. The House, no doubt, knows that after this matter of Andhra State is definitely settled and the Andhra State starts functioning, it is Government's intention to consider the larger issue of a reorganization of States, etc., in India from all points of view because we have come to the conclusion that piecemeal consideration of the subject is

5. B.S. Murthy asked when Justice Misra had mentioned that plebiscite should decide the issues why had that part of the report not been taken into consideration by Nehru while dealing with the *firqas* of Moka Rupangundi and Bellary including Bellary town.
6. At this point, referring to Nehru's statement that certain disputed areas would be referred to the proposed boundary commission, Sucheta Kripalani said that though she did not approve fasting as a method to settle the issue she preferred that the Bellary issue should be referred to the commission as there had been considerable feeling over it.

not right. It affects other parties fourth party interests; they cannot be separated. India is an organic whole and however much we may divide it for administrative purposes, as a matter of fact, each division affects some State. Therefore, if we consider the matter as an organic whole and appoint a high-powered commission some time later this year to consider this problem dispassionately and to make such recommendations to Government as they think fit and proper, Government would, no doubt, place it before this House....

4. To C.M. Trivedi¹

New Delhi
September 7, 1953

My dear Trivedi,

Yesterday some of us, that is, Maulana Azad, Dr Katju, Sanjeeva Reddi and Balvantray Mehta and I, discussed the Andhra situation and considered various alternatives. There appeared to us only two worth considering, namely:

1. If Prakasam² leaves the PSP and becomes an Independent and then, as such, joins the Congress Legislature Party in the Assembly, he should be invited by that Party to become Chief Minister. This does not mean that Prakasam joins the Congress organization as a whole. It means that he is a non-party Independent, but in the legislature, he is a Member, or rather an Associate Member, of the Congress Assembly Party and observes its discipline, etc.
2. If the above is not feasible, then Sanjeeva Reddi should form a purely Congress Government with such help as he can get. This might not be very stable, but it might be able to carry on. Anyhow, if it fails subsequently, the burden will lie on those who bring about that failure.

I saw Prakasam today and, in the course of conversation, he appeared to accept fully the first course suggested above. Indeed, he seemed to be happy about it. I tried to explain it to him as fully as I could, but naturally I could not go into detail as to every step. I told him not to rush to the Press, but to discuss the matter fully with Sanjeeva Reddi. I also told him that he must not burden himself with any portfolio. He asked me about the number in the Ministry. I said I could not definitely fix any number as it was difficult to be

1. JN Collection.

2. T. Prakasam was a member of the Praja Socialist Party.

rigid about such matters. But my own inclination was towards a small Ministry, say, about six or seven. He expressed his entire agreement with it.

Finally I again told him to discuss these matters fully with Sanjeeva Reddi. Since then I have met Sanjeeva Reddi and given him an account of our talk. He agreed and he is likely to see Prakasam today here in Delhi. Both are going back to Madras tomorrow morning.

Although my talk with Prakasam was more or less satisfactory, I am a little afraid about possible misunderstandings in the future. Therefore, one has to be very careful about this matter and it is important that Sanjeeva Reddi and Prakasam should understand each other completely.

So far as you are concerned, you will, of course, deal with Sanjeeva Reddi as the Leader of the biggest Party. It is for Sanjeeva Reddi and his Party to invite Prakasam to take a particular place, provided Prakasam has previously left the PSP and become an Independent Member. It is important that you deal with Sanjeeva Reddi to begin with in this matter and that Prakasam should come to you through and *via* Sanjeeva Reddi and the Congress Party. In the circumstances, it would be desirable for any recommendation in regard to the Ministry to be supported by both Sanjeeva Reddi and Prakasam. Also that if this question is considered, you should send for both.

I have given you a general indication. I suggest that you see Sanjeeva Reddi as soon as possible and discuss the matter further with him. I would prefer no formal step to be taken till the meeting of the Congress Working Committee which takes place on the 19th of this month. If by then Sanjeeva Reddi has come to a clear agreement with Prakasam, we can give our formal sanction to it in the Working Committee.

The situation is, of course, rather peculiar. The future government of Andhra will be a Congress dominated government with the Congress Party as its main pillar. All Ministers must necessarily be Members or Associate Members of the Congress Party in the Legislature. Others may support it as Members of a Coalition. They may or may not become Associate Members of the Congress Assembly Party. The fact that this is a Congress dominated government must be kept in view throughout to avoid any misunderstanding at any stage. Therefore, Prakasam comes in not by direct invitation from you, but on the invitation of the Congress Party conveyed to him through Sanjeeva Reddi, who then informs you of this. Subsequently, you deal with Prakasam and Sanjeeva Reddi together.

It will, of course, be desirable for Sanjeeva Reddi to be Deputy Chief Minister. We do not usually have any Deputy Chief Ministers in the States, but in the present case that is obviously indicated.

You might keep Sri Prakasa³ generally informed of the situation without

going into details, as he has been interested in it. I am not writing to him on this subject.

I might mention that I have had a brief letter from Rajaji today expressing his disagreement with the proposal that Prakasam should be Chief Minister or rather he disagreed with what Sri Prakasa had written to me on this subject. I remember some time back when Rajaji had told me that Prakasam might be made Chief Minister. I think that the way out we have found is, in the balance, satisfactory. It has its drawbacks of course, but we cannot find any way without some hurdles and difficulties. Everything depends on many factors, notably the human factor. Sanjeeva Reddi is a man who has some capacity to get on with others and that is good.

I might mention something that I have told you previously. One of the persons in Andhra who is greatly disliked not only by Prakasam, but by many others is Kala Venkata Rao.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Member, Madras Legislative Assembly.

5. Shriman Narayan¹

New Delhi
September 17, 1953

My dear Shriman,

Your letter of today's date. I am afraid I cannot possibly find any time to have a talk with Kripalaniji till at least the Working Committee is over.² Indeed the very next day, that is, Monday, I am going to Pilani.³ I suggest that you and Balvantray might have a talk with Kripalaniji and later I could meet him.

I had a very brief letter from Jayaprakash last night.

I do not agree with him about his advice regarding Prakasam. Prakasam of course had agreed to my proposal and thought it generous. So far as I

1. From *Letters from Gandhi Nehru Vinoba* by Shriman Narayan (New Delhi, 1968), p. 43.

2. Referring to his talks with Jayaprakash Narayan, Shriman Narayan wrote that though the former had no objection to Prakasam becoming the Chief Minister of the new Andhra State, he felt it "desirable to call Kripalaniji for a personal talk before taking any final decision in the matter."

3. Nehru went to Pilani to inaugurate the Electronics Engineering Research Institute on 21 September 1953.

know, he had consulted Kripalaniji at the time also, who had raised no objection. It is now for Prakasam to decide.

As regards the Travancore-Cochin Ministry, it will certainly be desirable to discuss this with Kripalaniji.⁴ Perhaps Damodaran⁵ and others might be interested also.

As for Jayaprakash's proposal for some kind of a coalition between Congress, PSP and other parties,⁶ in theory there may be something in it. But in practice, I fear this will lead to difficulties. My last attempt at something of this kind led to unfortunate results. What are the other "democratic parties?"

I am always prepared to discuss these matters. But one should be careful not to land oneself in a morass.

You might discuss this with Balvantray. I rather think that we should not bring it before the Working Committee, as that will give it undue publicity.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Shriman Narayan wrote that Jayaprakash felt that a personal discussion with Kripalaniji might help in finding "some solution for Travancore-Cochin on the basis of a coalition between the Congress and the PSP." On 14 September, the Travancore Tamil Nad Congress Party had withdrawn from Travancore-Cochin's sixteen-month old Coalition Ministry, as per the directive of its General Committee. Ultimately the Ministry was dissolved on 24 September after it lost the vote of confidence in the Assembly.
5. K.A. Damodara Menon (1906-1978); Congressman from Kerala; edited *Mathrabhumi* for fourteen years; Member, House of the People, 1952-57; Minister for Industries, Kerala Government, 1960-64.
6. Shriman Narayan also wrote that Jayaprakash had told him that "in order to achieve substantial results in the economic development of India some kind of a coalition between the Congress, PSP and other democratic parties would be desirable and as the Communists tried to forge United Fronts for establishing dictatorship so the democratic parties of a country might forge a United Front for checking totalitarianism."

6. To C.M. Trivedi¹

New Delhi
20 September 1953

My dear Trivedi,

Sanjeeva Reddi will be seeing you and will tell you of developments in Delhi. As I wrote to you previously, Prakasam had willingly agreed to my suggestion that he should become an independent non-partyman. That meant his dissociating himself from the Praja Socialist Party. I did not ask him to join the Congress as such. But it was obvious that as Chief Minister he could not

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

hang in the air and he had to work through a party group which would support him. Therefore, he would become an Associate Member of the Congress Legislature Party. You will notice the difference between his joining the Congress as such as an organization outside and his association with the Legislature Party in the Assembly.

On his return to Madras, Prakasam got most of the members of the executive of his party to agree to this in writing. Thus far there was plain sailing. At the meeting of the PSP Executive in Delhi, however, they refused to give him permission to withdraw from the Party for this purpose.

Anyhow, Prakasam is eager to do so and since we have made this offer to him, we should, of course, stand by it. It was not our wish to appear to break up the PSP because we want their cooperation. Even now our approach to them will be a friendly one. Prakasam has clearly intimated to me that he would withdraw from the PSP and join the Congress Legislature Party as an Associate Member. In fact, he has expressed in writing his wish to join the Congress Legislature Party as an Associate Member.

He has had talks with Sanjeeva Reddi and they have drawn up the names of the Members of the Cabinet. Sanjeeva Reddi will tell you about this: Prakasam, Chief Minister, without any portfolio, Sanjeeva Reddi, Deputy Chief Minister, Visvanathan,² etc.

It is important that Prakasam should have no portfolio. The other portfolios have not been finally fixed yet, but probably Visvanathan will take Finance and Sanjeeva Reddi Home, etc.

You will notice that of the seven Ministers only three are regular members of the Congress Party.

Sanjeeva Reddi will meet you and later he will take Prakasam to see you. I indicated the procedure to you in my last letter, that is, that you should invite Sanjeeva Reddi as leader of the biggest party, thereupon he would inform you that Prakasam had associated himself with his party and he had invited him to become Chief Minister. You will then deal with the two together and fix up the Cabinet.

Sri Prakasa is of opinion that for the sake of a certain propriety, Rajaji, as retiring Chief Minister so far as Andhra is concerned, might recommend to you to send for Sanjeeva Reddi. Certainly, this may be done as a formality, though it has no particular importance.

So far so good. You will, no doubt, have plenty of hurdles to surmount. But we are starting under somewhat better auspices than was at first considered likely....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Tenneti Viswanathan was Member of Madras Legislative Assembly.

III. PRIVY PURSES

1. To the Rulers of Indian States¹

New Delhi

September 10, 1953

Dear friend,

I am venturing to address you on a subject which has been troubling me for a long time. Indeed, about a year ago, I drafted a letter on this very subject, but refrained from sending it then.

2. Over six years ago, nearly all the old Indian States acceded to the then Dominion of India and various Covenants and Agreements were arrived at between the Government of India and the Rulers of those States. Those accessions, at that vital period of transition in India's history, demonstrated the wisdom of the parties concerned and the change-over was brought about peacefully and cooperatively. Few events that occurred in those memorable years struck the imagination of the world so much as this peaceful, and co-operative solution of a very difficult problem. This demonstrated afresh the genius and ability of India to solve its problems peacefully. Credit for that solution of the old Indian States problem was certainly due to the lessons we had learnt from Mahatma Gandhi and the general policy that we had pursued. It was indeed that policy which brought about that other remarkable change, a peaceful settlement between England and India resulting in the independence of India. But, undoubtedly, the Rulers of the Indian States deserve credit also for that solution.

3. It may be said that some such solution was inevitable because of the factual situation that existed in India then as well as the temper of the age. That may be so, but the fact remains that even obvious courses of action are objected to and resented. It was, therefore, a triumph of the Indian spirit which led all of us to tackle successfully this problem at that critical moment.

1. File No. 134/53. President's Secretariat. Copies of the letter were sent to 102 princes who received a privy purse of rupees one lakh and above. Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir was not addressed this letter. On 20 August 1953, copies of a draft of this letter were sent to the President, Vice-President, Abul Kalam Azad and K.N. Katju for their views. Rajendra Prasad writing back on 2 September said that the constitutional sanction should "be revised if possible" but only with the princes' consent and "not in any way explicitly or implicitly repudiating the agreements made. Therefore, I consider your approach, if I may say so, to be quite correct, and I hope it will have the desired response."

4. Over six years have passed since then and many changes have taken place in our country during this period. India has become a Republic and a new Constitution of the Republic was adopted and given effect to. In accordance with that Constitution, general elections were held early in 1952 and these elections demonstrated again the peaceful and democratic character of the Indian people. The political revolution in India was thus completed. But that did not mean that we had entered a static phase. Immediately we had to face economic problems and the vital and urgent necessity of increasing the well being of the people of India. Indeed, these problems had been before us even earlier. They had been somewhat overshadowed by the political struggle for independence. The Constitution itself laid down certain basic principles of social justice and directive principles of policy.

5. The Constitution merely stated in dignified and emphatic language what all sensitive men and women the world over thought. Everywhere there was this urge for social change. In some places there had been violent revolutions and complete upsets of the existing social order. Crisis after crisis had arisen in various countries because of the impact of these social and economic forces. In India we were fortunate in many ways because of the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and our desire to pursue peaceful methods. But India also inevitably felt the impact of these forces. The nationalist movement in India for long represented not only the urge to independence, but also the urge to social justice. Our country being essentially an agricultural country, the first urge was in the direction of land reform. The abolition of the zamindari and jagirdari systems thus became an important plank in our programme. All over Asia, land problem became the dominant programme. In China, a far-reaching revolution dealt with this problem in its own way. In Burma and some other countries, land reforms were introduced, and, generally speaking, the zamindari system or something like it was abolished. In India also, we have put an end to the zamindari and jagirdari systems in most States and I have no doubt that the relics of them, wherever they still remain, will also go fairly soon, the sooner the better. There is no place for such a system in the modern world and no country can progress if it is tied down by feudal and out-of-date land tenures.

6. Even after putting an end to the zamindari and jagirdari systems, we have to consider earnestly further steps in land reform. Step by step we have to go forward towards equality and a lessening of the great differences in wealth and the privileges that wealth gives.

7. Last year, our Planning Commission produced the First Five Year Plan. A year earlier, an Outline Five Year Plan had been issued and public criticism of it had been invited. There was a great deal of criticism and the Planning Commission profited by it and produced the revised Plan. This Plan is now the basis of our economic and developmental activity. It is a great step and

India today is experimenting on a vast scale in democratic planning. This Plan must hold, but even within the brief space of a year, this Plan has proved to be not fully adequate and we are now thinking of revising it and augmenting it so as to meet the urgent needs of today. Those urgent needs are many but the primary one is how to give employment to the vast number of people who are at present unemployed, both in urban and rural areas. We cannot solve this problem very quickly or by some magic method. Nevertheless, we have to go forward with some speed towards its solution, for, if we do not do so, that problem might well overwhelm us. Our resources are limited and we have to make the best possible use of them and not allow any part of them to be wasted or frittered away.

8. The Five Year Plan not only deals with agriculture and industry but touches almost every aspect of our national life. Planning means a definite objective and targets for the future; it also means a coordination of the various activities of the nation in order to achieve that objective and those targets. Our objectives are the growth of the nation and the advancement of our people socially, economically and culturally. Today, in spite of such progress as we have made, the spectre of poverty haunts us in great parts of India and vast numbers of our people are deprived of the opportunity to grow to their full stature. Even our children, who are the true wealth of the nation, do not have the primary necessities which every child has a right to be provided with. Famine or acute conditions of scarcity occur in some part or other of the country. We fight these conditions of scarcity with all our strength, for it is intolerable that our people anywhere should die of starvation. While we are preventing actual deaths by starvation, under-nutrition continues to darken the lives of vast numbers of our people.

9. We have not only to meet the crisis of the moment, but also to lay firm foundations for preventing such crises occurring in our country. We have, in fact, to produce greater wealth and to see that it is properly distributed among our people. Both greater production and a more equitable distribution are essential. At the same time, we have to meet the problem of ever-increasing population which demands the necessities of life. This increasing population leads to growing unemployment.

10. With our meagre resources it is difficult to produce the surplus which is necessary for future progress. It is only by large-scale investment in schemes of national development that we can advance. That advance, therefore, depends upon the surplus available for investment. This is the problem which the Planning Commission has to face continuously, and the consequences that force themselves upon their attention are not pleasing. We cannot expect miracles to happen or great progress to be attained suddenly. But the pace cannot be too slow either, for then events might well overwhelm us.

11. All this leads to serious thinking about the economic structure in

which we function. Are there any impediments in that structure which come in the way of progress or our resources being tied up or not being used to full advantage? Can we move faster by removing those impediments or by changing that economic structure in some places? We have, of course, to proceed on democratic lines not only because of our Constitution, but because we value the essential features and bases of democracy and have full faith in them. How can we within that democratic structure achieve the best and quickest results in regard to social and economic progress?

12. All over the world, similar problems are facing Governments and peoples. They have been tackled in different ways. We can learn from the success and failures of others, but we have finally to determine what we should do keeping in view our ideals and the conditions that exist in this country. We cannot, however, ignore what happens elsewhere, for the world, in spite of its rivalries and conflicts, becomes an ever-closer unit.

13. Apart from the actual economic and social changes that might be brought about, there is the psychological aspect of these problems which cannot be ignored. If we aim at social justice and equality of opportunity for all, as we do and as we have solemnly declared so often, then we must aim at the removal or a lessening of flagrant inequalities. That applies to every phase of our national life. Such flagrant inequalities are a constant irritant to the people and therefore tend to produce discontent and sometimes even conflict.

14. You have, no doubt, followed with sympathy and interest the progress of the Bhoodan movement in India initiated by Acharya Vinoba Bhave. This has certainly caught the imagination of many people, and has even excited interest in other countries. Probably, no other country would have thought of starting such a movement. It is peculiar to the genius of India to try to settle a problem bristling with conflict and to unsettle deep-rooted vested interests by this peaceful method of appeal and persuasion. Nobody says that the entire land problem of India will be solved by the Bhoodan movement. It would be improper for any Government to cast aside its own responsibility in regard to agrarian reform by relying only on the Bhoodan movement. But the fact remains that significant progress even on the practical side has been made by this movement. On the psychological side, the effect is even greater. It removes many a barrier and tones down much of the opposition of vested interests and thus makes it easier for the State to tackle this problem by legislation.

15. Can we apply this method, which is so much in consonance with the spirit of India and which produces results without the unfortunate trail of consequences that follow conflict, to other matters also? There are many economic problems which face us and which require this cooperative approach, if we are not to repeat the history of conflict in Europe and Asia. Vested

interests, more especially in property and privilege, are not easy to dislodge. Past convention and even the authority of religion have been invoked in their favour. Any attempt to remove them often excites passion and anger, and yet the course of history, as you are doubtless aware, demonstrates to us a progressive change in the idea of property and in the conception of privilege. In ancient times, human beings were property, which could be treated like any other chattel by the owner. The autocrat ruler was supposed to own as property his country and the people there and do what he chose with them, subject always to the fear of rebellion. After bitter conflicts, slavery was abolished and this form of property ceased to exist. Probably there is no man today in the world who can justify the institution of slavery. Other forms of property also underwent a progressive change. The serfs on land were given certain rights which could not be taken away. The old privileges gradually faded away, to a greater or lesser extent, in various countries. In fact, a test of the advancement of the country was how far it had got rid of inherited-privilege and vested interests. Property ceased to be sacrosanct and social thinking gave the first place to the human being and the social groups. It was considered the right of every human being to have equality of opportunity with others. Property is a product of law, and by changes in law, constitutionally affected, we can alter the whole structure of property, inclusive of ownership, inheritance and maximum limits. Each one of us receives a great deal from society or from the nation. What do we give in return for that? If we take more than we give, then we deprive others without justice. We must at least give as much as we receive. Indeed, we must give more so that the social group might progress.

16. I have stated this larger background because it is only when we keep this in view that we get the right perspective to consider any particular problem by itself. One of the problems before us is the present position and the future of the old Princes and Rulers in our country. As I have said above, it was an act of wisdom and statesmanship on their part to help by accession to produce an integrated and unified India. They deserve credit for that. The Government of India entered into certain covenants² with them and any such agreement arrived at by the Government must not be lightly reviewed. Whether I like

2. In 1949, the Government of India introduced four Articles in the Constitution, namely, Articles 291, 362, 366(22) and 363, which were directly concerned with the assurances given to the Rulers about their privy purses and privileges. Foremost among them was Article 291 which provided: (a) such sums shall be charged on and paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India; and (b) the sums so paid to any Ruler shall be exempt from taxes on income.

that agreement or not, I would hesitate to go behind it, but at the same time, we cannot ignore the rapid pace of events in the country and in the world and the urgent demands of the present situation. There is no doubt that there is growing criticism all over the country about the terms agreed in many of these covenants. Reference has been made to them and resolutions moved in meetings of the Congress Party and the All India Congress Committee. We have generally been able to restrain the members of the Congress, but others have expressed their criticism of the present arrangement more openly and in stronger language.

17. The fixation of very large sums of money as privy purses is totally out of keeping with the Directive Principles of our Constitution and the temper of the age. So also is the provision to have Rajpramukhs for life. We have Governors in our Part A States and they perform an important function. Rajpramukhs take the place of Governors in Part B States. As a matter of fact the functions they perform are, on the whole, less than those of the Governors in Part A States. Governors function for a fixed period; Rajpramukhs for life. Some principle of perpetuity is followed, though that principle has been given up elsewhere in our Constitution and in our political structure.

18. How long can we continue these anachronisms? How long can we justify to our people the payment of large sums of money from the public funds to the Princes, many of whom discharge no functions at all? We discuss frequently the problem of unemployment. Apart from the human misery involved in it and the bad economic consequences, in that the unemployed are an unproductive burden to the State, it is bad for any of them to be functionless. The unemployed at the other end of the social scale, that is, those who have no function and who give little or nothing to society by way of productive effort, and live on the earnings of others, are equally a burden to the State, and, as a group, socially undesirable. Moral, political and social theory does not justify the continuation of any functionless group, and more particularly, the payment of large sums of money to that group. In the context of India today, with famine and scarcity and the country struggling hard to overcome them, this anachronism becomes all the more glaring. Apart from theory, in a democratic State, where the masses of the people are politically and otherwise growing in awareness, no one can expect that this can continue for long. Ultimately the power rests with the people and the people will grow increasingly critical, and a time will come when they will exercise that power to put an end to anything that they consider unjust and a barrier to their own well-being. Should we wait till then when force of circumstances brings about a change or should we rather look at the present picture of our country and of Asia, with all its ferment and urge for progress, and bring about changes by cooperative and peaceful methods? Political wisdom consists in anticipating events and guiding them.

19. It is right that the old Rulers should live in dignity. We want our President, the Head of our Republic, to live and function with the dignity that is appropriate for the Head of our State. We have provided for that. Can it be said that others in India want to maintain some higher standard of dignity than even the President of India?

20. Many of our Princes have, apart from their privy purses, considerable private fortunes invested in India or abroad. There has been an unfortunate tendency to invest abroad. This is not in keeping with the service that India demands from each one of us, for India requires all her resources for her own development. Some of the Princes have left their ancestral homes and live elsewhere, cut off from their people. Some go to foreign countries almost every year and waste their time and substance there. I need hardly point out to you the impropriety of this behaviour and its reactions on the people. Whatever their private fortunes may be, certain arrangements in the past entitle the Princes to privy purses. But, is it right or proper from any point of view for those privy purses to be out of all proportion to standards in India?

21. I should like the Princes to give consideration to what I have said,³ because events move fast in this world of ours and we ought to keep pace with those events. What might have been good yesterday may be wholly out of place today and tomorrow might compel a change. I am not making any positive suggestion in this matter at the present moment. I should like the Princes themselves to consider what I have written and themselves suggest how best we can deal with this situation.⁴ Their own old States call loudly

3. On 27 November 1953, while replying to a question by Hukam Singh, Akali Member, in the House of the People, Nehru said that no official communication had been sent to the former princely rulers by the Government of India about the possibility of scaling down the privy purses. Instead, he had written a personal letter to a number of Princes. Most of the replies received by him were in the nature of provisional replies, stating that the matter was being considered more fully. He further added that "it will not be desirable to give any further particulars about these replies at this stage." When Hukam Singh asked whether any of the princes had conveyed to Nehru their refusal to reduce privy purses, the Speaker overruled him.
4. While this letter evoked lukewarm response, yet another appeal by Nehru to the Princes in 1954, to agree to a voluntary contribution to the public revenues of ten to fifteen per cent of their privy purses, went unheeded. Subsequently, by the Presidential Order of 6 September 1970 derecognizing the rulers, the privy purses were also abolished. However, since the Order was declared *ultra vires* by the Supreme Court it became inoperative. Finally, by the passing of the Rulers of Indian States (Abolition of Privileges) Act in 1972, which removed the exemptions and immunities provided in respect of rulers consequent on their derecognition by the Presidential Order of 1970, the privy purses and privileges were abolished.

for development which suffer for lack of money. A part of the privy purse might well be set aside for the development of their own people. Private properties, many of which are now a burden to the owner, might be used for purposes of social welfare and public advantage. But, apart from the monetary aspect, I should like the Princes to line up with their people in other ways also and thus help in the great tasks which demand all our strength and energy.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

TRIBAL AREAS

I. NORTH EAST FRONTIER AGENCY

1. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
July 2, 1953

My dear Medhi,

I find that there has been some excitement in Assam about a proposal that we have considered here to appoint a Commissioner to assist the Governor for the North East Frontier Agency. I really do not understand why there should be any excitement or even any objection to an administrative measure of this kind. I suppose that the objection is due to the fact that Assam wants to incorporate these areas within its own territory. There is no question of that being done in the near future at least and we must make the best and the most efficient arrangements possible for the progress of these areas. If at any time any wider issue is raised, the presence of the Commissioner will not come in the way.

I confess that I feel unhappy when these provincial considerations are put forward. I am quite clear in my mind that at present and for some considerable time to come, the North East Frontier Agency should be kept as a separate unit under the Central Government for a variety of political and other reasons appertaining to the frontier. If so, then we must improve the machinery of administration there and that is all that is meant by appointing a Commissioner.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
July 9, 1953

My dear Medhi,

...I am glad to learn about the general improvement in the situation in the Naga Hills.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

I have your other letter also of July 7th in regard to the NEFA. At Agra I had a talk with the President² of the Assam PCC and others and I believe they were satisfied with what I said.

What exactly does it mean to say that it is proposed to constitute the North East Frontier Agency into a separate State? It is at present a separate administrative unit under the Central Government. No change is going to be made to it and no addition is going to be made either. It will continue as it is under the Central Government. There is no proposal before us to add any other area to it or to put an end to it in its present condition.

You suggest that I should issue some kind of a statement to the Press about the gradual and progressive assimilation of this area, presumably to Assam. I cannot issue such a statement because I do not know what the developments in the near future are going to be. These areas are highly important from the political point of view, being frontier areas. They are undeveloped and in order to develop them, large sums are necessary. If they were added to Assam, the burden on that State would be very great with no equivalent income. Apart from this, I do not quite understand what you mean by 'assimilation'. I am very doubtful about assimilating these tribal people into any other form of cultural life. They may, of course, partly assimilate themselves. They have very special customs and it is important that they should be made to develop on their own lines without any attempt being made to change them too much.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. On 7 July 1953, at Agra, Nehru was reported to have told B.P. Chaliha, President of the Assam PCC, that the Government of India had decided to appoint a commissioner for the NEFA under the Governor of Assam who would administer the area in consultation with the Government of Assam.

3. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
July 14, 1953

My dear Medhi,

I am gradually dealing with papers which have accumulated. Sometimes I take them up not in proper order.

1. JN Collection.

I have just come across copies of five resolutions passed by the Asom Jatiya Mahasabha² at a meeting of its Executive Committee held on 16th June. I have read these resolutions with considerable surprise. What has amazed me is that this organization has called for demonstrations on the 16th July, which has been fixed as an "All Assam State Language and Assam Integration Day".³ Even schools have been asked to join these demonstrations.

This is a serious matter. On me it has created an impression which is the very reverse of what the Asom Jatiya Mahasabha apparently intended.

I have already written to you about this subject of the North East Frontier Agency. We have proposed no change in the status of the North East Frontier Agency, but we are intensely anxious to help that area to develop itself. With that object in view various proposals were considered by the Cabinet here and were subsequently sent to your Governor and you for your comments. I repeat no change in status was thought of. The North East Frontier Agency was to remain as it is, that is, a unit under the Government of India. Instead of comments on the proposals that we had made and which were based on expert advice, I find this agitation in Assam, and demonstrations and threats. I just cannot understand what all this is about.

I do not know exactly whom the Asom Jatiya Mahasabha represents, but its resolutions indicate a mentality with which I have not the least sympathy. It is the narrowest provincial outlook against which I have been raising my voice all over India.

The North East Frontier areas, because of geography, must necessarily have close relations with Assam. But any approach such as is indicated in the Asom Jatiya Mahasabha resolutions makes it clear to me that the Frontier Agency should not be merged, as suggested. The whole outlook of the Asom Jatiya Mahasabha is completely wrong.

Surely any decision about the North East Frontier Agency will have to depend primarily on the good of the people there and their wishes as well as important military considerations. These cannot be overridden.

I presume that it is realized that the Frontier Agency is a heavy financial liability. It brings no revenue. It is all expenditure and heavy expenditure at that. How it will benefit Assam to be saddled with this expenditure is not clear.

2. Founded in 1926 by Ambikagiri Roy Choudhury, the Asom Samrakshini Sabha was later on christened as Asom Jatiya Mahasabha. The Mahasabha since its inception had put up a strong case for "Assam for Assamese".
3. On 16 July 1953, the Assam Congress, the Praja Socialist Party, and the Assam Jatiya Mahasabha held a joint public meeting in Guwahati to protest against the changes in the administration of NEFA.

I would like to know what exactly has happened to induce some people in Assam to talk in this utterly odd, illogical and narrow-minded way. To drag in schools in this is a very undesirable business.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Changing the Name of Lushai Hills¹

I think that we should change the name of the district. But I am not quite sure 'Mizoram' will be a suitable name. Perhaps 'Mizo District' might be better. I suggest that, before we put this up before the Cabinet, we might consult the Governor and the Chief Minister of Assam. I know that they have been consulted generally but they might be consulted specially also. I remember that, when I was in the Lushai Hills, some people did not like the idea of 'Mizoram' although they were agreeable to 'Mizo'.

2. About one thing I am quite clear. Whatever the name of the district might be, the hills should continue to be called the Lushai Hills. That is to say, we do not change the geographical name of the hills but we are prepared to change the name of the district.

3. I have no particular objection to 'Mizoram' for the district, but I think it will be better to make sure about the point mentioned by me above.

1. Note to Cabinet Secretary, 16 July 1953. JN Collection.

5. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
20 July 1953

My dear Medhi,

I have your letter of July 15.

I have tried my best to understand the position that has arisen in Assam

1. Bisnuram Medhi Papers, NMML.

about NEFA.² But I confess that I am completely unable to appreciate this. I see no reason why I should issue a statement as suggested by you.³ Such a statement would presumably mean the laying down of a certain policy for the future. We are not laying down any policy at all. We are only considering some administrative improvements in regard to the NEFA. I cannot say that the NEFA will be completely integrated with the State of Assam at a later stage. It may be so. But one of the principal considerations which we have to bear in mind is the frontier situation and the military responsibilities that have been cast upon us. If the State of Assam is in a position to discharge these military responsibilities, then this difficulty need not arise.

But I just do not understand how all this question has arisen at the present moment. I can understand of course that quite inevitably the State of Assam has to play a great part in those areas because of geographical considerations and all kinds of cultural and other associations.

You refer to Chaliha saying that I would issue a statement.⁴ I do not know what he means. I sent him and you a note on the interview I had with him in Agra. That is all the statement that I intended making. That note can be published if Chaliha or you wish it.

I have no recollection whatever of my having made any statement in Parliament as stated in the *Assam Tribune*.

We were considering a difficult frontier and political position and we had to deal with this in a special way from considerations of India's security, etc. Also we were considering how best to deal with the peculiar problems of tribal communities which vary greatly in their social structure and advance. We have highly developed and progressive tribal groups in Assam, chiefly in your autonomous areas, and we have very primitive people in some parts of the NEFA. These primitive people especially have to be dealt with care and friendliness and require expert knowledge which our average administrator does not possess. Hence the necessity for a specially trained cadre. That is what the Burmese are doing on the other side in their own way. This approach

2. On 13 July, the *Assam Tribune* reported about a meeting presided over by B.P. Chaliha at which violent speeches were delivered against what was called a "diabolical move" of the Central Government, and some people even threatened to resign from the Congress because of this move.
3. Medhi, referring to the agitation in Assam for integration of NEFA area in Assam, pleaded with Nehru to make a declaration "as to the ultimate objective as envisaged in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution" in order to "allay the misconception in the minds of the people" regarding the "progressive assimilation and integration of the areas with India through Assam."
4. Quoting a report from the *Assam Tribune* of 13 July, Medhi wrote that Chaliha expected "that the Prime Minister would make a statement on this issue very soon."

does not affect in the slightest the future relationship of this area with Assam. That continues exactly as it is today till circumstances indicate that it should be changed.

The proposed appointment of a Commissioner has been made much of.⁵ It is a simple administrative expedient which has nothing to do with any policy. We have not decided on such an appointment. It is a matter of convenience only just as we appoint any officer anywhere. That does not change the status of the NEFA at all. We may as well decide not to have the Commissioner. But we are quite clear that this question of backward tribes has to be dealt with in a particular way under expert guidance. If you wish to know how I view this question, you might refer to a speech⁶ I delivered at a conference held in Delhi a year or so ago. I send copies of this speech to you.

There is a great deal of talk of integration. I do not quite know what this means. I am working for closer integration of all parts of India with each other. But integration does not mean imposition. It means the development of a common national psychology which holds together. It means a sensation of having much in common. It does not mean regimentation. I want to preserve the rich variety of India, and, at the same moment, to develop an inner unity. It is inevitable, if all goes well, for the State of Assam to have much closer affinities and association with the NEFA and the people there. But, in order to develop that, the attitude will have to be very different and not the hectoring one which some people in Assam are adopting at present.

Barooah⁷ saw me today and had a talk with me. He will be going tonight to Assam and will no doubt see you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. At an all-party public meeting at Guwahati on 7 July presided over by B.P. Chaliha, a resolution was passed which said that the administration as conducted in the NEFA "is hampering the process of integration and the proposed appointment of a Commissioner, however well-intentioned it may be, will create further and more stubborn obstacles on the way to integration and will encourage separatist tendencies."
6. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 18, pp. 370-377.
7. Dev Kant Barooah, Member, Congress Working Committee.

6. To Jairamdas Doulatram¹

New Delhi
July 24, 1953

My dear Jairamdas,

... In your letter of July 3rd you refer to Verrier Elwin.² I agree with you that we should utilize him to the best advantage. We should trust him in this matter. You make three proposals all of which, in their own way, are good and do not conflict with each other. I think he should be allowed to visit the tribal areas and even the frontier area. But I do not wish him to carry a troop of other people, notably Americans, with him.

In view of recent developments, you might inform Medhi of what you propose to do in this matter. If he is agreeable to Elwin being allowed to work in parts of the autonomous districts, this may be arranged. Otherwise, in any event, Elwin can go to the NEFA....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. A well-known British anthropologist who lent his services as adviser on tribal affairs in NEFA and other places in India.

7. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
July 29, 1953

My dear Medhi,

... As I have indicated to you previously, I have been greatly disturbed by this agitation in Assam in regard to the NEFA. I am not worried by what the Asom Jatiya Mahasabha or any other organization might say. But when Congressmen associate themselves with this kind of thing, it is a matter for serious thought. The resolution passed by the Assam Pradesh Congress Committee deals with this subject almost as if I was in the dark and required

1. JN Collection. Copy was sent to the Governor of Assam also. Extracts.

to be defended.² It is stated that since I have given various assurances, etc., the Committee feels that further agitation at this stage is unnecessary. Reference is made to what I said in Parliament on this subject.³ I hold completely by what I said in Parliament, but I should like my statement to be read in full and not an extract of it torn out of its context.

It is very good of the Pradesh Congress Committee to come to my rescue, if I may say so. But, unfortunately, I have no feeling of being guilty or requiring a rescuer. On the contrary, I feel that Congressmen in Assam, not to mention others, have gone off the rails completely and have not advanced their credit or their interests in any way. I am always not only prepared, but eager, to consult the Pradesh Congress Committee in Assam and, of course, you and your Government, in regard to any affairs of the North East. But to be told that I must behave in future and accept all kinds of demands made upon me, whether I agree with them or not, is a novel experience. To be told further that for the present the agitation is discontinued, apparently waiting for me to make various public avowals, is not likely to produce the results aimed at. I propose to make no public statement except in the ordinary course in Parliament if I am asked, or perhaps at a Press conference. The public statement that I might make then, might not be wholly to the liking of the Members of the Assam PCC.

There has been no thought in our minds of any basic change in the position in the NEFA. But there has been a good deal of thought about the methods we should adopt to develop that area from the political and frontier points of view and, more particularly, from the point of view of the good of the tribal people involved. Those are the basic considerations and they remain and everything is going to be judged by those standards. For the present and in the foreseeable future, the responsibility of the NEFA will remain with the Central Government because of the political and other reasons indicated above. We have made the Governor of Assam our agent for this purpose. If there is any conflict in this position or any agitation against any Governor of Assam undertaking this function, the only possible result is that our agent there will be somebody else than the Governor, so as to remove this sense of conflict. That would probably not be approved by you because that would lessen the field of consultation, etc. We do not intend to do that, but I am merely

2. On 22 July, the Executive Committee of the Assam PCC, meeting at Guwahati under the Presidentship of B.P. Chaliha, had passed a resolution stating that it was "glad to learn from the message of the Prime Minister conveyed to the Chief Minister of Assam that there is no change in the policy followed by the Government of India in respect of the progressive integration of NEFA with Assam." It requested Nehru to make a public statement on the NEFA with a view to remove misapprehensions.
3. The resolution also referred to the "earlier pronouncement of the Prime Minister in the House of the People made on July 11, 1952" laying down "the aforesaid policy."

indicating that the type of agitation that has been carried on in Assam is likely to lead, if pursued, to completely different results from the ones aimed at.

You refer in your letter to the appointment of various officers, such as Civil Surgeon, Superintending Engineer, Agricultural Officers, etc., from outside the Assam cadre. I do not know about these appointments and I would, of course, very much like to encourage Assamese to hold appointments not only in Assam, but elsewhere in India. But I am not agreeable to appointments in high places on provincial grounds. That would defeat the very purpose aimed at and reduce the level of administrative efficiency greatly. Assam at present is administratively rather low in the list of our States. No doubt it will improve. But a narrow outlook will not make it improve. A few appointments here and there will not lead to the development of Assam. I do not know who your present Chief Engineer is, but you might remember that I expressed my opinion about a previous engineer last year whom I considered completely incompetent.

At the present moment most of our engineers come chiefly from two provinces—the Punjab and Madras. They are spread out all over India, because they happen to be the best. Indeed, some of them have a world reputation. If, for provincial reasons, we choose second-grade men, then that province will suffer. The aim is not to provide a few posts to a few men, but to develop rapidly the whole apparatus of the State. A country or a State is judged ultimately by the quality of its personnel. If India is to go ahead, it will go ahead by quality and not by numbers of which we have far too many.

You mention the knowledge of historical background and of the mode of living and customs of the tribal people. I entirely agree. It is for this reason that we are convinced that people appointed to serve in such areas must be specially trained for that particular work which is completely different from other administrative work. Because of this we have suggested a special cadre of officers. In the normal course, this cadre should consist of many Assamese. But the test will be their capacity for this particular work as well as general quality, not a provincial test.

You refer to the Railways and Posts & Telegraphs Departments. I do not know anything about them, but if you have any suggestion to make, I shall gladly pass it on to the Ministries concerned. Unemployment, unfortunately, is present all over the country, more especially among our college trained young men and young women. Probably there is much more of it in Calcutta and Madras than anywhere in India because more people are turned out of colleges there annually. However, it is right that each province should be fairly treated in this matter.

You refer to setting up a machinery for consultation in regard to the detailed administration of the NEFA such as appointments, educational policy, development schemes and the like. I do not see how this can be done with

any advantage to any party. It would merely be a fifth wheel in the coach preventing all progress. In view of the agitation that has recently been carried on in Assam, this appears to me to be peculiarly undesirable. You will not expect me to take important steps simply to please some narrow-minded critics. The NEFA is the direct charge of the External Affairs Ministry here. So long as this is so, they must shoulder the responsibility. There can be no division of responsibility as such division is always unsatisfactory. Consultation about important matters with you as Chief Minister is certainly desirable. But the full responsibility for that must remain with the Government of India so long as the present structure continues....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. To Jairamdas Doulatram¹

New Delhi
August 10, 1953

My dear Jairamdas,
Your letter of August 7.

I am interested to learn of the impressions of the Tawang people. I have had a meeting with Medhi and I shall see him again before he goes. I spoke to him very frankly about what I thought about the Assamese agitation regarding the NEFA.²

The proposal about the commissioner has not been dropped. It has not even been considered, much less dropped. I never attached too much importance to it. However, we shall examine it in due course when we examine the other matters.

I have also received your letter of August 6. I am afraid we are not at all excited about all this agitation in Assam. We shall consider these matters in due course and let you know what our proposals are.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. In his talks with Bisnuram Medhi on 9 August 1953, Nehru informed the former that due to unwise agitation in Assam, the question of making NEFA a separate State, which was not in the contemplation of the Government of India or, as a matter of fact, in the mind of anybody, had been suddenly drawn into prominence as indicated by a large number of telegrams received by him.

9. Legislative Assemblies for Tripura and Manipur¹

I had a deputation today from a number of Members of Parliament, including Keishing² and Communist and Socialist Members demanding Legislative Assemblies for Tripura and Manipur. I told them that we did not think any such step was desirable at this stage and that probably it would lead to all kinds of difficulties. We must try to carry on with the Adviser regime which has recently been instituted.

They gave me a note which I enclose.

But, apart from this question, such information as I get leads me to think that no progress has been made in Tripura and Manipur. They are completely static. In fact, they are almost the worst in India. Unless we show some results in both these States, it will be difficult to justify the present arrangements. Something has to be done. If the men in charge are not good enough, they should be changed.

When I was there last,³ I sent some notes to the States Ministry.⁴ In these notes I pointed out the lack of competent men there and suggested that immediate steps should be taken to do something about this. There was no proper engineer even. Money for development purposes lapsed.

All this is very depressing and I think some kind of an active and even aggressive policy has to be pursued there.

1. Note to Minister of States, 15 September 1953. JN Collection.
2. Rishang Keishing (b. 1920); founder-Member and Head Master, Christian High School, Ukhrul, 1949-52, and Phungyar High School, 1959-61; General Secretary, Naga Integration Council, 1968-72; Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-57 and 1962-67; Minister, Government of Manipur, 1974-77; Chief Minister, Manipur, November 1980 to February 1981, June 1981 to 3 March 1988, and December 1994 to December 1997.
3. Nehru visited the tribal areas of Assam, and Manipur and Tripura in October 1952.
4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 20, pp. 170-171.

10. To Durgabai Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
September 16, 1953

My dear Durgabai,²

... The Social Welfare Board³ should carry on its normal activities fully in Assam. It should also give such help as it can in the North East Frontier Agency. In regard to the NEFA, we felt that some special considerations apply and we should help social welfare schemes there even more than elsewhere. It is a backward, undeveloped area right near our frontier and thus has a certain political significance also. Therefore, we want to pay special attention to it. Therefore, we have decided to have a Special Officer in charge there with a small Advisory Committee.

This does not mean that your Social Welfare Board should not give help there for welfare activities. It simply means that in addition to such help as you may give, we shall go further. Naturally, there should be full coordination and the help your Social Welfare Board gives should be through the agency of our Special Officer and his Advisory Committee there.

In addition to the money which the Social Welfare Board is going to spend, we have a certain sum of money (ten crores) which the Planning Commission has set aside for the development of the NEFA. All these various amounts that are available to us or such additional amounts as might be made available for the development of this area and for social welfare activities there, should naturally be coordinated to produce the best results.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(284)/53-PMS. Extracts.
2. Member, Planning Commission.
3. The Board was inaugurated by Nehru in New Delhi on 12 August 1953. The eleven-member Board, under the chairmanship of Durgabai Deshmukh, had been set up to help the volunteer social organizations in the country in developing and expanding their existing programmes and welfare schemes and to integrate them with developmental programme being executed under the Five Year Plan.

II. THE NAGAS

1. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
August 23, 1953

My dear Medhi,

The situation in the Naga District had been improving, as you told me. But I find that there has been deterioration there now during the last ten days or so. As far as I can make out, this was due to the unwise order issued to schools and other places calling upon them to observe the Independence Day in a special manner.² This was an unnecessary challenge and gave them an opportunity to demonstrate with the result that you had some trouble, and again the situation has gone back to what it was some time ago.

This shows how careful we must be in our dealings with these Naga people.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. On 15 August, some students of Kohima High School, in defiance of the orders of the headmaster, took an active part in meetings sponsored by the Naga National Council, at which resolutions were passed boycotting the Independence Day. Nineteen students of the school in a memorandum also threatened assault on teachers and students during the Independence Day.

2. To Rishang Keishing¹

New Delhi
August 31, 1953

Dear Rishang Keishing,

I have your letter of the 31st August.

As you know I am greatly interested in the welfare of the Naga people and I try to keep in touch with developments there. I have been grieved that, after a period of comparative quiet, there were again unfortunate developments

1. JN Collection.

there during this month.² I cannot judge from here about every incident, but it seems clear that some trouble-makers there again misbehaved and then the Government had to take some action.

It is obvious that any continuation of an anti-national agitation in the Naga Hills can only do injury to the Nagas and come in the way of their progress which all of us so much desire. We have been giving constant thought to their advancement in accordance with their own ways and genius. We want them to be associated with their own affairs as much as possible. But all this is obstructed by the recalcitrant attitude of the Naga National Council. I know that there are many Nagas of goodwill who realize that the welfare of their people lies in cooperating with the Government and in taking their share in it. It is our desire to strengthen their hands. But they must also realize that they have to take a clear attitude in this matter and not allow themselves to be frightened by the activities of some people.

I am keeping in touch with the Government of Assam and I shall again address them on this subject. You will appreciate, however, that they have to shoulder this responsibility and have to decide, from time to time, what should be done and what should not be done. It would be improper for me to lessen that responsibility which is theirs.

If any Members of Parliament wish to go to the Naga Hills, there is nothing to prevent them from doing so. But I do not see any advantage in a deputation proceeding there for the purpose you have mentioned.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Keishing wrote that since Nehru's visit to Kohima in March 1952, a section of the Nagas in the Naga Hills, under the guidance of the Naga National Council, was agitating for an independent Naga Hills State.

3. To Jairamdas Doulatram¹

New Delhi
September 5, 1953

My dear Jairamdas,

... It is proposed that this Special Recruitment Board should consist of representatives of the Ministry of External Affairs, Defence and Home Affairs

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

and a specialist in tribal affairs. It has also been proposed that there should be a representative of the Governor of Assam on it. I am not quite sure if that is necessary or desirable. I should like you in your capacity as Governor to keep apart from this selection so as not to rub the Government of Assam, the wrong way.

A suggestion has been made that the Government of Assam should be asked to nominate a representative on this Special Recruitment Board. There are reasons for and against it. On the whole, we were inclined to think that this was not desirable. But we have an open mind on this subject. What is your advice? The Government of Assam, of course, will be very happy if we included their representative.

The Special Recruitment Board will function in Delhi.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
September 17, 1953

My dear Medhi,

Two or three days ago, I sent to your Governor copy of a note of a conversation which our Embassy people in Rangoon had with the Burmese Commissioner² who had accompanied us to Kohima when I was there last.³ This was an interesting report⁴ of first impressions. It was not quite correct, but the man is supposed to be very good and has had to deal with Nagas for a long time.

In the course of this report, he had mentioned his own impression that

1. JN Collection.
2. M.J. Carrott, Commissioner, Sagaing Division, Burma.
3. March 1953.
4. Apprehending an armed revolt by the Nagas within three years, especially by the Angamis and the Kanoma tribes, Carrott felt that the unrest was the definite result of the British policy before independence, which not only isolated the Nagas from the Indians but also created hatred among them for the latter. He suspected the missionaries' role in the Naga agitation against the Indians. According to Carrott, even the Government of India distrusted the few Nagas who were in Government service as they were kept away from Naga areas.

the then Deputy Commissioner of Kohima⁵ did not appear to him to be a very suitable person for that place.⁶

That has been my own opinion, and I think I wrote that to you soon after my return from Kohima. It was perhaps not advisable to transfer him soon after the incident there, but I think it would definitely be desirable to send another person there now. Your Deputy Commissioner may be quite good in some other place, but he did not fit in there at all. I hope you will give thought to this matter because it is of the utmost importance that the right person should be sent to these tribal areas.

It has been suggested to me here in my Ministry that one of your Deputy Commissioners who is I think an Anglo-Indian—Carvalho⁷ by name—might fit in at Kohima. He is an ex-army man, and our Ministry people came in contact with him in the War Services Selection Board. He produced a very favourable impression on them from this point of view specially. I met him also during my brief visit to Silchar where he was Deputy Commissioner, and I was generally struck by him as a competent man.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. S.N. Barkataki.
6. Carrott thought the Naga boycott of Nehru's meeting at Kohima might have occurred "due to lack of tact on the part of the D.C., Kohima," who appeared to him to have little understanding of the psychology of the Nagas.
7. S.J.D. Carvalho, IAS, replaced Barkataki as Deputy Commissioner, Kohima. He held this post from 1953 to 1957.

III. THE BHUTIAS

1. Trade Across the Tibetan Border¹

While in Ranikhet, I have met Dr Weber,² the FAO expert, who is working here on behalf of the UP Government. I find that he is doing good work there to develop horticulture and the preservation of fruit. He told me that the UP Government had wanted him to go to the Bhutias, who live near the Tibetan

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, and Foreign Secretary, Ranikhet, 26 September 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. F.B.C. Weber.

border, to help them develop fruit-growing, etc. The Bhutias are a problem for the UP Government and for us. There are about fifty thousand of them. Previously, they lived a hard life, but carried on somehow with some trade across the border. They took foodgrains and brought back wool. All this has been upset and their life has become even harder.

2. From the political point of view, even apart from the humanitarian, it is rather important that we should help them to better themselves and to find some work. There is the question of our making some arrangement for a barter of wool with some foodgrains. I have written to you about that separately.

3. Another approach is to develop horticulture there which, I understand, is quite possible. In fact, good results are obtained in these hills in developing horticulture. In view of this fact it would have been desirable for Dr Weber, the FAO expert, to be allowed to go there, accompanied by some UP official, to draw up a scheme of horticultural and similar development. Unless there is some special objection to his going there, I would permit him to cross the Inner Line for this particular purpose. I have informed the Chief Minister of the UP about this and suggested that if he wants Dr Weber to go to the Bhutias; we might be prepared to reconsider this matter and, if there is no special reason to the contrary, to allow him permission to go there. He would, of course, be accompanied by a UP official....

CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES

1. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
July 10, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,
Maulana Azad has sent me the enclosed papers. Perhaps you have seen them already.

The Cardinal Archbishop of Bombay² will be coming to Delhi at the end of this month and I have given him an appointment. Among other things, he will no doubt discuss this question of evangelical work in India. I think it would be a good thing if you met him also.

We can hardly take up the attitude that evangelical work is forbidden.³ That would not only be against our Constitution, but also against our general policy. There has been a good deal of feeling in South India—Travancore-Cochin, etc—over this matter. We seem to forget sometimes that we have a very large indigenous Christian population.

Yours affectionately,

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1. JN Collection.
2. Valerian Gracias.
3. See *Selected Works* (second series), V

that important region and hence admission to that region was strictly limited. Those who were functioning there as missionaries were allowed to remain there, unless there was something against any individual. But we did not want fresh centres of activity to be opened or for the present work to be extended to other fields in that area beyond the Inner Line. Also we wanted to be sure that no political or like activities were indulged in there by any foreigner, including missionaries.

8. Apart from this, the question of other tribal areas was also considered by us and we felt that some special attention should be given to missionary activities there to avoid conflicts and trouble. We did not wish to stop such activities there, but only wanted to prevent anything that might lead to trouble and difficulty.

9. Elsewhere there was no question of our interfering with normal activities, but I would advise them to go a little slow about foreigners coming here because that led to certain reactions. I realized that evangelical activities could not be entirely separated from social activities and Christian communities might require ministration which was not available locally. If this requirement was not there, there should be no difficulty in providing it even from outside. Also in regard to social, medical and like activities, there should be no difficulty.

10. I agreed with the Cardinal that it was not desirable for the police to be entrusted with this work of making enquiries from individuals. If any information was required, the Government concerned should write to the headquarters of that organization and they will supply it. Anything that savours of individual persecution was most undesirable and should be stopped.

11. In regard to visas, it was obvious that no satisfactory enquiry could possibly be made locally here about a foreigner. When visas were asked for the organization should send full particulars to the local government. If any further information was needed about any one, this could be asked for from the organization. In any event, the local policemen should, as far as possible, not be brought into the picture.

12. There were some other minor matters to which the Cardinal referred. He was particularly anxious that some statement should be made on our Government's behalf to remove this widespread feeling of fear and uneasiness that had spread over the Christian community all over India.² This had been caused not so much because of what we had said, but because of police activities everywhere. I told him that it might be possible to make our position clear at a suitable opportunity.

2. Gracias spoke of the widespread impression among the Christians all over India that the policy of the Government of India towards them had changed and suggested that something might be said on behalf of the Government "to allay these fears and to revert to the former position of trust and confidence."

3. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
August 1, 1953

My dear T.T.,

... Broadly speaking, I divide the problem of Christian Missionaries in India into three parts:

- (1) North East Frontier area.
- (2) Certain tribal areas in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, etc.
- (3) Other areas in any part of India.

I consider the North East Frontier area purely from a political and military point of view and I am not prepared to admit foreigners in that area beyond the Inner Line. This has nothing to do with Christianity or any other religion. It is true that there are already some Christian Missions in that area as well as in the Inner Line in the UP. They have been there for a long time, and, in fact, have often done good work from the educational point of view. It has also to be remembered that in the North East Frontier area Christianity was established more than 50 years ago and is part of the social fabric there. Any interference with it as such would not only be wrong but would give rise to trouble. Of course, we have no intention of interfering and existing Mission activities have to continue, though we should try to get foreign missionaries replaced by Indians. I do not think we can do that wholly in the near future, but I am against the establishment of any new Mission centre in these frontier areas whether in the North East or in the UP, and I would strictly examine the question of any new foreigner going there.

Oddly enough, much of the trouble has been caused by the Methodist Mission. Catholics generally and some Protestants are much wiser in the way they work.

In the second area, that is, the tribal areas in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, etc., there are rather aggressive Mission activities and there is even danger of conflict with public sentiment, which has been roused greatly by Jan Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha and other people. The State Governments are rather anti-missionary, and have recently put a great deal of pressure on them through police enquiries, etc. I should like to proceed carefully in these areas and not encourage extension of Mission activities.

1. JN Collection. Extracts. Copy was sent to K.N. Katju also.

In regard to the third area, I think we should interfere very little, except that we do not want hordes of foreigners coming to India. I would not interfere with educational, medical and like people coming for particular posts. Generally they should be replacements. There might, of course, be for medical or educational purposes a newcomer coming, and we should not come in his way if he is useful.

There is no doubt that some alarm has been caused among Christian establishments in India, partly by police activities and partly by general impression that Government is against them. Both from the point of view of general policy and our principles as well as from the political viewpoint, it is bad to give this impression and we should try to remove it.

As you know something about this matter, especially in the South of India, it would be a good thing if you have a talk with Katju.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
August 10, 1953

My dear Raiendra Babu,

In yesterday's *Hindustan Times* (dated 9th August) at page 4, there is a big headline: "Conversions by Foreign Missionaries". This refers to a meeting held at Rashtrapati Bhavan over which you presided and where, it is stated, the work of conversion of tribal people by missionaries who offered them material inducements was discussed at great length.

The Committee passed a resolution on this subject and decided to take a deputation to the Home Minister.

I have been rather disturbed by this piece of news because of your association with such a meeting discussing the proselytizing activities of

1. JN Collection. Also available in File No. 117(2)/53, President's Secretariat. A copy of this letter was sent to K.N. Katju.

missionaries.² Quite apart from the merits or demerits of that subject, it is clear that it is a very controversial one and indeed a controversy is going on about it in many parts of India. Christians from Travancore, Madras, Bombay, Central India, Bengal and Assam have expressed their grave uneasiness at certain statements made on behalf of Government and, what is more, by many local incidents that have occurred. The new Roman Catholic Cardinal was in Delhi recently because of this. Probably he saw you also.

The question is a difficult one. I have always distinguished the political activities of missionaries from others. So far as these political activities are concerned, I have no doubt in my mind that we should stop them. But so far as other activities are concerned, including evangelical activities, it is very difficult for us to say that we will try to stop them, unless they are conducted in the wrong way. I think it was unwise for the Adimjati Sangh³ to take up this matter officially and to give so much publicity to it. From a purely social service organization, they take a religious colour and thereby encourage prejudice against them in some quarters. It may not be so easy for Government to help them financially or otherwise if objections are raised.

But I am much more concerned with the effect that your association with this matter might have on a large number of Christians. The President, whatever his personal views and convictions might be, is above religion and is the Head of a secular State, which treats all religions alike. He is in fact the symbol of that secular State. If anything happens, that affects his position as such a symbol. It would no doubt create apprehensions in the minds of many of our citizens.

It is because of these difficulties in my mind that I have ventured to write to you on this subject.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Rajendra Prasad, in his reply of 11 August, wrote that he recognized his position and was careful about his own conduct. "But if some members had any complaint against the missionaries of a particular religion, they could not help talking among themselves about it and bring the matter to the notice of the Government... I shall, however, see to it that I do not get involved even in such trivial and harmless things."
3. Bhartiya Adimjati Sevak Sangh was formally started in 1948 at the national level with Rajendra Prasad as founder-President. The Sangh had been engaged in tribal welfare activities since June 1946.

5. To Yngve T. Brilioth¹

New Delhi
August 22, 1953

My dear Archbishop,²

Thank you for your letter of August 10. It was a pleasure for me to be associated with you in the ceremony at Cambridge.³

It seems to me that there has been much misunderstanding about the attitude of the Indian Government in regard to the work of missionaries from abroad. There has been no difference at all in our policy of full religious tolerance. Every religion has complete and equal freedom in India.

The question of missionaries coming from abroad came before us in its political aspect and not its religious. In fact we found that some missionaries serving in the North East Frontier of India, had not only participated in political activities but had encouraged the tribal people of those areas to start movements against the Government of India. Partly this was a legacy of the last days of British rule, but it had continued even after that. These areas were frontier areas and this particular frontier had become rather important for us in recent years because of various developments. We could not view with favour any political development there which might embarrass us and lead to difficulties. There is, in fact, an area in the North East Frontier where entry is allowed by special permit. It was in this area that some action had to be taken against two or three missionaries who had, according to us, acted improperly. It was because of this that the question of missionary activity was mentioned in our Parliament.

Another aspect of this question that came up before us was that some missionaries from abroad had a tendency to run down India and Indian culture. This was resented by people and organizations in those areas and led sometimes to conflict. This was more so in certain tribal areas in Central and other parts of India. We had, therefore, to be a little careful about their activities in those areas.

A third-approach to this question was that, as far as possible, the Indian Church should be independent. That did not mean that they should not have

1. JN Collection. Also available in File No. 117/53, President's Secretariat.
2. (1892-1959); graduated from Uppasala, Sweden, and got degrees from Cambridge, Oxford and Glasgow; ordained in 1918; awarded Nobel Prize, 1930; as former Archbishop, scholar and churchman he played a significant role in furthering the ecumenical movement.
3. On 5 June 1953, in a ceremony at Cambridge, the degree of Doctor of Divinity was conferred on Y. Brilioth while the degree of Doctor of Literature was awarded to Nehru.

helpers from abroad. We have in India the Syrian Church which has been here for 1,800 years and more. We have our own Catholic Church which has flourished in India for more than 300 years, chiefly in the South, and we have various Churches of the Protestant persuasion for the last 100 or 150 years. These periods are long enough to build up an indigenous Church which need not rely too much on external assistance.

In some cases, difficulties of a political kind have arisen. Thus, in the case of Roman Catholics, the Archbishop of Goa, who was appointed by the Portuguese Government, considered a part of India as his diocese. This had a political aspect and we objected to it very much. After much argument, we have put an end to this.

None of these considerations had anything to do with any limitation of full religious tolerance. Humanitarian and educational work is always welcome, and, though we may not be enthusiastic about purely evangelical work, we do not wish to come in its way. But when this evangelical work gets associated with some form of condemnation of Indian culture, then it creates conflict and difficulty and is resented by many people. You will appreciate that nationalism is a dominant urge in India as in many other countries.

It is for this reason that we have been a little cautious so as to avoid internal friction between missionary activity conducted by foreign missionaries and the nationalist urge that moved many of our people. This has, I believe, nothing to do with what might be called religious tolerance. It has something to do with the feeling of national self-respect when some missionaries from abroad, or for the matter of that non-missionaries, adopt an attitude which is not looked upon with favour here. The old idea of missionaries going to backward countries to convert the heathens, who were supposed to be primitive and very backward people, obviously has little application in the India of today. Sometimes, however, that idea persists still and comes in the way of that free and equal intercourse which we would like to encourage.

There are many kinds of foreign missionaries in India and there can be no doubt that very fine work has been done by them. We would not like to come in the way of that work. Indeed we should like to encourage it. But among these large numbers, there are others who have not been so successful and who have not been able to adopt themselves to the new conditions that exist in India.

I have written to you frankly about this matter. I do wish to assure you that we shall strictly adhere to our principle of full religious tolerance. There may be sometimes some mistakes made by our administrative apparatus or at least in regard to the issue of visas. That I fear cannot always be avoided, but, where our attention is drawn to this, we shall certainly look into the matter. I might add that, so far as I know, we have had no complaint about the Swedish Church Mission.

I do not know the circumstances under which the application for the admission of a young Norwegian clergyman, in the service of the Swedish Church Mission, was recently refused, or about the other cases that you mention. I shall enquire into them.

With all good wishes,

I am,
Yours very sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To Amrit Kaur¹

New Delhi
30 August, 1953

My dear Amrit,

You wrote to me on the 27th August, sending me copy of a letter from Bishop Pickett² and of your letter to Dr Katju. I have enquired into this matter. I find that Bishop Pickett's facts are not correct... In fact, he himself acknowledged in a letter of 21st July that "no application made by the Board of Missions of the Methodist Church for the grant of a visa for one of its missionary appointees has ever been denied by the Government of India." I do not quite see, therefore, why the Bishop should make such fuss about this and why you should take his word for granted and refer to continuing trouble and a reference should be made to the Cabinet on the subject.

I have seen some of the Bishop's letters. Like some of his brother Americans, he writes in a very superior way about our catering for the goodwill of the American people. I am not impressed by this kind of thing. In fact, I do not approve of it. We have had quite enough of American superiority. There are at present in India a very large number of Americans and a considerable number of American Missionaries also. I am not concerned with their religion, but politically they are becoming more and more irritating. They carry their politics and their peculiar outlook on the world wherever they go. I am afraid that if this continues, we shall have to be much stricter with them. That, I repeat, has nothing to do with religion.

We have had trouble with American activities in Kashmir and in Nepal and we receive reports of these difficulties from a few other countries in Asia

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. J.W. Pickett.

also. It is odd to find that usually these difficulties are connected with Missionaries and the Methodist Church from America. The Burma Government is exceedingly angry with them.

However, as I have stated above, and as Bishop Pickett has himself acknowledged, there have so far been no cases for him to complain of. There might have been some delay occasionally. If Bishop Pickett expects the Government of India to sit at his doorsteps and carry out his bidding at the shortest notice, I am afraid he is mistaken. I think he is trying to exploit you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
September 14, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

You will remember my sending you a letter from the Archbishop of Uppasala in Sweden and copy of my answer to him. I have now received another letter from the Archbishop. With this he sends me the cases of some missionaries from the Swedish Mission who have applied for permits. Except for one where a permit was granted, the others have either had no answer or have had their applications rejected.

I shall be grateful if you will kindly have each one of these cases fully examined.

As I wrote to you, the Archbishop is a Primate of Sweden and is a person held in great respect in Europe. The Swedish Mission works chiefly in the hospital at Tirupattur in the residuary Madras State.² This hospital has a very good reputation and has attracted, I am told, many fine men. There are a number of very eminent Indian Christian doctors as well as foreign doctors attached to it who are famous in South India. In fact, they are known to have supported the national movement. One of them, Dr Paton,³ became quite a hero in South India because the British punished him.

1. JN Collection.
2. Established in 1874, the Church of Sweden Mission undertook missionary activities in hospitals and schools in South India. Its trained doctors were working in the general and eye hospital at Tirupattur, in Tamil Nadu.
3. Ernest F. Paton, a Britisher, took part in the Indian freedom struggle.

Such a hospital and people connected with it should be encouraged in every way.

We must make a distinction between these very fine men and women who come here and give devoted service to India, without really caring for conversion, etc., and other missionaries who are politically or otherwise troublesome.

Apart from this, I would hesitate very much to take any action against a person recommended by the Archbishop of Uppasala. Sweden has no political axe to grind here and even in the evangelical sense, Swedes do very little. We have to distinguish between aggressive countries and these quiet Scandinavian countries.

I hope you will please have immediate enquiries made into these cases. I should like to write to the Archbishop the result of this enquiry.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

I. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS

1. Congress Stands for Social Reform¹

The members should rise above petty jealousies and quarrels and function effectively. We have many problems to solve and none can be solved by merely passing resolutions. Resolutions are only an indication of how our minds are working. There is a need for strengthening the organization if it is to carry us anywhere. You should go home with renewed spirit and fresh determination.

To me, it is amazing that any person calling himself even remotely a Congressman should deliver a speech that Mr Biswanath Das has done.² I say so with all authority of the Congress President. The resolution only tries to implement what is in the Congress election manifesto.³ Let Mr Biswanath Das read the general election manifesto, ponder over it and try to think over it and see how far his speech today fits in with that manifesto, which the All India Congress Committee and the full Congress had decided upon after the fullest deliberation. In that manifesto and in the resolutions of the body he will find repeated references made to social reform, the Hindu Code and the rest.

And he should remember that the last election was fought by many of us, directly on this issue of the Hindu Code Bill, especially by me against a

1. Speech delivered at the concluding session of the All India Congress Committee at Agra, 7 July 1953. From the *National Herald*, *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, and *The Tribune*, 8 July 1953.
2. Biswanath Das said that "the question of the Hindu Code Bill was very important to the Hindus but if, however, Government must enact a Code, why not do it for all communities and have a common Code? Why don't you face it? Is it that you cannot face all communities and all religious denominations and you want to amend only the Hindu law because you can do it? Is that fair?" He added that "no one would object if there was to be a common Code and likewise no one would object if the Hindu Code was made optional. Let those who wanted to be governed by it be given an option."
3. The Congress election manifesto was adopted at the Bangalore meeting of the AICC held in July 1951.

person who dared to challenge this very conception,⁴ this very basis on which the Congress stands. The Congress does stand by it. I say that any person who does not believe in social reform among Hindus can go out of the Congress so far as I am concerned. We have no place here for reactionaries, for people, who in the name of religion either bring up a communal issue or any other bigoted issue or want this country to remain behind and stick to something which is long past and which has no relevance today. I am amazed at the speech I heard from my old colleague and find how he had slept through the ages not realizing what the world is going through and what the Congress has stood for in the past few years.

The Congress has all along stood basically for the reform of society. And I do believe, as I said yesterday, that you must have an integrated approach to life. What is the good of your talking of economic reform if socially you are backward and tied up with some customs and ways which have no relevance today? They may have been good a thousand years ago or ten thousand years ago but what is the good of talking it today? Today, this Congress stands for reform, social, economic and political. Nothing less than that. Any person who is out of step with us is welcome to go to some other reactionary organization, as many people have gone out. Let us be clear about it. It is not a small matter to speak in such a light manner about a vital issue for which the Congress stands. The resolution deals only with the approach and not with the details. Nobody wished to commit the AICC to details. It deals with a principle which the Congress has accepted in the election manifesto right through and on which it stands.

Naturally changes can be made in details. As a matter of fact, the old Hindu Code Bill that was connected with Dr Ambedkar's name⁵ was being split up, changed here and there and brought up in party. We do not stand by every word of the original Bill. In fact we thought that we could improve upon it and we are trying to do so. But the essence of it, the basis of it, which has been challenged by Mr Biswanath Das, we do stand by it, we will stand by it and we will fight for it.

4. In Allahabad, Prabhu Dutt Brahmachari, one of the candidates who opposed Nehru in the general elections, in a statement said that he was opposing Nehru only for one reason and that was the Hindu Code Bill. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 17, p. 59.
5. The Hindu Code Bill was introduced in Parliament by B.R. Ambedkar in August 1951.

The resolutions passed at the session are no solutions to the various problems. But certainly they give an indication of the steps towards solution and the trend of the people's mind.

The problems which have been discussed here are not the problems which we alone are facing. Many other countries are also in the same position.

Poverty has to be banished from the country but it will take some time. In the meantime, it could be minimized by sharing it among all.

The immediate problem before the country is to increase production of wealth and its equitable distribution. This can only be done with the cooperation of the people. The world is changing every day and we have to march with the time.

2. To Harekrushna Mahtab¹

New Delhi
July 11, 1953

My dear Mahtab,

... In Agra, I saw a telegram you had addressed to Balvantray Mehta about resigning from the AICC, etc.² I confess I do not understand all this. Old comrades do not suddenly take such steps without personal talks and consultations. We are bound together by closer ties than normal political associations.

Now I find that the matter has been given to the Press.

I suggest that you come here at your convenience and that we discuss these matters first.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. P-22/1953, AICC Papers, NMML. Extracts. A copy was sent to Balvantray Mehta, the Congress General Secretary.
2. On 1 July 1953, Mahtab expressed his wish to be relieved from the post of Secretary-General of the Congress Parliamentary Party so as to work in the "rural areas than wasting in the city" as that would also enable him "in the interest of the country to work at a little distance from the administration of today."

3. Congress Defeats in By-elections¹

Question: Why has the Congress suffered defeats?²

Jawaharlal Nehru: From an all-India point of view, the Congress has done rather well.³ It is true, the Congress has suffered some defeats in UP⁴ but, may be, this is due to local causes or may be, to other economic causes, the responsibility for which rests on the shoulders of the Government and the ruling Party.

Of course, the Opposition will take advantage of all this and other factors like factions in the Congress and certain other weaknesses in the organization.

Anyhow, it is satisfying to find every other party—the Communists, the Praja Socialists, the Jan Sangh and the rest—all putting up a joint fight against the Congress. It is, indeed, pleasing to see them all marching together step by step.

Q: Would you like to have a strong Opposition?

JN: Do I like an opponent? Well, I shall face an opponent and let him have a good fight. I have derided the idea of people always thinking in terms of British parliamentary democracy. It is bad enough that we are following many of their rules in our Constitution.

What a country needs is a strong government. It is also good to have a few parties, but they should be strong parties. Of course in periods of crises or other critical moments, nobody thinks in terms of parties. Similarly, when a country faces serious problems, the people should think in different terms....

1. Remarks at a Press Conference at Lucknow, 17 July 1953. From the *National Herald*, 18 July 1953. Extracts.
2. Out of the by-elections held for fifteen seats in the House of the People, the Congress, contesting fourteen of them, retained seven out of eleven it had won during the general elections. In the by-elections for ninety-seven seats for State Assemblies, the Congress won fifty as against forty-nine it held in those Assemblies.
3. While the total percentage of Congress vote in the by-elections for the House of the People declined from 48.9% to 45.4%, the percentage of votes polled by the Congress in the elections to the State Assemblies rose markedly from 37.1% to 47%.
4. In the Uttar Pradesh Assembly, out of ten bye-elections it contested, the Congress could retain only two.

4. Tours by General Secretaries¹

...3. (1) In the report of Shri Shriman Narayan Agarwal he refers to the condition of the handloom weavers in the South and states that mill saris from Bombay and Ahmedabad have flooded the market in South India.² This is a matter which has been repeatedly discussed by us, because a large number of States have actually complained against the restrictions put on the mill saris. It has also been pointed out that prices have risen because of these restrictions and consumers are complaining. This matter should be more carefully discussed between us and then with the Commerce Ministry and the Planning Commission.

(2) I agree that the Muslim League in Madras and Malabar requires special attention.³ I have expressed myself openly on this subject on several occasions.

(3) I am not at all satisfied with conditions in Mysore. Shri Hanumanthaiya has a certain drive and energy, but his way of treating others is inevitably getting him into trouble. His deliberate boosting up of the editor of *Blitz* recently and making him his guest in Mysore, Bangalore and Ootacamund was in excessive bad taste. At that time the editor of *Blitz* was being proceeded against by the Bombay Government.

The case of Shri Nanjappa⁴ has been dealt with by the party there and I remember writing a note about it to the AICC. We must find out from Shri Hanumanthaiya what has happened about it. It is obvious that matters cannot be allowed to rest where they are.

(4) Hyderabad—I have written separately about this and we have decided

1. Note to General Secretary, AICC, 7 August 1953. Shriman Narayan Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. On 2 August 1953, Shriman Narayan, in his note, wrote that unemployment and underemployment were the two problems being faced by village and cottage industries. The village industries were being systematically uprooted in the States by the inflow of mill-made goods.
3. On 22 July, at a meeting in Chennai, the Muslim League adopted several resolutions including the one by which the Government was requested to treat teachers of Arabic language on par with teachers of other languages and not to treat them as part-time instructors as had been done by the Malabar District Boards. The meeting also urged the Government to hasten the amendment of the Madras Tenancy Bill by removing such provisions in the existing Bill as were highly injurious to tenants especially in the Malabar district.
4. V. Nanjappa, brother of Hanumanthaiya, got fifty acres of land for his own use resulting in the eviction of a number of ryots.

that after the Chief Minister and Shri Bindu⁵ have considered all the allegations and the reply of Doctor Chenna Reddy,⁶ the papers should be sent here for our consideration.

(5) Orissa—The case of Orissa is distressing. Somehow we seem to have lost touch there and people are pulling in different directions. There was some talk of the leaders coming here.⁷

(6) In the report Bengal has been well spoken of and yet soon after the report there were big troubles in Calcutta and the Congress has been completely shaken up by them. We shall have to go into this matter carefully. Dr Roy is coming here and I hope to discuss this with him.

5. G. Bindu Digambar Rao, Home Minister of Hyderabad State.

6. M. Chenna Reddi (1919-1996); physician by profession; set up private practice after serving for some time in Osmania General Hospital; Joint Secretary, Andhra PCC, 1949; Member, Provisional Parliament, 1950-51, Hyderabad Legislative Assembly, 1951-56, Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly, 1956-62, 1962-67; Minister of Agriculture, Hyderabad State, 1952; Chief Minister, Andhra Pradesh, 1978-80 and 1989-90; Union Minister of Steel, Mines and Metals, 1967-68; Governor, Uttar Pradesh, 1974-77, Punjab, 1982, Rajasthan, 1992-93 and Tamil Nadu, 1993-96.

7. Following defeats in the by-elections, the Congress leaders in Orissa had begun the exercise of analyzing the causes of the defeat, and senior leaders like N.K. Chaudhuri and H.K. Mahtab were contemplating, at the request of Balvantray Mehta, to visit Delhi to consult Congress High Command.

5. To Nabakrushna Chaudhuri¹

New Delhi

August 21, 1953

My dear Nabakrushna,²

...You refer to what I said about Biswanath Das at the AICC.³ Whether the particular language I used was happy or not or was too forceful, may be disputable. But your calling my action undemocratic surprised me. It is not my conception of democracy to say only things that might please the majority.

1. File No. P-22/1953, AICC Papers, NMML. Extracts.

2. Chief Minister of Orissa.

3. In his letter of 16 July, Chaudhuri expressed dissatisfaction at Nehru's "denunciation of Biswanath Das" in the open meeting of the AICC which he thought "to be intolerant and undemocratic." Chaudhuri wrote that "after all what Biswanath Das said about the Hindu Code reflects the opinion of the majority of the Hindu Congressmen." See *ante*, pp. 255-256.

Personally I am not prepared to accept the statement that a majority of Hindu Congressmen are against the reforms suggested in the Hindu Code Bill. But even if that was so, it is open to me, as to anyone else, to put forward a certain point of view as forcibly as possible. So far as I am concerned, I would have no place in the Congress if Congressmen as a whole are opposed to the general principles of the Hindu Code Bill, I am not referring to details, just as I would have no place in the Congress if it became even more conservative than it is in regard to economic matters. A leader has to give a lead in democracy as in any other system. Apart from this, the Hindu Code Bill was one of the principal issues during the general elections. Not only I but scores of Congressmen fought their election on that principal issue. Our Party in Parliament is committed to it. Generally speaking, the Congress as a whole is committed to this kind of reform, though not in detail. Therefore, to oppose it in the AICC in the manner that Biswanath Babu did, was to go against the broad policy of the Congress. *

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
September 6, 1953

My dear Rajaji,

I have just received your letter² of September 5. I am distressed to read it. Only yesterday I wrote to you on this subject³ but I did not have the background that you have given me. It had been suggested to me that, as a formal matter, it might be desirable to have a meeting of the Party to choose

1. JN Collection.

2. On 5 September 1953, Rajagopalachari wrote that Kamaraj desired his retirement and the election of a new leader with a view to get a "Chief Minister who will depend on him for maintaining the position or to set a competition going without any satisfactory agreement being reached so that he himself may step in."

3. In his letter, Nehru had sought Rajagopalachari's advice about "a matter affecting you as leader of the Madras Congress Legislature Party," as to whether he would consider it to be "the proper course" for a fresh election to be held by the Congress Party in the residuary Madras State after the split of the old Party. Nehru had added that he of course felt that Rajagopalachari was "the only person who could carry the burden during this difficult period."

a Leader since the old Party had been split up. I thought this was a question of confirming your leadership.

Now it appears from your letter that there was something more behind it than I had thought. I am naturally distressed by this. I am sure that the Party would act most unwisely if they acted in the way suggested and the prestige of the Congress in Madras would go down.

I do not know what the feelings of your Party members are on this subject, that is, of the majority. Your holding a formal meeting of the Party to consider this matter hardly seems to me to be a desirable course at this stage at any rate.⁴ Such a meeting should only be held after you know exactly what the position is by informal talks and have come to a decision as to what to do about it. Any formal discussion might naturally lead to somewhat unpleasant consequences. I suppose it is easily possible to find out informally and privately from members of the Party what their general feeling is. After that we can consider what is the proper course to take.

I am deeply distressed at this trend of events. You took up this burden at a time of great difficulty and rehabilitated the prestige of the Congress and the Government. It is the height of unwisdom and a complete lack of gratitude for anyone to behave in this way at this stage.

I shall think about this more and write to you later.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

4. In his letter, Rajagopalachari also said that he proposed "to convene a meeting of the Congress Legislators belonging to the residuary area in Madras on 17th of this month, definitely referring to the attitude of the President of the Tamil Nad Congress Committee in the notice, and to ask them the straight question whether they want me to continue for the time being or whether they agree with Kamaraj."

7. To Sri Prakasa¹

New Delhi
September 6, 1953

My dear Prakasa,²

...But what are we to do about it? Rajaji has suggested convening a Party

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Governor of Madras State.

meeting to put this question straight to them. That I feel would not be right at this stage and that is likely to lead to rather unpleasant exchanges. It would be better to talk to Members separately and informally to find out what the position is and then Rajaji and we could decide what we could do about it. That is what I have written to Rajaji. I do not know to what extent this feeling has spread among the MLAs in Madras. I am writing briefly to you now, but I shall be thinking about this and I might write to you again.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

II. PCC AFFAIRS

1. To Brahm Perkash¹

New Delhi
July 2, 1953

My dear Brahm Perkash,²

Thank you for your letter of the 2nd July about the Ajmeri Gate election.³ I am sorry of course that we lost this election. But I do not attach any great value to this loss, although other people may. I think the best thing about this election was the fact that all Congressmen worked together. It was a straight fight and we just lost by a very small number of votes.⁴ This shows us both our strength and our weakness. If we profit by this lesson and work hard, we need not worry....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Chief Minister of Delhi State.
3. The by-election held on 20 June 1953 was caused by the death of S.R. Kidwai, Minister for Education, Delhi State.
4. In a straight fight between M.M. Beg, the Congress candidate, and Hari Chand of the Jan Sangh, the latter won the election by a margin of 35 votes.

2. To Ramananda Tirtha¹

New Delhi
July 10, 1953

My dear Swamiji,²

I think you have been informed already that I was much distressed to read, when I was in England, that the Hyderabad PCC had passed a resolution recommending the splitting up of Hyderabad State.³ My views on this subject are of course known to you. But apart from my views, it seemed to me very strange that the PCC should choose this particular moment to pass such a resolution. I could see no relevance or propriety about it except, in a sense, to adopt some kind of pressure tactics. I am sorry that this course should have been adopted.

Now apparently a question arises as to whether this matter should be raised in the Hyderabad Assembly. I think it will be completely improper for it to be raised there at this stage at any rate. The Assembly is presumed to be a responsible body. It does not throw out odd opinions in the air. If and when a proper time comes, of course, it has a right to express its opinion, whatever that might be.

I fear we are rapidly going towards some kind of a disintegration in the South of India. Deterioration there obviously is going to be and has set in already. Few people take a long view. They are much too concerned with narrow problems.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 7(98)/48-PMS.
2. President, Hyderabad PCC.
3. A resolution recommending that the "three linguistic areas of Hyderabad State ought to be integrated with the contiguous linguistic regions", was adopted on 2 June 1953 at Hyderabad by the executive of the Hyderabad PCC under the chairmanship of Ramananda Tirtha. The resolution also appealed to people "to approach this problem in a constructive manner according to directions contained in the resolution of the Congress Working Committee of May 16, 1953."

3. Charges of Corruption and Favouritism¹

I suggest that you send the following reply to the attached letter which is sent by 20 members of the Hyderabad Assembly.² You might tell them that we are always anxious that every specific and concrete charge of corruption or favouritism should be investigated. Vague charges cannot be considered. Therefore when some cases were brought to the notice of the President, he communicated them to the Chief Minister of Hyderabad. He promised to enquire into them. Unfortunately, owing to domestic worries, the Chief Minister could not deal with this matter at that stage. But we are assured that he is dealing with it now. He has further invited Shri Bindu³ also to look into these matters so that he can have an independent opinion or advice in regard to them. This should lead to an adequate enquiry from the files and papers. If after that it is considered necessary for a fuller enquiry, this should certainly be held.

You might send a copy of this letter and of your reply to the Chief Minister of Hyderabad.

1. Note for Balvantray Mehta, General Secretary, AICC, 20 July 1953. JN Collection.
2. Twenty Congress Members of the State Legislature including three former Ministers had written to Nehru that they might have to resign if "things were not set right in the Administration." They had also made certain allegations of corruption, favouritism and nepotism against the Ministers. The letter was forwarded by Nehru to Ramakrishna Rao, Chief Minister of Hyderabad, who was asked to send him specific cases of complaint, so that he could form his own opinion about them.

4. To Balvantray Mehta¹

New Delhi
6 August 1953

My dear Balvantray,

I enclose a letter I have received from Shri Narendra Nath Sen, President of the convention held in Calcutta recently.²

This convention was obviously organized by the dissatisfied elements in the Congress in Calcutta.³ It would appear that they have gained strength considerably because of recent happenings in Calcutta.

We have to take note of what they say, in particular their charge that large numbers of complaints have come to the AICC about Bengal affairs. These complaints, they say, are referred to the very people complained against and so nothing happens.

I should like you to find out how many complaints have been received in the course of the past year from Bengal and what steps we took about them.

I think you should write to the President⁴ and Secretary⁵ of the West Bengal PCC asking them for their comments on the Resolutions of this convention and, more especially, in regard to the general situation created in Calcutta when the Congress became completely powerless. This matter must be investigated. If necessary, someone should go down to Calcutta for the purpose.

Dr Roy is coming to Delhi tomorrow and I shall naturally discuss these matters with him.

Please acknowledge receipt of the letter to me from Narendra Nath Sen.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. PCD-26/1953, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. On 30 July 1953, a convention of a group of Congressmen was held in Calcutta under the Presidentship of Narendra Nath Sen, member, West Bengal Legislature, to criticize the handling by the West Bengal Government and the Pradesh Congress of the situation created in the city by the agitation against the tram fare increase and to demand an inquiry by a tribunal into all the allegations of excesses committed by the police during the agitation.
3. The convention was attended by West Bengal Congressmen like Amrita Lal Hazra, Bhakota Chandra Roy, Keshab Chandra Mitra, Sushil Banerjee, Sudhir Kumar Bose and Nalinakshi Sanyal.
4. Atulya Ghosh.
5. Bijoy Singh Nahar.

5. Tamil Arasu Kazhagam and the Congress Constitution¹

It is not clear to me where there is a conflict in the new aims and objects of the Kazhagam² with the Congress Constitution. In some matters they may go a little further than the Congress, but that does not mean a conflict. Perhaps, to talk about the national interests of Tamils is not right, because they are not supposed to be a nation.

The Tamil Arasu Kazhagam, at our request, has changed its objects.³ That is to say, they went a good distance in meeting our wishes. Whether they have fully met us or not may be a matter for argument. If we consider that they have not done so, the proper course would be for them to be informed of this and to be asked to make some more alteration. To take the action suggested in the resolution of the Tamilnad PCC Executive without previously informing the Kazhagam that we are not wholly satisfied with their new amendments, seems to me not quite right.

In the Tamilnad PCC resolution,⁴ reference is made to the public utterances of members of the Kazhagam. I have not seen them. So I cannot say.

I suggest that you point all this out to the Tamilnad PCC and tell them that it is better not to rush this thing. We shall consider it at our next meeting of the Working Committee. Meanwhile Shri Rajagopalachari might look into this matter and see what can be done.

1. Note to Shriman Narayan, 8 August 1953. File No. P-20/1954, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. The changed aims and objects of the Kazhagam were the preservation of the national interests of the Tamils in consonance with the Gandhian ideals; promotion of the formation of a Tamil province within the framework of the Indian Republican Constitution, without in any way jeopardizing the national solidarity; fostering of Tamil language and culture; abolition of economic inequalities and the establishment of an egalitarian society and eradication of the caste distinctions and stopping religious conflicts so as to bring about unity and solidarity among the people.
3. The Tamil Arasu Kazhagam was negotiating merger with the Tamil Nadu PCC, and the latter asked it to suitably change their Constitution as suggested by the Congress President.
4. On 29 July 1953, the Tamilnad PCC stated that "on a scrutiny of the replies received from the Kazhagam and on an examination of their public utterances and their explanations, the Committee has come to the conclusion that the activities of the Tamil Arasu Kazhagam are not satisfactory and are in conflict with clause IV of the Congress Constitution. The Committee, therefore, resolves that those who do not resign the membership of the Tamil Arasu Kazhagam within 15 days hereof, shall be removed from the membership of the Congress."

6. To B. Ramakrishna Rao¹

New Delhi
August 25, 1953

My dear Ramakrishna Rao,
I have received your letter of the 25th August. Thank you for writing at length.

I can understand your irritation at various charges being levelled against you and your colleagues, but people engaged in public activities cannot be thin-skinned and must put up with such matters. You are quite right in thinking that you should not resign because charges are made. The only way to deal with them is to meet them.² I am glad you are doing this. I shall await further papers from you and Bindu.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. B. Ramakrishna Rao had asked the Congress members of the Hyderabad Legislature individually to send him specific cases so that he could form his own opinion about them.

7. To Kidar Nath Saigal¹

New Delhi
August 27, 1953

My dear Kidar Nath,
I was astonished to learn that on Independence Day you and some others celebrated that day separately from the official celebration at Ludhiana.² I am not aware if this happened anywhere else in India. It is extraordinary some Congressmen should do so.

I was still more surprised to read a report of a public meeting in the *Daily Samaj* of Ludhiana. At this meeting, apparently, the principal speakers

1. JN Collection. Copy of letter was sent to Balvantray Mehta also.
2. On 15 August 1953, Shri Ram Sharma presided over the celebrations organized by Congressmen of his group like Kidar Nath Saigal, Mota Singh, Abdul Ghani Dar and Shanno Devi, who all were members of the Punjab State Assembly.

were Master Mota Singh and Pandit Shri Ram. There was a procession in which apparently you took part on horse-back and the mottos exhibited were:

“Beware of Japanese Congressmen and kick them out.”

“Present government is of traitors and must be turned down.”

Master Mota Singh's speech was, as usual, totally irresponsible and reprehensible. I shall not discuss the other speeches.

I am afraid that things are going much too far to be tolerated. You will remember coming to see me with Abdul Ghani and Shanno Devi. I told you frankly what I felt then. More particularly, I expressed my disapproval of Ghani's activities. Evidently all this has had no effect and activities are indulged in by some people which are completely subversive of any kind of discipline.

I should like to have your account of the incident referred to above.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. To Balvantray Mehta¹

New Delhi
29 August, 1953

My dear Balvantray,
I enclose a letter from Dr Keskar.

I saw Tikaram Paliwal² here and had a fairly long talk with him. It was a frank talk. I told him that I was getting a little fed up with these intrigues in Rajasthan. At least one of his colleagues and supporters (whose name I forget for the time being) had misbehaved completely and I had the lowest opinion of him. This man had been taken in at the General Elections after much reluctance. Later he misbehaved openly. Then he apologized. Then again he had been misbehaving. If Tikaram Paliwal relied on such people, his own reputation suffered.³

1. JN Collection.
2. Ex-Chief Minister of Rajasthan.
3. Paliwal later submitted his resignation from the State Assembly on 12 September 1953 in protest against the disciplinary action taken against Vedpal Tyagi, who was expelled from the party on the previous day.

I told him that the way Members in the Rajasthan Assembly were functioning would do little credit to the Congress organization. There must be some stability and some discipline.

That was the general tenor of my talk with him.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. To Harish Chandra Bali¹

New Delhi
September 7, 1953

Dear Acharya Harish Chandra,²

I am in receipt of your letter of the 4th September.³ I have myself been distressed at some developments in the Punjab⁴ and, in so far as I can, I am checking them. I think, however, that you have taken perhaps an exaggerated view. Taking it all in all there has been plenty of good work being done in the Punjab and there is progress on many fronts. It is true that the Punjab is especially liable to faction. That has been the misfortune of the Punjab in the past.

I shall certainly try to do my utmost to check this spirit of faction.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Principal of CRA College in Sonapat.
3. In his letter, Bali, after referring to his close association with political leaders of the Punjab, greatly regretted the "shameful internecine war" which had brought the Congress credit in the State to nil.
4. Bhimsen Sachar's Ministry faced its first political crisis on 21 July 1953 on the question of the shifting of the Punjab Government offices and holding of the autumn session of the Legislature at Chandigarh during September. Kidar Nath Saigal had publicly protested against it. Sachar and Pratap Singh Kairon met Congress leaders in Delhi to discuss the proposed dropping of Shri Ram Sharma of the Saigal group from the Punjab Cabinet.

10

KASHMIR

1. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
July 2, 1953

My dear Bidhan,

Thank you for your telegram 13 of 1st July.²

You must have seen in today's papers a statement issued by Shamlal Saraf,³ Health Minister of Kashmir, regarding the circumstances of the death of Syama Prasad Mookerjee.⁴ I think it is a good statement frankly stating the facts and I really do not understand why there should be commotion and excitement as well as condemnation of the Kashmir Government over this matter. I am quite certain that the Kashmir Government was in no way to blame and that in fact before his death and after they did everything in their power. Whether the doctors in charge functioned correctly or not is a matter of opinion and only other eminent doctors can express their competent opinion.⁵

You will have seen that on the afternoon of the 22nd June it was suggested that telegrams be sent by the Government or by the doctor in charge to Dr Mookerjee's relatives. Syama Prasad discouraged this and said that he would himself send those telegrams. There is no doubt that he sent those telegrams

1. JN Collection.

2. Nehru had suggested to B.C. Roy, Chief Minister of West Bengal, on 29 June (see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, pp. 202-206) to go to Srinagar and make informal enquiries himself into the circumstances of the death in detention of S.P. Mookerjee, founder-President of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh and a Member of the House of the People, in Srinagar on 23 June 1953. Roy informed Nehru on 1 July that any findings of his were likely to be misunderstood as he was holding office, and said that the enquiry must be made by non-political persons.

3. Businessman and politician from Kashmir; was associated with the National Conference for many years; held various portfolios as Minister in the Jammu and Kashmir Government, 1948-62; nominated to the Lok Sabha, 1962.

4. The statement, issued on 1 July, described how S.P. Mookerjee was looked after by the State Government during the six weeks of his detention, the medical aid rendered to him when he was taken ill on 20 June and the efforts made to save his life. It also gave extracts from letters written by Mookerjee to his acquaintances showing the extent to which the arrangements made were to his satisfaction.

5. Referring to the statement of the Jammu and Kashmir Government, B.C. Roy wrote to Nehru on 2 July that it seemed to him that "what was humanly possible was done in this case."

and I have seen the photostat copies of the originals.⁶ Later in the evening his lawyer⁷ came and discussed various matters. Evidently no one suspected any dangerous development. Whether a more competent physician should have done so, is more than I can say. It was only rather late at night that the situation deteriorated rapidly. The doctors telephoned to the Health Ministry there. As I have told you, the Kashmir Government has been at sixes and sevens and no one expected any bad news. Ultimately, the Deputy Home Minister⁸ was informed. He got up immediately and went to the Indian Army Station Hospital to get the doctors from there. Distances are great in Srinagar. By the time he got help of these doctors and brought them over to the other Hospital, Syama Prasad was dying or had just died and there was nothing to be done. I understand that Syama Prasad's brother, Justice Mookerjee,⁹ was put out by the telephone message that he got on the morning of the 23rd. That message was sent by Durga Prasad Dhar, Deputy Home Minister. Dhar could not get through for a long time and when he got through it was not possible to hear or be heard. Therefore, the conversation, such as it was, took place through repetition by the Delhi operator and the Calcutta operator. You can imagine how such a doubly relayed conversation sounds. Ultimately the Calcutta operator said something in brief and much less than what Durga Prasad was saying or wanted to say. Thus the message that Justice Mookerjee got was completely distorted and was not what Dhar wanted to say. I hope you will explain this to Justice Mookerjee. D.P. Dhar made every effort for a long time to get through to him directly but did not succeed.¹⁰

6. At about 2.00 p.m. on 22 June, S.P. Mookerjee sent nearly identical telegrams to his brother, Ramaprasad Mookerjee, at Calcutta and to his son, Anutosh Mookerjee, at Patna. The telegram to his brother read, "Sudden dry pleurisy three days ago. Better today. Fever pain much less. Removed hospital. Satisfactory medical arrangements made. No anxiety. Specially tell mother—Syama Prasad." Telegram printed in Umraprasad Mookerjee (ed.), *Syamaprasad Mookerjee—His Death in Detention: A Case for Enquiry* (Calcutta, 1953), Appendix, p. 34.
7. Umashanker Muljibhai Trivedi, a Jan Sangh Member of the House of the People and senior advocate of the Supreme Court.
8. Durga Prasad Dhar.
9. Ramaprasad Mookerjee (1895-1984); elder brother of S.P. Mookerjee; eminent lawyer and judge; elected to the senate of the Calcutta University, 1920; councillor, Calcutta Corporation, 1924-83; Member, Council of States, 1924-29; served as senior Government pleader; elevated to the Bench of the Calcutta High Court, 1948.
10. Referring to the message received by Ramaprasad Mookerjee on 23 June, B.C. Roy wrote to Nehru on 2 July that Ramaprasad had come to his house at 5.45 a.m. and wanted to know if the message was correct. Roy added, "I then telephoned Shaikh Abdullah...and he told me that he had made all arrangements for sending the body within half-an-hour."

Even Shaikh Abdullah got to know of the death in the morning. Immediately he did everything in his power and all the Ministers showed every respect to Syama Prasad's body and went to the airport, etc. I do not see the slightest reason for casting any blame on the Kashmir Government in this matter except to say that in the course of the small hours of the night their governmental apparatus did not function very effectively in giving information and that they are not a very efficient Government from this point of view. Syama Prasad's death was a blow to them and obviously did them injury. They were on the point of releasing him for other reasons and had specially given him facilities to meet every person he wanted to meet.¹¹

For the last week or so there has been bad weather in Kashmir and all air services have been stopped. It has, therefore, been difficult to send letters to Srinagar or to get them from there. Communication by secret telegram is not easy and is only done through the Army.

I am quite sure that when all the facts are known, as they should be now, people will understand that their doubts and fears and apprehensions about the whole of the Kashmir Government in this matter are completely unfounded.¹²

Yours,
Jawahar

11. According to the statement of the Jammu and Kashmir Government, Hukam Singh, Member of Parliament, met S.P. Mookerjee on 16 June in an attempt to find ways and means of ending the Praja Parishad agitation. Subsequently he conveyed to Shaikh Abdullah Mookerjee's suggestion for facilities for a meeting with Prem Nath Dogra, President, Jammu Praja Parishad, who was accordingly brought to Srinagar and allowed to meet Mookerjee.
12. On 2 July, Nehru replied on the above lines to Atulya Ghosh, President, West Bengal PCC, who had also conveyed to him the public feeling in West Bengal as well as the feelings of some members of the PCC, including himself, on the death of Mookerjee. Charging the Kashmir Government with callousness for not timely intimating to Mookerjee's family members or Dr B.C.Roy, his physician, about his illness, Ghosh suggested an inquiry into the cause of Mookerjee's death by some eminent non-official persons. In his reply, Nehru, *inter alia*, said that he was aware of the feelings in Bengal but was quite convinced that the Kashmir Government "did everything in their power to show courtesy and consideration to Dr Mookerjee."

2. Appeal for Ending the Praja Parishad Agitation¹

I was on the point of leaving Geneva by air for Cairo² when I heard the news of Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee's death. The news stunned me as it was so wholly unexpected. About a month earlier, I had paid a brief visit to Srinagar.³ I had made inquiries then about Dr Mookerjee, about his health and where he was kept.⁴

I was told that he was keeping very well and I was shown where he was staying. This was a lovely villa by the side of the Dal Lake and adjoining the famous Moghul garden called the Nishat Bagh. The villa had a little garden with fruit trees and flowers. From the accounts I had I was happy to learn that Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee was living in healthy and agreeable surroundings and was being well looked after. I had hoped that, in these conditions and in the excellent summer climate of Srinagar, he would improve in health.

The shock, therefore, of the news of his death was all the greater because it was so utterly unexpected. He and I had often differed in our views in regard to political matters and we have had many an argument in Parliament. But, however much we differed, we respected and had affection for each other and his passing away is a severe loss. Parliament, of course, will be much poorer. We are poor enough in men of outstanding ability at a time when the country demands all that is best in us.

The fact that Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee died in detention makes his end particularly sad and painful. The Kashmir Government, whatever their differences with Dr Mookerjee, went all out to treat him with every courtesy and to offer him every convenience that was possible in the circumstances. To them his death was a severe blow. The end came suddenly. It is easy for all of us to be wise after the event and to point out what should have been done and was not done. But till the very evening preceding his death no one

1. Statement to the Press, New Delhi, 2 July 1953. From the *National Herald*, 3 July 1953.
2. Nehru left Geneva for Cairo on 23 June for a three-day visit to Egypt on the last leg of his month-long foreign tour. He returned to India on 26 June.
3. From 23 to 24 May 1953.
4. Mookerjee was arrested, along with two of his colleagues, on 11 May 1953 two miles inside the Jammu and Kashmir State, near the Pathankot-Jammu border, for entering the State without the necessary permit. The three of them were taken to Srinagar the next day and put up in a private bungalow known as Heather Villa.

suspected what was going to happen and Dr Mookerjee himself met his lawyer-friend that day and sent reassuring telegrams to his relatives in Calcutta telling them not to worry.

Just a few days before his death, Dr Mookerjee had long interviews with Sardar Hukam Singh, his lawyer and Mr Prem Nath Dogra of the Praja Parishad. He was discussing with them, so I am told, the question of withdrawal of the movement with which he had become associated.⁵ The Kashmir Government had decided to release him within a few days. But that was not to be, and tragedy supervened and found another release for him.

I can well understand the shock that his numerous friends and others experienced when they heard of this sad event for which they were so totally unprepared. But sorrow should not lead us astray from right and balanced thinking. It should lead us rather to a deeper and calmer consideration of even wider issues. A leading personality amongst us has passed away and the burden is all the greater on those who remain.

Party politics have their place in a democracy and often serve a useful purpose. But there are problems, national and international, which should transcend the politics of parties. Let us, on this occasion, think of some of the issues that confront us. We have to face tremendous problems in India and ever greater responsibilities are cast upon us in the international sphere. In these matters, more especially, we have to pull together to the best of our ability. To the best of my knowledge, Dr Mookerjee's mind was turning in this direction and I was looking forward, on my return, for a more hopeful turn in our politics in this respect. But my home coming became a sad one.

Dr Mookerjee was lately associated with the Jammu agitation. I would suggest to those responsible for this now to view this and other questions from a wider perspective. I have often expressed myself on this issue and pointed out that this agitation could only injure the cause of the Jammu and Kashmir State and India and, more particularly, that of Jammu. It has had deplorable consequences. I realize that large numbers of people in Jammu have suffered and wherever our countrymen suffer, we share to some extent in that suffering.

5. The Praja Parishad had started an agitation in Jammu in November 1952 in protest against the framing of a separate constitution for Jammu and Kashmir and the decision of the State Constituent Assembly to have an elected head of the State in place of the Maharaja. It demanded full and unqualified accession of the whole State to the Indian Union, and self-determination for the people of Jammu if there was no complete accession to the Union. On 5 March 1953, S.P. Mookerjee, on behalf of a joint action committee of the Jan Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Ram Rajya Parishad, announced the launching of an all-India movement in support of the demands of the Praja Parishad.

'The question of Kashmir has been with us now for five and a half years. It is no easy problem, and if it is to be decided peacefully, as we are determined that it must be, it requires a peaceful approach by the principal parties concerned. Those parties are India and Pakistan and, more especially, the people of the Jammu and Kashmir State. If some of those people in a part of the State pull in one direction, they may well produce counter-reactions on other people in the State. That indeed has been the case and the problem has thus become, instead of easier, more difficult of solution. And yet the time is coming when we should make every effort to achieve that peaceful solution. Any action which comes in the way of that cannot serve the interests of the people or of our country.

Certain doubts and fears arose in the minds of some people in Jammu. The Jammu and Kashmir Government have declared their policy clearly in regard to many important matters and have taken certain steps in order to remove these doubts and fears. More particularly, they have stated, in regard to the internal constitution of the State, that they were considering a measure of autonomy for certain parts of the State, including Jammu.⁶ Whatever is aimed at or has to be done will surely be more easily achieved by friendly cooperation and not through bitterness and conflict. Any other course will have a disintegrating influence, doing injury to all concerned.

I would, therefore, appeal for the ending of this conflict and a return to the normal ways of peaceful and cooperative politics. Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee's death has given us all a great shock. Let us, therefore, think deeply and calmly and pursue a path now which is obviously dictated by the necessities of the moment. I feel that had Dr Mookerjee been with us now, he would have recommended this. However much we may have differed, he stood, as I hope we stand, for the larger good of our country being attained by peaceful and democratic means, which call for the greatest measure of cooperation in working for the great tasks that lie ahead of us.⁷

6. In a broadcast from Radio Kashmir on 17 April 1953, Shaikh Abdullah announced, "We have decided to give autonomy to the different cultural units of the State as will be provided in the constitution that is being drawn up. This will remove all the fears of domination of one unit over the other and will make for the voluntary union and consolidation of the people of the State."
7. The Praja Parishad agitation and the sympathetic all-India movement were called off on 7 July in response to Nehru's appeal. The three parties supporting the agitation, however, said in a joint statement that "the normal constitutional agitation for the just demands of the people of Jammu will not in any way be prejudiced or weakened" and "the basic demand of the Praja Parishad deserves cordial acceptance."

3. To Jogmaya Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
July 5, 1953

Dear Mrs Mookerjee,²

I thank you for your letter of the 4th July which has just reached me.³

I can well understand a mother's sorrow and mental anguish at the death of a beloved son. No words of mine can soften the blow that you must have felt.

I did not venture to write to you before without going into the matter of Dr Syama Prasad's detention and death fairly carefully. I have since enquired further into it from a number of persons who had occasion to know some facts. I can only say to you that I arrived at the clear and honest conclusion that there is no mystery in this and that Dr Mookerjee was given every consideration.

I might mention that letters to Kashmir go by air, but the air services are very irregular because of the weather and sometimes they do not go for a week or more.⁴ In fact, they have not gone there now for over a week and many important letters which I had sent have thus been delayed.

It has been my lot to spend about ten years in prison and I have been kept in innumerable jails of all kinds all over India, and so I know something about how a prisoner feels and what the conditions of his imprisonment usually are.⁵

On the day of Dr Mookerjee's sudden death, a Minister of the Kashmir Government tried to telephone to Justice Mookerjee. It was not possible for him to get through for a long time, and then he could not speak directly. His

1. U.P. Mookerjee Papers, NMML.

2. Mother of S.P. Mookerjee and wife of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee.

3. In an emotional letter written on 4 July, Jogmaya Debi claimed that her son, Syama Prasad's death was shrouded in mystery and that, according to eminent physicians, "it was, in the least, a case of gross negligence." She also demanded "an absolutely impartial and open inquiry by independent and competent persons" into the cause of his death.

4. Jogmaya Debi complained, "The Kashmir Government had not even the courtesy to allow free flow of family correspondence. Letters were held up with inordinate delay and some mysteriously disappeared." She added that some letters written to Syama Prasad were not delivered to him, although they had reached Srinagar by 16 June.

5. Ridiculing Nehru's observation made in his letter of 30 June (see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, p. 209) to her that Syama Prasad "was being kept, not in any prison but in a private villa", Jogmaya Debi wrote that actually he was "strictly confined in a small bungalow with a little compound, guarded day and night by a body of armed guards."

message was relayed by two operators on the way and no doubt became completely distorted.

I am forwarding your request about Dr Mookerjee's diary and other papers to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad.⁶ I am sure that, if he has got any papers, he would certainly send them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Nehru wrote to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Deputy Prime Minister, Jammu and Kashmir, the same day.

4. To Jayaprakash Narayan¹

New Delhi
July 8, 1953

My dear Jayaprakash,

I have just returned from Agra. In today's papers there appears a statement by you, in which you say that the Kashmir authorities had been criminally negligent in looking after Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee's health.²

This appears in a number of papers. I enclose a cutting from the *Times of India*, Delhi Edition. I presume that this report is a correct one of what you said.

You accuse me in a public statement of pronouncing judgment on a controversial subject.³ You have yourself, however, categorically pronounced

1. Jayaprakash Narayan Papers, NMML.

2. Jayaprakash said this in a statement on 7 July. Basing his assessment on the "whole story" as pieced together and narrated to him by Ramaprasad Mookerjee, Jayaprakash regretted that Nehru in his letter to Atulya Ghosh (see *ante*, p. 275) should have categorically stated that no negligence was shown in the care of S.P. Mookerjee. Calling for "a proper and impartial inquiry into the whole affair," he said, "In the meantime, it does not seem proper for the Prime Minister to pronounce judgement on such a controversial issue."

3. Jayaprakash clarified to Nehru on 25 July that he had no desire to make a statement on the subject, but "when your unqualified chit to the Kashmir Government appeared in the Press.... I felt compelled to raise my voice. I said as much in my statement, but some papers omitted that portion of it." Incidentally a gist of Nehru's letter to Atulya Ghosh had appeared in the Press.

that judgment in stating that you had no doubt in your mind that "the Kashmir authorities were not only negligent but criminally negligent in looking after Syama Babu's health." Further you said that the life of this great Indian could have been saved by better care.

You have passed your judgment presumably on what Justice Ramaprasad Mookerjee told you. Obviously, Justice Mookerjee, at the time, had only fragmentary facts in his possession and was deeply moved by the sudden death of his brother. I made the statement I did partly from personal knowledge and partly from examining both papers and persons who had some direct knowledge. From that evidence I came to a certain conclusion which I conveyed to Atulya Babu in answer to a letter to me.

I do not know whether you had read a statement issued by the Kashmir Government about three or four days ago. You make no reference to this statement. That statement itself was naturally fairly brief. I believe they are issuing a very detailed statement soon. But even that brief statement, I think, presented a clear case that the Kashmir Government were anxious to do, and did in fact do, everything in their power to show consideration for Dr Mookerjee. I am naturally no judge of what medicines should have been given to him.

Having had a fairly lengthy acquaintance with prison life, as you have had, I do not know of anyone in prison having been given more comfortable quarters to live in than Dr Mookerjee. The place was an ideal one climatically and otherwise. The surroundings were beautiful. Food and other conveniences were, it has been admitted, very satisfactory. The one complaint that Dr Mookerjee made at some late stage was that he could not have long walks. There was a small garden attached to the house with flowers and fruit trees, but this was not big enough for a long walk. When he pointed this out he was permitted to go for a walk to the adjoining Nishat Bagh, which is one of the loveliest of the Moghal gardens. I believe he did go there once.

As regards medical attendance, apart from the usual doctors connected with the jail establishment, the Director of Medical Services, Colonel Chopra,⁴ visited him fairly regularly and kept in touch with his requirements and health. Unfortunately he went on tour just two days before Dr Mookerjee's death.

Occasionally Dr Mookerjee complained of some minor ailment which was attended to. There was no serious complaint and there was no apprehension in the mind of anybody. It was only the day before his death that, for the first time, his condition was not good. A little later he was removed to the hospital. As I have said above, I cannot say what a proper treatment in such cases

4. Ram Nath Chopra, Director of Health Services and Inspector-General of Prisons, Jammu and Kashmir Government.

should be. The men in charge were supposed to be competent and even in hospital there was no serious development. When the doctors suggested that they would send telegrams to his relatives, Dr Mookerjee himself said that he would prefer sending the telegrams himself telling them not to worry and that he was being well looked after. In fact, he was apparently fairly well till the very evening of his death and met people. No one thought that there might be a serious turn to his illness. Certainly the Kashmir Government had no reason to think so. It may be that some doctors might have taken a more serious view. Heart disease is naturally a serious thing, but people have it for years and then it may be that some sudden thing upsets them. Only three weeks ago, a friend of mine died of this very heart disease, "coronary thrombosis", which he had had for a long time, while driving a car.⁵ He just collapsed at the wheel.

I really do not see where any negligence, criminal or other, comes in on the part of the Kashmir Government. It may be that the doctors should have been more wide awake. It may be also that they should have informed the Kashmir Government of the very serious nature of the case earlier. The Kashmir Government was as much taken by surprise by the sudden development in the course of the night as any other person.

However, I do not wish to argue this matter with you. I merely wish to point out that I did not make the statement I did without enquiring into the matter with some care and satisfying myself about the facts.

When Dr Mookerjee was sinking, efforts were made to get doctors from the Indian Army Hospital. Distances in Srinagar are long. It took some time to get them out in the middle of the night. They came just too late.

Communications from Srinagar are not very easy. Efforts to telephone were not successful. Ultimately a telephone message came to Delhi. Some time later they got through to Calcutta, but it was impossible to hear or be heard. The result was that the message could not be given directly but had to be relayed by two telephone operators, who repeated very briefly what they liked and could not convey it in proper form or at length. That message as delivered by the telephone operator must have shocked Justice Mookerjee.

Letters from Kashmir have been delayed greatly during the last few weeks. They go by air and sometimes air services are held up for a week at a time.

It is a well-known fact that a few days previous to his death, the Kashmir Government had given facilities for Sardar Hukam Singh, Mr Trivedi, his

5. Khurshed Ahmad Khan, ICS, who was the Chief Commissioner of Delhi during the Partition period, suffered a fatal heart attack on his way from Delhi to Aligarh on 20 June 1953.

lawyer, and later Prem Nath Dogra, the President of the Jammu Praja Parishad, to see Dr Mookerjee. Prem Nath Dogra had been specially brought from his place of detention in Jammu and he had long talks with Dr Mookerjee. The Kashmir Government knew that these talks related to the withdrawal of the Jammu agitation and were naturally anxious to facilitate them. In fact they had decided to release Dr Mookerjee within a few days. I am mentioning these facts so that you might judge of the motive or intention of the Kashmir Government in this matter. The fact is that no one in Srinagar, and certainly not the Kashmir Government, had the least intimation or feeling that Dr Mookerjee's illness was serious. This illness took a turn for the worse just five or six hours before the death took place.

You refer to an enquiry into this "whole affair". Personally I or the Government of India cannot have any objection to any enquiry. But it is not for the Government of India in such matters to bypass the State Government. It is for the State Government to take such action as they decide upon. More particularly, in regard to Kashmir, there is so much argument in regard to what the Government of India's relations are with the State Government, and it would be improper for us to take any such action directly. As you must know, Shaikh Abdullah invited Dr Bidhan Roy to come and see for himself, as they have nothing to hide and welcome any friend going there to find out facts for himself.⁶ But they do object to being put in the dock and treated as if they were criminals and charged, as you have done, with criminal negligence when, according to their thinking, they went out of their way to show every courtesy and consideration to Dr Mookerjee.

I might mention that after Dr Mookerjee's death, when his body was being flown from Srinagar aerodrome, his two colleagues,⁷ who had been with him in detention and who accompanied the body, had not only no complaints to make but, in spite of their evident sorrow, expressed their appreciation of what the Kashmir Government had done in this matter. That was their immediate reaction.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

6. Inviting him to visit Kashmir, Shaikh Abdullah stated in his telegram of 2 July to B.C. Roy that such a visit "at this juncture will help clear many doubts". Roy, who was leaving on 5 July for a tour of Europe, replied on 3 July that he would prefer "some non-political persons" to conduct the inquiry. Alternatively, he could visit Kashmir on his return but would like "one or two such persons to be associated with me."
7. Gurudutt Vaid, an Ayurvedic physician and President, Delhi State Jan Sangh, and Tek Chand Sharma, a Jan Sangh worker, were detained along with S.P. Mookerjee.

5. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
July 8, 1953

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

I just returned from Agra and received your letter² of July 4. I have read this long letter with care. Before I went to Agra, I had several talks with Afzal Beg and Bakshi³ and no doubt they must have conveyed to you my views.⁴ I believe they met Maulana Azad as well as Dr Katju and Rafi Ahmed Kidwai. They had talks with them.

Your letter raises quite a variety of issues. Some of them are in the nature of a complaint against the treatment accorded to the Jammu & Kashmir State, or rather to the Muslims of that State, by the Government of India.⁵ Other complaints relate to the attitude of the Indian Press⁶ and of course of the communal organizations in India. You also hint at the Government of India adopting a dubious attitude towards its future relationship with the Jammu

1. JN Collection.
2. Replying to Nehru's letter of 28 June 1953 (see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, pp. 193-199). Shaikh Abdullah said that his Government stood by the Delhi Agreement, but just as its implementation began, the Praja Parishad agitation shook the very foundation of Indo-Kashmir relationship. He asserted that the most pressing problem before the State "is not the character and shape of internal arrangements with India... but the larger question of solving the dispute between India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir."
3. In fact, Nehru had invited Shaikh Abdullah and some of his colleagues to Delhi for talks. Abdullah declined to come but sent Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and Mirza Afzal Beg, his ministerial colleagues. The two emissaries held discussions with Nehru on 3 and 4 July.
4. After his return to Srinagar, Bakshi wrote to Nehru on 17 July that Shaikh Abdullah "had felt that taking into account the internal and international position of India and also the promised willingness of Pakistan to append their agreement to his solution, he could force India also to give her acceptance. But your categorical refusal to entertain any idea or proposition which involved certain responsibilities for India to guarantee and finance the independence of the Valley caused the first upset in his calculations."
5. Abdullah wrote that discrimination in the matter of recruitment in the State Army and the Posts and Telegraph services was bound to create among the Muslims of Kashmir a sense of uncertainty in regard to their future.
6. Abdullah accused the Indian Press of vitiating the public mind by "indulging in a virulent campaign of vilification against us."

and Kashmir State.⁷ Should you so wish it, I am perfectly prepared to discuss every single matter with you.⁸ I do not think that you have been quite fair to the Government of India in your criticism, or perhaps in some minor matters there might be justification.

But it serves little purpose to repeat past complaints and past history except in that it shows a lack of confidence. Present issues have to be decided in the present. As I indicated to you in one of my previous letters, I could not understand any argument about the full implementation of the Delhi Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of Kashmir. That agreement was arrived at after full consideration and discussion and ratified by both parties. There the matter ends and either party has to adhere to it without doubt or hesitation.⁹

It is true that by itself that implementation does not solve the problem of Jammu and Kashmir State in so far as Pakistan, etc., are concerned. That issue has to be tackled separately. In tackling that issue, as I have said, we have to bear in mind three factors: the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir State, India and Pakistan. I shall be happy indeed if all these coincide and we get an agreement. I am prepared to go as far as I can without giving up the basic principles and policies that we stand for. If no agreement can be reached with Pakistan without a sacrifice of those basic principles, then I am not going to agree. You know very well that this question has a very important significance to all of us in India. If any decision is arrived at in Kashmir which appears to go against the secular policy we have espoused in India, then that will raise tremendous consequences. But even apart from those consequences, I can hardly be expected to accept a policy which is entirely opposed to all I have thought of and done.

Therefore the question of an agreement has to be thought of within the limitations of certain basic policies.

7. Abdullah wrote that when Vallabhbhai Patel expressed the Government's approval to Article 370 in the Constituent Assembly on 12 October 1949, the people of Kashmir had felt assured that the Instrument of Accession would be the final basis of Indo-Kashmir relationship; on 5 August 1952, however, N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar stated in the Council of States that Article 370 was not a permanent feature of the Indian Constitution. The Government of India, Abdullah noted, had failed to make a clear statement defending "the present status" of Kashmir.
8. Abdullah wished Nehru and Azad to visit Srinagar for talks before Nehru went to Karachi later in July.
9. While the Jammu and Kashmir Government gave immediate effect to those provisions of the Delhi Agreement which aimed at autonomy, the abolition of monarchy being the first step taken, it delayed action on its other provisions, which confirmed the State's ties with India.

As I told Beg and Bakshi, and as indeed I wrote to you, we have tried in the past, and largely succeeded, in having joint policies. That should be our endeavour now and later because if we cannot evolve those joint policies as between the Government of India and the Jammu and Kashmir State, both will undoubtedly suffer greatly. But, if by mischance, we are totally unable to evolve joint policies, then inevitably separate policies have to be evolved. Even so, it is desirable that we should know precisely what these separate policies are. The matter is of high consequence for all of us, and the consequences of what we do or do not do will be very great indeed. Therefore it requires all our wisdom and sobriety and judgement. It is for this reason that it is of the utmost importance that there should be full and frank talks between you and some of us. I had hoped that you would come here before I went to Agra. That could not be arranged. I hope now that you will come at the earliest date convenient to you. I am not only tied up with heavy work here but have to receive some Foreign Ministers and other important persons from foreign countries in the course of the next fortnight. I shall be away from Delhi from the 17th to the 19th mid-day and then I shall go to Pakistan on the 25th July returning on the 27th. I am afraid I cannot manage a visit to Kashmir during this period. Apart from this, it would be much better if you came here and could discuss this matter not only with me but with others who count in our counsels.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
July 9, 1953

My dear Maulana,

I have received a letter from Shaikh Abdullah dated July 4. In this he says that he sent you a copy of his letter. I therefore enclose a copy of my reply² I am sending him.

1. JN Collection.

2. See the preceding item.

Shaikh Abdullah's long letter, as you will see, is a confused document which mirrors his confused mind.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Azad wrote to Shaikh Abdullah on 9 July assuring him of the Government's willingness to make a declaration to the effect that the special position of Kashmir was of a permanent nature. Reminding him about the stress laid on independence of the Kashmir Valley by Abdullah himself at his meetings with Nehru and Azad in May and June respectively, and by Bakshi and Beg earlier in July, Azad noted that if independence of the Valley was recognized, Kashmir would inevitably fall in Pakistan's hands. The "only one way of safeguarding the future well-being of the people of Kashmir" was for Abdullah to hold steadfastly to the existing relationship with India.

7. Cable to Rajeshwar Dayal¹

Your telegram 207 dated July 8. Trumbull's story, as reported in *New York Times*,² has no basis except rumours. Our Government has not considered this matter at all and no reference to it has been made by either Government, formally or informally. It is probably true, however, that leading Americans, including Dulles and Adlai Stevenson have privately put forward this proposal. Some, including Stevenson, have visited Kashmir.³ Our view has all along been that independence of Kashmir State, and more especially of Valley, would be completely unreal and cannot endure. There is no question of our guaranteeing any such arrangement which must lead to friction.

1. Drafted by Nehru on 9 July and sent by Foreign Secretary to Rajeshwar Dayal, Permanent Representative of India at the UN, on 10 July 1953. JN Collection.
2. Robert Trumbull, special correspondent of *The New York Times*, said in a report published on 5 July that the Governments of India and Pakistan were considering an independent status for the Kashmir Valley and a partition of the rest of the State along the existing ceasefire line, since the method of plebiscite had not been found suitable. Under this arrangement India, Pakistan and the Valley State would enter into agreements amongst themselves to safeguard the new State's defence and communications. He added that John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State, was supposed to have supported a solution of this nature.
3. Stevenson, the Democratic candidate in the US Presidential election of 1952, met Shaikh Abdullah in Srinagar in the first week of May 1953.

8. To Mahavir Tyagi¹

New Delhi

July 10, 1953

My dear Mahavir,²

...About your other letter, I am worried at many things happening in Kashmir.³ I think it would be a good thing if Atal came here for a talk. I do not want it to appear that he has been summoned to meet me. Perhaps you can ask Rajendrasinhji⁴ to send for him in an informal way....

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. Mahavir Tyagi Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. Minister for Defence Organization.
3. Tyagi wrote on 10 July that he had reasons to believe that an "alarming conspiracy" had been brewing in Kashmir against Shaikh Abdullah and that some important officers of the Home Guards were party to it. He thought it would be perilous to allow such activities, though any action taken to suppress them might prove to be counter-productive. Tyagi also advised Nehru to call Major-General Hiralal Atal from Srinagar for a talk.
4. General Maharaj Rajendrasinhji, Chief of Staff, Indian Army.

9. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi

July 15, 1953

My dear Rajen Babu,

Thank you for your letter of the 14th July about Kashmir.² I am very greatly

1. JN Collection.
2. Setting forth his views on the Kashmir problem, Rajendra Prasad wrote that in case of an overall plebiscite, India might not only lose the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, but would also have to face the problem of exodus and rehabilitation of the Hindu population of the State. The best course would be to have the existing ceasefire line as the boundary between India and Pakistan, but if Pakistan insisted at the ensuing talks in Karachi, India might propose a plebiscite confined to the Kashmir Valley or, alternatively, zonal plebiscites in Jammu, Ladakh, the Valley and 'Azad Kashmir'. Citing the example of the referendum in NWFP, Rajendra Prasad said that a demand for independence of the whole State or a part thereof could not be put as an alternative before the voters. He was also against India jointly guaranteeing with Pakistan an independent Valley as such a State might become a centre for rivalry between the power blocs.

worried about this matter, more especially because of the more recent developments in Kashmir, both in Jammu and in the Valley. I shall write or speak to you more about this later. Meanwhile, I shall give earnest consideration to what you have been good enough to write to me on this subject.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. Talks with Pakistan¹

Question: Are you hopeful of the outcome of your forthcoming talks with the Pakistan Premier?

Jawaharlal Nehru: It is rather difficult for me to say 'yes' or 'no'. If I hope too much, I will be called an optimist and if I hope too little I will be called a pessimist. Everybody desires an agreement in Kashmir. But I shall be going to Karachi only for a few days. The Pakistan Premier will visit Delhi later. This is only the first of a series of conversations. There is every desire to find out and explore ways and means of solving this problem, and when the approach is friendly, the chances of success are naturally greater.

Q: What do you think about the recent speech by Shaikh Abdullah that Kashmir would neither merge nor separate?²

JN: This might be an answer to the Praja Parishad people.

There is no foreign influence in Kashmir. It is not foreign but outside people who, by their interference, sometimes make the problem more difficult....

1. Remarks at a Press conference at Lucknow, 17 July 1953. From the *National Herald*, 18 July 1953.
2. Addressing the National Conference workers in Srinagar on 10 July, Shaikh Abdullah said that the Praja Parishad and Jan Sangh leaders were steadfastly sticking to their demand for Kashmir's merger with India, posing a threat to Kashmir's relations with India. He said these relations "should be neither one of merger nor of separation. It would be a compromise between the two."

11. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
July 19, 1953

My dear Maulana,

I am sorry to learn that you are not keeping well. I hope to see you soon.

We have to deal with two problems, both difficult. One is Nepal. I had a talk with the Prime Minister of Nepal today and I shall see him again. He will be seeing you also. We shall later discuss these matters among ourselves.

Kashmir is much more difficult and indeed we have arrived at a very critical stage, when everyone seems to be pulling in a different direction. Shaikh Abdullah has sent me a copy of his letter to you dated 16th July.² Just before I left Delhi for Lucknow, he wrote to me a long letter.³ I received a letter from Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad.⁴ I shall share this with you later.

All this indicated a crisis of great magnitude. Practically Shaikh Abdullah has said that he does not think any meeting between us will be much good and therefore he is not coming here. Even in regard to correspondence, he does not seem to encourage it.

It seems to me that we must take counsel together as to what we should do and that we should not send him any letters till we are quite clear about

1. JN Collection.

2. Shaikh Abdullah welcomed the Government of India's willingness to make a declaration about the special position of Jammu and Kashmir, but doubted if it would have the support of all sections of the people in India and the State. Without such support, he said, the declaration could not allay the fears in the mind of the people of Kashmir the majority of whom had been "feeling grossly neglected even in the matter of those subjects which have been transferred to the Union." He added, "I have come to the inevitable conclusion that the shape of the internal relationship can emerge only after the external conflict has been resolved finally."

3. Shaikh Abdullah wrote on 15 July that while he recognized "the responsibilities and obligations that devolve on us by virtue of the Delhi Agreements," the commitment on the part of India, Pakistan and the UN in regard to ascertaining the wishes of the people of the State about its future disposition might be fulfilled without delay. "It is a very delicate position for us here" and any consideration other than taking a final stand with regard to the State's future "will surely bring about deterioration in the situation here."

4. Bakshi wrote on 17 July that the associates of Shaikh Abdullah and Beg were carrying on intrigues and factional activities in the National Conference and the State Government and the administration had almost collapsed on all levels. This development "has got to be arrested somewhere and that too very quickly." Bakshi added that Abdullah had resorted to a bitter campaign against India with the object of forcing India to revise her attitude of hostility to the idea of an independent Kashmir Valley.

our line of action. I do not propose to write to him just yet, if at all, and I would suggest that you might also not write for the present.⁵

Yuvaraj Karan Singh is here and is naturally greatly upset. I had a long talk with him today.⁶ You will also be seeing him. With him, as with others, we might for the present not indicate any precise line of action.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

5. Bakshi had suggested to Nehru that if it was found desirable to continue further correspondence with Shaikh Abdullah on vital matters, the practice of various persons writing to him might be avoided for the sake of uniformity of approach.
6. Karan Singh, who was Sadr-i-Riyasat, Jammu and Kashmir, at this time, recorded in his autobiography, *Heir Apparent* (1982), about his meeting with Nehru in the third week of July 1953: "I found Jawaharlal's attitude considerably changed. Not only did he not make any attempt to defend Shaikh Abdullah, he seemed to be as disturbed as I was about the way the situation was developing.... He listened in grim silence to my detailed presentation, occasionally frowning and nodding agreement.... I did make it clear that if Shaikh Abdullah persisted in his hostile attitude a parting of the ways was inevitable.... As I took leave he put his hand on my shoulder and said, 'Don't worry, do your best'."

12. To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai¹

New Delhi
July 19, 1953

My dear Rafi,

... About Kashmir, the position is an exceedingly difficult one and it seems to grow worse from day to day. I am afraid Mridula's activities in Kashmir and about Kashmir have definitely added to our difficulties.² Her appraisal of the

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad had written to Nehru on 17 July that Mridula Sarabhai's utterances in Srinagar were lending unwitting support to the campaign of vilification being carried out there against India. He said Mridula Sarabhai had been arguing that Shaikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg were being misunderstood by the "bourgeois" press and organizations in India and that "the Government of India, which has communal and reactionary elements in it, should be forced to pursue a policy of relentless opposition to... communal forces in India." Bakshi added that she had even criticized Nehru's press statement of 2 July and described it as having been manoeuvred by D.P. Dhar.

situation is different from mine and her activities constantly counter mine. That by itself is undesirable. I have no doubt about her earnest intentions and her goodwill. But her judgment is not good and she has strong prejudices which colour any objective appraisal of a situation. In any event it is absurd for contradictory policies to be pursued by us.

I came to this conclusion nearly a year ago at the time when we were having talks with the Kashmir leaders which resulted in an agreement.³ Mridula then rather came in the way of that agreement and I told her later that I thought her attitude was completely wrong. She has however continued to pursue a policy which has encouraged some of the recalcitrant elements in Kashmir to become more recalcitrant and to cast the blame on India for everything big or small.

While I value Mridula's work greatly and admire her very much and have affection for her, I do feel that in this matter she is far from helpful. I have even previously suggested to her to keep away from it. I am again suggesting this to her.

Yuvaraj Karan Singh is here. He is naturally greatly worried at developments in Kashmir. His own position becomes more and more embarrassing and he has continually to face the question as to whether and for how long he should continue where he is. He had a long talk with me today. I shall be seeing him again. Meanwhile I think you should have a talk with him also. I have suggested this to him. You should know various viewpoints.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Discussions between the representatives of the Government of India and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir took place in Delhi from 12 to 20 June and again from 16 to 22 July 1952 resulting in the Delhi Agreement signed on 24 July 1952.

13. The Role of American Agents¹

I am sending you an interesting report from Shri Ranbir,² the Editor of the *Milap*. The *Milap* has been known to be a communal organ in Delhi and elsewhere and it has done a good deal of mischief. Shri Ranbir went to the US under the Leadership Programme. I do not particularly fancy the US people selecting communalists for this purpose.

2. The visit abroad has evidently produced a marked impression on Shri Ranbir who has undergone almost a sea change in regard to many of the views that he held previously....

10. But the most surprising thing is that Shri Ranbir should suggest that the Praja Parishad Movement in Jammu as well as the separatist movement in the National Conference in Kashmir were started at the instigation of American agents. It must be remembered that Shri Ranbir's paper has strongly supported the Praja Parishad Movement in Jammu in the past. Shri Ranbir hinted that there was much American money behind the Jan Sangh also and darkly mentioned Mauli Chandra Sharma's³ name as the probable recipient of this bounty....

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, 23 July 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Ranbir Singh (1907-1982); Chief Editor of Urdu daily, *Milap* (Delhi), 1949-82; author of several novels in Urdu and Hindi; received Soviet Land-Nehru Award, 1960.
3. (1900-1979); participated in the non-cooperation movement; served as minister and prime minister in various princely states, 1934-43; member, central committee, All-India States' People's Conference; general secretary, Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, 1944-48, and its vice-president, 1948-75; general secretary, Bharatiya Jan Sangh, 1951-53, and its president, 1953; resigned from Jan Sangh and joined Congress, 1954.

14. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
July 24, 1953

My dear Bakshi,

I received your letter of July 17th some days ago and read it with care. I received also about the same time a letter from Shaikh Abdullah dated July 15th.

1. JN Collection.

We have given a good deal of thought to Kashmir affairs and discussed them amongst ourselves as well as with others concerned. It is naturally our desire to keep in close touch with the Kashmir Government and to have a joint policy with them.

During the past five or six years we have always proceeded on this basis and consulted the Kashmir Government, and more especially Shaikh Abdullah, whenever any new situation arose.

I find some difficulty now in finding out what the policy of the Kashmir Government is. As officially expressed, it is a continuation of the old policy, with which we have been in agreement. But occasionally voices are raised by responsible people² which are in conflict with this policy. I think that the Kashmir Government should make it perfectly clear what it stands for and that it continues to adhere to the old policy. I was glad to find that Sadiq expressed himself clearly on this issue the other day.³

It seems to me that clarity is necessary to remove confusion from the public mind.

I am going tomorrow morning to Karachi and, so far as I am concerned, I shall make it clear to the Pakistan Government what our policy has been and is today. I do not see any valid alternative to it.

I had hoped that Shaikh Abdullah would come here for a talk, but he has informed me that he is unable to do so. He has also stated that it will not serve any useful purpose to carry on a long correspondence. As I am not in a position to go to Kashmir, the result is that the chances of any profitable discussion are practically nil. I have, therefore, to function in Karachi and elsewhere to the best of my ability and as I think right. I cannot obviously agree to something which I consider basically wrong and harmful to all concerned.

2. Addressing the National Conference workers in Srinagar on 10 July, Shaikh Abdullah said that Kashmir would have to guard its internal autonomy at all costs; justice had not been done to the Muslim majority in Kashmir and he himself was not trusted. "A time will, therefore, come when I will bid them good-bye." In another speech delivered on 13 July, he conveyed the same ideas, though in a less acrimonious tone. M.A. Beg, who was campaigning for the independence of the Kashmir Valley, was vociferous in his view that Kashmir's relationship with India should not go beyond the terms of the Instrument of Accession. At the meetings of the working committee of the National Conference held in July 1953, he also proposed that in the event of an overall plebiscite, the party should demand withdrawal of "foreign troops" and establishment of a coalition between the ruling parties in Jammu and Kashmir and 'Azad Kashmir'.
3. Speaking at a conference of peasants on 19 July, Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, President of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, ridiculed the idea of independence of the Kashmir Valley. He said that Kashmir, with its borders touching "Tibet, China, Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, would be the hotbed of international intrigues and cannot maintain its independence for long."

You have suggested in your letter that I should make some kind of a public statement to the effect that the J & K State has a special position within the framework of the Indian Constitution. This, of course, is so and it has been stated on innumerable occasions. It can be stated again when occasion arises.

The important thing is that the Kashmir Government must speak with a clear voice and not allow confusion to grow all round it making people doubt as to what it stands for. So far as we are concerned, we are quite clear in our minds about the policy we should pursue.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

15. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
July 29, 1953

My dear Bidhan,

I hope you have come back in better health than you went.² You will have to face tremendous problems. I will not write to you about these problems, but we have been greatly worried about them and your absence from Calcutta at this particular juncture³ has been an additional burden on us. However, now that you are back, this is a comfort. You will, no doubt, immediately come to grips with the situation and deal with it as you think proper.

During the last two or three weeks I have had repeated requests from various people in Calcutta asking me to go there. Maulana Azad has also been requested to do so. But it was patent to us that our going there for a day or two would not help and might indeed hinder and come in the way of the State Government on whom lay this heavy responsibility of dealing with the situation. I was busy enough, of course, but I would have left any other work to go to Calcutta if thereby I could have really helped.

I need not tell you that I would gladly do anything in my power to ease the situation or to help you. If you think that it is worthwhile, you can come

1. JN Collection.

2. B.C. Roy returned to Calcutta on 30 July, cutting short his visit to Europe where he had gone in connection with his own treatment and some official work.

3. Calcutta witnessed widespread disturbances in July in the wake of an agitation in protest against a rise in tramway fares. Besides there was public outcry in the whole of West Bengal over the death of S.P. Mookerjee. Labour trouble in the iron and steel factory at Burnpur also needed urgent attention.

to Delhi for a day or two so that we can discuss these matters. That is entirely for you to decide. I shall be in Delhi now for some time. Parliament starts on August 3rd and I have no programme to go out, at least for a fortnight or so.

Before you left India, you sent me two letters. Both of them dealt, in different ways, with the Kashmir situation. One of them was about the suggested inquiry into Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee's death. You were good enough to say that in view of the circumstances and the facts that had been brought out, we should not press for an inquiry.⁴ Your second letter, which related to conditions in Kashmir and the attitude of various leading personalities, gave a glimpse of this background in Kashmir. What you wrote was well-known to me and in fact much more is known to me. It is this situation that has caused us no end of trouble, because it undermines our case for Kashmir. One can face an opponent, however stout he might be, but it is far more difficult to face inner rot. I do not quite know what the future will be, but so far as Kashmir is concerned, I fear our difficulties have increased very greatly.

Undoubtedly, a major reason for this has been the Praja Parishad and Jan Sangh agitation and its reactions in the Valley of Kashmir. Whatever its justification might have been in Jammu itself, the reactions in the Valley of that agitation in Jammu and various parts of India had the most harmful results. The inhabitants of Kashmir, and they are 90% Muslims, saw the communal face of India and were frightened by it. Their desire for remaining with India weakened and in fact many thought that they would be suppressed in many ways if they were completely merged with India. It was difficult to face this growing feeling in the minds and hearts of many people. One cannot deal easily with imponderable sentiments.

Since Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee's death, the demand for an inquiry has been put forward in such a way as to put Shaikh Abdullah and the Kashmir Government in the dock as murderers. Indeed, I have been included in this list. Common slogans at Hindu Mahasabha and Jan Sangh gatherings had been *Abdullah ko phansi do*;⁵ *Dr Mookerjee ke qatil (murderers) kaun?* — *Nehru aur Abdullah*;⁶ *Khoon ka badla khoon se lo*;⁷ and so on. These slogans may have little effect in India, but they are carried to Kashmir and repeated as the voice of India or, at any rate, of a large section of India. You can imagine the reactions. They are also given much publicity in Pakistan newspapers, where there is an attempt to win over Shaikh Abdullah and point out to him how badly India has treated him.

4. B.C. Roy wrote on 2 July that the Kashmir Government's statement of 1 July had clarified many important issues and no enquiry was called for "at this stage".

5. Hang Abdullah.

6. Who are the murderers of Dr Mookerjee?—Nehru and Abdullah.

7. Blood for blood.

I am writing to you briefly about this matter, though much can be said. But you will be able to fill in details. It is this very difficult situation that we have to deal with and our difficulties increase very greatly by the attitude taken up by the communal organizations and even by many of our friends. It is clear that we cannot, in the ultimate analysis, hold Kashmir or the Valley by force of arms alone. If it is patent that the people there do not want us to remain, then we have no case left and we cannot continue for long.

As you know, I have just come back from Karachi after long talks there.⁸ I am writing to you separately⁹ about them. I had great difficulty in discussing the Kashmir issue there because of this background.

You will appreciate that I cannot publicly talk about these matters in Parliament or elsewhere. Probably, on the opening of Parliament, strong speeches will be delivered about Syama Prasad Mookerjee and inquiries will be demanded. I shall deal with them of course to the best of my ability. But I cannot speak frankly about all these basic difficulties that we have to face.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

8. Nehru visited Pakistan from 25 to 27 July 1953. For his discussions with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, see *post*, pp. 424-428 and 438-439.
9. See *post*, pp. 443-444.

16. To Jayaprakash Narayan¹

New Delhi
July 29, 1953

My dear Jayaprakash,

I returned yesterday from Karachi and received your letter of the 25th July.² Since yesterday, I have been thinking whether it will serve any useful purpose

1. Jayaprakash Narayan Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. Jayaprakash Narayan wrote that he was not surprised at Nehru's reaction (see *ante*, pp.280-283) to his press statement on S.P. Mookerjee's death, but he would have been happier had Nehru instead said to himself, "If a mild person like Jayaprakash felt like that, perhaps it was necessary to look closer into the matter. However, authority is always infallible in this country—even though repeatedly proved to be otherwise—and those in opposition are, of course, always in the wrong." He added that Nehru's long pleading to him as well as his reply to Mookerjee's mother (see *ante*, pp.279-280) had left him unconvinced.

to send any immediate reply to you. It seems to be my misfortune that I get out of step with you however much I may try to do otherwise.

Some time ago we had talks³ when, without any mental reservations but only with the desire that we should come closer to one another in our work, I had made some suggestions. Those suggestions may not have been good enough and you were perfectly justified in not accepting them. But to my great regret I found that a controversy had arisen about it and motives were imputed to all of us, including you and me. The result was that instead of our coming somewhat nearer, we are pushed further away.

There was the case of the election at Purnea⁴ where, again, it was my desire as well as that of my colleagues to make a friendly gesture. That too failed and led to some amount of bitterness. Evidently some evil fate is pursuing us and I have begun to think that the safest policy might well be not to tempt that fate and to remain quiet.

I wrote to you, when I saw your statement in the Press about Dr Mookerjee's death, because I felt I should indicate to you frankly what I felt. Thereby I tempted fate again and I have had my punishment. If you feel that I am behaving in this matter or any other matter, like some High Authority which considers itself infallible, then, of course, there is nothing more to be said by me. If I have fallen from grace, nothing can justify what I do.

Some time ago I received a letter from Dr B.C. Roy about Dr Mookerjee's death and the suggested enquiry. He had himself urged this enquiry publicly and privately. His letter, therefore, has some relevance. I am enclosing a copy of it for your information.

You refer to Indo-Kashmir relations.⁵ I presume you know that these relations for some time past have been very strained and difficult. Indeed it is not merely a question of governmental relations but popular reactions, more especially in the Kashmir Valley. The Jammu agitation of the Praja Parishad and the Jan Sangh, whatever its local justification might have been, was carried on in such a way, both in Jammu and in some other parts of India, that it produced powerful reactions on the people of Kashmir generally. Naturally

3. Nehru had talks with Jayaprakash on 16 March 1953 for a coalition between the Congress and the Praja Socialist Party (PSP). See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 21, pp. 432-441.
4. J.B. Kripalani, Chairman, PSP, won the general seat of the Purnea-Bhagalpur double-member constituency in the by-election to the House of the People held in June 1953. The Congress had withdrawn its candidate from the contest for this seat. The reserved seat was also won by a PSP candidate, Kerai Mushar, who defeated his Congress rival.
5. Jayaprakash Narayan had written, "Your plea that an enquiry (to which you are not yourself opposed) is not possible when the State Government is unwilling is a sad commentary on Indo-Kashmir relations."

disproportionate publicity was given to that agitation by our opponents in Kashmir as well as in Pakistan. The Pakistan Press played it up greatly, realizing that that would do them good. The effect of all that was an increasing feeling among the people of Kashmir that the communal face of India was much bigger and more powerful than had been thought and that their future might well be imperilled by association with this. Their desire to remain with India became weakened and they tried to seek escape from it in other ways. That may have been foolish. But such was their reaction.

Unfortunately many statements and writings of some of our leading persons affected them even more, because they came from non-communal people. Kripalani's writing in the *Vigil*⁶ and some of his speeches⁷ hurt them very much. So did Lohia's.⁸ It is in this context that I would like you to consider your own statement in regard to Dr Mookerjee's death.

I am merely trying to analyse the situation, not justifying or criticizing. You may be right in what you say about Shaikh Abdullah.⁹ But that does not help much when large numbers of others feel with him. Since Dr Mookerjee's death, a frequent slogan in the Hindu Mahasabha and Jan Sangh meetings has been Abdullah *ko phansi do*. Also Dr Mookerjee *ke qatil kaun* - Nehru *aur* Abdullah; *Khoon ka badla khoon se lo*. Thus Shaikh Abdullah and the Kashmir Government have been put in the dock as murderers and the whole enquiry

6. *Vigil*, a political weekly founded by Kripalani, had expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Union Government and the Jammu and Kashmir Government had tackled the Praja Parishad agitation. Kripalani wrote in the issue of 27 June that it was political fanaticism to believe that the Kashmir question could be viewed only from the official point of view and every other viewpoint was inimical to the best interests of the country.
7. Presiding over the first national convention of the PSP at Betul on 14 June, Kripalani said, "It will be presumptuous to say that the people of Jammu and even of Ladakh have no genuine fear about their future....I believe lots of people in India, including Congressmen, do not consider their demands as communal." He added that merely dubbing the opponents as 'the most reactionary and communal elements' could not solve the problem.
8. Rammanohar Lohia stated in Mumbai on 14 July that though Nehru might try to blame Hindu or Muslim communalism for the Kashmir developments, the prime responsibility was Nehru's. He added that the future of Kashmir related not so much to India's relations with Kashmir or with Pakistan as to Hindu-Muslim relationship and that Kashmir was an example of tragic failure of Indo-Pakistan statesmanship.
9. Referring to Shaikh Abdullah's speech of 10 July, wherein he had regretted that "even men of the stature of Jayaprakash Narayan should have, without any investigation, charged the Kashmir Government with criminal 'neglect' in giving medical aid to Dr S.P. Mookerjee", Jayaprakash wrote to Nehru, "This somewhat inflated individual acts much like that fond mother who thought every soldier, except her son, to be out of step. That mother had at least the natural weakness of motherhood to excuse her blind judgment; Abdullah has only his excessive self-esteem."

into Dr Mookerjee's death becomes a trial of Abdullah, etc., for murder. That is how it appears to large numbers of people in Kashmir.

There has been a controversy about the measure of accession of the Kashmir State to India. That controversy has not ended. In the final analysis, we cannot hold any part of Kashmir by force of arms alone and without the wishes of the people concerned. If that is so, these reactions in the Kashmir Valley have weakened our position terribly and for the first time I feel very doubtful about the future. No amount of strong speeches or statements here on this subject help, because ultimately the decision will be made by the people of Kashmir. They have been frightened and angered by much that has been said here and is being said.

When there is so much controversy about the measure of accession, for us to impose an enquiry from above, which is clearly outside the subjects of accession, would immediately raise not only constitutional issues of importance, but passionate resentment. It would become an example, in many people's eyes, of how we treat Kashmir as a subject country. It would, in fact, put an end to such case we have had in Kashmir based on the people's goodwill.

As I have said above, I decided to write to you with some reluctance because you are the last person with whom I would care to have a controversy of this nature. But then I felt that I should at least place some facts before you because grave issues are at stake. The Kashmir issue is grave enough in all conscience. But, with that are tied up so many other issues in India. Kashmir has been a symbol to us of secularism, etc. If that is decided on a communal basis, then the reactions in India are likely to be far-reaching and unfortunate. Therefore, I have written. You need not trouble to reply to me in so far as this subject is concerned. If you hold a different opinion, you are at perfect liberty to do so....

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

17. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
July 30, 1953

My dear Bakshi,

Nearly a month ago, I received a letter from Dr B.C. Roy which he sent me

1. JN Collection.

on the eve of his departure for Europe. This was in answer to a letter I had sent him in regard to the proposal to have an inquiry into Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee's death. It has just struck me that this letter of Dr Roy's might interest you. I am, therefore, enclosing a copy of it. This letter is not meant for publication. So, please keep it confidential.

I had been given to understand that the J & K Government would bring out a small pamphlet giving all the particulars in regard to Dr Mookerjee's death. This has not been done so far. I think this is very necessary. I have sent word to Khwaja Ahsanullah² about it and I understand that he has communicated this message.

Probably Dr Mookerjee's friends are bringing out a pamphlet³ of their own on this subject for distribution to Members of Parliament. No doubt, there will be speeches in Parliament on the subject and probably improper things will be said.

You will be interested to know what happened in Karachi. Although we discussed Kashmir there at much length, no definite result came out of it. That was, of course, natural in the circumstances. Yet the discussion was helpful, as it was fairly frank.

Both the Governor-General, Ghulam Mohammed, and the Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali, were terribly eager to have a settlement, though they would not make any precise proposals. Their appeals to me were quite plaintive and almost pathetic. I agreed of course with them completely on the desirability of a full agreement about all outstanding issues between India and Pakistan. The question was how to get going. My stress was on our not taking any step which might produce a further upset and perhaps leave things worse than they are now. In fact, I said that the only safe solution was to accept the status quo with minor modifications. Anything else would lead to some kind of upheavals, ill will and possibly even migrations. That would have a bad effect in India and Pakistan and ultimately even affect the good relations between the two countries which we were aiming at. I spoke at some length, but this was the gist of what I said.

Mohammad Ali did not think that he could put this through. He then discussed the Graham proposals, etc., and asked me if we could not get over the difficulties that came up there. I told him that I was prepared to consider that, though the chances were remote. Two years' discussion with Graham had not led to anything. I pointed out our basic position, which was not so much

2. He was closely connected with the National Conference and had set up the Kashmir Arts and Crafts Museum in New Delhi to promote exports of Kashmir handicrafts.
3. A book edited by Umāprasad Mookerjee was published from Calcutta in July 1953.

connected with the quantum of troops, but rather with the fact that all Pakistan authority, civil and military, should leave Kashmir territory.

He then asked what were the other courses open, and briefly enumerated various things that had been suggested in the past, such as regional plebiscite or plebiscite only in a selected area, with the rest divided up without a plebiscite, and partial independence, etc. He made it clear that he was not proposing any of these, but he was merely mentioning them as suggestions. Rather casually he said that independence would not appear feasible, and I agreed with him.

So, we talked at length and left the matter at that. My own general impression was that they would like a regional or zonal plebiscite. We did not discuss this at any length or consider any details. We are to meet early in September again.

The general atmosphere of our talks was very friendly and the Pakistan Government went far in making much of me. But much more than this was the reaction of the public of Karachi who gave me a tremendous welcome. Indeed, hundreds of people came from outside Karachi. It was clear that there was a strong desire among the public for Pakistan and India to resolve their differences and a belief that Pakistan was suffering from these conflicts. There were many friendly slogans. One incident might interest you. An oldish man in the crowd shouted: *Aye Hindustan ke Badshah, Pakistan ko apnao*.⁴

Conditions in Pakistan, both political and economic, are obviously bad and there is no sense of stability there. There are far too many intrigues afoot right from the top. The condition of the refugees there was pitiful. There are nearly four hundred or five hundred thousand refugees in Karachi living in miserable huts and apparently getting no help from Government. The sight reminded me of the refugees in India five years ago in 1948.

The situation inside Kashmir appears to be as confused as ever, in fact somewhat worse. I have seen some reports of your speeches⁵ and have also seen, of course, reports of Shaikh Sahib's speeches. I confess that I feel very depressed at all this. Shaikh Sahib appears to have developed a particular

4. 'O Emperor of India, please adopt Pakistan.'

5. Addressing a big gathering in Sopor on 23 July, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad declared that Indo-Kashmir relationship was based on the Instrument of Accession and the Delhi Agreement and had the unreserved backing of the entire National Conference, and cautioned the people against any slogan or threat which sought to disturb this relationship. Addressing a public meeting at Kulgam on 28 July, he said that Kashmir had affiliated itself as a single entity with India and any further partition of the State, already dismembered by the Pakistan aggression, would open the way to foreign intervention and conflict which would result in economic and political disaster.

animus against all of us in India, notably me and Maulana Azad.⁶ After twenty years of close contact and comradeship, this comes as a blow, and I have been deeply pained. But the personal equation apart, what troubles me is the future that is developing. The consequences in Kashmir are likely to be bad. The consequences in India and Pakistan will also be bad. I suppose we must accept things as they are and try to carry out our duty to the best of our ability.

Mohammad Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, is likely to come here in the beginning of September. We shall discuss Kashmir again then and we cannot go on talking indefinitely in general terms. Normally, I would have discussed this matter with Shaikh Sahib and you and others, but Shaikh Sahib's last letter to me and Maulana was practically an indication that he wants no further correspondence with us. Nor is he coming here. I feel reluctant therefore to write to him when he does not like me to write to him. That is why I am not reporting to him about my conversation with Mohammad Ali at Karachi.

In any event, it will be necessary for me to meet you before I met Mohammad Ali again. I should like to be seized of the situation in Kashmir by then. We shall have to decide what line we should take with Mohammad Ali. Obviously, I cannot ignore the wishes of the people of Kashmir. If our efforts thus far have been, as it now appears, in vain and the only result that we can expect is some sort of a tragedy, even so we have to behave decently and honourably, adhering to what we have stood for.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Shaikh Abdullah had rejected repeated suggestions from Nehru to come down to Delhi during July 1953 for discussions. When Azad went to Srinagar in June, he was "pointedly ignored" by Abdullah and "virtually insulted by the National Conference workers."

18. A Proposal for the Future of Jammu and Kashmir¹

The present drift and the resulting confusion cannot be allowed to go on. The policy of Government must be clearly stated to the public. The members of

1. As recorded by M.O. Mathai, Private Secretary to Prime Minister, this statement was prepared by Nehru on 31 July 1953. JN Collection.

Government should not speak in different voices.² In order to remove doubt about this policy, a brief memorandum might be prepared and placed before the Cabinet. In this Government's policy should be precisely stated. Apart from other major issues, there might be some reference in it to certain economic issues also; or, if it is preferred, the economic issues can be stated in a separate note. Among these economic issues might be mentioned the raising of the price of procurement of rice, the removal of the customs barrier, etc., the object of all this being to lessen the burden on the common man.

The main point clarified in the memorandum should be the future of the State which has given rise to so much argument in public recently. Members of Government should be asked to support the policy laid down in its entirety.

If, as is probable, some members of Government do not agree with this policy and this statement, the majority should nevertheless accept that policy. If the minority refuse to abide by it, the continuation of the present Government becomes impossible. The Head of the State should be informed accordingly. He should ask for the resignation of the Government because it cannot function as a team and pursue its contradictory policies. If the resignation is offered, then the Head of the State should call upon another person representing the majority view to form a new Government.

It will be desirable not to allow any marked lapse of time between the demand for resignation and the formation of the new Government. The Head of the State should send for all members of Government and inform them of his decision and ask for their resignations. If the resignations are not forthcoming, he should have an order ready for the dismissal of the Government because it cannot fulfil its functions properly. Immediately he should entrust the formation of the new Government to the other person.

It will be desirable to prepare the ground for this, insofar as considered feasible, with prominent members of the Executive of the Party.

Immediately after the formation of the new Government, the Executive of the Party should meet. Both the new Government and the Party should

2. Shaikh Abdullah was increasingly favouring the hardliners led by M.A. Beg, while most of the other senior leaders including the two Cabinet Ministers, G.L. Dogra and Shamlal Saraf, and D.P. Dhar had rallied behind Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. In a speech at Ganderbal on 31 July, Abdullah declared that accession to India had been "forced" upon Kashmir by her refusal to give assistance against the Pakistani invasion on any other terms and must be ratified by the free will of the people. He doubted whether the existing relationship with India could be worked satisfactorily and asked the people to "steer clear between the two extreme views of merger with India and merger with Pakistan." The majority group led by Bakshi was, however, agreeable to a more comprehensive relationship covering such areas as judiciary and financial arrangements. The two groups had clashed at the meetings of the working committee of the National Conference held in the last week of July.

issue statements to the public stating the facts and indicating their policy, including their economic policy.

Some persons who are notorious for their corrupt activities should be apprehended and steps taken for an inquiry into those activities.

It may be desirable to arrest one or two such persons, who are known to be corrupt, even before the steps indicated above are taken. But this is a matter of judgment.

All necessary steps should be taken for the preservation of law and order. Any persons taking a lead in creating any disturbance should be apprehended. Such assistance as may be considered necessary for the maintenance of law and order should be available. Any action taken should be carefully calculated so as not to exceed the necessities of the situation, and the change-over should be as peaceful as possible.

Immediate first steps afterwards should be the removal of certain well-known corrupt officers, etc., suspension of others whose loyalty is doubted, and an appeal to the people for maintenance of peaceful conditions. The broad outlines of the programme of the new Government should be given and it should be stated that it would be for the people to decide ultimately what political or economic policy has to be adopted—the sole test will be the good of the people and their wishes in the matter.

19. To Bhimsen Sachar¹

New Delhi
31 July, 1953

My dear Sachar,

I am sending you my usual fortnightly letter.² This is to inform you separately that the internal situation in Kashmir has been progressively deteriorating. To some extent you must yourself have followed this unfortunate trend. There is at present a good deal of confusion there as members of Government pull in different directions and proclaim entirely different policies. Indeed the position becomes distinctly odd when the Chief Minister, while retaining his position as such, begins functioning as the leader of the Opposition. In some ways the position is worse because of the peculiar situation of Kashmir.

1. Bhimsen Sachar Papers, NMML.

2. See *post*, pp. 580-585.

Matters are tending to come to a crisis there. It is clear that the present set-up of the Government can hardly continue for long and one view or the other has to prevail. So far as we in the Central Government are concerned, we have tried our utmost to compose these differences and to emphasize a uniform policy.

The essential differences have probably roots in the long past. But undoubtedly recent developments have been caused by the wholly misconceived Praja Parishad and Jan Sangh agitation, which produced strong reactions in the Kashmir Valley.

You know that we have considered the problem of Kashmir as symbolic of many things, including our secular policy in India. Therefore anything that happens there has larger and wider consequences. Hence its great importance.

The situation is a difficult one. We shall no doubt deal with it to the best of our ability. I am merely writing this top secret letter to you to keep you informed.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

20. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
August 1, 1953

My dear Maulana,

If I may suggest it, it would be desirable for you to send for Maulana Saeed Masoodi² of Kashmir and have a talk with him. Today, he has issued a Press statement strongly condemning the resolution passed by the Communist Party about Kashmir.³ I do not mind his condemnation of some parts of it, but his

1. JN Collection.

2. Mohammad Saeed Masoodi was a Member of the House of the People and General Secretary of the National Conference.

3. In a resolution released on 31 July, the Communist Party of India denounced the reported move to make Kashmir an independent State and said that the separation would only mean "enslavement and further impoverishment for the Kashmiri people." The resolution further observed that the people had to be saved from "new designs of imperialists and their conscious supporters and misguided votaries."

general attitude⁴ does not appear to me to be quite right. I think it would be desirable for you to have a talk with him. The talk will have to be rather general. As events are moving fast, I suggest that you see him as soon as possible.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

4. Masoodi criticized the resolution as "a most unbecoming attempt... to create dissensions in the ranks of the National Conference." He, however, admitted that the idea of independence was being tentatively considered for the first time and the growth of this idea was due to a new development: The exercise of organized pressure from India for the total merger and integration of Kashmir, which seemed to the people of Kashmir little different from the military pressure unleashed on behalf of Pakistan in late 1947.

21. To Mahavir Tyagi¹

New Delhi
2 August 1953

My dear Mahavir,

... I think in the circumstances that are arising it would perhaps create confusion and also lead to speculation if any senior Generals went to Kashmir in the near future. It is better for them to keep away.

You might authorize Atal to use our aircraft if special need arises.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. Mahavir Tyagi Papers, NMML. Extracts.

22. To Mridula Sarabhai¹

New Delhi
August 3, 1953

My dear Mridu,²

... You are completely right in saying that the Kashmir situation is deteriorating rapidly. As you know, my appraisal of that situation is wholly different from yours. I must act according to my own judgment. I know perhaps better than you do of the consequences of what is happening and what is likely to happen—consequences not only in Kashmir but the whole of India and Pakistan. It is with that knowledge that I have to judge the situation and take such action as may be necessary from time to time.

Evidently you think that Rafi Sahib and I and many others here are all hopelessly mistaken and that your view is correct. All I can say is that I do not agree with you....

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. A prominent social worker and follower of the Congress; daughter of Ambalal Sarabhai, a textile industrialist of Ahmedabad and a devoted Gandhian.

23. To N.C. Chatterjee¹

New Delhi
August 4, 1953

Dear Mr Chatterjee,²

You wrote to me about some report from Srinagar about Praja Parishad volunteers there being attacked.³ I have made enquiries about this both from the Kashmir Government as well as some of our own officers in Srinagar. They have both separately replied to say that no such incident has occurred and the report is baseless.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. President, All India Hindu Mahasabha, and Member of Parliament.
3. The Praja Parishad said in a press note on 2 August that more than a dozen Praja Parishad workers were injured in an attack on them by a mob in Srinagar when they came out of the Central Jail after their release.

24. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
August 9, 1953

My dear Mr President,

I have been keeping you informed of the internal conflicts that were taking place in Kashmir between various members of the Government there, as well as in the National Conference of the Jammu and Kashmir State. These conflicts had been getting more and more intense and they came to a head yesterday.² Because of these conflicts, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the work of the Government of the State to be carried on and a good deal of confusion and apprehension was felt by the public at large. Our Government was not directly or constitutionally concerned with these internal matters. But we were naturally greatly interested in whatever might happen there because of its larger consequences.

Some references were made to us from time to time about our attitude in the matter. We made it clear that we would not like to interfere in any internal arrangement provided that had the sanction of the people and the National Conference behind it. So far as our Government was concerned, we wanted conditions of peace and orderly development in Kashmir under an autonomous Government which had the goodwill of the majority of the people behind it. In view of our constitutional relationship, we were responsible for certain matters as well as for the peace of the State. The assurances we had given in regard to the future of the State remained and it would be for the people of Kashmir to decide about that future.

Yesterday, late at night, we were informed of certain developments which indicated that probably the Sadar-i-Riyasat would dissolve the existing Government. This had not been actually done by that time. We did not wish to interfere in any way with these internal happenings, but we made it clear that

1. JN Collection.
2. Following differences in his Cabinet of five members, Shaikh Abdullah insisted on 7 August that Shamlal Saraf should resign for serious lapses in the departments under him, but Saraf refused. In a memorandum on the next day, the majority in the Cabinet comprising Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, G.L. Dogra and Shamlal Saraf charged Abdullah with not only delaying the implementation of the Delhi Agreement but denouncing it "purposefully and openly." They also criticized his economic policies, his "corrupt and inefficient" administration, and his support to communal-minded colleagues like M.A. Beg. They stated that the Cabinet lacked unity and had lost the confidence of the people. On receiving a copy of the memorandum, Karan Singh called an immediate meeting of the Cabinet, but Abdullah did not attend; thereupon he was replaced by Bakshi.

our armed forces should be kept apart and not used in any way unless there was any grave threat to peace and order and the civil authority asked for their help. Early this morning we heard of the step that the Sadar-i-Riyasat had taken in dissolving the Cabinet and appointing Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad as the new Prime Minister of the State. Some time later, about midday, we were informed that Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah,³ Mirza Afzal Beg and some others had been arrested and taken to various destinations because of a fear of breaches of the peace.

Information has reached us of some demonstrations in Srinagar in favour of Shaikh Abdullah and against Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. All these have thus far been dealt with by the local police and militia and no request has been made, so far as I know, for the military to aid the civil authority.

The Sadar-i-Riyasat has acted on his own responsibility in this matter. In the course of the last day or so he informed us of the difficult situation he had to face. But he did not ask us for any intervention of any kind. We thought it best not to intervene as constitutionally the Central Government was not directly concerned. Events later took a rapid turn and we were informed of each of them as or after they took place. The situation is not a static one and I shall keep you informed of developments.

It is my intention to make a brief statement in the House of the People tomorrow after question hour placing such facts as we have in regard to these developments before the House.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Shaikh Abdullah was arrested in the small hours of 9 August under the Public Security Act. He was charged with indulging in acts of disruption, corruption, nepotism, maladministration and establishing foreign contacts of a kind dangerous to the peace and prosperity of the State.

25. To Indira Gandhi¹

New Delhi
9th August, 1953

Darling Indu,

It has been difficult to keep pace with your movements and hence not easy to write to you. I sent you a letter to the Swiss School. I had intended giving a note for you to Krishna Menon who left late last night.² But at the last moment I forgot. I was very tired and went to bed.

You will see Krishna and he will tell you something of how we are. In a week or so you will yourself be here after your long wandering. The house and its present occupants await you with eagerness.

Life is not dull here at least. In Kashmir, after a continuing crisis, things have boiled over. The Cabinet there split up and Shaikh Saheb carried on a bitter campaign against India and to some extent against me. Last night the Sadar-i-Riyasat dismissed his ministry and called upon Bakshi to form a new Government. We have no further detailed news yet.³

Send a message to say when you are arriving here. I want to be in Delhi on that day.

My love to you and the children.

Papu

1. From Sonia Gandhi (ed.), *Two Alone, Two Together: Letters Between Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru 1940-1964* (London, 1992), p. 596.
2. V. K. Krishna Menon, who was a member of the Indian delegation to UN General Assembly, visited New Delhi for consultations from 3 to 8 August.
3. Indira Gandhi wrote to Nehru from Zurich on 10 August, "I got the Kashmir news in a Swiss paper.... It is a heart-breaking thing to happen. I do realize that everyone concerned must have thought and thought before taking this grave step. And it must be justified and right. And yet—it wasn't a shock, for I was dreading such a thing since your letter I am filled with a terrible and deeply penetrating sadness. I suppose one has to do some things for the greater good but it is like cutting a part of oneself." Nehru had written to Indira Gandhi on 2 August, "Tomorrow Parliament begins at eight a.m.... But my real headache is Kashmir where Shaikh Saheb has turned many somersaults and is bitter against India and me. The situation there is explosive and anything may happen."

26. Recent Developments¹

Sir, certain events have occurred in the State of Jammu and Kashmir with dramatic suddenness during the last two days, and I am therefore venturing to take some time of the House in placing before it such facts as are known to us. Not only this House but the country at large must have viewed these developments with anxious concern. The State of Jammu and Kashmir has been to us not merely a piece of territory which acceded to India five and three quarter years ago, but a symbol representing certain ideals and principles for which our national movement always stood and which have been enshrined in our Constitution. It was because of a community of these ideals and principles which brought the State, in a moment of grave crisis in October 1947, into the larger family of India. But even before that constitutional development took place, a devotion to these ideals and to certain common purposes had brought the national movement of the Jammu and Kashmir State in line with the struggle for freedom that inspired our people. In the Kashmir State it was the National Conference which represented this struggle and spoke on behalf of the masses of the people there. The association of the State with India therefore had a deeper significance than even the constitutional link that was built up.

Much has happened during these years and we have faced trial and tribulation together. Even at the time of the accession of the State to the Union of India, it was made clear that it was for the people of the State to determine their future when suitable opportunities for this arose. The Union was a free union of free people without any compulsion on either side. It was recognized from the very outset that the peculiar position of the State made it necessary for a special position to be accorded to it in our constitutional relationship. Later, when the Constitution of the Republic of India was drawn up and finalized, this special position was recognized and it was made clear that any change in or addition to that position would depend upon the wishes of the people of the State as represented in their Constituent Assembly. The subjects of accession were three, namely, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. In an agreement that was arrived at last year, known as the Delhi Agreement, certain consequential and implied powers were defined. But the essential subjects of accession remained the three already mentioned.

1. Statement in Parliament, 10 August 1953. From *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, 1953, Vol. VI Part II, cols 439-446.

I mention this because much confusion has been caused by forgetting this basic fact that we have all along stood for a special position of the Kashmir State in the Indian Union. Some people have talked of a "merger". That word of course is totally inappropriate in any event and, to the extent it meant something beyond the constitutional position and our present agreements, was opposed to our policy and those very agreements. Others advocated a weaker association which would also have been against the basic policy that had all along been agreed to and would have involved grave difficulties.

In recent months, an unfortunate agitation sought to undermine this basic position and created not only confusion but powerful reactions, more especially in the Valley of Kashmir. That has been one of the important causes of the difficulties that the people of Kashmir and of India have had to face. Unfortunately, some persons in the State were so affected by this agitation, as to forget that community of ideals and principles which had brought Kashmir and India together. It was still more unfortunate that wrong advice was given by them to Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah who had been the acknowledged leader of the national movement in the State and the Prime Minister. Certain utterances of Shaikh Abdullah² reflected this advice and created confusion in the minds of the people of the State. Disruptive elements, who had not accepted the principles on which the democratic movement in the State had been built up took advantage of this position and attempted to disrupt the State. At a time when economic problems of grave import all over the State demanded attention and solution, the Government of the State was divided and ceased to function effectively.³

A serious situation was thus created and there was a progressive tendency towards disruption. The Government of India were naturally gravely concerned at these developments, but they did not wish to interfere, except with advice, in the internal structure and administration of the State. Advice was frequently given, but unfortunately it did not succeed in bringing about that unity which had been shaken in the course of the past few months.

2. Reversing his earlier stand, Shaikh Abdullah, in a speech to the working committee of the National Conference on 18 May, opposed the continuation of Indo-Kashmir relations on their existing basis and objected to any financial integration with India or the jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme Court over Jammu and Kashmir as provided under the Delhi Agreement.
3. Shaikh Abdullah admitted in a public speech on 31 July that "raising the economic standard of the masses or even providing the people an honest and efficient administration had become impossible" but said that "innumerable internal and external tensions created by the present conditions of uncertainty" were responsible for this and only an early solution of the Kashmir problem would put an end to the difficulties faced by the people.

Some five weeks ago, two Ministers of the Kashmir Government, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and Mirza Afzal Beg, visited Delhi and had prolonged consultations with us. We pointed out to them the necessity for resolving their differences and working as a team in furtherance of the aims and objectives of the State. We assured them that we recognized the special status of the State and the Government of India did not wish to interfere in any way in internal problems which should be decided by the Government of the State. We were anxious to help, financially and otherwise, in the development of the State, and were interested in the maintenance of the security and internal order of the State.

A few days ago, we were informed that the differences within the Kashmir Cabinet had become even more pronounced and in fact Ministers publicly spoke against and criticized each other and advocated rival policies. The majority in the Cabinet adhered to the objectives for which they had always stood. One member of the Cabinet, Mr Beg, however, progressively encouraged by Shaikh Abdullah, opposed these policies. A considerable majority of the Executive of the National Conference sided with the majority in the Cabinet and against the Prime Minister. The break was almost complete and it was impossible for the Government to carry on in this way.

When we were informed of this and our advice was sought, we urged that some way should be found for the working of the Cabinet as a team on agreed principles and policies. This was an internal matter and we did not wish to interfere. Our interest was in a peaceful and progressive Government having the support of the people. Three days ago we learnt of the demand made by Shaikh Abdullah to one of his Ministers to resign and the latter's refusal to do so.⁴ Events then moved rapidly. We were informed of them, but our advice was neither sought nor given. On the 7th August, the majority of the Cabinet presented a memorandum to Shaikh Abdullah in which they pointed out that a factional tendency had been evident in the Cabinet and that this had been responsible for a progressive deterioration in the administration, that their advice had been disregarded and that the Cabinet, as constituted, could not continue. They communicated this memorandum to the Head of the State, the Sadar-e-Riyasat.

4. In a letter to Shaikh Abdullah on 7 August, Shamlal Saraf accused him of having repudiated the declared policies of the National Conference concerning the State's relationship with the Indian Union, and said that "the manner in which you have created a dangerous situation in the country by making highly inflammable speeches before the public, combined with your authoritarian attitude in the Cabinet, have convinced me that instead of helping the difficult situation my resignation will encourage you to pursue your policies unbridled. Such a course will be suicidal for the country."

On the 8th August, the Sadar-e-Riyasat sent for Shaikh Abdullah and conveyed his deep concern at the serious differences which existed in his Cabinet. He impressed upon him the immediate necessity for restoring harmony and unity of purpose among the members of his Cabinet in the execution of his policy. Shaikh Abdullah could not give any assurance about the future and as to how he would be able to get over these differences. The Sadar-e-Riyasat thereupon suggested that an emergent meeting of the Cabinet should be held at his residence that evening so that the possibilities of securing a stable, unified and efficient Government for the State could be jointly explored. Shaikh Abdullah, however, did not agree to this. Later in the day, the Sadar-e-Riyasat wrote to Shaikh Abdullah pointing out all these facts and stating that in these conditions he had been forced to the conclusion that the present Cabinet cannot continue in office any longer and hence he had decided to dissolve the Council of Ministers. A formal order to this effect was passed and a copy of it was sent to Shaikh Abdullah. In concluding his letter to Shaikh Abdullah, the Sadar-e-Riyasat said:

I need hardly add how deeply distressed I was at having to take this action but the vital interests of the people of the State, which it is my duty to safeguard, leave me no alternative. I trust that this will in no way affect the mutual regard and cordial feelings that we have for each other.

Immediately afterwards the Sadar-e-Riyasat called upon Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad to form a new Cabinet. In doing so he stated that the continuance in office of the new Cabinet would necessarily depend upon its securing a vote of confidence from the Legislative Assembly during its coming session. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad accepted this invitation and was sworn in as Prime Minister of the State.

I received information of some of these developments at 11 p.m. on Saturday night, that is, night before last. Further information followed on Sunday morning.

Shaikh Abdullah had meanwhile gone to Gulmarg. In fact, the last order was served upon him in Gulmarg. Later he was placed under detention and so was Mr Beg. I have not received the exact papers in regard to this matter yet, but I understand that this was done in the interests of the peace of the State which was threatened in various ways.

Some time after the news of Shaikh Abdullah's arrest became known yesterday morning, small processions in protest started in some parts of Srinagar and converged towards Amira Kadal, which is a bridge. These processions became violent in some places and threw stones at the police and militia. On two occasions the police had to fire on the crowd, it is stated, in self-defence. Three rounds were fired on one occasion and four rounds on

another. The total casualties were three killed and one injured. The dead body of one person was paraded through the streets.

As it was Sunday, shops were generally closed and there was little obstruction to traffic. There were no communal incidents of any kind.

So far as is known, there has been no trouble in any of the outlying areas. By the evening the situation had improved considerably. Till last night, 35 arrests had been made.

The Indian Army personnel was not involved in any way. The situation was dealt with by the Jammu and Kashmir police and militia. One party, however, of the Central Reserve Police functioned in one place.

Shaikh Abdullah was taken to Udhampur where he is lodged in the Rest House and every comfort has been provided for him.

It is a matter of deep regret to me that Shaikh Abdullah, an old comrade of 20 years, should have come into conflict with our other comrades in Kashmir and that it should have been considered necessary by the Kashmir Government to place him in detention for the time being. I earnestly trust that this is a passing phase and that the leaders of Kashmir will cooperate together in the service of that beautiful and unfortunate land.

Last night, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, the new Prime Minister, broadcast a long speech in which he has referred to the recent developments as well as to the policies which he and his Government intend pursuing.⁵ I would commend this speech to the Members of the House.

I should like to repeat that we have considered these recent developments in Kashmir as an internal matter with which we should interfere as little as possible. On the larger issues our policy remains what it was and we shall stand by the assurances we have given.

To the Members of this House, to the Press and this country and the people generally, I would make an earnest appeal to exercise forbearance and restraint in regard to these events which have followed each other in quick succession in the Jammu and Kashmir State. We must send our full sympathy to the young Sadar-e-Riyasat, to the Government and to the people of that State who are facing this crisis, and assure them of all the help that we can give them to bring about normality and a progressive administration which will serve the cause of the people of that State.

5. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad said that Kashmir had indissoluble links with India and charged Shaikh Abdullah and some of his colleagues with working for an independent State with the "connivance and support of interested foreign powers." He further said that "an independent Kashmir under the influence of an imperialist Power will be a grave threat to the freedom and independence of the Indian and Pakistani peoples." Bakshi assured the people of Kashmir that they would continue to enjoy under the Delhi Agreement complete autonomy in economic and agrarian matters, announced a comprehensive programme of social and economic reforms, and said that a special tribunal would be set up to suppress corruption in the State.

27. To Karan Singh¹

New Delhi
August 10, 1953

My dear Yuvaraj,

I have received tonight your letter of the 9th August together with the papers which accompanied it.²

I quite realize the great strain which you must have undergone during these few days. I think you have acted with wisdom and dignity.

I made a statement³ in Parliament today which may have reached you already. I enclose a copy of it.

The recent developments in Kashmir have naturally far-reaching consequences. The new Government has to deal with the local situation. It will receive such help as we can give. We shall try to encourage tourist traffic and the sale of Kashmir handicrafts. There are many other matters that we are enquiring into so that some economic help might reach the people of Kashmir.

It is obvious that a new chapter of problems has opened out before us. It would be foolish to imagine that we are out of the wood. Reactions in Pakistan have been strong⁴ as was to be expected. I have just learnt that the Pakistan Cabinet met this morning and decided to ask their Prime Minister to ask for an immediate meeting with me to discuss the Kashmir question. I have not received a formal request to this effect yet. Probably it will reach me by tomorrow morning. We shall consider it then and decide what we should do about it. As far as I can see, we can hardly refuse such a meeting and I shall have to give him some time in the near future to come to Delhi.

1. JN Collection.

2. Forwarding to Nehru a copy of his report to the President on the recent developments in Kashmir, Karan Singh wrote, "In this whole matter I have attempted to act in a democratic and constitutional manner, keeping especially in mind what you said when we met last. On the whole I feel that we have done the best that was possible under the circumstances." Probably Karan Singh last met Nehru on 19 July. See *ante*, p. 291.

3. See the preceding item.

4. Describing Shaikh Abdullah's dismissal as "a challenge to Pakistan", *Dawn* stated on 10 August that Nehru had shown that anyone who questioned the finality of Kashmir's accession to India was a criminal. Saying that it would be foolish to be hopeful about Kashmir when Mohammad Ali went to New Delhi, it warned that Pakistan must not weaken its physical defences. *The Pakistan Times* said that "any attempt at the consolidation of India's overlordship in Kashmir must gravely prejudice the case for a free and unfettered plebiscite in the State." The Radio, especially the 'Azad Kashmir' Radio, also broadcast extremely provocative anti-India programmes aimed at exploiting religious fanaticism and inciting the people of the Valley to revolt against the new Government. Besides, several leaders spoke about the gravity of the consequences of the action taken in Kashmir.

My general line with him, if he comes here, will naturally be that this is an internal matter for Kashmir and has nothing to do with any major questions which have been discussed or might be discussed between India and Pakistan. It is true, however, that it has an intimate bearing on those questions.

I shall keep you and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad informed.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

28. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
August 10, 1953

My dear Bakshi,

We have followed the succession of events which have taken place in Kashmir and I can well imagine the strain on you and others during these days. You have undertaken a heavy burden and you have all our sympathy. I made a statement in Parliament today, copy of which I enclose.

In regard to various economic matters, tourist traffic, sale of Kashmir handicrafts, etc., we shall try to help you to the best of our ability. But it is obvious that nothing much can be done for the next few days till greater normality prevails. Meanwhile, our Railway Ministry is trying to work out some schedule of concessional rates. Apart from normal concessions, I have suggested that we might evolve a system under which for an inclusive sum a person could travel to Kashmir and spend ten days or so there and come back. This would have to be arranged with the cooperation of the Kashmir Tourist Bureau who will have to look after such visitors properly.

We might also be able to arrange to purchase on behalf of the Indian Cooperative Union in Delhi, which is run by Government, quite a quantity of Kashmir handicrafts. We want particularly to help the small shopkeepers there and not the big firms. You can discuss this matter with Vishnu Sahay.²

It is obvious that recent occurrences in Kashmir have opened out a new series of problems for us and for you. For the moment, the local situation

1. JN Collection.

2. Vishnu Sahay was appointed as Secretary for Kashmir Affairs in July 1953, the post having been revived after more than two years. He earlier held this post from February 1949 to March 1951.

may absorb your attention. You may also be thinking of steps to be taken in the economic domain to help the people. But apart from this, there is the question of international reactions.

As was to be expected, the reactions in Pakistan have been strong. Pakistan Radio announced tonight that the Pakistan Prime Minister is going to ask for an immediate meeting with me to discuss Kashmir. This is their Cabinet decision. I have not yet received any formal message to this effect, but no doubt this will come by tomorrow morning. We shall consider it in our Cabinet Committee. If he wants to come here, I can hardly refuse such a meeting. I shall let you know what message we send him.

I had a talk with Maulana Mohd Saeed Masoodi last night. He is distressed, but appears to accept the new position. He said he would be going to Kashmir in two or three days' time. As for his joining your Ministry, he felt that he could be of greater use in the organization. There is something in that. It is for you and him to decide what he should do.

Maulana Masoodi was anxious that all references to Shaikh Abdullah should be friendly and courteous. That of course is right, but the step you have taken³ puts an almost impassable barrier between him and you and others. Indeed, this is going to be a problem in many ways.

Mridula Sarabhai behaved rather wildly when she heard of these happenings in Kashmir and she cursed everybody—you, of course, but also the Government of India, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai and even Maulana Saeed Masoodi. She was angry with me also. I have not seen her since. She wanted to go to Kashmir, but we were not prepared to issue a permit to her. She went last night by train to Amritsar. What she is going to do I do not know, but she is likely to behave quite irresponsibly.⁴

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Karan Singh wrote to Nehru on 9 August that the decision to arrest Shaikh Abdullah was taken by the new Government. He said, "On my part I strongly urged them to desist from arresting him soon after the dismissal, but they were most apprehensive that with his presence in the Valley at this juncture reactions would have been greatly intensified and there was a grave danger of the situation getting completely out of hand and even resulting in violence and bloodshed."
4. Mridula Sarabhai, who was not permitted to enter Kashmir, said in a statement on 13 August that the steps taken for alleged ideological differences with Shaikh Abdullah were being justified by making serious allegations against him and this was reminiscent of the campaign started against Abdul Ghaffar Khan by the ex-ministers of the NWFP. It was wrong, she added, to describe Abdullah as a foreign agent and a communalist and that "there is something much deeper than is known to the public."

29. To Chief Ministers¹

New Delhi
10th August, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,

You must have followed the recent developments in Kashmir. This morning I made a statement in the House of the People. Last night, the new Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, spoke at some length on the radio and his speech has appeared in the Press. This speech not only gives the background of events in Kashmir, but indicates the approach of his Government to the problems of Kashmir. I cannot say how the situation will develop, but I hope that life will return to normal within the next few days.

One of the unfortunate results of the tension and confusion in Kashmir, and more especially in Srinagar, during the last two months or so was to scare away the tourists. The Valley of Kashmir depends a great deal upon the tourist traffic. This year a large number of visitors went to the Valley and, as a result, innumerable shopkeepers and others invested their savings in goods for sale. In June internal controversies produced troubled atmosphere and the tourists started to fade away till hardly any remained. The whole economic life of Srinagar was powerfully affected by this.

We could do much to help the State and its people at this stage by encouraging visitors to go to Kashmir. As a matter of fact, in some ways the latter half of August, September and October are the best months in the Valley. Our Railway Ministry is considering what steps they can take in the way of offering concessions to visitors to Kashmir and they will probably make an announcement fairly soon. We should also try to encourage the sale of Kashmir arts and crafts. I am drawing your attention to this matter which is important, and hope that you will be able to do something to help.²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. This letter has also been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.) *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol. 3 (New Delhi, 1987), pp. 354-355.
2. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad wrote to Nehru on 6 September, "I am glad that in response to your appeal two to three hundred tourists from Calcutta and Madras have made their appearance here" affording "a sense of relief to those connected with tourism".

30. Cable to Mohan Sinha Mehta¹

Your telegram 362 dated August 10th.²

I entirely agree with you and approve of what you said to Mohammad Ali.³ I am sure his rushing up here now will do no good to him or to the prospects of a solution of our problems. There is nothing to discuss so far as recent internal happenings are concerned.

As for the larger question of Kashmir, this attempt to discuss it in a hurry and in an excited atmosphere cannot possibly yield any result. In fact, it might make matters worse.

If Mohammad Ali comes here next week, will this visit take the place of next month's visit or will it be in addition to it? How long will he stay? It will be difficult for us to make proper programme in a hurry. I am definitely of opinion that it would be better for him not to rush up here now, but to wait till early September when normal visit should take place. But if he insists on coming, I cannot say no.

I have just received formal message from Mohammad Ali through his High Commissioner⁴ here. I shall send my reply⁵ to him later today through you.

1. New Delhi, 11 August 1953. File No. KS-25/53, Ministry of States. Mehta was the High Commissioner of India in Pakistan.
2. Mehta reported that Mohammad Ali had told him on 10 August that he desired to meet Nehru at once for discussing the Kashmir issue as the public opinion in Pakistan was seriously excited over the developments in Kashmir and it would be impossible for him to pacify it without some such step. He appeared concerned about possible violent demonstrations in Pakistan on her Independence Day and considered "coming back from Delhi without any substantial result" as a less dangerous alternative to "not doing anything." Mohammad Ali also said he would not discuss with Nehru the recent developments but continue his talks which began at Karachi.
3. Mehta dissuaded Mohammad Ali from visiting Delhi immediately for Nehru might not agree to a discussion in "the present context" and the visit could neither bring about any change in internal Kashmir affairs nor a quick solution of the Indo-Pakistan dispute regarding Kashmir. He told Mohammad Ali that his visit would not be in the interest of the stability of his Government and suggested to him to rather take firm measures to prevent public disorder in his own country.
4. Ghazanfar Ali Khan.
5. See the next item.

31. To Mohammad Ali¹

New Delhi
11 August 1953

My dear Prime Minister,

Your High Commissioner has given me your message² in which you suggest coming to Delhi at once to discuss the problem of Kashmir. You are always welcome here, but I confess I do not understand how a sudden and hurried visit will be helpful in considering that problem.

You refer to recent internal developments in Kashmir. I imagine that wrong reports³ may have reached you and others in Pakistan. Indeed, the report I have read in *Dawn* newspaper has astonished me, as it is full of misstatements. The Indian Army in Kashmir has had nothing to do with recent happenings there and has kept studiously apart. The whole situation has been handled by the police and the local militia. In fact there has been no major incident. Some petty affrays on Sunday led to police firing and the unfortunate death of two Muslims and one Sikh. The situation has been surprisingly calm all over the Valley and elsewhere.

For the last two or three months there had been internal differences in the Kashmir Cabinet. These were reflected in the National Conference. The situation was a simmering one throughout this period and ultimately it came to a constitutional crisis in which the majority viewpoint prevailed. We have treated this matter as an internal matter and have not sought to interfere with it. In fact, previously we were continually advising restraint. This is, of course, no concern of Pakistan at all, but I am giving you this background for you to understand these recent occurrences in Kashmir. They have nothing to do with the talks you and I have had or may have about the major problem. I had suggested your coming here on the 5th or 6th of September when I had

1. JN Collection.
2. In his message of 10 August, Mohammad Ali stated that Pakistan had been gravely disturbed by the developments in Kashmir and that it was "imperative that we should meet without any loss of time in an earnest effort to resolve the Kashmir problem." He said he was ready to proceed to Delhi at once and wanted that the meeting should not be delayed beyond 17 August.
3. The *Dawn* alleged on 10 August that "a wave of repression has already followed Abdullah's dismissal and.... Bharati troops are shooting and killing Muslims in the streets of Srinagar." Another report said that Indian troops had mowed down Muslims in Srinagar. A heading in *The Pakistan Times* read, "Indian Army opens fire on demonstrators in Srinagar; several killed." The *Pakistan Post* said on 10 August that Indian money and wire-pulling had succeeded in finding some obliging tools "to suppress with Indian bayonets the revived national spirit of the Kashmiri Muslims."

hoped that we would have full discussions for some days in regard to our various problems, including Kashmir. I did not expect a solution of these problems to emerge suddenly out of our talks then, but I did hope that we may go some distance forward towards a solution. The measure of success we might achieve then would depend very largely on our approach and the circumstances in which we meet. If we discuss the problem in an abnormal and excited atmosphere, then that discussion can hardly be expected to yield any result. In fact, further difficulties might come in our way leading to public disappointment.

The reason you suggest for our meeting very soon appears to me to point the other way. You describe the disturbed atmosphere of Pakistan, no doubt due to exaggerated reports about Kashmir. That is hardly helpful to a calm consideration of any problem. In the past, you are well aware that frequent changes have taken place in that part of Kashmir territory which is occupied by Pakistan now.⁴ That did not result in any excitement in India or in any approach by India to Pakistan. I do not understand why internal constitutional changes in Kashmir now should lead to our losing our balance and thereby making it more difficult to consider this problem. Obviously, I cannot discuss these internal changes with you. Even the Government of India does not interfere with internal matters in Kashmir and treats that State as autonomous.

What then are we to discuss if we meet suddenly? Are we to discuss the basic problem in these circumstances and in a hurried way? Surely that will not prove helpful either to us or to the public. The inevitable result will be further disappointment, because that problem should be considered by us in a calm and dispassionate way. Our meeting in abnormal circumstances can only lead to formal and rather strained talks and not the kind of friendly and cooperative consideration of problems which you and I desire. Other and unfriendly forces would exploit the situation to their advantage and create difficulties.

I am therefore clearly of opinion that it is not desirable for you to come here in a hurried manner. That would rob your visit of the grace that should attend it and would not give us time to welcome you and your wife in a fitting manner.

4. The 'Azad Kashmir' Government of Sayeed Ahmed Ali Shah, which had been formed in 1950, resigned on 1 December 1951 as a result of differences with the leaders of the 'Azad Kashmir' movement. The Government of Mir Mohammed Yusuf Shah, which was sworn in at Muzaffarabad on 5 December 1951, was replaced on 21 June 1952 by a new Government headed by Sher Ahmad Khan. A protest against the formation of the new Government was made by Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim, President of the Jammu and Kashmir Moslem Conference, who asserted that it had been formed without the party's sanction.

Would such an early visit be a preliminary to the later visit or take its place? In either event the consequences are not likely to be favourable from the point of view of attaining any satisfactory objective.

Within three days you have your Independence Day. On August 15th we celebrate our Independence Day. On August 16th I am going out of Delhi in the afternoon. I could, in an emergency, meet you on August 17th or 18th and subsequent days should you so desire it. But such an emergency meeting is likely to lead to excitement and later frustration. The proper course appears to me to be for us to meet normally in a friendly atmosphere and then to discuss our problems calmly and dispassionately. It is unfortunate that the Press should give exaggerated reports and thus add to the excitement of the public.

I have put before you, quite frankly, how I feel about this matter, because I think that it would be most unfortunate for us to take any wrong step which would come in our way in the future. I shall await your reply.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

32. Interference by Foreigners¹

I enclose a letter from Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Prime Minister of Kashmir. This letter more or less repeats what was said in his telegram² today. There is perhaps just a little more information.

I think we must take early steps in this matter. So far as the UN Observers are concerned, we shall have to ask General Atal to speak to the head of the UN Observers and, apart from giving some instances, tell him generally that we consider the behaviour of these Observers in Srinagar as improper. If we can get any special evidence about individuals, we can ask for his or her removal as a *persona non grata*.³

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, 11 August 1953. JN Collection.

2. Nehru was informed that 18 UN Observers apart from several Americans, including some from the US Embassy, had been active throughout the day on 10 August, taking photographs of demonstrations and talking to various people. Some of these foreigners were reported to be in close touch with the troublemakers and also involved in the espionage work in the State.

3. In a statement on 16 August, Major-General B.L. de Ridder, acting Chief UN Military Observer in Kashmir, categorically denied the charges of interference with the internal affairs of the Jammu and Kashmir State levelled against UN Observers by the State Government.

Regarding the Americans, you might speak generally to the US Ambassador⁴ tomorrow mentioning the names. You need not be precise on this subject.

I hope Vishnu Sahay will give us some further information tomorrow.

4. George V. Allen (1903-1970); American diplomat; Ambassador to India and Nepal, May 1953- November 1954.

33. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
August 12, 1953

My dear Mr President,

You have seen the reply² sent to the Prime Minister of Pakistan yesterday. I have just received (10 p.m.) a message from our High Commissioner in Karachi which will be sent to you separately.

You will observe that in spite of what I said to him, he is extremely anxious to come to Delhi tomorrow, 13th August. Our High Commissioner did his best to dissuade him, but he did not succeed. It will be highly inconvenient both to us and to him to come here on these dates. But I do not see how I can tell him not to come when he is so anxious to do so.

I am therefore informing our High Commissioner that if Mr Mohammad Ali is anxious to come here tomorrow, he can do so. I suppose I shall know by tomorrow morning at what time he is arriving here and also the names of the members of his party.

I have pointed out to our High Commissioner that Mr Mohammad Ali will no doubt have to attend the party at the Pakistan High Commissioner's house on the 14th evening and the party at Rashtrapati Bhavan on the 15th evening.³

I trust that this sudden programme will not inconvenience you much.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. See *ante*, pp. 322-324.
3. Mohammad Ali said in his reply to Nehru on 13 August that he proposed to arrive in New Delhi on the 16th morning. He, however, thought that a meeting around 17 August would not be "sudden" as it would be taking place three weeks after Nehru's visit to Karachi and ten days after the developments in Kashmir. He added, "Our meeting need not be hurried either, for I would be prepared to stay as long as may be necessary to ensure... positive results."

34. Return of Normalcy in Kashmir¹

I think it is desirable to send regular information to our High Commissioner in Karachi and Deputy High Commissioners in Lahore and Dacca and also to some extent to some of our other Missions. I do not quite know how to arrange for this being done daily. I get regular information from a number of sources. So does Mr Mahavir Tyagi, MDO. As a matter of fact, there is not much factual information to give, because there have been no major incidents. After the 1st day, which was referred to in my statement in Parliament, there were a number of petty incidents in the Valley apart from Srinagar, and altogether during this period, as a result of firing, nine persons have died, including one Sikh.

For the rest, there have been small processions, stone throwing, etc. Usually little boys have thrown stones. There was a hartal in Srinagar and most of the Muslim shops closed for two or three days. Maybe all the shops are not open today. Today being Friday was rather a special day, but everything passed off peacefully and shops have opened. Prayers took place as usual in the mosques.

The Secretariat, the various offices, colleges and schools are all functioning in Srinagar. Certain reforms that the new Prime Minister has announced have had a good reception. On the whole it appears that things are calming down. Reports in the Pakistan newspapers are hopelessly false. It is quite clear that the Indian Army personnel was not utilized in any way during this period. Of course, the mere presence of the Indian Army in the neighbourhood no doubt had a stunning effect, but it did not come into the picture otherwise. Some mistakes, however, might be made, because the Kashmir Militia were in uniform which is very similar to that of our Army. I think we supplied it from our surplus stocks. We have some Reserve Police there which was sent from India some time ago to Jammu. This Police was utilized to some extent.

Our information is that even the UN Observers, after rushing about a lot, came to the conclusion that the Pakistan stories were completely wrong, that our Army was not used at all and that the casualties were very small, and generally that things were calming down. This fact, however, should not be mentioned.

Shaikh Abdullah is kept in a Government Guest House at Udhampur. I believe that one of his relatives and one or two others have been sent to keep him company, and is otherwise well looked after.

The general situation report today was definitely good and to a

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 14 August 1953. JN Collection.

considerable extent normality had come back. It must be remembered that the events of the last few days have come with terrific suddenness on the people and it takes a little time to get over the shock.

You may send a brief message giving the above facts to Karachi, etc.²

You may add that so far as Delhi or India is concerned, everything is completely calm and there is no excitement whatever. The Prime Minister of Pakistan will be coming here day after tomorrow and a suitable welcome for him is being organized with a number of major social functions.

2. On 14 August, Nehru cabled to V.K. Krishna Menon that the situation in Kashmir had calmed down, and added, "Newspaper reports in Pakistan are full of amazing falsehoods resulting in mass hysteria encouraged by leaders, chiefly rivals of Mohammad Ali, who wish to weaken his position."

35. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
August 15, 1953

My dear Bakshi,

I have not written to you or spoken to you on the telephone during the past critical days. I have, of course, been getting full information from various sources about happenings in Kashmir. All these developments were inevitable and yet they have been very painful, and I have felt some strain during these days. Your strain, of course, was much greater.

When events moved in this way to this crisis, it was clear that whatever steps might be taken, we were entering into an entirely new phase. Not to take any steps was to court disaster. To take them, was also to invite a break with all its difficult and unknown consequences. I am sorry for the manner in which much has happened. I do not like things done in the dark and in the middle of the night.² I have insisted right from the beginning that constitutional

1. JN Collection.

2. An aide-de-camp of the Sadar-i-Riyasat was deputed late in the evening of 8 August to deliver the letter of dismissal to Shaikh Abdullah. Delayed by torrential rains, the ADC along with a police contingent reached Gulmarg, 51 kms from Srinagar, late at night when Abdullah and his wife were "fast asleep". Karan Singh recorded in his autobiography, "With some difficulty and much knocking he was awoken and handed the letter as well as a warrant of arrest.... He was given two hours to say his *namaz* and pack.... In the early hours of the 9th morning they were.... driven out of the Valley to the Tara Niwas guest house in Udhampur." Around the same time Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was sworn in in Srinagar as the new Prime Minister of the State.

procedure should be followed. Technically this was done. I confess that it left a bad taste in my mouth. However, it is difficult to judge from here and you and others on the spot acted according to your judgement of the situation.

That is over, but that itself has led to numerous problems and events now will move at a faster pace. Previously, one could say that a certain portion of the people of the Valley were pro-Pakistani, another part pro-India and the bulk probably neutral and not caring very much except for their immediate needs and difficulties. Shaikh Sahib's position and his popular appeal were strong. The sudden removal of Shaikh Sahib, and the manner this was done, obviously must have given a shock to many people. His adherents as well as many others who looked up to him will naturally swing away towards Pakistan. Thus the immediate effect must be to increase the pro-Pakistani element in the Valley and in some other places considerably. Whether this will be affected later by better Government and relief to the people³ is a matter to be seen. A certain considerable section in Srinagar is not likely to be affected by any such measure. But the peasantry and others in the rural areas might perhaps be so affected. The situation may be controlled and a certain acceptance of the present Government may grow. But many will feel sullen and frustrated and are not likely to get out of that mood easily.

It is clear that finally the people will decide. An earlier stage will be that of the Constituent Assembly when it meets. It is likely, I suppose, that the Constituent Assembly will support your Government, though I have no doubt that a strong minority will oppose it. Thus you will have two parties in the Assembly and a strong Opposition. But the fact remains that ultimately the majority of the people will some time or other have their way. That is right, and any other attempt at a solution is bound to fail.

A question arises, quite an important one, as to how long you can keep Shaikh Abdullah in detention. It is patent that we cannot and should not keep him indefinitely in detention. The question does not arise immediately. But a couple of months later on or so, you will have to consider it,⁴ perhaps after the Constituent Assembly has come to a decision. I take it that the Assembly will meet early in October.

3. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad announced on 10 August that compulsory procurement would be limited to paddy, the procurement price of which was to be raised; small peasants, however, would be completely exempted. A reduction in the selling price of paddy in Srinagar was also announced. The Government would set aside Rs 1,500,000 to provide credit through agencies for the benefit of the peasantry, artisans, and small shopkeepers, and a further Rs 500,000 for the supply of seeds and fertilizers at concessional rates. All teachers would be guaranteed a minimum salary and education would be free for poor students. Some measures were also contemplated to strengthen the administrative machinery.
4. Shaikh Abdullah was initially detained for two months. On 5 October, his period of detention was extended by another two months.

Mohammad Ali is coming here tomorrow. I shall not discuss recent events with him in Srinagar, but I should like to give him my viewpoint even about those and to express myself strongly about the hysterical and highly objectionable reactions in Pakistan to what has happened in Kashmir. In the main, however, we shall have to discuss the future.

What is that future going to be? We are committed to the plebiscite. If so, the questions to be considered are:

- (1) The conditions which should precede the plebiscite,
- (2) the manner of the plebiscite and the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator, etc., and
- (3) the timing of the plebiscite.

We need not, of course, come to any final decisions at this stage. But something has to be said about these various matters. We have discussed the conditions and chiefly the question of armed forces for two or three years. We shall no doubt discuss them again. But I think other matters are beginning to take precedence.

Should the plebiscite be for the entire State or part of it? I am quite clear that it should be for the entire State including the 'Azad' areas, etc. But it should be rather on a regional basis. That is, we have voting in all over the State and that voting guides us about the wishes of the people in various areas. It is then for the Governments concerned to decide how to give effect to the desires of the people. It is obvious that some parts of the State will plump for India; other parts for Pakistan. It is no good any longer to talk of the whole State going this way or that way. If the whole State was pushed to one side or the other, that would result in an impossible situation in some parts of it and considerable migrations. That has to be avoided. Therefore, inevitably one has to keep partition in view, though we need not talk about it directly. If it is a question of partition, then the views of the people naturally have a great say but not a final say about every area. Such a partition will mean the fixation of an international boundary, and, for this purpose, all kinds of other considerations will have to be borne in mind. We cannot have a boundary which has no geographical features or which is in the middle of a hill-side. It must be a clear and defensible boundary for both parties. This is a ticklish matter, but it has to be borne in mind. There cannot be islands of territory here and there.

Perhaps, instead of a plebiscite, one might have a new election for a Constituent Assembly all over the State. I am not clear about this, but the idea came into my head as worth considering. This Assembly could then tackle the question of partition or something like it.

In any event, I rule out the idea of independence. At any time this was not practicable; now it is not possible and it can only create all kinds of difficulties and conflicts.

I am merely putting some ideas before you so that I can have your reaction to them.

Then comes the question of a Plebiscite Administrator. If we think in terms of a plebiscite, we shall have to accept such an Administrator. I am clear in my mind that we should not have such an Administrator from the USA or any big country. He should come from the smaller and more neutral countries of Europe or from some Asian country. Most of his principal lieutenants should also come from these countries.

When can a plebiscite be held? It is impossible to say now, because all kinds of things will have to be done previously, including the preparation of the electoral roll and that will take time. This question can really only be decided after the Plebiscite Administrator has started functioning and has made some investigation and presented a report and recommendations. At the earliest I suppose it will have to be some time next summer. It may be later.

These are vague and general ideas which will have to be given more definite approach soon, although an element of uncertainty will naturally remain.

Meanwhile, of course, you will go ahead with stabilizing your Government and taking effective measures to give relief to the people. We shall help you in so far as we can. Above all, the basic fact is to create an impression among the people that an honest administration is functioning which carries on its work with integrity without corruption and nepotism. That is the basic thing. There has been too much talk of corruption and nepotism in the past. Kashmir has a bad name for this.

Is it not desirable for you to start some cases against persons who are known to be guilty of corruption. Also it is worth considering whether you should have, apart from any cases, an enquiry into major charges of corruption and nepotism. I think something of this kind should be done.

I have met Maulana Masoodi on two or three occasions. He seems to be somewhat reluctant to go back to Srinagar in the near future. He advances plausible arguments, and I have respect for his intellect. But he seems to be rather timid and a little afraid of acting in accordance with his own logical convictions. You have been speaking to him on the telephone.

We are trying our best to help you in various ways and all our Ministries are prepared to do their utmost in this respect.

The point I wish you to remember is that we have entered a dynamic phase which cannot be treated in a static way. We cannot wait all the time for events to happen or for nothing to happen. Things will happen, and it is best not only to be prepared for them but to give the lead.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

36. Conversations with Mohammad Ali¹

I had a two-hour talk with Mr Mohammad Ali this afternoon. I began by saying that I was greatly distressed at the hysteria exhibited by the Press and others in Pakistan during the last few days over the Kashmir occurrences. I could understand a certain excitement, even some resentment, but what had actually taken place had amazed me and distressed me. Prominent people including Ministers and Governors had completely lost control of themselves and expressed themselves in a way which seemed to me deplorable. There was talk of *jihad*, etc. Khan Abdul Qayum Khan was present at yesterday's meeting in Karachi where very strong speeches were made.² Mr Firoze Khan Noon had also come out with wholly unbalanced statements.³ Chaudhuri Khaliq-uz-Zaman had talked about swords and horses of Islam being on the move.⁴

2. I said that I had known Khaliq-uz-Zaman and Shuaib Qureshi⁵ for many years well and I had unfortunately come to the conclusion that they were wholly unbalanced and lived in some distant past. They had not got out of the late twenties.

3. With this background of hate and denouncement, it was not particularly easy to create the atmosphere for a friendly settlement which we all desired.

1. New Delhi, 17 August 1953. JN Collection.

2. Slogans demanding *jihad* and "Kashmir at all costs" were raised at a mass public meeting in Karachi on 16 August. The meeting, which was also attended by Abdul Qayum Khan, the Pakistan Minister for Food and Industries, passed a resolution calling upon the people of Pakistan to "join their Kashmiri brethren in their righteous cause and fight for freedom."

3. Noon, Chief Minister of West Punjab, said in a public meeting in Lahore on 16 August, "The peace-loving Indian dove.. has again taken to bayonets in mowing down an innocent and peace-loving people." He argued that the Partition of India had taken place after acceptance by the Congress of the two-nation theory, yet the Indian Government "went back on that international understanding between the two countries" by forcibly sending troops into "a predominantly Muslim country—Kashmir."

4. In a speech at Dhaka on 14 August, Khaliq-uz-Zaman, Governor of East Bengal, exhorted the people to "keep their swords shining and horses ready" to meet any future calamity. In a radio broadcast on 16 August, he said that the objective of carving out an independent country in order to serve Islam had bestirred the Muslims in undivided India and claimed that Pakistan had become "the light house in the ocean of Muslim world affairs defying...the canons of secularism, tribalism and provincialism."

5. Shuaib Qureshi, the Minister for Kashmir Affairs in Pakistan, in a speech at Rawalpindi on 11 August, assured all possible assistance to the people of Kashmir to ensure an unfettered expression of their will in the matter of the State's accession.

4. I referred to recent events in Kashmir and said that I felt unhappy about many things that had happened. Shaikh Abdullah was an old colleague, and to have to take action against him by detaining him hurt me. The situation in Kashmir had been simmering for some months past. I had gone there before I went to England and found that internal conflict had reached a high pitch. This was resulting in instability, friction and the Government could hardly function. I had asked Shaikh Abdullah and others then to work together, and, at any rate, not to take any step which might create trouble till I came back from England and we could confer again together. When I came back, I wrote to him immediately asking him to come here,⁶ but he did not agree to do so. Meanwhile, the situation there became worse and worse and it became impossible for the Government to function as it was. The Executive of the National Conference was also split up, a great majority not agreeing with Shaikh Abdullah's views.

5. Ultimately, I advised them that, if they could not pull on together in Government, they should declare their policy clearly and those who agreed with the majority view should carry on the Government. If Shaikh Abdullah had to leave Government because he represented a minority view, that could not be helped. Constitutional procedure should be adopted.

6. Some days later, events followed each other in quick succession and resulted in quick succession and resulted in Shaikh Sahib's arrest. I regretted this, but it was difficult for me to stop the course of events as the responsibility lay with the people in Kashmir. There were disturbances later and these had to be dealt with by the Government there. Otherwise, there would have been chaos and no Government could function in that way.

7. In Srinagar and the Valley, there were obviously two sets of people, one pro-India and the other pro-Pakistan. Most people, of course, were hardly political and only cared for their economic betterment. Then there were many people who looked up to Shaikh Abdullah particularly, and, as a consequence of his arrest, they naturally began to side with the anti-India elements, accusing India for what had happened. It was obvious that nobody wishing well to India could have deliberately liked these developments. But circumstances and events could not be governed and one step led to another.

8. I referred to the false and wholly exaggerated stories in the Pakistan Press about Indian Army and massacres of Muslims. Actually, so far as I knew, about 15 or one or two more persons had been killed by Police or Militia fire. This was regrettable, but, when riotous behaviour and violence was indulged in by a crowd, the Police had to take some action.

6. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, pp. 193-199.

9. Mohammad Ali said he greatly regretted the hysterical attitude of the Press and some people in Pakistan. He had tried to check it but there were some people who were difficult to control. He referred specially to a Kashmiri woman by the name of Bhat⁷ who did a lot of mischief in this respect. He referred to Shuaib Qureshi also and said that he had himself come to the conclusion that he was not helpful at all and was very rigid and limited in his outlook.

10. I referred to the wonderful welcome that Mohammad Ali had received in Delhi. It was obvious that this was not a got-up affair but was spontaneous and all classes of people joined in it. This was because of their desire for friendship with Pakistan and because they thought that Mohammad Ali was working for this.

11. I then came to the problem of Kashmir and said that I was convinced that we must deal with this firmly and arrive at a settlement. How was this to be done? The easy way would be for us to come to some settlement by ourselves and thus end the dispute. I had once or twice mentioned this to Liaquat Ali Khan some years ago, but my proposal was not accepted. Although this was an easy way, I thought that this was no longer open to us. Any such *ad hoc* settlement would anger people both in India and Pakistan. The only way left was to cast the responsibility for the settlement on the people of Kashmir themselves. We, therefore, came back to the plebiscite. Let us work therefore for a plebiscite. We had talked about this for a long time and had got stuck over certain preliminary question, namely, the quantum of forces on either side. This question was not only one of numbers but of principle also, because we had claimed that there should be no Pakistan forces of any kind in 'Azad Kashmir.' Normally speaking, after these preliminaries had been decided, the decisions would have to be implemented. When that had been done, the UN Representative was supposed to declare that the work had been carried out and suitable conditions prevailed. At that stage, the Plebiscite Administrator came into the picture and he would take all necessary steps for the plebiscite.

12. All this was a prolonged affair and it could not be rushed. Even the preliminary steps might well take some months, perhaps six months or so. Then would come the Plebiscite Administrator, who would make a survey

7. Presumably the reference is to Begum Wilayat Butt, President, All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. In a letter to the editor of *The Pakistan Times*, published on 12 August, she said that psychological weakness exhibited by Mohammad Ali in his talks with Nehru on the Kashmir issue had led Indians to believe that the people of Pakistan were dying for a settlement and therefore they could be forced to any terms of India's choice. Saying that she had "no faith left in the future parleys by our leaders", she appealed to Pakistanis and Kashmiris to unite and work together to liberate Kashmir.

and present a report as to what should be done. Actual preparations for the plebiscite would take a considerable time. No plebiscite could be held in Kashmir during the four or five winter months.

13. We had talked of a plebiscite for the whole State. Dixon suggested another way.⁸ That was a much more logical approach, but, in the way he had suggested it, it was objectionable. We were not prepared to consider this question on the basis of Muslim areas and Hindu areas. But it was clear that the whole State could not be considered as a unit which should go this way or that way. There were some parts of the State which could not be absorbed by either India or Pakistan. Therefore, inevitably we had to come to the conclusion that some kind of a division of the State had to be made.

14. But this should only be done after a plebiscite of the entire State. The plebiscite should not automatically decide the question but should give the necessary data for this decision, and this decision would be largely governed by the result of the plebiscite. There were, however, other important questions. A division of the State would involve the fixation of an international boundary. This boundary should be related to geographical factors. It should avoid islands of territory and should be on the whole a clear physical line, which, as far as possible, gave effect to the wishes of the inhabitants. It would not be able to do so wholly, for that might produce an artificial and difficult frontier line. Therefore, after the result of the plebiscite was known, the two Governments should consider the question afresh and finally decide where the frontier should be. In this matter, we might have to consult others, including our Military Advisers on both sides. If we proceeded in the old way and tried to deal with the preliminary conditions for a plebiscite, we might be hung up again now. Besides, that was rather a technical question and military advice was needed. Could we postpone this question and say that, after a certain period, say six or seven months, the Plebiscite Administrator should be nominated? Before that we should undertake to settle the other preliminaries. After the Plebiscite Administrator comes in, he would take charge of the arrangements with our cooperation.

15. The Plebiscite Administrator would be appointed formally by the Kashmir Government. That had been agreed to previously, but, of course, it would have to be with the approval of India and Pakistan. I was quite clear that the Plebiscite Administrator should not come from any of the major powers. This would create difficulties and rivalries among the great powers because of the strategic position of Kashmir. Therefore, the Plebiscite Administrator should be chosen from the small and more or less neutral countries in Europe or Asia.

8. In 1950, Owen Dixon, the UN mediator, had sought to arrange zonal plebiscites.

16. As regards the conditions preliminary to the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator, there was the question of civil authorities in 'Azad Kashmir' and the question of refugees returning or not. The refugee question was an exceedingly difficult one, and I did not see how we could tackle it at all. Properly done, it would mean the examination of each claim and then possibly questions of rehabilitation and the like. This might take ages and yet prove unsatisfactory because proof would be lacking and all kinds of persons would claim to be refugees. Therefore, the only feasible way of proceeding was to leave out the refugees and have the plebiscite with the present population of the State as a whole.

17. This argument led to the following conclusions:

- (1) A decision that a plebiscite must be taken and the result of the plebiscite should be the major factor in coming to further decisions about the future of the State.
- (2) The Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed by a certain date, say, six months or so from now. He should come from the small and neutral countries of Europe or Asia and the staff should also be largely recruited from such countries.
- (3) During this interval of six months or so, not only must the Plebiscite Administrator be chosen by consent, but the other pending questions about forces, etc., in Kashmir and civil administration and local authorities of 'Azad Kashmir', should be settled between India and Pakistan in consultation with the Government of Kashmir.
- (4) The Plebiscite Administrator, after his induction, should take charge of that work and make his plans with our cooperation. The UN would be formally associated with his work. The date, etc., for the plebiscite would depend on his judgment and the progress of his work. That work is likely to take at least a year if not more.
- (5) The question of the refugees returning should be left out, as this was wholly impracticable, and, in any event, would delay matters tremendously.
- (6) It should be kept in mind that the final decision about the State was likely to be one of division. Where exactly the line of division might be drawn would depend primarily on the result of the plebiscite, but there were other important factors also to be considered in drawing up that international frontier line. It will be for the two Governments to consider the results of the plebiscite as well as all these factors, in coming to a decision about a practical and feasible frontier.
- (7) All these decisions should be governed by our desire to upset things as little as possible, that is, our decision should not lead to migrations and the like as far as possible.

18. Mohammad Ali generally agreed with what I said, though I cannot say that he committed himself to everything fully. He agreed about the Plebiscite Administrator not coming from the great powers. On the whole, he thought that refugees should be left out so as to save time. He also said that our decisions will have to take other matters into consideration such as I had mentioned.

19. Our interview ended then. We meet again tomorrow afternoon.

Additional Note

I might add that I discussed briefly with Mohammad Ali the question of an independent Kashmir. I told him how this had gradually arisen in Shaikh Abdullah's mind and taken shape. At first he vaguely talked of the whole State being more or less independent. Lately, having come to realize that some parts of the State would not agree to this, for instance Jammu, he had developed the thesis of a so-called independent Kashmir State for the Valley and some surrounding areas only, that is, what are considered the Kashmiri language speaking areas. This would be a very small State, neither politically nor economically viable. Apart from this, it would be an arena of conflict between India and Pakistan and possibly other countries also. Either of these countries would try to gain more influence there and in fact to make it a sphere of influence for itself and later enlarging its contacts with it. There would thus be no normality and in fact this independent Kashmir, far from bringing peace between India and Pakistan, would be a source of discord.

Mr Mohammad Ali agreed with this wholly.

37. Points for Consideration¹

It is agreed that the future of the Jammu and Kashmir State should be

1. New Delhi, 17 August 1953, JN Collection. It appears that Nehru prepared this note before his meeting with Mohammad Ali, possibly as a draft of a joint statement to be issued at the conclusion of the talks.

determined after the wishes of the people of that State have been ascertained. The most feasible way of doing this is by a plebiscite, conducted fairly and impartially.

2. Although the idea of a plebiscite was accepted long ago, little or no progress had been made because no agreement could be arrived at on certain necessary steps to be taken prior to the plebiscite. In particular, discussions about the quantum of forces to be kept in the State led to a deadlock which has continued for the last two years or more.

3. While it is necessary to resolve this deadlock in regard to preliminary matters, it is desirable to make a somewhat different approach, so that the present deadlock on these issues should not come in the way of future progress towards a plebiscite.

4. In the event of these preliminary steps having been agreed upon and effect being given them, the next step would be the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator, who would then review the situation in the State and present a report laying down his method of procedure and the steps to be taken in order to prepare for the plebiscite. These steps would inevitably be comprehensive and complicated. They would include preparation of electoral rolls for the whole State as well as all kinds of other arrangements.

5. It is desirable that a date should be fixed, provisionally at least, for the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator and his induction to office. This date should be so fixed as to allow an adequate period for a settlement of the preliminary issues between India and Pakistan and the Kashmir Government and for giving effect to the decisions taken. The earliest feasible date for this purpose appears to be April 1954. That will give fairly enough time for all these preliminary steps to be taken. In any event, an earlier date would be climatically unsuitable because the winter comes in between and the Plebiscite Administrator will be unable to function at all before some time in April.

6. The Plebiscite Administrator should be selected from some small and neutral country in Asia or Europe. It is desirable to avoid a choice being made from one of the great powers because that would lead to rivalries with other great powers and other complications. The choice would be made by India and Pakistan in consultation with the Kashmir Government. The UN would accept him, though the formal appointment would be made by the Kashmir Government as had been previously agreed upon.

7. The Plebiscite Administrator would then take charge of his office and, after his survey, take such steps as may be considered necessary. He would receive our cooperation in this work.

8. Meanwhile, that is, before the choice of the Plebiscite Administrator is made, India and Pakistan and the Kashmir Government would settle the

preliminary issues. One of these issues relates to refugees. It appears to be completely impracticable to get refugees back to Kashmir for this purpose. If this was done properly, elaborate enquiries would have to be made in regard to each person so as to avoid wrong persons from coming in. Adequate data would be lacking and questions of rehabilitation would arise. All kinds of upsets would thus take place and the whole procedure would be indefinitely prolonged and might ultimately even so not produce any satisfactory result. Therefore, the only feasible procedure appears to be not to take the refugees into consideration for this purpose and to limit the plebiscite to persons resident in the State.

9. After the plebiscite is over, India and Pakistan would then proceed to decide the question of the future of the State finally. The Government of Kashmir would naturally be consulted. In taking this decision, the result of the plebiscite would naturally play a dominating part. But other important considerations would also have to be borne in mind. The most important of these is to create as little upset as possible, which might lead to large scale migrations from some part or other of the State territory.

10. It is likely that different regions of the State might vote differently. To compel a region to be attached to a country against its manifest will, would be improper and could only lead to continuing difficulties. Therefore, it must be borne in mind that as a result of the plebiscite there might be a partition of the State, so that the wishes of the people might be given effect to in the largest measure. Such partition, however, cannot be automatic. The partition will lead to a new border which will be an international frontier. That international frontier has to be carefully decided upon to avoid artificial border lines and to fit in with geographical conditions and a proper and easily demarcated defensible line in so far as this is possible. Pockets of territories will also have to be avoided.

11. The Governments concerned will, therefore, take all these matters into consideration, including principally, the result of the plebiscite, to determine finally what the frontier line should be.

12. It is only possible to go through these complicated procedures if there is peace and order in Kashmir and a cooperative approach on the part of India and Pakistan. It will not be possible to make any progress if the atmosphere is vitiated by attacks, denunciations and threats of war.

13. Therefore, it is essential that all attacks on each other and the kind of denunciations and threats of war that have been going on in the Pakistan Press, in public statements and even, to some extent, in the Pakistan Radio, should stop. Unless this is done, there will be no peaceful atmosphere and no satisfactory, fair and impartial plebiscite can be held unless these conditions prevail.

38. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
August 18, 1953

My dear Bakshi,

Vishnu Sahay came back last night. I have had a long talk with him and I have also conferred with Maulana Azad, Dr Katju, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai and Ajit Prasad Jain.² Indeed, we have an informal Kashmir Committee which meets daily. This consists of the persons named above and Mahavir Tyagi.

Vishnu Sahay gave me your message and further gave me such other information as he had in regard to the situation in Kashmir and your needs. At my request, he saw the Finance Minister who has generally agreed to help you in the manner desired.

All of us here realize the tremendous burden that you are carrying and the difficulties you have to face. I need not assure you that we are anxious to help you in every way open to us and to lessen your burdens wherever possible. I am repeating this obvious statement lest you might be led to think otherwise by some odd fact.

The situation that you and we have to face is indeed a difficult one. Nobody ever thought that it would be easy, but certain new factors have made it even more difficult than we might have expected. We have now, with the experience gained, to think fully of our policy and line of action, keeping not only the immediate present in view but also the probabilities of tomorrow and the day after. After making some kind of appraisal of these future possible developments, we should mould our policy from now onwards accordingly. Naturally, nobody can speak with certainty about the future and we shall have to keep wide awake at every step. It is a little difficult to discuss all these matters in a letter. I would like you very much to come here so that we could have a full heart to heart talk but I know that is not possible and you have to remain in Srinagar. Therefore, we are doing the next best thing. I am asking Ajit Prasad Jain to go to Kashmir immediately so that he can discuss all these matters with you fully and tell you how our mind is working. He will tell you also something about the talks I have been having with Mohammad Ali. Those talks are by no means over, and I am likely to meet him again tomorrow and the day after. But the general lines of those talks

1. JN Collection.

2. Union Rehabilitation Minister.

have more or less taken shape and Ajit Prasad Jain will tell you about them. Between him and Vishnu Sahay, you should be in possession of both developments here and how we view them. In this matter, my colleagues and I here are generally in agreement.

I shall not write much to you, therefore, in this letter because Ajit Prasad Jain will tell you all I might have written and much more. I should like you to give full thought to what he says on our behalf and to discuss it with him.

The situation in Kashmir and as between India and Pakistan has become a very dynamic and indeed an explosive one. It cannot be treated in a static way. We have to consider the various forces at work and, understanding them, try to fashion our policy so as to get the best advantage out of it. In particular, we have to look a little ahead and think of the future. Only then can we function satisfactorily in the present. Every course that we may adopt is beset with difficulties and risks. We cannot avoid them. We have to choose the lesser evil and we have to choose a path which not only promises the greatest advantage but is dignified and in keeping with our general policy.

As you know, Pakistan has behaved very wildly and hysterically during the last week or more. In fact there has been some reality in talks of war. A break of diplomatic relations was definitely talked about. It was odd that just at this time Mohammad Ali should have come here and that the people of Delhi should have given him an astonishingly warm welcome.³ No one that I can remember has ever had such a tremendous welcome from Delhi, apart from Gandhiji. Obviously, this welcome was not particularly to an individual. It was due to a desire for peace and a settlement of various issues and it was due to a recognition that Mohammad Ali was honestly aiming at peace and settlement. The contrast between the wild outpouring of *jehad*, etc., in Pakistan and this wonderful welcome was extraordinary and significant.

This welcome has undoubtedly helped in creating a better atmosphere and it is not only right but also wise on our part to take advantage of this atmosphere. That will affect the Kashmir situation also to a great extent and ease many tensions. We have to think of our problems not only in the narrow

3. Mohammad Ali and his wife, on their arrival at Delhi airport on the 16th evening, were greeted by a large crowd with enthusiastic shouts of "Mohammad Ali Zindabad" (Long live Mohammad Ali) and "Pakistan Zindabad" (Long live Pakistan) and showered with garlands and flowers. At a civic reception accorded to him at the Red Fort on 19 August, Mohammad Ali was cheered lustily and repeatedly by a crowd of over 10,000 people who had gathered there defying heavy rain. Mohammad Ali said on the occasion that the "capital of Republican India" had given him a "right royal reception" and acknowledged that never before had he received such a memorable welcome.

governmental way, which of course we must, but also from the broader psychological point of view. We have to deal with masses of human beings and ultimately it is these masses who make a difference in a critical situation. We have to deal with foreigners whose weight can be cast for us or against us at a particular moment, and that also makes a difference.

You have a number of good ideas for the reform of the Kashmir administration for relieving the burdens on the poor. The sooner you give effect to them the better and we shall help you in that. But you will only succeed in doing that in the measure that tension is lessened. Otherwise, the atmosphere for constructive work will be absent and your energies will be absorbed by day to day difficulties. A lessening of tension between India and Pakistan will inevitably lessen tension internally in Kashmir and give you that chance of working which you must have.

Keeping all this in view, we have thought that we should take some slightly positive step in our talks with Mohammad Ali in regard to Kashmir. I think that this step should be our agreement to select a Plebiscite Administrator by some provisional date, say, the end of April next. That means about eight months from now. Meanwhile, we should agree to try our best to settle some of the preliminary problems that have confronted us with the UN. I do not want the UN to come into the picture at this stage, or, as far as possible, even at later stages. Also I want to make it clear that such a Plebiscite Administrator should come from a small and neutral country of Asia or Europe, not the big powers like America or England. After such a Plebiscite Administrator is selected and appointed (he would necessarily have to be appointed formally by the Kashmir Government), he will have his work cut out. It will be a difficult job which will take at the very minimum a year and probably nearly two years. That means that, before a possible plebiscite takes place, about two years from now will elapse or possibly more.

It is true that the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator will somewhat create a disturbance in peoples' minds. On the other hand, not to say that we will take such a step next year will itself create a further disturbance and conditions will remain abnormal and difficult. In the balance, therefore, it seems to us desirable that we should accept this position and take this step and thus lessen tension all round and then work to the best of our ability. That is the general line of our thinking; Ajit Prasad will develop this further.

It is important that whatever agreements we should arrive at with Mohammad Ali here should have your and your Government's full approval, publicly given. That will strengthen you and help you greatly. Any other line would obviously be harmful and would encourage your opponents.

Maulana Masoodi saw me today and said that he wanted to go to Kashmir for a few days. He asked if he should do so. I told him that, of course, he

could do so. He was greatly disturbed at various developments in Kashmir⁴ and he was particularly anxious to have a talk with you. He will be going tomorrow morning by air but will get off at Jammu and go by jeep from there.

You will of course discuss matters with him fully. He represents a considerable section of people and a line of thought which is fairly widespread. His cooperation with you will obviously be helpful. To what extent this is possible, it is for you to judge.

I told him that you were carrying a heavy burden and it was our duty to help you in this crisis. He said he agreed entirely, but he wanted to put to you his own appraisal of the situation and how it should be dealt with.

Maulana Masoodi asked me if I thought it would be right for him to seek an interview with Shaikh Abdullah. I said that it was difficult for me to give a definite reply. I could not, of course, suggest that he should not interview him, but it was to be considered what the proper time for this should be. That could be best judged by you and him.

I wrote to you about Shaikh Abdullah previously.⁵ The question of his release does not arise at present, but I cannot conceive of his being kept in detention indefinitely. I realize the difficulties either way. The point is that we should fashion our policy now in such a way that it might not come in our way later.

Mohammad Ali will be leaving Delhi on the 20th night, that is, just before the Id.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Addressing a meeting of the Congress Parliamentary Party on 10 August, Masoodi said that the developments in Kashmir were an internal matter of the State to be tackled by the State itself and that they could not be dealt with in a light manner. In a statement on 16 August, Masoodi said that the cause of Kashmir and India would not be served by "indulging in a mud-throwing at Shaikh Abdullah" and that "the only way to find a really fair and lasting solution of the Kashmir problem is to ascertain the wishes of the people of the State.... and it is their feelings and their interests that should be kept in mind if their sympathies are not to be alienated."
5. See *ante*, p. 328.

39. Conversations with Mohammad Ali¹

At this afternoon's meeting with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, he produced a new draft which was very different, in important particulars, from the one that I had given him.² Evidently, Mr Zafrullah Khan³ was chiefly responsible for this. This draft went much further in many ways from what I had drafted. I pointed out that this would involve a *de novo* consideration of many matters.

2. After much discussion, I accepted some changes in my draft which I did not consider vital to our argument. The others I would not agree to.

3. In the course of our talks, we telephoned to Mr Zafrullah Khan and had a talk with him about some matters. Later, Aziz Ahmed⁴ came and saw his Prime Minister separately.

4. Thus, the talks this afternoon were rather difficult. Ultimately we agreed to a statement, copy of which I attach. This is to be released in the Press tomorrow morning, August 21, and not earlier.

5. Apart from some minor changes made, the two or three principal changes were as follows:

- (1) It has been added that the Prime Ministers should appoint committees of military and other experts to advise them in regard to preliminary issues. (This is in the middle of paragraph 3.)
- (2) At the end of paragraph 3, the following words have been added: "and take such other steps as may be considered necessary therefor."
- (3) Great stress was laid on the omission of the reference to the Plebiscite Administrator being selected from the smaller nations. The principle was agreed to fully, but Mr Mohammad Ali and Mr Zafrullah Khan said that it would be very embarrassing for them to put this down in the communique without their referring to their colleagues in the Cabinet. They are prepared to let me have their formal agreement to that a few days later. They wanted to show this courtesy to their Cabinet. We argued this at some length. Ultimately, I agreed to take

1. New Delhi, 20 August 1953. JN Collection.

2. Draft for a joint statement. See *ante*, pp. 336-338.

3. Foreign Minister of Pakistan.

4. (1906-1982); civil servant and diplomat; Cabinet Secretary, Government of Pakistan, 1952-56, and Secretary-General, 1956-59; Ambassador to USA, 1959-63; Foreign Secretary, 1963-66; Chairman, Press Trust of Pakistan, 1967-70; Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1971-73; Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence, 1973-77; Foreign Minister, March-July 1977.

out the phrase about the selection of the Plebiscite Administrator from the small nations, and, earlier in paragraph 3 where it was said that "the Plebiscite Administrator should be selected and appointed by the end of April, 1954", "selected and" have been omitted from the statement. It is clearly understood, however, that the Plebiscite Administrator will be selected from the smaller nations and this can be formally stated after a little while.

- (4) Efforts were made to change the date for the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator from the end of April to the end of February. I would not agree to this. Then an attempt was made to add "at the latest by the end of April". I did not think this necessary.
- (5) In the first paragraph Kashmir has been mentioned.
- (6) One or two other minor changes have been made.
- (7) Paragraphs 4 and 5 relating to Evacuee Property and Cooch-Behar enclaves, etc., were redrafted by Mr Zafrullah Khan. I accepted the redraft.
- (8) It was suggested that we might add that the Prime Ministers should meet soon again. I did not think this necessary.

40. Joint Statement¹

The Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India held several meetings on August 17, 18, 19 and 20 in New Delhi. These talks were in continuation of the talks they had had in Karachi three weeks earlier. Kashmir and other problems outstanding between the two countries were discussed fully and frankly. Both the Prime Ministers were actuated by a firm resolve to settle these problems as early as possible, peacefully and cooperatively to the mutual advantage of both countries.

2. The Kashmir dispute was especially discussed at some length. It was their firm opinion that this should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State, with a view to promoting their well-being and causing the least disturbance to the life of the people of the State. The most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by fair and impartial

most feasible
and impartial

the least disturbance to the life of the people of the State. The most
method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by fair and

plebiscite. Such a plebiscite had been proposed and agreed to some years ago. Progress, however, could not be made because of lack of agreement in regard to certain preliminary issues. The Prime Ministers agree that these preliminary issues should be considered by them directly in order to arrive at agreements in regard to them. These agreements would have to be given effect to and the next step would be the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator.

3. In order to fix some kind of a provisional time-table, it was decided that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed by the end of April, 1954. Previous to that date, the preliminary issues referred to above should be decided and action in implementation thereof should be taken. With this purpose in view, committees of military and other experts should be appointed to advise the Prime Ministers. On the Plebiscite Administrator's formal appointment and induction into office by the Jammu and Kashmir Government, he will examine the situation and report upon it. He will then make such proposals as he thinks proper for preparations to be made for the holding of a fair and impartial plebiscite in the entire State, and take such other steps as may be considered necessary therefor.

4. The Prime Ministers considered the evacuee property issue and were glad to find that as a result of discussions between the representatives of the two Governments at Karachi, considerable progress had been made. Certain data were now being collected to enable final decisions to be taken. It was hoped that a meeting of the representatives of the two Governments would be held within a month for a further consideration of these problems.

5. At their meeting in Karachi the Prime Ministers had agreed that the Cooch-Bihar enclaves in East Bengal should be exchanged with East Bengal enclaves in Cooch-Bihar.² It was accordingly decided that a conference should be held in Calcutta as soon as possible to work out the necessary details. The conference should also consider travel and trade facilities and other issues, especially relating to East Pakistan, West Bengal and Assam. This conference should be attended by the representatives of East Pakistan, West Bengal and Assam and the two Central Governments.

6. The Prime Ministers are happy to record this large measure of agreement on vital matters affecting their two countries and they trust and believe that further success will attend their efforts so that all the problems which have unfortunately come in the way of good relations between the two countries should be solved satisfactorily. But progress can only be made in this direction if there is an atmosphere of peace and cooperation between the two countries. This has, therefore, to be actively encouraged. The Prime Ministers deprecate

2. See *post*, p. 427.

any propaganda or attacks on one country by the other in the Press, by Radio, or by speeches and statements made by responsible men and women of either country. They trust, therefore, that all organs and responsible leaders of public opinion will direct themselves to this great task of promoting goodwill between the two countries and thus help in solving all problems and disputes that might exist between them. The Prime Ministers attach the greatest importance to this friendly approach and to the avoidance of words and actions which promote discord between the two countries.

7. The Prime Ministers intend to keep in close touch with each other so as to expedite progress in the directions indicated above.

41. To Karan Singh¹

New Delhi
August 21, 1953

My dear Yuvaraj,

Thank you for your letter of August 19th.²

D.P. Dhar has been here and has discussed these matters with us fully. He has gone back and will, no doubt, explain the position to you and to Bakshi and others.

We are all fully aware of the great burden that Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad is carrying and we are anxious to help him. But it is no help to him if we do something which turns out to his great disadvantage. While it is perfectly true that Bakshi and others in Srinagar are in a better position to judge of the situation there, there is always the danger of a limited and rather narrow viewpoint being taken and of other major facts being ignored. It is this balanced picture that is necessary; otherwise we shall get into hopeless trouble later.

The immediate objective is some toning down and a quieter atmosphere.

1. JN Collection.

2. Karan Singh wrote that Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was "stunned" to learn about the intended fixing of a date for the induction of the plebiscite administrator as this represented a complete reversal of his stand, and had expressed his inability to carry on the Government. Karan Singh believed that as soon as a date was announced, a "frenzied and communal propaganda" would be unleashed upon the people of Kashmir, jeopardizing the law and order situation. Hoping that Nehru would stand by Bakshi at this critical juncture, he strongly urged him to defer the decision.

Recent events in Kashmir have had a very powerful reaction in other countries.³ This is against us completely. I am not referring to Pakistan which has grown madly hysterical. If this hysteria continued, it would inevitably produce reactions in Kashmir among the pro-Pakistani elements and their sympathisers. The result would be no period of quiet at all and constant trouble.

But for some kind of an agreement between us and Pakistan, the matter would inevitably have been raised in the UN immediately and they might well have sent down their representative to Kashmir. All this again would have kept the agitation alive and made it grow.

The matter is much too serious to be looked upon from a local or a merely law and order point of view. It is all these considerations that made us agree to the statement that has been issued. I think that, in the circumstances, this is a good statement and helps us in trying to get a quieter atmosphere.⁴

I hope Bakshi will come here as soon as he can do so.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. For example, the *Daily Telegraph* said on 11 August that the developments in Kashmir had undone all the good which might have been done by the Karachi talks; the *New York Times* stated on 14 August that no equitable solution of the Kashmir problem was possible without a free plebiscite; on 15 August the *Daily Mirror* described Nehru's attitude as "that of an imperialistic conqueror not subject to the UN"; the pro-Government *Bakhtar-e-Imrooz* (Iran) of 13 August questioned the justification of Shaikh Abdullah's imprisonment; the British edited *Egyptian Gazette* (Cairo) commented on 16 August, "Nehru is proclaimed as a champion of democracy, but... he has a special brand reserved for Kashmir... labelled 'incorporation in India' " and suggested that an early and properly supervised plebiscite should form the basis of conversation between Nehru and Mohammad Ali.
4. Bakshi sent his resignation on the 20th evening after learning about the joint communique. Karan Singh wrote in his autobiography that when Nehru was informed of this "he lost his temper and spoke angrily of this 'ridiculous nonsense'. I handed the phone to Ajit Prasad who listened for a while until Jawaharlal banged down the phone." Karan Singh and A.P. Jain eventually persuaded Bakshi not to press his resignation. Bakshi said in a statement on 21 August that the communique was finalized "with our concurrence and has our unqualified support."

42. To N.C. Chatterjee¹

New Delhi
August 21, 1953

Dear Mr Chatterjee,

I have your letter of the 21st August.²

The reference to the "entire State" in the statement issued about my talks with the Pakistan Prime Minister, was deliberate. That does not mean, however, that in the result the State will be taken as a unit. In fact, as things are, that might well be wholly undesirable. This is well understood. Consideration of this matter in detail can only come much later when the actual details of the plebiscite are taken into consideration. But our friends were strongly of opinion that we should not go into this matter at this stage, as this would give rise to all kinds of difficulties and intrigues. It was, therefore, at the request of our friends that we did not indicate anything further at this stage, though, as I have said, it was well understood.

In this matter, the Pakistan Premier was prepared to refer to this in the statement.

The point is that the plebiscite should take place everywhere, but, previous to that, the manner of its implementation will no doubt be decided upon.

I am sending you this information, but I would request you to keep this to yourself as otherwise it may encourage wrong elements.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Chatterjee thought that the holding of a plebiscite for the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir, as proposed in the agreement between Nehru and Mohammad Ali, might "imperil the fate of not only the Valley but also of Jammu and Ladakh", and wanted to know whether the plebiscite would be an overall plebiscite or it would be held on zonal basis.

43. To G.S. Bajpai¹

New Delhi
August 24, 1953

My dear Girja,²

Thank you for your letter of the 22nd August.³

Ever since the change-over in Kashmir and the events that followed it, I have undergone a good deal of strain. Work does not matter, but some things hurt one and this Kashmir affair has pained me a good deal.⁴ For the last three months, I have seen this coming, creeping up as some kind of inevitable disaster. I did not, of course, know the exact shape it would take. To the last moment, I was not clear what exactly would happen.

Our joint communique, to which you refer, is certainly, I think, a satisfactory document from our point of view. I must say that Mohammad Ali is a much better person to deal with than any I have encountered thus far from Pakistan. He is really desirous of friendship and cooperation.

On the third day of our talks, I gave him a draft communique. He agreed with it except for a statement in it that the Plebiscite Administrator should be chosen from some small nation. Even with this he agreed in principle but he did not want me to put it down as he thought that this might offend the US and he had not consulted his Cabinet. The next day he came with an entirely new draft, which no doubt had been prepared by Zafrullah. I expressed my surprise and said that we could hardly start talking *de novo* about everything. He and I both had talks with Zafrullah on the telephone. Aziz Ahmed also rushed up to my house to whisper something to Mohammad Ali. Ultimately I agreed to a number of relatively unimportant changes.

The reception that Delhi gave Mohammad Ali was really quite remarkable. Mohammad Ali was greatly impressed but, what is more significant, even the

1. JN Collection.

2. Governor of Bombay and former Secretary-General, MEA.

3. Bajpai congratulated Nehru for the joint communique, calling it "a remarkable feat of firmness, patience and skill" on the part of Nehru. "So far as I can see, we have given nothing away and India's position has been fully maintained."

4. Bajpai had written to Nehru on 11 August that the change-over in Kashmir "must be, to you, a sad if not tragic dénouement." He doubted whether Shaikh Abdullah would "see the error of his ways and return to the old path", and thought that apart from "power...warping his mind, some persons in his immediate entourage and, of course, Afzal Beg, must bear the responsibility for leading him astray."

hard-boiled persons who accompanied him, such as Bokhari,⁵ Aziz Ahmed and others were quite bowled over. Bokhari went on saying that all this was quite incredible.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Z.A. Bokhari, Director-General of Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan.

44. Statements by Mohammad Saeed Masoodi¹

I had two long talks with Maulana Mohammad Saeed Masoodi today about his recent visit to Kashmir. I expressed my great surprise at the intemperate statements he had made there and his comparing what had happened there to several Jallianwala Baghs.² He had remained in Srinagar about two days or less and, during that period, he had no doubt seen a number of people who had repeated these allegations to him. He had conducted no enquiry of any kind or even taken the trouble to find out from the Government's side what their version of the facts was. This appeared to me to be very irresponsible behaviour.

Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was present during our interviews and he denied absolutely many of the statements made by Maulana Masoodi. He said that he was perfectly prepared to have any enquiry about any incident.

I informed Maulana Masoodi that apart from the Kashmir Government's accounts, we had been receiving accounts from our own Intelligence and Army men there. These accounts varied slightly from Government accounts, but in the main they supported them. There were also a number of Press correspondents in Srinagar, many foreigners and quite a number of foreign observers. It was quite inconceivable to me that all these people would remain silent and try to suppress news of the type of holocaust that Maulana Masoodi

1. Note to B.N. Mullick, Director, Intelligence Bureau, 24 August 1953. JN Collection.
2. Hundreds of people were done to death and thousands seriously wounded on 13 April 1919 in an indiscriminate shooting ordered by General Dyer at a peaceful meeting at Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar.

spoke about. He seemed to imagine that hundreds of people have been killed on several occasions separately.

I asked him to give me the names of places where he thought this kind of thing had happened so that I could make particular enquiry about them by our own men. He mentioned the following places:

1. Pattan
2. Hunza (*ilaqa* Birwa)
3. Magam
4. Sopore
5. Hindwara
6. Traal
7. Kulgaun
8. Qazigund
9. Doru Shahabad
10. Anantnag
11. Hazratbal
12. Haran (Badgaun)

I should like you to ask your special representatives to send us as full reports as they can about the incidents that occurred in the above places. They should indicate how far they rely on information other than Government information. Perhaps Shri Mehra³ might be asked to do this.

I should also like to know what their estimate of total deaths is from firing since the change-over in Kashmir.

3. D.W. Mehra, who was Deputy Director, Intelligence Bureau, at Amritsar and in charge of Kashmir affairs, was temporarily sent to Kashmir towards the end of July 1953 with authority to assume control of the Jammu and Kashmir Police in an emergent situation. He assisted the State Government during the time of Shaikh Abdullah's deposition.

45. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
August 25, 1953

My dear Bakshi,

I am glad you came here and we had a full talk. I should have liked to meet you after your last talk with Maulana Masoodi and Sadiq to find out

1. JN Collection.

the result of your talk. Perhaps you can indicate that to me in a brief letter.

I want to know how matters stand with Maulana Masoodi. I must confess that his shifting attitude has distressed me greatly and I have little faith left in him. Some other information has reached me which also makes me doubt his bona fides.

You have various schemes, economic and other, to help the people. That is good, but I am quite certain that the first thing is an efficient and honest administration. It is by that that your Government will succeed or fail. Unfortunately, the reputation of the last administration was exceedingly bad. I hope you and your colleagues will pay special attention to this.

Also, I was told that the Secretariat in Srinagar functioned most inefficiently. Officers hardly went to their offices and clerks lounged about. This must be remedied strictly by punctuality and efficient working. All this will create a greater impression on the public than mere speeches.

I am very anxious that you should look after yourself properly or rather be looked after. In a report from Srinagar, I read that someone had said in the course of his speech that there were toadies in every *mohalla* and they should be killed. The man who said this no doubt was pro-Pakistan. In any event, you should be adequately looked after.

As I told you, your Chief Secretary, M.K. Kidwai,² can come here just as soon as you like and we shall try to find some place for him at the Centre. To begin with he had better take some leave. I hope you will find a first-rate Chief Secretary to replace him. I am not an admirer of your IGP. It is for you to decide what to do about it. But, in any event, some efficient man should look after the police. Can you utilize the services of Mehra as an adviser for some time in this respect?

I should like to have as full information as possible about the activities of the UN Observers and other foreigners in Srinagar. This might enable us to carry on negotiations at this end.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. He was Chief Secretary, Jammu and Kashmir Government, at the time of the deposition of Shaikh Abdullah.

46. To Mohan Sinha Mehta¹

New Delhi
August 28, 1953

My dear Mohan Sinha,

... This afternoon I had a visit from Ghazanfar Ali and he handed me a letter from his Prime Minister.² I enclose a copy of this letter.

I am sending an immediate reply³ to Mohammad Ali which I enclose, together with a copy for you. You will notice that this is by way of being a preliminary reply. I shall follow it up by another reply⁴ a little further.

I need not say much to you here because all that I wanted to say has been said in Mohammad Ali's letter. I want to lay the greatest stress on behaviour of the Pakistan Press, backed no doubt by some officials or members of his Government.⁵ I think Mohammad Ali should realize that this kind of thing is going to obstruct completely any progress that we might make.

So far as this question of Admiral Nimitz is concerned, there was complete agreement not only between him and me, but even with Zafrullah, that we should choose someone else in the circumstances. So far as we are concerned, it is quite impossible for us to accept any American as a Plebiscite Administrator. American political behaviour has been progressively becoming worse and worse in almost every matter in world affairs. In the recent UN debate over India's inclusion in the political conference, the US went all out to bring every kind of pressure to coerce countries to vote against India.⁶

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. In his letter of 27 August, Mohammad Ali conveyed the reactions of his Government to two proposals discussed during his talks with Nehru in Delhi. namely, the manner of holding a plebiscite and the appointment of a plebiscite administrator from one of the smaller countries.

3. See the next item.

4. See *post*, pp. 361-368.

5. Several newspapers in Karachi came out on 27 August with accusations against Nehru for having started a "campaign" of misinterpreting his talks with Mohammad Ali. Quoting "responsible political circles in Karachi", the *Dawn* wrote that there had been "absolutely no agreement" about replacing Admiral Nimitz with another person, yet Nehru, in more than one interview, had expressed himself against a plebiscite administrator belonging to any but a small nation; the Pakistan Cabinet had given full consideration to this matter and shortly "the ball will be in Pandit Nehru's court". It added that negotiations could go ahead if Nehru did not prove intransigent.

6. Pakistan, Taiwan, Greece and 17 Latin American countries voted with the US in opposing a resolution in the Political Committee on 27 August nominating India to the Korean political conference. As the resolution, which got 27 votes in favour and 21 against with 11 abstentions, lacked the prospect of securing the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, India withdrew her nomination the next day.

Some countries who had openly stated that they would vote for us had to back out. Not only that, but American Ambassadors brought this pressure on countries in their respective capitals. It really has been an extraordinary experience to see how a great power behaves.⁷

I have no doubt that American agents have been the cause of some mischief both in Kashmir and Nepal.⁸ I have little doubt that it is American help that has brought about the last change in Iran.⁹

With all this background, I am not prepared for an instant to accept an American nominee whoever he might be.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. John Foster Dulles said on 2 September that the exclusion of India from the conference was the "price" India paid for not fighting with the other countries of the UN in Korea.
8. See *post*, p. 467.
9. The Government of Mohammed Mossadeq was overthrown by a royalist revolt on 19 August and a new Government was formed by Fazulla Zahedi. On 5 September, it was announced that the US President had granted the new Government of Iran 45 million dollars in emergency economic aid.

47. To Mohammad Ali¹

New Delhi
August 28, 1953

My dear Prime Minister,

Your High Commissioner handed to me this afternoon your letter of the 27th August. This letter deals with some matters we had already discussed as well as with some new matters. I hope to send you a reply² in regard to these at an early date.

2. But I must tell you that I am deeply concerned at certain other developments. Indeed, I thought of writing to you yesterday, but the news, which had appeared in the public Press, that you were sending a letter to me, led me to wait for it.

3. You will remember the penultimate paragraph in the joint statement³ we issued after our talks in Delhi. In this paragraph we made an earnest

1. JN Collection.
2. See *post*, pp. 361-368.
3. See *ante*, pp. 344-346.

appeal to the Press, the Radio and to responsible men and women in both countries to help in creating a friendly and cooperative atmosphere, and to avoid saying or doing anything which would disturb such an atmosphere. We said, and we meant it, that we attached the greatest importance to this. Indeed, unless we make this approach and are supported by our colleagues and others who influence public opinion, it is manifest that our progress will be obstructed at every step. Some evil fate has pursued us in this Kashmir matter and our repeated attempts, on both sides, for a settlement have been checked and vitiated by the activities of people who apparently lack all goodwill and prefer conflict and trouble.

4. Our meeting in London⁴ and our subsequent meeting in Karachi had led me to hope that we would take a turn for the better and deal with this intricate and difficult problem in a spirit of goodwill. Subsequent to our meeting in Karachi, certain events happened in Kashmir, which led to a violent outburst in Pakistan against India. As I wrote to you then and mentioned to you when you came here, I could understand a feeling of resentment and irritation in Pakistan, but I was completely taken aback by the violence and intemperateness of language that was used not only in the public Press in Pakistan but by responsible Ministers, Governors and the like there. There were cries for *jehad* and war.

5. It was in this context that we met in Delhi. I am sure that you will agree with me that you found no trace of this intemperateness in language in Delhi. The contrast was rather remarkable. While the newspapers in Pakistan and public men were continually talking in strong language about war and *jehad* against India, just at that very time, you and your party were given the most cordial of welcomes here. That must have demonstrated to you the basic goodwill which existed in India for you and for Pakistan and the strong desire for a settlement and friendly relations. That goodwill could not be manufactured. It survived even the intemperate attacks in Pakistan. To me, that was a matter of the greatest satisfaction. It showed that our people, by and large, took a sane and long-distance view of our problems and were not swept away by momentary passion at some untoward developments.

6. We hoped that, as a result of our talks and the appeal that we issued, there would be a definite calming down of the excitement in Pakistan. It was in that hope that we parted. For the first time almost, I felt that we had got out of the vicious circle which had caught us during these past years. We had not solved the problem, but it was a great thing to look at it aright and with hope and to take some definite steps in the direction of its solution. That was no small matter, considering the past background of fear and suspicion and interminable and fruitless debate.

4. In June 1953.

7. After you went away, I was a little distressed to find that there was no great change in the Press of Pakistan and, more particularly, in what is called the 'Azad' Radio, which continued to pour out its venom from day to day.⁵ Nevertheless, I hoped that things would improve. To my great surprise yesterday, I found that a number of newspapers in Karachi had suddenly come out with big headlines accusing India, and more especially me, of flouting Delhi decisions. There was reference to Bharat's campaign and Karachi being perturbed and at Nehru's outburst on Nimitz. I need not refer any further to these newspapers, as you must have seen them yourself. More particularly, the *Dawn* and the *Times of Karachi* of the 27th August had these big headlines and comments. Probably other papers dealt with this matter in the same way, but I have not seen them yet.

8. This sudden outburst in the Karachi Press, following an identical line, could only have taken place under some kind of official inspiration. I cannot imagine this identical approach suggesting itself independently to a number of newspapers on the same day.

9. What was the cause for all this? I could not remember anything that I had said or done. Indeed I had not said a word in public, and very few words even in private, since our talks and the statement we issued. How then was "India flouting Delhi decisions"? What was "Nehru's outburst on Nimitz", which was resented? What was "Bharat's campaign" which had perturbed Karachi? I was deeply intrigued by all this, because I could not lay my hands on anything. Then, I remembered that, while you were here, two days before you left Delhi, I had a brief talk with the correspondents of the *Dawn* and the Associated Press of Pakistan. When I fixed this interview, I was not clearly aware as to who they were and did not know that they were Press correspondents. I merely thought that they were members of your party who desired to see me, and I made an effort to find some time in spite of a busy morning. When I met them, I realized that they were newspapermen. We had a brief private talk, which I did not consider an interview for publication. In the course of this talk, I was asked, I think, about Admiral Nimitz and I replied rather casually that I had almost forgotten his appointment long ago. I added that in view of the world situation, it was better to avoid the great

5. 'Azad Kashmir' Radio had started a drama serial in which characters portraying Hindu deities were made to prove through ludicrous arguments as to which country Kashmir should belong to. Another feature called "Zarab-i-Kalim" described Indians as perfidious people and cheats, who wanted to grab Kashmir at all costs. Nehru was described as an adept at befooling others, and Mohammad Ali was asked, "Whom are you going to dance with like a monkey?" The Radio also made much of the South Korean President, Syngman Rhee's opposition to India's appointment as a member of the Korean political conference.

powers which were so entangled with each other. That was all that I said and I had no idea that it would be published. I found that something to that effect did appear in the *Dawn*.⁶

10. That is the only reference I have made and that was before our statement was published or even agreed to. How then have I or has India flouted in any way the Delhi decisions or carried on any kind of agitation about Nimitz or anyone else?

11. You will appreciate my distress at all this. That distress would have been there even if some individual paper had indulged in this story which has no foundation. But it was all the greater because it seemed to me obvious that this had official backing and inspiration. Can we pursue any policy of conciliation in this context and with these continuous attacks and insinuations, which have no foundation whatever? Are we to be caught again in the vicious circle which has been our fate during the past few years? This is important because unless we have faith in each other's bona fides, it is difficult to make any progress.

12. A great deal has been said in these Pakistan newspapers about Admiral Nimitz. I spoke to you about this matter, and you will remember that both of us spoke to Chaudhuri Zafrullah Khan also. I gathered the clearest impression that both of you agreed with my viewpoint but did not like the idea of any mention being made of this in the statement. Indeed, you said that it would be a discourtesy to your Cabinet colleagues for any reference to be made of this without their knowledge and consultation. I appreciated your point of view and gladly agreed to leave that sentence out of our statement. You had told me that probably within a few days, you would be in a position to send me your approval of this after consulting your Cabinet colleagues.

13. Imagine, therefore, my surprise at this sudden and organized attack, after a few days, in the Pakistan Press. I need not go into the merits of this question, as I explained myself fairly clearly to you during our talks. Much has happened during the last four or five years, and the international situation has changed and developed. All kinds of new conflicts have arisen, in all of which the great powers are involved. Even while I was talking to you, the Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly was carrying on a heated debate, in which the United States, and Britain and most of the Commonwealth countries, apart from others, were ranged on opposite sides.⁷ I spoke to you and Chaudhuri Zafrullah Khan about this UN debate also and pointed out some of the wider consequences of it. It so happened that India's

6. The brief conversation between Nehru and the two correspondents from Pakistan took place on 19 August and its report appeared in the *Dawn* of 21 August.

7. The resolution nominating India to the Korean political conference was jointly sponsored by the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, while the US opposed it.

name had been dragged in, although India was not at all eager to find a place in the Korean political conference. The question before the UN Committee was, however, a much wider one and India happened to be just a symbol for the moment. I had hoped that Pakistan would side with the Commonwealth and Asian countries in this matter. To my regret, it did not do so. But that is entirely for your Government to decide and I have no right to complain. I can only regret a decision which rather comes in the way of peace in the Far East and impairs somewhat the cooperation of the Arab-Asian countries as well as that of the Commonwealth.

14. But this debate in the United Nations, and the deeper conflicts that it brought out, itself makes it evident that the great powers are too entangled in their difficulties and often pull against each other. Hence it has become the normal practice to avoid having representatives of these powers in any matter requiring some kind of a neutral and impartial approach. That is no reflection on any power, much less on an eminent person like Admiral Nimitz. It is merely an appreciation of the facts of present-day politics.

15. I have taken an early opportunity to write to you on this subject because I have been gravely perturbed. It would serve little purpose for us to come to some settlements in our talks and then to have these upset not only in fact but, what is more important, in the psychological background which is so vital.⁸

I shall write to you further in answer to your letter.⁹

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. In a note to V.R. Bhatt, Deputy Principal Information Officer, Nehru stated on 28 August that apart from what he had stated in a private conversation with two correspondents from Pakistan and which appeared in the *Dawn* of 21 August, "I have not said a word on the subject. Some indication might be given to the Press here to this effect." Referring to the campaign in the Pakistan Press against India and himself, Nehru said, "I would recommend no elaborate notice in our Press of this campaign and, as far as possible, no criticism of it. That is the best way to deal with it."
9. Mohammad Ali admitted to M.S. Mehta on 30 August that the attitude of the Pakistan Press had been mischievous and "it was a much more serious problem for him than for us", as reported by Mehta to Nehru. Mohammad Ali also wished if Nehru could delay the reply in regard to matters dealt with in his letter of 27 August as some passage of time would calm down the passions in Pakistan and thus be a help to him. Nehru wrote again to Mohammad Ali on 3 September. See *post*, pp. 361-368.

48. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
September 1, 1953

My dear Bakshi,

I had a visit from Maulana Mohammad Saeed Masoodi today. I had not seen him since you were here. He said that he wanted to bring three matters to my notice.

The first was about his seeing Shaikh Abdullah. He said that he felt that every effort should be made to find some way out of the present tangle and it was worthwhile seeing Shaikh Abdullah and finding out from him how far he still adhered to his old opinions or how far he was prepared to change them. He wanted to go there in his capacity as General Secretary of the National Conference.² Merely to allow matters to drift would not help in solving them.

Secondly, he said that the arrest of Sofi,³ the MP, on his return to Kashmir had distressed him. Sofi was a quiet man here and obviously he had done nothing in Kashmir because he was arrested on arrival. If he was not wanted in Kashmir, he might be allowed to return to Delhi.

Thirdly, he said that he was distressed at attempts to cast aspersions on Shaikh Abdullah in the Press. A day or two ago a note appeared to the effect that proceedings would be taken against Shaikh Abdullah for corruption or misuse of public funds and the like. This kind of thing would only make matters worse and was totally unnecessary and undesirable.

I told Maulana Masoodi that much had happened in the past few months in Kashmir which had distressed me greatly. We had been driven gradually into taking steps which were painful. Having taken the step with all its consequences, it seemed to me wrong not to hold by it. Any other course would mean confusion and chaos. Therefore we had to support the present Bakshi Government in Kashmir on whom a very heavy responsibility rested and who were facing a very difficult situation. It was for Bakshi and his Government to decide as to what should be done because they would have to shoulder the consequences of any act. I did not interfere in the old days with internal happenings in Kashmir and I did not propose to do so now. Of course,

1. JN Collection.

2. Masoodi said in a Press statement on 27 August that during his visit to Srinagar, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad had given him permission to have an interview with Shaikh Abdullah and "find a solution of the impasse," but on his arrival at Udhampur, where Abdullah was detained, he was informed that the permission had been cancelled.

3. Sofi Mohammad Akbar, an active member of the National Conference since 1939, was at this time a Member of the House of the People. He was placed in preventive detention on 24 August.

occasionally I could make suggestions, but I could take no step which would put an end to the authority and responsibility of the Bakshi Government because I could not shoulder that responsibility afterwards. Therefore, in all matters relating to internal happenings in Kashmir, Bakshi should be consulted and his advice taken.

About Sofi's arrest, I said that I knew nothing about it till I read of it in the newspapers. That again was the responsibility of the Kashmir Government and they have to judge of the circumstances.

About aspersions on Shaikh Saheb in the public Press, I said that I did not approve of personal aspersions at any time and I did not think they would do any good. I did not know who was responsible for the particular news item.

I added further that before Maulana Masoodi went to Kashmir I had explained our general position to him and had advised him to help the Bakshi Government and to consult Bakshi before he took any step. In fact, however, Masoodi said and did much which encouraged Bakshi's opponents and embarrassed the Government there. He did not even see Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad till some time after when part of the mischief had been done. I was surprised and distressed at this.

Maulana Masoodi explained how his actions had been misunderstood. He arrived in Srinagar late at night and naturally went to his place of residence where he was surrounded by large numbers of people. He had to tell them to come the next morning. Again the next morning thousands came and he could not get out of the difficulty except by promising to speak in the afternoon. He then went to see Bakshi Saheb, etc., etc.

I repeated that the burden and the responsibility lay on Bakshi Saheb for carrying on the administration there and we had no wish to interfere with internal affairs. In the circumstances, we had to support Bakshi Saheb's Government. It was for Maulana Masoodi to consult and take Bakshi's advice about any matter. I could not issue any directions from here. I could understand that some time or other Shaikh Abdullah should be interviewed. Nobody wanted to keep him indefinitely in detention. But we must be clear as to what we were aiming at and it would be folly to take a step which could only lead to a worsening of the situation and confusion. The General Council of the Conference would be meeting soon and later the Constituent Assembly and they would no doubt decide on general policy. Anyhow, Maulana Masoodi should refer any matter to Bakshi Saheb.

This is an account of the fifteen minutes' conversation that I had with Maulana Masoodi and I am passing this on to you for your information.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

49. To Mohammad Ali¹

New Delhi
September 3, 1953

My dear Prime Minister,

I received your letter of the 27th August on August 28. That same day I sent you a reply.² This reply did not deal with some of the matters you have discussed in your letter. I was anxious, however, to point out to you my concern and distress at certain developments which had taken place in Pakistan since we met in Delhi and issued our joint statement.³ The structure of friendly approach and confidence which you and I have sought to build up with much labour was being undermined. The atmosphere of goodwill, that is so essential for any real progress towards a settlement, was being vitiated by Press attacks and public statements in Pakistan. In our joint statement, we had laid the greatest stress on the necessity of everyone, both in India and Pakistan, striving to produce this atmosphere of a friendly approach and to avoid by word or deed anything that might vitiate it and thus come in the way of a satisfactory settlement. That was the basic approach, and yet this very thing that we considered so essential and to which we attached the greatest importance was suddenly repudiated and denied. If the foundation goes, how will the super-structure survive?

2. I wrote to you immediately because my mind was full of this difficulty and I wanted you to appreciate how we were feeling. I did not follow up that first reply of mine immediately partly because I have been heavily occupied. But the real reason was that I was trying to come to grips with something which eluded me. The more I read your letter, the more I felt that it bore little relation to our talks or to the statement we had issued. It was something independent of them and something which raised some issues discussed and disposed of long ago. Instead, therefore, of our going ahead, as I thought we had done when we met, we seem to be going backwards.

3. It is easy for me to write to you at length, quoting chapter and page, about previous discussions on these issues, but it will serve little purpose to get entangled in these controversies which yielded little fruit in the past. It was because of this that I wondered how I was to deal with these issues that you had raised in your letter and which bore so little relation to what we had talked. Even more than this, I wondered how in this atmosphere of threat and denunciation in Pakistan, we could ever come to a friendly settlement.

1. JN Collection.

2. See *ante*, pp. 354-358.

3. See *ante*, pp. 344-346.

4. You refer in your letter to the past atmosphere of suspicion, mistrust and mutual recrimination, and add that "happily that atmosphere no longer exists". "It is essential", you say, "to approach the problem with a fresh outlook born of present feelings of trust, cordiality and friendship between India and Pakistan".⁴ That was my hope, but, I would ask you, is this atmosphere and are those feelings of trust, cordiality, friendliness evident in the Press or in the public statements of Pakistan today? How then are we to get over this basic and initial difficulty?

5. A tremendous deal of fuss has been made about Admiral Nimitz being made the Plebiscite Administrator. I have already written to you about this matter. I thought you agreed completely with me at the time.⁵ Since Admiral Nimitz was appointed, with our consent, four and a half years have passed, and, quite apart from Kashmir, the world situation has developed greatly. A war has been fought with disastrous consequences in Korea. There is, fortunately, an armistice in Korea now, but, only recently, we saw an unedifying sight in the Political Committee of the United Nations. We saw conflicts between the great powers, even among those who were closely allied to one another. Those conflicts were a reflection of deeper and vaster conflicts which imperil the peace of the world and trouble mankind.

6. We in India have taken up a clear and definite attitude in regard to world affairs. We have consistently refused to entangle ourselves in these conflicts or to align our country with one power bloc or another. For any great nation, however much we might respect it, to be brought into the Kashmir picture, would be to make Kashmir a part of this world conflict arousing rivalries between great powers. That would lead to further entanglement and difficulty. That might well confuse the issues still further. If Kashmir becomes also an arena of conflict between the great powers, then not only India and Pakistan, but also the people of Kashmir play a secondary part.

7. It was for this major reason, and not from any ill-will for the United States or for Admiral Nimitz, that we suggested the salutary rule that the

4. Mohammad Ali wrote that the existing international agreement on an overall plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir was "a compromise hammered out of conflicting claims in an atmosphere of suspicion, mistrust and mutual recrimination." He claimed that a better atmosphere was now prevailing, and said, "The people of the State in its various parts should also share in this trust and friendliness."

5. Mohammad Ali wrote that Admiral Nimitz had been appointed with the agreement of the Governments of India and Pakistan. His impartiality was beyond question and he would not be acting on behalf of any particular country. Moreover, he was eminently suitable for the job and finding a replacement matching his qualifications would not be an easy matter. Mohammad Ali, however, suggested that the two Prime Ministers might give further thought to Nehru's proposal in regard to the nomination of a Plebiscite Administrator.

Plebiscite Administrator should be chosen from some small and more or less neutral country of Asia or Europe. There are many such countries and there should be no difficulty in finding an eminent and impartial person from among them. I feel sure that, in these circumstances, the Government of the United States, as well as Admiral Nimitz himself, would have appreciated our viewpoint. Indeed, I thought that the appointment of Admiral Nimitz was practically terminated long ago and the matter had anyhow to be approached afresh in the new circumstances of today. This could have been done quite easily without affront to anyone; but the surprising agitation in Pakistan over this issue has made it a major one and needlessly created difficulties.⁶ For us, it is not merely a question of Kashmir, but of our major world policy to which we have adhered to the best of our ability, during these troubled years. For us to agree now to what you have suggested in your letter is, to some extent, to deviate from that world policy of non-alignment. You and your colleagues will, I hope, appreciate my argument and realize that it is impossible for us to take any step which endangers that larger policy, apart from bringing about other consequences which we consider undesirable.

8. As I write this letter, I am informed that Admiral Nimitz has formally submitted his resignation to the Secretary General of the UN.⁷ The question of his continuing does not, therefore, arise. But I have, nevertheless, dealt with this matter fully so as to explain our position to you.

9. In your letter of August 27, you state that I put forward two proposals, one dealing with regional plebiscite and the other with the nomination of a Plebiscite Administrator. I have dealt with the second point above. As for the other, I did not put forward any proposal that "we should now agree upon a regional plebiscite."⁸ What I said in this connection was different.

10. I laid great stress on our finding a solution which would cause the least disturbance to the life of the people of the State. We have mentioned this in our joint statement. In discussing this matter with you informally, I pointed out that we must avoid anything that results in unfortunate migrations

6. Observers in Karachi, according to a report published in the *Pakistan Times* of 28 August, felt that "Nehru's statement that he would not have an American Administrator was an affront to the US and Pakistan will not acquiesce in it."

7. It was announced on 4 September that Admiral Nimitz had resigned from the post of Plebiscite Administrator for "personal reasons."

8. Mohammad Ali wrote that during their discussions in Delhi, Nehru had proposed that "instead of the agreed solution of a free and impartial plebiscite to determine whether the entire State of Jammu & Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan we should now agree upon a regional plebiscite." Mohammad Ali added that the idea of a regional plebiscite without a definition of regions was not concrete enough for the expression of a definite view for or against it.

from, or other disturbances within, the State. Indeed, you will remember that it was at my insistence that the word 'entire' was added before 'State' at the end of paragraph 3 of our statement, where it is said that there should be "a fair and impartial plebiscite in the entire State." What I suggested was that as a result of the plebiscite over the entire State, we would be in a position to consider the matter, so that the final decision should cause the least disturbance and should take into consideration geographical, economic and other important factors. Indeed, any attempt at defining regions rather prejudices the result of the voting. In any event, all these are matters to be considered at a much later stage.

11. You refer in paragraph 4 of your letter to the new approach and a fresh outlook, but then you go on to suggest certain modifications which, according to you, would be necessary in the existing agreement.⁹ I do not quite know which agreement you refer to, unless it is our joint statement which does not deal with these problems at all. The particular points you refer to are, as a matter of fact, not new at all; they are very old and rather stale. They were discussed four or five years ago repeatedly and, in regard to a number of them, definite decisions were arrived at by the UN Commission with our joint consent. We have proceeded largely on the basis of these decisions though, undoubtedly, to some extent a variation might have to be made because of the passage of time and other developments.

12. Your point (i) in paragraph 5 refers to the administration of the State and suggests that this should be in the hands of an impartial authority or a joint Indo-Pakistan Commission. We have made it clear in the past, and our contention has been accepted by the UN Commission, that there can be no such change in the administration of the State. Indeed, the Resolution of the United Nations Commission is based on the recognition of the *de jure* authority of the State Administration over even the areas now occupied by Pakistan, and the constitutional right of the Government of India to safeguard the security of the State. There can be no question whatever of Pakistan or any outside authority sharing, in any way, in the administration of the State.¹⁰ The whole basis of the UN approach in its Resolutions, and subsequently through Dr Graham,¹¹ has been the recognition that there is a difference between the

9. Mohammad Ali wrote that if the idea of a regional plebiscite was to be pursued, certain modifications "would be necessary in the existing agreement which is based on an overall plebiscite." He also listed three conditions for ensuring "a truly free and impartial plebiscite."

10. The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, in its Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, did not recognize the *locus standi* of Pakistan in any matter of internal administration of Jammu and Kashmir, nor was Pakistan given any role in the organization and conduct of the proposed plebiscite.

11. Frank P. Graham, UN mediator in the Kashmir dispute, 1951-52.

status of the two countries in this and other matters. Because of this recognition of the authority of the Government of the Jammu & Kashmir State, the Plebiscite Administrator was to be formally appointed by that State, and was to act as an officer of that State. It is admitted, of course, that he would be chosen with the consent of the parties concerned.

13. It is the Government of Jammu & Kashmir State that is recognized throughout; there is no recognition anywhere at any time of any Government in the areas of Kashmir State occupied by Pakistan forces. Even in regard to the withdrawal of troops, there was to be, according to the UN Commission's Resolution, a complete withdrawal of Pakistan troops from all areas of the State occupied by them, while Indian forces were to remain, though in reduced strength. The right and responsibility of the Government of India to maintain a certain minimum number of troops, such as might be required for the security of the State, have throughout been recognized.

14. At one time a proposal was vaguely put forward that some foreign troops, belonging to another country, might be brought into the State.¹² We made it perfectly clear then that we could never accept the intrusion of foreign troops in the Kashmir State or anywhere else in Indian territory. That proposal was not pressed and was given up.

15. I have dealt above with your point (ii) (in paragraph 5) which relates to the exclusion of troops of either country from the plebiscite area or the presence of a joint force. Both these suggestions have been dismissed in the past. There has been an argument, however, more especially during the past two years or more, as to the quantum and quality of forces to be kept prior to the plebiscite. Unfortunately, we did not come to an agreement over this issue, in spite of Dr Graham's efforts. That is a matter which has to be decided. Indeed, that is the principal matter which you and I have to consider and decide as one of the preliminary conditions which have to be satisfied before the appointment and induction of the Plebiscite Administrator.

16. Your point (iii) in paragraph 5 relates to the powers of the Plebiscite Administrator.¹³ To some extent, this overlaps point (i). It is clear that we

12. During informal talks on the Kashmir question at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London on 9 January 1951, R.G. Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, had proposed that the Commonwealth countries could provide a security force for Kashmir for the period of plebiscite, but Nehru rejected it on the ground that the return of British or Dominion troops to India would be highly provocative.

13. In para 5(iii), Mohammad Ali said, "The Plebiscite Administrator should have all the powers he considers necessary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite including the power to secure compliance with any instructions he might give to the civil and military authorities in the State in carrying out his functions."

should ensure a fair and impartial plebiscite and that the Plebiscite Administrator should be in a position to organize such a plebiscite. That has nothing to do with the normal functioning of Government. It has certainly something to do with the non-interference of the Government in the plebiscite. These are matters to be discussed and arranged.

17. You refer in paragraph 2 of your letter to the refugees being allowed to vote¹⁴ and to outsiders residing in the State not being allowed to vote. Outsiders, who are presumably not permanent residents of the State will, I take it, not vote. As for refugees voting, I referred to this in the course of our talks, and I pointed out the extraordinary difficulties that we would have to face if we tried to give facilities for such voting. There would have to be a most careful check-up of all such persons, detailed enquiries as to whether they were permanent residents of Kashmir or not, where they came from and the circumstances in which they left the State, a certification of their identity, etc. There would be the problem of settling these refugees as also of unsettling settled refugees and resettling them elsewhere. I should like you to picture to yourself how all this can be done and how long it will take. It would result in an indefinite prolongation by years of the period preparatory to the plebiscite. It would also mean a very considerable disturbance to the life of the people of the State, which we wish to avoid. Therefore, for the most practical of reasons, this course does not appear feasible.

18. I think that I have dealt with all the points raised in your letter. Some of them, as I have endeavoured to point out, do not arise at all; some others were disposed of long ago; some others still have to be disposed of at a later stage. There are a few preliminary issues to be decided in the near future before the Plebiscite Administrator comes in. To that we can address ourselves. It was with this purpose in view that we suggested in our joint statement that committees of military and other experts should be appointed to advise the Prime Ministers.

19. While I have dealt with the points you have raised in your letter, my mind has been full of the background of this unfortunate conflict and more particularly with the present atmosphere of Pakistan in this respect. I hope you will appreciate that it is not an easy matter to talk calmly or to discuss dispassionately any question when threats of war and *jehad* are held out and there is daily denunciation of India. Take even one matter which has often been discussed, the question of our reducing our troops in Kashmir. We have often expressed our readiness to reduce them to the barest minimum necessary

14. Mohammad Ali stated that the refugees should be entitled to have their votes recorded for the region of their origin.

from the point of view of the security of the State. In doing so, we are prepared to take considerable risks and you will remember that there is a large frontier to be guarded on all sides. Do you think that any responsible Government can afford to take the major risk of withdrawing its troops when there is this talk of war and invasion? It is, therefore, absolutely necessary, and a prerequisite for any other progress, that this atmosphere must change and the appeal that you and I made in paragraph 6 of our joint statement should be given effect to.

20. I should like to make it clear that there is no intention on my part to exclude the UN from this question of Kashmir. The Plebiscite Administrator would function under UN supervision, but it seems to me quite obvious that while the UN can be helpful, any settlement must depend upon the consent and cooperation of India and Pakistan. Therefore it is for us to agree and not to look to the UN to produce some settlement, without our agreement.

21. I have been drawn, rather unwillingly, in a discussion of some controversial matters. This entire question of Kashmir bristles with controversy. Indeed, but for this, it might have been settled long ago. I realize, however, that it is not by a controversial or legalistic approach that this question can be effectively handled or settled. I have, therefore, wrestled with this problem in an attempt to deal with it in a more cooperative way. That was the virtue in our talks and in the statement that we issued. It is quite easy to pick holes in our talks and in the statement that we issued. It is quite easy to pick holes in that statement or to say that it does not take us very far. But the fact remains that this was the first successful attempt to get out of the morass in which we have been stuck for a long time and that it did take us some distance. These were no small gains.

22. We are not going to settle this problem by mere cleverness or trying to overreach each other. We are also not going to settle it by coercive processes, whether they are of the nature of war or some other. Nor can it be settled by coercion exercised on the people of Kashmir or any large section thereof. It was with this in mind that I laid stress on the significant phrase in our joint statement that in any solution we must avoid disturbance to the life of the people of the State. The problem before us is, how to succeed within these limitations.

23. I should like that you and I should consider this quite frankly and without any inhibition. I know that is difficult for both of us, situated as we are. And yet, the responsibility that we shoulder demands that we do so and that we should not allow ourselves to accept a position which might offer some temporary relief today but which might result in sowing the seeds of future trouble and conflict. History gives us examples of conflict between nations continuing for generations over some intermediate territory. Wars have sometimes made a temporary difference but not solved the problem. If we aim, as we must, at closer and cooperative relationship between India and

Pakistan, we must find a solution of the Kashmir problem which is not only satisfactory to the people as a whole there, but is also achieved without bitterness and a sense of continuing wrong to India or Pakistan. While the interests of the people of Kashmir are paramount, there are also certain national interests of India and Pakistan which come into conflict over this Kashmir affair. It also happens that a very great deal depends not only on the solution of the problem, but perhaps even more so on the manner of doing it because that matter will have far-reaching consequences both in India and Pakistan in the present and the future. You will understand what I mean. The large minorities in India and Pakistan will be affected by that solution. If it is wrongly done, then the position of these minorities might well suffer and new problems be created, even bigger than the one of Kashmir. We must, at all cost, avoid this. To ignore it in our extreme desire to show some quick result in Kashmir is bankruptcy of statesmanship. To submit to the momentary passion of an excited populace and take a wrong course is not leadership.

24. We have to look at current events in some historical perspective. In this perspective, our huge continent of Asia appears to awaken after 300 years of quiescence. The inevitable destiny of India and Pakistan must be to cooperate, as independent nations, to their mutual advantage and for the good of Asia and the world. If that is the objective, then we must move wisely and warily and not take any step which is in the wrong direction. Every step in the right direction, however small it may be, helps and produces that atmosphere out of which right action comes. It is for this reason that I have suggested that we should proceed to consider and solve all our problems. Obviously, the Kashmir problem is of high importance, in some ways the most important problem before us, and we must tackle it. But it appears to me important that the other matters, which are by no means unimportant and which affect large numbers of people, should also go ahead. But above all, in whatever we may do, let us keep this larger objective in view and think of the perspective of history. For my part, I am determined to try my utmost to seek satisfactory solutions which will lead to friendship and cooperation between the two nations, and I shall not permit myself to be diverted from this aim even by untoward occurrences.

25. You suggest in your letter that we might meet again soon to carry on our discussions. I would be happy to meet you at any time, but I see no purpose in our meeting frequently without adequate preparation or our meeting in an atmosphere of excitement and denouncement. The ground must be prepared first before we can profit by a meeting.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

50. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
September 6, 1953

My dear Bakshi,

I have had your message about the activities of Maulana Masoodi and others here.² I do not approve of those activities and I have made that perfectly clear. We have taken some other steps to counteract them. We shall continue to watch and to take such steps as might be considered necessary. But I do not think it is desirable for us, nor indeed is that possible under our law, to arrest and detain a person for such activities. Apart from the law, the effect of arrest or internment is often the reverse of what is desired.

In the preservation of law and order, one has to take many steps which are normally disagreeable. I can quite understand that in the very special condition that Kashmir is at present, many such steps have to be taken. But it must always be remembered that, if one overdoes this kind of thing, it has contrary repercussions. Government cannot be carried on for long by show of force and by making people afraid. It is difficult to lay down any fixed rules about these matters, but one should not forget certain healthy principles. Whatever our difficulties in India, we have to function within certain limitations.

I was a little disturbed when you arrested Sofi, the MP. He was arrested on arrival in Kashmir, that is, before he had done anything or had the chance to do anything. I do not suppose he could have done much, and, if he had done anything objectionable, action could have been taken.³ As it is, one has to balance the evil effect of what he might have done with the evil effect of his arrest in the circumstances. This kind of thing is exploited by our opponents everywhere and more especially in Pakistan. I suppose in Kashmir too, while some good might come out of this thing, there is also this bad effect.

I have been reading in the newspapers of your announcement about free

1. JN Collection.
2. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad wrote to Nehru on 6 September that Masoodi had been making allegations in regard to excessive firings and trying to confuse the people "by raising all sorts of unnatural issues". He said Masoodi had been sending posters, leaflets and letters in abundance to Srinagar and using Mridula Sarabhai, B.P.L. Bedi and some other persons for this purpose.
3. Bakshi wrote to Nehru on 10 September, "I am sorry we had to arrest Sofi Mohammad Akbar immediately after his arrival here. We had reports that he had been deputed by Maulvi Saced to this place with definite instructions to create an adverse situation for the Government."

education throughout from primary school to university.⁴ This is, of course, excellent, but it is the kind of thing which even rich countries cannot afford. At the most, they have said that primary and secondary education might be free. In Kashmir, this will mean some burden. We may help you to shoulder that burden, but the impression is bound to spread about your various announcements that they are meant to bribe the people. The grace of the action is hidden and the effect one wants to produce is greatly lessened thereby. I am merely pointing out this to you so that you might keep this in mind.⁵

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. The State Government announced on 31 August that henceforth education would be free from primary stage to post-graduation level in government institutions.
5. Bakshi replied on 10 September that the revenue from education fees was "very meagre" and its abolition "has had a tremendous psychological effect" as the poor and middle classes could hardly afford to have their children educated.

51. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
September 7, 1953

My dear Bakshi,

Mahavir Tyagi has already spoken to you on the telephone about the story printed in the *Blitz*.² This is the type of fantastic nonsense which does us a good deal of harm. I am having it contradicted here of course, but I think that your Government should also contradict it, pointing out the utter absurdity of it. It is necessary that you should contradict it also, because otherwise people might think that the Kashmir Government had put out the story.

I do not like at all the attempts made by some newspapers to malign Shaikh Abdullah. There have been stories about his trying to escape to Pakistan, stories of his corruption, etc., etc. This kind of thing is not only bad form, but is likely to produce a boomerang effect. It brings down the level of a

1. JN Collection.

2. On 5 September, *Blitz* published a report giving details of an unsuccessful attempt by armed Pakistanis to kidnap Shaikh Abdullah from his place of detention near Udhampur. Giving details of the alleged raid, the report mentioned that 28 persons were killed in the conflict that ensued.

high debate to low personal animosities and charges. I hope, therefore, that you will try your best to prevent people indulging in this kind of attack or charge.

Last night rather late Bamzai³ came to me and said that two members of the Delhi Congress were going to Kashmir by car and that one of them was likely to do mischief there. The other was a Deputy Minister of the Delhi Government.⁴ I enquired immediately into this matter although it was late at night and the two persons were met and interviewed. As a result, I found that there was no substantial truth in the allegations. In any event, our talk with them did good. I allowed them to go on to Kashmir and suggested that the Deputy Minister might meet you.

This case is an instance of how nervous people are inclined to recommend action at the slightest rumour or provocation. They do not realize that the little good that might be done by the action is very much counter-balanced by the evil reactions of it. I am sure these two persons or either of them will not and cannot do any particular harm. If I had stopped them, that would undoubtedly have done some harm here and spread an impression that things are very bad in the Valley and we do not allow any persons to go there. We can hardly talk about tourist traffic if we act in this way.⁵

I know that there are some people in Delhi, not many, who have taken up an objectionable attitude. On the whole they are toning down and realizing their mistake. To the best of my knowledge even Mridula is remaining more or less quiet, though sometimes she says objectionable things.

3. Kashi Nath Bamzai (1915-1988); member, Jammu and Kashmir National Conference; worked for *National Herald*, *Daily National Standard*, 1944-45, and *Blitz*, between 1939 and 1946; Officer on Special Duty (Kashmir Publicity), Union Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1949-65; Chief Press Adviser, 1965-66; Registrar of Newspapers for India, 1966-72; Director, Publications Division, Government of India, 1972-1974.
4. The two persons were: Om Prakash, a member of the Delhi Congress Committee, who also used to work with Mridula Sarabhai; and Shiv Charan, the Deputy Minister.
5. Om Prakash was stopped at the border, while Shiv Charan was allowed to proceed to Srinagar. Nehru was later told that the order about Om Prakash was issued by D.P. Dhar after he received a message apparently from Mohan Singh Sawhny of *Vande Mataram*. Nehru wrote to Bakshi on 9 September, "All this appears to me to be very casual and the kind of procedure that might well land us in grave difficulties. Quite apart from my being gravely embarrassed, a Deputy Minister of the Delhi State Government feels insulted and the story goes about that even the Prime Minister of India's approval to a visit to Kashmir is not enough.... It is not a good thing for a government to be nervous about little things. The nervousness of a government gradually conveys itself to its officials and others."

Maulana Masoodi has, as you know, issued some statements and the other day addressed some students and others.⁶ But I think that he has quietened down a little too.

We have to produce, as soon as possible, a sensation of normality in regard to Kashmir. That, no doubt, will be your aim. The value of any meeting of the General Council of your Conference will not be much if large-scale arrests are taking place and, more particularly, if Members of the Council have been arrested in considerable numbers. That applies to the Constituent Assembly also.⁷ It will be very easy for our critics to point out that we get a majority by removing opponents.

I am told that Ghulam Qadir's wife and children have been put in prison.⁸ His wife is half mad and she once created a scene in Parliament here in the visitors' gallery when she had to be removed. I would suggest to you to send Ghulam Qadir's wife and children to Delhi. The children are in school here. As far as possible, avoid putting women and children in prison. It is better to put up with their mischief than to put them in prison as this latter course has a bad effect on the public and can be exploited. I would suggest that even Begum Abdullah should be given more or less a free hand.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Addressing the students of Hindu College in Delhi on 2 September, Masoodi said the developments in Kashmir pertained to the internal politics of the National Conference and had no international implications. He further said that the people of Kashmir could justifiably consider the alternative of having an autonomous State apart from the alternatives of joining India or Pakistan, and Shaikh Abdullah was only giving an expression to this idea.
7. Bakshi wrote to Nehru on 10 September that the total number of detainees in the State was 243. He denied that a large number of Members of the Council were under detention and said that nine Members of the Constituent Assembly had been detained.
8. Ghulam Qadir, the brother-in-law of Shaikh Abdullah, was under detention at this time. In his reply Bakshi said, "It was with great reluctance that we had to arrest them, as his wife behaved violently." Qadir's wife was detained for a few days and then let off.

52. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
10th September, 1953

My dear Bakshi,

I have your letter of the 6th September. Also another brief letter in which you ask for two engineers to be sent to you for your scheme of control of floods. About this latter matter, I am getting in touch with the Ministries concerned. I shall let you have a reply very soon²....

I am glad that you are gradually overcoming your difficulties. We shall, of course, help you to the best of our ability.

You have written about Maulana Saeed and Mridula, etc. It is true that Maulana Saeed goes about talking to MPs and others privately, but he does nothing in public now. I believe that even in private he has somewhat toned down. As for Mridula, she has also been indiscreet. But, apart from some private talk, so far as I know, she has said nothing and has tried at least to restrain herself.

In all such matters one has to balance various factors. To adopt the police method appears easy, that is, to stop a person from talking or functioning. But it often has bad reactions. All our training has been against such methods and people do not like them. The biggest propaganda against us can be that Kashmir has been converted into a police State. That must be avoided. In an emergency one has to take such steps and they become unavoidable. But it has always to be remembered that such steps produce bad reactions. It is sometimes better to allow a few persons to talk than to make it appear that we will not permit any such thing.

You give me the figures of persons killed in firing, etc. The figures I have received from our Intelligence are not the same. For instance, you give the total number of persons killed as 34. The figures sent to me after due enquiry are:

Killed as a result of firing by the Police or Home Guards or J & K Militia	...	45
Died on account of injuries by lathi charges	...	4
That is, total deaths from Police and like action	...	49

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Two engineers were subsequently sent to Jammu and Kashmir.

Further, I am told that the total number of Magistrates, Policemen, Militia and Home Guards injured by demonstrators is 44.

I do not want a conflict to arise between the figures you mention and the figures we may have to indicate.... Our Intelligence has the benefit of information from your Government sources as well as from such enquiries as they make.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Nehru was informed on 17 September that as per information collected by State Government sources, the number of total deaths from Police and like action was 46 and the number of officials injured was 148.

53. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
September 11, 1953

My dear Bakshi,

I have been pressed all along by N.C. Chatterjee and others in Parliament to fix a day for a discussion of their motion on an inquiry into the circumstances of Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee's death. I had avoided this all along, and I thought that recent changes in Kashmir would make such a discussion completely unnecessary. But Chatterjee and others insist. The reason, I think, is that they want to show off, especially to people in Bengal. The Speaker admitted the motion sometime ago²....

I am passing on some information to you for what it is worth. There is no doubt that Americans are very anxious to have a finger in the pie of Kashmir. This is part of their natural tendency to interfere everywhere. They have done so in Iran. They are giving us trouble in Nepal. Kashmir to them is a highly important strategic place and the proximity of the Soviet Union frightens them. They are under the impression that the present Kashmir Government has a good deal of communist influence in it. This is another reason for their anxiety. They are constantly trying to increase their contacts there to get information and, possibly, to influence people....

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. The motion was discussed on 18 September.

I am told, and I imagine you know this quite well, that Afzal Beg gave certificates of first-class Kashmir citizenship to a thousand men or more who came over from Pakistan. They were put in Baramula which thus became the centre of Pakistani propaganda. The idea is that they will spread out into the interior during the winter months. Probably your colleague, Mir Qasim,³ knows about this.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Syed Mir Qasim (b. 1921); arrested during the Quit Kashmir movement, 1946; member, Constituent Assembly, Jammu and Kashmir, 1951-57; Minister, Jammu and Kashmir Government, 1953-57, 1961-63 and 1971; President, Jammu and Kashmir PCC, 1965-71; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1975-79; Union Minister for Civil Supplies, 1976-77.

54. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
11th September, 1953

My dear Bakshi,

...I have received your letter of 10th September.² I am glad you have written more or less fully and given me a picture of the present situation.

It is, of course, for you to judge what you should do in Kashmir. Nobody else, and certainly not any of us at a distance, can lessen your responsibility. All we can do is to point out certain things or make suggestions to you which appear to us to be worthwhile. It is sometimes helpful to see a situation from a distance. The principal actors get too much involved in it....

I am sure you are right in allowing freedom to Begum Abdullah and her daughters.³ They can certainly do a good deal of harm. Still I think that any positive action against them would do more harm. As the general situation

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Bakshi wrote that the law and order situation in Kashmir was gradually improving and "we are devoting our entire attention to rational political discussions so as to convince the people about the propriety of our actions." He said that unemployment was the biggest problem and they intended to tackle it in all seriousness. He added that unless the people were offered "concrete gains" in economic matters, "we are not likely to succeed in dispelling their misapprehensions."
3. Bakshi wrote that Begum Abdullah and her daughters were organizing meetings, instigating students and women and addressing them in the streets.

has improved and will go on improving, their activities will produce less and less effect and ultimately might stop.

About Maulana Masoodi, it is true that he talks to many people here. But, so far as MPs are concerned, he has practically no effect. They all know him now and his line.⁴ He may, of course, give some trouble elsewhere, but it is very little and you need not bother yourself about his activities here. Anyway, the same question arises—the choice of a lesser evil. Any action taken against him would produce worse consequences....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Bakshi had written that Masoodi's "line seems to be to confuse public opinion in India.... We cannot overlook the mischief of such activities." On 21 October 1953, a meeting of the General Council of the National Conference removed Masoodi from general secretaryship on the charge of wilful deviation from the party line.

55. To Ravi Shankar Shukla¹

New Delhi
September 11, 1953

My dear Shuklaji,²

I enclose a cutting from the *Nagpur Times*. I am shocked to read that Shaikh Abdullah's effigy was taken out in a procession and burnt. This is a degradation of our politics, and, what is more, it has evil consequences. The Kashmir question is a highly complicated question and we are not going to deal with this satisfactorily in this way. Apart from this fact, it is wholly unbecoming for any of us to behave in this manner in regard to a person who has been our colleague for many years, even though we might have parted company.

Of course, you have nothing to do with this, but I am drawing your attention to it so that you might make our view clear to persons responsible for this misbehaviour.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh.

56. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
September 15, 1953

My dear Bakshi,

This letter is being taken by Punya Dev Sharma whom you have probably met. Some months ago, I sent him to Jammu to counter, in his own quiet way, the Praja Parishad agitation. Later, he wandered about the Kashmir Valley. He says he met you on two or three occasions. He came to me the other day and asked me what work he could do. I thought that, perhaps, he might be useful in Kashmir, and so I am sending him. If you find him of use, he can remain there for a month or two. If you think he is not of any particular use, you can send him back. I have given him some money which will be enough for him for his journey and for a month's stay or more. So, you need not bother about his expenses.

You will see that he is a simple village type of man. I have known him for the last 30 years as a village khadi worker. He is one of those simple and sound village workers that Gandhiji drew out in large numbers. His wife is a member of the Bihar Assembly at present.

I think this simple type of worker can make himself useful in Kashmir. It would be better to allow him to function by himself as an independent person and not to go about on behalf of Government. He can look after himself and gets on well with people. All you will do is to tell him generally in what area he should go. He can report to you or someone else from time to time....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

57. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
September 17, 1953

My dear Bakshi,

... We have followed through the Press and radio the activities of this

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

Convention.² I am happy at the success that has attended it. This will have a very soothing effect all over the State. But, as you say, this effect will fade away unless there are persistent efforts at consolidation. Nothing is more dangerous than complacency after a successful effort.

We had a debate on foreign affairs today. Naturally Kashmir was referred to by me³ and by many others. Maulana Masoodi spoke. He said that he had been one of the persons opposed to Shaikh Abdullah's recent policies. In fact he had taken a leading part in this opposition. Nevertheless he was not quite happy at many things that had happened. Keeping their objective in view, they must judge every step from the point of view of that step leading to that objective or not. He referred to Shaikh Abdullah and hinted that his cooperation should be sought. He agreed that while exaggerated rumours had been spread in Pakistan and elsewhere about casualties in recent happenings in the Valley, he requested me to have a full enquiry made.

This was the main burden of his speech. He said much else which was more or less in praise of our general foreign policy.

Sheo Narain Fotedar⁴ spoke subsequently, to some extent contradicting Masoodi. In particular, he mentioned the fact that Shaikh Abdullah had been thinking of an independent Kashmir since 1948.

Many references were made by speakers to the improper activities of UN Observers and others. About this matter frequent references have appeared in the Press, but thus far I have not received any precise information from you. If you have any such information, please send it....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad wrote on 17 September that a marked feature of the Convention of the National Conference workers held in Srinagar from 14 to 17 September and attended by over 4,000 delegates was that the delegates from the villages displayed initiative and a constructive approach in regard to the problems discussed at the sessions. The Convention unanimously adopted a resolution offering support and cooperation to the State Government.
3. For Nehru's speech in the House of the People, see *post*, pp. 389-421.
4. Educationist and social reformer from Kashmir; Municipal Commissioner and Vice-President, Srinagar Municipality, for twenty years; Member, Kashmir Legislative Assembly, for ten years; nominated to the House of the People, 1953.

58. To Mohammad Ali¹

New Delhi
September 23, 1953

My dear Prime Minister,

You will forgive me for not having acknowledged your letter of September 5th earlier.² As a matter of fact, I had written to you on September 3rd at some considerable length dealing with a number of points which had arisen in your previous letter. Probably our two letters crossed each other.

2. You refer to Admiral Nimitz.³ It is evident that I gathered a wrong impression from your talk with me. To me, it was obvious that, in the circumstances, there could be no Plebiscite Administrator from any of the great powers. Developments had taken place in the last three or four years which necessitated some other choice. Any other course would have been inconsistent with the foreign policy we have been pursuing. This had nothing to do with the merits of Admiral Nimitz, who is a man of eminence. It never struck me that you or your Government would attach any great importance to this matter and would find it difficult to appreciate our viewpoint.

3. I have already informed you of the casual and private talk I had with the correspondents of the *Dawn* and the Associated Press of Pakistan prior to our consideration of our joint statement. As a matter of fact, I had not met any Indian newspaperman and, in fact, have not done so ever since. The fact that Indian Press correspondents had discussed such matters previously is not difficult to understand. Vaguely they have been discussed long before, not at our instance, but because newspapers make intelligent surmises. We have vaguely discussed the Kashmir question with newspapers from time to time in previous months long before you came here. The journalists themselves often put forward suggestions. I doubt if there was any leakage at our end, though it is possible that some Cabinet Minister may have been loose in his talk. Personally I hardly ever see journalists except for an occasional Press conference once in two or three months.

1. JN Collection.

2. Replying to Nehru's letter of 28 August (see *ante*, pp. 354-358), Mohammad Ali justified *Dawn's* caption, "Bharat's Campaign", by arguing that a categorical statement about Admiral Nimitz made by Nehru to correspondents from Pakistan, and officially inspired leakages pertaining to Admiral Nimitz and a possible regional plebiscite, published in *The Hindustan Times* of 20 August and *The Times of India* of 21 August, bore no relation to their joint statement and were interpreted in Pakistan as an attempt to force her hands.

3. Mohammad Ali wrote that both Zafrullah Khan and he himself had made it clear to Nehru during their talks in Delhi that without consulting their colleagues they could not agree to Nehru's proposal in regard to the Plebiscite Administrator.

4. Even if there was some misunderstanding or leakage in relation to Admiral Nimitz, I confess I do not understand the tremendous campaign in the Pakistani Press and Radio. The 'Azad' Radio has even excelled its own remarkable previous record. I have with me a huge pile of cuttings and reports from the Pakistani Press and Radio. I do not wish to trouble you with these extracts. They are easily available to you and, in any event, it serves little purpose to bring out these unsavoury comments again.

5. It was a shock to me, however, to find that even Mr Shoaib Qureshi should have encouraged what is called a Liberation Front in a speech at Muzaffarabad and talked about a war of liberation.⁴ He mentioned that East Pakistan had offered to send four lakhs of volunteers. This was reported in the *Dawn* of the 6th September.

6. I am reluctant to give you long quotations from speeches and statements of responsible Ministers. I would refer you, however, to a few reports of speeches, such as a speech by Khan Abdul Qayum Khan,⁵ which appeared in the *Dawn* of the 17th August; a speech by Sardar Abdul Rashid,⁶ Chief Minister, NWFP (14th August); and to a speech of Mian Jaffer Shah,⁷ Minister, NWFP (18th August).

7. I think that you will find that during all this period no Minister in India, whether Central or provincial, had said anything aggressive in this context. In fact, anyone can notice the difference between the calm atmosphere of India and the hysterical outbursts in Pakistan. While the Pakistan Press was full of *jihad* and war, our newspapers discussed the Estate Duty Bill,⁸

4. Mohammad Ali wrote that he was not aware of any responsible person in authority in Pakistan having advocated *jihad* or war against India, and asked Nehru for specific instances.
5. Addressing a public meeting in Karachi on 16 August, Abdul Qayum Khan alleged that a section of the Indian population was trying to convert the Muslim majority of the Kashmir Valley into a minority as it had done in Kapurthala State and Jammu province by driving the Muslims out of their homes to seek refuge in Pakistan. Khan also exhorted the people to get ready for any eventuality.
6. Abdul Rashid Khan declared at a public meeting in Peshawar on 14 August that "the cruel slaughter of our Muslim brethren in the Kashmir Valley would prove valuable for (their) ultimate liberation... as their blood had laid solid foundation for their independence."
7. Jaffer Shah, Education Minister of NWFP, addressing a public meeting in Peshawar on 14 August, had called upon the UN "to come immediately to the rescue of the suppressed Kashmiris who were groaning under the Bharat-cum-Dogra barbarism."
8. The Estate Duty Bill, aiming at reducing wide disparities in the accumulation of wealth and finding funds for the development schemes of the States, was passed by the two Houses of Parliament on 15 and 22 September.

the Andhra State Bill,⁹ the floods in various parts of the country and economic policies.

8. It is this atmosphere that counts if we are to make progress and it should be our endeavour to maintain an atmosphere of peace and goodwill. You have seen for yourself how the people generally feel from the reception you received in Delhi. I am sure that the people in Pakistan feel likewise. Unfortunately, the Press and some others are often bent on creating trouble.

9. It will continue to be my endeavour to work in every way for a peaceful settlement of all issues between India and Pakistan.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. The Andhra State Bill, constituting the State of Andhra Pradesh, was passed by the House of the People on 27 August after a week's debate and by the Council of States on 12 September.

59. To Bhimsen Sachar¹

New Delhi
September 23, 1953

My dear Sachar,

I have received reports that the Jan Sangh people are very active in Pathankot and many of their workers enter the Jammu & Kashmir State without a permit, usually going *via* Basouli.

Some vague reports have even reached me that some arms were being collected in Pathankot with the intention of sending them to Jammu. Golwalkar² is visiting Pathankot in the course of the next few days, after going to Mandi, etc., where there are some municipal by-elections.

I should like you to find out what is happening on the Jammu border, more especially at Pathankot. We must not relax in regard to the Bharatiya

1. JN Collection.

2. M.S. Golwalkar, Sarva Sanghchalak, Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS). Describing Kashmir as an integral part of India "naturally, culturally, morally and constitutionally", the Central Committee of the RSS had said in a resolution on 31 August that secession of any territory from India was a matter to be decided by the whole of the country, and warned the Union Government and the Jammu and Kashmir Government against taking a weak stand, as that would encourage "the rank communalistic aggressive State of Pakistan".

Jan Sangh people or the Jammu Praja Parishad people. They are a mischievous lot and they are capable of any stupidity and worse. The situation in Kashmir is far better now but obviously there are strong undercurrents, and one has to take every care.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

60. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

Camp: Ranikhet
September 25, 1953

My dear Bakshi,

...There is one matter which is worrying me, and, no doubt, you must have given a good deal of thought to it. When your Government goes to Jammu for the winter, what arrangements are you going to make in the Valley? It is obviously important that the Valley should not be left uncared for or only partly cared for. I have little doubt that mischief makers in the Valley, as well as in Pakistan, will want to take advantage of this winter period, when your Government is away, to create trouble. Indeed, some information of this kind has reached me. Therefore, Government must continue to be in intimate touch with the Valley throughout the winter season.

I see that the Praja Parishad people, in spite of all their promises and assurances, are again moving in a mischievous direction in Jammu. They are trying to consolidate themselves and might well give trouble from time to time. They should be kept in check and not encouraged in any way. To some extent, they derive help from the Jan Sangh and other communal organizations in India. We shall try to watch these developments here, and if you send us information from time to time, we can follow it up. Of course, the best way to meet this Praja Parishad activity is to build up the positive side of the National Conference in Jammu.²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad wrote to Nehru on 17 September that there were differences among the National Conference workers from Jammu and that the party also lacked cadres in its Jammu unit. He thought that "any softness shown towards the Praja Parishad leaders will be harmful for our own parties."

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I. FOREIGN POLICY

1. India and World Peace¹

Three months ago, on May 15th, I made a statement² on foreign affairs in this House. I referred then to the many evidences of a new approach to the solution of international problems, and, in particular, to the desire shown on all sides for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The long drawn-out negotiations at Pan Mun Jon, with all their ups and downs, appeared gradually to be moving towards some settlement. There were setbacks again, but ultimately the major hurdle in the way, that relating to the prisoners of war, was crossed. On June 8th an agreement was signed between the parties in regard to the prisoners of war. This agreement, in all its main features, bore a close resemblance to the Indian resolution which has been adopted by the General Assembly some months earlier.

In this agreement a heavy responsibility was cast upon India. For any country, and more especially for us, this was a novel experience. We were reluctant to assume new responsibilities, especially in an international theatre of operations. But the circumstances were such that it would have been improper for us to evade this heavy responsibility. The cause of peace, to which we are devoted, as well as the faith placed in us by other countries, demanded this service from us. We accepted these duties, therefore, in a spirit of humility and in the faith that we would continue to receive the generous cooperation of other countries in the tasks that were being entrusted to us.

Almost everyone thought that the final armistice agreement would be signed soon after. But, unexpectedly, a series of deplorable events delayed this realization and brought a period of grave uncertainty. Doubts arose whether the conditions in which we had expected to function in Korea would in fact be established. After several weeks of suspense the long-awaited armistice agreement was signed at Pan Mun Jon on the morning of July 27th, and fighting came to an end a few hours later.

This armistice agreement introduced no modification of the terms of the prisoners of war agreement although the release of a large number of prisoners of war by the South Korean Government had vitally affected that agreement. The way was cleared for us to proceed with the preparations for fulfilling our responsibilities. These were threefold. The Neutral Nations Repatriation

1. Statement in the House of the People, 17 August 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, 1953, Vol. VI Part II, cols 895-902.

2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, pp. 501-505.

Commission consisted of representatives of Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India. To the Indian member was assigned the responsible position of Chairman and executive agent of the Commission. We were further charged with supplying forces and operating personnel for the custody of the prisoners of war who had not been repatriated directly by the detaining sides, and, thirdly, our Red Cross was asked to undertake all Red Cross work in connection with such prisoners of war.

It must be remembered that the armistice had been arrived at between the two Commands—the UN Command on the one side and the Chinese and North Korean Commands on the other. We had thus to deal with these Commands directly. As a first step, we decided to send an advance party to Korea to confer with these two Commands and to report to us what detailed arrangements we had to make. This advance party was led by the Foreign Secretary³ and had representatives of our armed forces and Red Cross. They were to assure themselves that India's representatives and armed forces would be able to function in an honourable capacity and under conditions in keeping with India's self-respect and dignity. This had become a vital matter because of certain improper and undignified statements that had been made on behalf of the South Korean Government in regard to India's representatives and forces. This advance party left Delhi on August 5th. They have completed their labours and are returning tomorrow. I should like to express my gratitude to the two Commands for the courtesy and help they have given to our representatives. From such reports as we have had from our advance party, their talks with these Commands have been in every way satisfactory.

In view of the novel and heavy responsibilities cast upon India, we have taken special care to choose suitable representatives for the various duties entrusted to us. Our representative on the Repatriation Commission and its Chairman will be Lieutenant-General K.S. Thimayya and the Alternate Representative will be Shri B.N. Chakravarty, our Ambassador at the Hague. These officers, with some members of their staff, are expected to leave for Korea in the first week of September, so as to be in time to complete all preliminary arrangements before the Commission begins to function by the end of September.

Arrangements have also been made for the despatch of the Indian Custodian Force. This will be under the command of Major-General Thorat.⁴ It is estimated that a total of about 5,000 persons, including Red Cross staff, will be required for service in Korea. Of these, nearly 4,000 men will embark at Madras on three ships within the next few days, the first ship

3. R.K. Nehru.

4. Major-General S.P.P. Thorat.

S.S. JALADURGA leaving tomorrow. The remaining number of men are expected to sail some days later as soon as a fourth ship becomes available.

I am placing before the House these details because Members will no doubt be interested in the work that our people are going to do in Korea. They have gone there on a mission of peace and I am sure that they carry with them the goodwill of every section of this House and of the country.

The conclusion of the armistice has been a great event, but the future is full of difficulty. The armistice agreement has laid down that, in order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, a Political Conference of a higher level of both sides should be held within three months after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, "to settle through negotiations the questions of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc." These are difficult questions which require calm and dispassionate consideration and a will to peace if they are to be solved satisfactorily. Unfortunately, there have been indications recently that this will to peace is not always in evidence, and even threats have been held out. One party has stated that unless its demands are acceded to within a stated time, it reserves its right to start military operations again.⁵ Agreements have been made and assurances given, which have not been fully made public, and we do not know how far they might come in the way of a full discussion of this problem in the Political Conference.

A special session of the UN General Assembly is meeting in New York today to consider this problem. It must be remembered, however, that the armistice agreement is between two parties and the UN Assembly represents one such party, that is, the UN Command. Any decisions, in order to be effective, must have the concurrence of both parties.

Neither the composition nor the functions of the Political Conference have yet been determined and there appears to be a considerable difference of opinion, even among members of the United Nations, as to the composition of the Conference. India has been mentioned as a country which should be represented in this Conference. I should like to say that we have no desire to seek a place in this Conference or elsewhere unless it is clear that we can perform some useful function in the interests of peace and the major parties concerned desire our assistance in this matter. I earnestly hope that the approach to this Conference will be made in a temper of peace and with the firm determination to settle the problems of the Far East in a peaceful way. Any

5. On 8 August 1953, John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State, and Syngman Rhee, President of South Korea, after signing a mutual security pact in Seoul had stated in a joint statement that they would break off the Conference "if after ninety days, it becomes clear to each of our Government that all attempts to achieve our objectives have been fruitless."

recurrence of war in Korea will be a tragedy and anything that encourages the atmosphere of war will be a misfortune.

The House is aware that the Prime Minister of Pakistan has come to Delhi at our invitation.⁶ We welcome him as a distinguished guest and we would like to assure him and his country that we are anxious to settle every problem that has unfortunately embittered relations between the two countries in a peaceful way. There may be and are difficulties and sometimes a solution is not easy to find. But where there is a firm desire to follow the path of peace and reconciliation, there can be no doubt that success will come. I visited Karachi and had long and profitable talks with the Prime Minister of Pakistan. At the end of those talks we issued a joint statement⁷ in the course of which we stated that "the independence and integrity of the two countries must be fully respected, each country having full freedom to follow a policy of its choice in domestic as well as international affairs." "At the same time," the statement continued, "the Prime Ministers are convinced that the interests of both countries demand the largest possible measure of cooperation between them and that, therefore, every effort should be made not only to resolve the existing Indo-Pakistan disputes but also to promote goodwill and friendship between the two countries. They consider this essential to progress in both countries and to the promotion of the welfare of the common man, which is their primary concern." By this statement our Government stands and I have no doubt that our people generally are firmly behind this policy. It is a matter of deep regret to me that some sections of the people of Pakistan as well as some in India occasionally challenge this basic policy. Only those who have little understanding of the world today and of our respective countries and have no vision at all can think in terms of conflict between the two countries which geography, history and a common past inevitably bring together. We are firmly resolved to pursue this policy and not to be diverted from it, even though some people may be swept away by the passion and prejudice of the moment. Our long struggle for freedom in this country led us to an understanding of and a deep sympathy with similar struggles in other countries. That was the basis of our policy, even when we worked for our own independence. That policy inevitably continues today not only as an inheritance from the past, but an understanding of the present. Peace, it has been said, is indivisible. So also is freedom, and no structure of world peace can be built on the denial of freedom to countries and large masses of people. It is a matter of deep regret to us that this basic fact is not recognized and given effect to in many countries.

6. Mohammad Ali was present in the House when Nehru made this statement.

7. On 27 July 1953. See *post*, pp. 438-439.

Even apart from the question of political freedom, the question of racial discrimination and suppression has become one of the outstanding problems of today. We have no desire to interfere in the affairs of other countries just as we are not prepared to tolerate any interference with our country. But there are certain factors which override national boundaries and which affect the well-being of the human race. Among these factors is this question of racial discrimination and the suppression of one race by another. That is an affront to the men and women of Asia and of Africa, as well as to every sensitive human being. I have, therefore, ventured to express in clear language what we think of this inhumanity and complete denial of what the Charter of the United Nations stands for. I am certain that, in saying so, I have echoed the feeling of every single person of the 360 millions who inhabit this country as well as of hundreds of millions of other peoples in Asia and Africa. We can never tolerate this idea of racial discrimination and inequality.

2. Continuity in Policy¹

I beg to move:

That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration.

At almost every session of this Parliament, this subject has come up for debate and the House has been pleased to express its approval of the general policy pursued by the Government of India in regard to international affairs. In the course of each session a considerable number of questions are put which indicate the eager interest that honourable Members take in international affairs. On my part, I should like to express my deep appreciation of this active interest and the support that this House has invariably given in these vital matters which affect our country and the world.

International affairs are not the privilege of a select coterie of diplomats today. They have to be understood especially by this House and even, I would say, by the general public—not in their intricate details, but in the matter of policies that lie behind them, because international affairs have become of enormous importance even in the lives of the common people today. They

1. Statement in the House of the People, 17 September 1953, *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, 1953, Vol. VIII Part II, cols 3974-4000.

might lead to war; they might lead to other developments which are almost as bad as war and thus affect the lives of each one of us.

Now, it is all very well to talk about international affairs or about foreign policy as if that was some integrated whole which you can put forward and say 'aye' or 'no' to it. Of course, the House knows that it is a much more complicated affair than that, and the fact is that even a policy, a foreign policy, which may have and should have, of course, certain fixed and more or less definite ideals and objectives, nevertheless is a collection of foreign policies—not one single item—because the world is not fashioned after our liking. All kinds of different problems arise and there are different interests, and we have to adapt ourselves to them keeping in view this basic policy. Apart from that, international affairs have been taking increasingly a stranger turn. There is an element of dogmatic fervour, something resembling the old approach of bigoted religion in them, something resembling that ordered division of "either you are with us, or you are against us", and so we have this, if I may say so with all respect, narrow approach which considers everything in terms of black and white—"those with us or those against us"—and repeating that old, unfortunate bigoted approach of religion which brought about the wars of religion in the past, with not even the saving graces which religion sometimes had provided in the past.

International affairs have ceased to be a game of debonair diplomats discussing some secrets and become something where hard things are said, threats are uttered continuously against each other, and, so far as the world is concerned, we live in a precarious state between hope and fear. Some people imagine that a country's policy should be what they call a 'strong' policy—strong policy apparently meaning that we should go about looking as fierce and ferocious as possible, threatening everybody, telling everybody that we will punish them if they don't behave as we want them to behave. Now, that kind of thing may sound very well at a public meeting and may evoke applause, but the fact is that that represents great immaturity in political thinking or understanding. Mature nations—as we are certainly in this matter as in many others—do not behave in this way. We have to show our maturity by trying to understand things, by trying to balance them, by trying always to see and act in a manner which helps, not hinder. Now, all these things put some limitations in our way, limitations in the way of expression, especially for a person who is responsible for the conduct of foreign policy, because on the one hand I would like to be as frank as possible with this House and with our country, and on the other hand I would not like to say anything which needlessly irritates or angers any country—whether I agree with that country or disagree with it is another matter—because I do not think we shall advance our cause, our country's cause or the world's cause by merely showing irritation against other countries' policies, in New Delhi. Naturally, where we differ

fundamentally from them, we have to express our own viewpoints of disagreement or agreement as the case may be. The pace of events has grown progressively faster. Whether all this is due to the fact that we live in an age of some kind of a consummation of the Industrial Revolution that began one hundred or two hundred years ago, or other factors are involved in it, I do not know. But you may symbolize that pace of events by the continuous talk of this latest progeny of the industrial age, the atom bomb, the hydrogen bomb, or the cobalt bomb of which some people have begun talking about. All this means a terrific threat over-hanging humanity, fear and apprehension all over; and oddly enough, at the same time the hope of an infinitely better life for humanity is offered. We have had some extraordinary things, and the choice before the world is between these two. Well, as I have put it, the choice can only be one. But the fact remains that nobody can be sure whether the choice will be war or peace.

Two days ago, the General Assembly of the United Nations began its sessions and they are having very important problems before them. And may I in this connection say something, in saying which I am sure I will be repeating the sentiments of the House, that we express our pleasure that a Member of this House has been elected to the Presidentship of the General Assembly of the United Nations,² and in particular that a representative of Indian womanhood has been so elected?

In considering foreign affairs we are naturally interested in particular problems which affect us intimately, whether it is the question, the old question of the treatment of people of Indian descent in South Africa or the question, also an old one, of the treatment of people of Indian descent in Ceylon, or other like problems of Indians overseas. We are interested in them. Because, we are concerned with the fate of hundreds and thousands of these people who, though no longer citizens and nationals of India, were in the past connected with India, about whom we have various agreements and assurances and the like, and therefore we have a certain responsibility with regard to them, although they are not our nationals. These problems continue, and must continue to interest the House.

Then there are those other problems of foreign establishments in India, and the House and our country is naturally impatient about them and does not like this delay in their solution. That is true. Nobody likes it. Not only do we not like it in the present from a political point of view, but from many others: they are centres of smuggling, of intrigues and trouble, danger spots

2. Vijayalakshmi Pandit was elected President of the eighth session of UN General Assembly on 14 September in succession to Lester Pearson.

even in time of peace. And suppose, unfortunately, some kind of war broke out in parts of the world, they might well become even greater danger spots. We have said quite clearly in this House that if war breaks out anywhere—it does not matter between whom it is—so far as we are concerned, we will not admit the right of any part of India, including those parts that are called foreign establishments in India, to be associated with that war in any way. I want to make it perfectly clear that if these places are used, directly or indirectly, in connection with a war, we shall have to take action to stop that. I say that not, obviously, in any sense as a threat, but because it is well to make clear some things so that others may be aware of the consequences of some action they might conceivably indulge in.

Having said that, I have also to put before the House my view as to how we should deal with these problems basically, not in detail. That is to say, it is easy enough for us to talk of strong measures, and it will not be difficult to take such measures in their limited significance. But nothing is limited in this matter, more especially when these establishments are connected with nations abroad, some great nations, some small. Then the consequences are far-reaching. And I think that the House agrees with me that to take some step, merely because of our impatience and irritation, some step which might produce these far-reaching consequences, which might entangle us in all kinds of difficulties will not help us in bringing about the solution that we desire. After all, the way of peaceful approach, though it may appear rather humdrum, brings results more speedily and, what is more, does not leave any trail of bitterness which is left among nations even after they have won a victory.

Therefore we have proceeded in regard to these foreign establishments firmly, I think, in the declaration of our policy—in the sense of pursuing that policy in a quiet way but at the same time peacefully and not trying to take, what I would call, measures that are not peaceful. We are perfectly alive to the questions relating to them. We are constantly giving thought and taking such action as may appear expedient within the four corners of that peaceful approach. The other day we withdrew our representative from Lisbon and closed our Legation there.³ That was a gesture, no doubt. But it was an important gesture showing how we are going in a particular direction, step by step. No doubt that step will have to be followed by other steps. I need not, before this House, go into the reasoning about these foreign establishments. But for the sake of others who might perhaps read or hear my words I should like to express my amazement at the fact that any country could still think of holding on any foreign country, could still think of having its footholds in India, holding on any territory in India, after the great changes that have

3. On 10 June 1953.

taken place in India and elsewhere. So far as we are concerned, we are against any colonial rule in any part of the world. It is true we do not, because of our—if you like—weakness, do much about it. And because we do not do much about it we do not shout much about it, because shouting without doing does not help.

We are against all forms of colonial rule. We also recognize that in a complicated situation it is not always easy merely to solve a problem by trying to give effect to a slogan. It may take time. We recognize also that the days of the old imperialisms are obviously ended—in a large measure they have ended. They continue undoubtedly in places in Asia and Africa, and sometimes create much mischief. The old imperialisms are past history. They may carry on in the present for a while. But even though they are past history, it is extraordinary how old vested interests cling on to what they have got to the bitter end. Now, if we are against all forms of colonial domination and rule, how much more must we object to anything actually on the soil of India? If we object even in Africa or a part of Asia, surely our objection will be infinitely greater for anything of that kind in India itself. And therefore, it is quite impossible for us as a Government and as a people to tolerate any foreign foothold in any part of India. But I think, if I may say so with all humility, we have shown a great deal of wisdom in not precipitating these matters and bringing about conflicts in order to solve them because any such attempt, I think, would have led to other problems and more difficult problems. I shall not say much more about these questions.

In regard to Ceylon, I would say this, that, as the House knows, I had talks with the Prime Minister of Ceylon⁴—friendly talks—in which we tried to understand each other's difficulties, and I am prepared to say to this House that I recognized the difficulties before the Prime Minister of Ceylon. It is not that he has no difficulties and he is just obstinate. He and his Government have got difficulties as we all of us have, but difficulties should not come in the way of what are obviously right solutions. That is another matter. In recognizing the difficulties the Prime Minister of Ceylon and his Government had, I went some distance in agreeing, in putting forward suggestions which normally I would not have agreed to. But it has been an axiom of our policy that we should live on friendly and cooperative terms with our neighbouring countries, and Ceylon is very much a neighbour, very much akin to us and it seems almost, I shall say, a tragedy for me to think of any conflict between a country like Ceylon so akin to us and this great country of India. So we approached Ceylon in a friendly way, we made clear the limits to which we

4. Nehru had talks with Dudley Senanayake in London in June 1953. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.22, pp. 350 and 524.

can go, beyond which we cannot go without sacrificing the interests of hundreds of thousands of people and making them homeless and Stateless wanderers because, remember, the question is of these people who are no longer Indian citizens or Indian nationals and who, if they are not absorbed in Ceylon, not considered as Ceylon citizens now or later, become Stateless and homeless. I hope that this question of people of Indian descent in Ceylon will be further considered in the same friendly way between the two Governments and between the Prime minister of Ceylon and me, and that we succeed in finding some solution which must obviously be to the advantage of both countries. It is not a question of Ceylon thinking that India, a great big country to the north of it, is trying to bring any pressure or coercion. I do not wish to put it that way, and that is why I do not like anyone here using the language of threat to or in regard to this question in Ceylon. Certainly we have to be clear and we have to be firm about our policy, but we have always to put it forward in a friendly way without rousing any apprehension on the other side.

In regard to South Africa, that question has become, shall I say, a frozen or a petrified question which does not show the slightest improvement and shows some continuing deterioration. That question, of course, has passed outside the limited sphere in which we raised it originally, in which it was. It has become a much wider issue in South Africa. It has become an issue not of people of Indian descent and the White settlers of South Africa, but a question of the great majority of the population of the Union of South Africa, that is, the Africans themselves, and a major question of racial discrimination. There is this racial discrimination in many places in the world, especially in Africa, but more especially in South Africa. In other places it takes place, but there is an element of apology about it, but in South Africa there is no apology. It is blatant. It is shouted out, and no excuse is put forward for it. In fact, this question in South Africa has become one of the major issues, major tests of the world, because there can be not a shadow of a doubt that if that policy of racial discrimination—of a master race dominating over other races, some colonies and settlers from Europe presuming to dominate for ever the populations of Asia or Africa—is sought to be justified, then obviously there are forces in this world—not in your or my opinion only, but in this world—which will fight that to the end. Because those days are past when such things were tolerated in theory or even in practice. Therefore, this issue in South Africa, though it apparently lies low today—to some extent it does not lie low, but other problems have somehow overshadowed it—is one of the basic issues in the world today which may well shake up this world. We have seen other aspects of this racial discrimination and colonialism in other parts of Africa. We have been accused—we meaning India, has been accused—of interfering in the affairs of other countries, in Africa. We have also been

accused of, well, some kind of imperialist tendency which wants to spread out in Africa and take possession of those delectable lands which now the European settlers occupy. As a matter of fact, this House knows very well that all along, for these many years, we have been laying the greatest stress on something which is rather unique—I think unique in the sense that I am not aware of any other country which has laid stress in that particular way on that policy. I do not mean to say that we are very virtuous and all that, and others, other countries, are not, but we have rather gone out of our way to tell our own people in Africa, in East Africa, or in some other parts of Africa, that they can expect no help from us, no protection from us if they seek any special rights in Africa which are not in the interests of the people of Africa. We shall help them; we have told them: “We shall help you. Naturally we are interested in protecting you, your dignity or interests but not if you go at all against the people of Africa, because you are their guests and if they do not want you, out you will have to go bag and baggage and we will not come in your way.”

Now, that is a very clear statement which sometimes, naturally, has not been welcomed by our people in East Africa, many of the merchant classes there who have done well; but it is our firm policy and I want them—our Indians abroad—to realize it, and I want others to realize it too. And if that is our firm policy, we cannot actually remain quiescent when things happen in various parts of Africa which, apart from affecting Indians as such, might create dangerous world situations. In Africa, one sees today in its extremist form both racial discrimination and domination, and the old colonialism at work. Recently in North Africa various developments took place⁵ which, well, one used to read about in the histories of the second part of the 19th century, and it is amazing that that kind of thing can continue to be repeated now, in the middle of the 20th century. It may perhaps apparently succeed for a while, but I very much doubt if any such policy can possibly bring any measure of success. Because the fact of the matter is that it has become almost impossible to terrorize the people into submission today, wherever the people may be. We have seen in a country, in a famous country, but in a weak country—a very weak country, either financially or militarily, or otherwise—a weak country in Western Asia which has had ups and downs and troubles in recent years, how many great powers could not force it into coming and following their wishes in some matters. Now, I am not going into the merits of these things. But my point is that it has become almost impossible for this method

5. The French colonial authorities had dealt severely with the nationalist movements in Morocco and Tunisia. The Sultan of Morocco, who supported the nationalist movement, was forcibly deposed in August 1953 and a large number of his supporters and workers of the Istiqlal (Independence) Party were arrested.

of coercion to be applied by one country against another. Of course, there are many ways of it, not merely military coercion; there may be promises of reward, there may be help and all that. But the conditions that have arisen today make it increasingly difficult for even the powerful countries to impose their will on the weak. To some extent, they might do it. Now, if that is so, how much more difficult or impossible it is for one powerful country to seek to impose its will on another powerful country? It is patently not possible today, and if one tries to do that, or both try to do that against each other, the result can only be conflict—ultimately war. And that is why we come up against this situation in the world today, this approach of great powers to each other in anger, in fear, in hatred—all this resulting in a continuing thing which has been called ‘cold war’ and which always thinks merely in terms of some future shooting war. And the problem before all of us in the world is, whether a big war is inevitable and, therefore, one must prepare for it and go in for it when it comes, or whether it can be avoided. That is a big problem. Nobody can prophesy; but I have no doubt that vast number of people in the world—in fact, I would say, nearly all the people in the world, in every country—obviously desire peace. And yet I must confess that recent events have made me slightly more doubtful of any permanent settlements in the near future. I do not, of course, rule them out; I think there are chances and we should work for them. But when one sees the temper of peoples’ minds and of statesmen’s minds which are moved, as I said, by that old something, approaching that old religious fervour, without the virtue of religion in it, then anything might happen.

We have heard or read about a long argument, about the shape of a table—whether it should be a round table or a square table or an oblong table.⁶ But the real question is of the shape and content of peoples’ minds. It does not matter what kind of table you use or whether you have no table and sit in the good old Indian way of squatting on a *takht* or a floor. The point is, how to approach these problems, and if you approach them in a spirit of warfare, well, then naturally the consequences are different. The House knows that the name of India came up repeatedly before the Political Committee of the United Nations some little while ago and the proposal was made that India might be made a member of the political conference that is the child of the armistice in Korea. India was put in a somewhat embarrassing position. We did not put our name forward and—I am perfectly sincere and honest in what I say—we did not want any additional burden. At the same time, we

6. There was discussion among nations concerning the terms of reference of the political conference on Korea. Countries like China, India and Canada were in favour of a round table basis of discussion. Also see pp. *post*, 500-528.

were strongly of opinion—and naturally—that this political conference should succeed, that there should be a settlement, a peaceful settlement, in the Far East of Asia, and that if we could help in that, we should not run away from that help, even if it might involve a burden on us. So, placed in this position, we did not put ourselves forward at all. But other countries, thinking that the presence of India there would be helpful, put our name forward. To the last, we made it clear that we could only function if the two major powers to this dispute wanted us to function. We were not interested in being pushed in by one party against the will of the other. And when I say 'the two major parties', I do not refer to any particular country, however big it may be, but the two parties being, on the one side, the United Nations, and on the other, the Chinese and the North Korean Commands. Those were the two parties which brought about the armistice, and the political conference which flows from the armistice would also ultimately be concerned with those two parties as such. I repeat this because there was some confusion which was attached to what we had said about this matter in the United Nations. So this matter, as the House knows, came to a vote and in the voting there was a considerable majority in favour of India and a big minority against it and a number of abstentions. But there was not the two-thirds majority that would have been necessary if it went to the Plenary Session. At that later stage we begged those who had put our names forward not to press for it and so India was out of it.

But certain interesting consequences flowed from this vote. If that voting is analyzed, you will see that apart from the four countries who voted against India, there were 21 votes, 18 of them from the Americas, 17 from what is called Latin America. Now, I have the greatest respect for the countries of Latin America. Let there be no mistake about it. But the facts stand out that nearly the whole of Europe and nearly the whole of Asia wanted one thing in this political conference while a number of countries, all the Americas, did not want it. They have as much right not to want it as they have to want it. But the question that we have been considering is an Asian question, a question of Asia, and is the will of Asia to be flouted, is the will of Asia and Europe jointly to be flouted because some people who really are not concerned with this question so intimately feel that way? That is an extraordinary position.

It is interesting because in spite of the major developments that have taken place in the world during the last few years, somehow it is not realized by many of the great powers of the world that the countries of Asia, however weak they might be, do not propose to be ignored, do not propose to be bypassed and certainly do not propose to be sat upon. The whole of Asia has been and is in a state of ferment. Changes are taking place and revolutionary changes—whether you may like it or you may not like it, it is there. If you make an objective study you will see that the old days of pressure are gone

and are going, and something new is coming in its place. Anyhow the old imperialisms have gone except here and there where they hold on for a while. Unless this fact is recognized by the rest of the world—I believe it is being increasingly recognized—you do not get a correct appreciation, a correct understanding of the world today.

The House knows that one of the issues before the United Nations for some time past has been whether the People's Government of China should be accepted there as a member or not. There has been some confusion of thought about this matter when people talk about China being admitted into the United Nations. There is no question of the admission of China; China is one of the founder members of the United Nations. The only question that can arise is who represents China. Can any one say that the present Government of the island of Formosa represents China? Factually, can any undertaking given by the Government of Formosa be carried out in China? Obviously not. They cannot speak for China. They cannot function there; they cannot give an assurance at the table on behalf of China. Therefore, it becomes completely unreal, artificial, to talk about China being represented in the United Nations or in the Security Council by someone who cannot speak for China, who cannot do anything in China, who cannot affect China and can only at the utmost express strong disapproval of China. This is one of the basic things which have been levelled against the politics of the United Nations.

How is this question or like questions considered? As I said, it is no question of likes or dislikes in this matter but of following certain basic realities, trying to change them, if you like. The other day—I think it was yesterday—I saw in the papers that it has been agreed amongst certain great powers that the question of China's inclusion should not be considered this year or this session—something very much like that.⁷ Now, I have no objection to doing things in a way which brings forward the least conflict. It may be that that takes a little time. But the kind of approach that I see is that an obviously wrong thing is perpetuated and a whole castle is sought to be built on an artificial foundation; and then, if something goes wrong afterwards, complaint is made. It does seem to me to signify that politically these international spheres seem to be getting more and more removed from the realm of logic and reasoning and that is why I said we are entering a bigoted

7. A report published in *The Hindustan Times* of 15 September quoted the Washington correspondent of the *Sunday Times* as saying that Britain and the US had agreed to sponsor a resolution in the UN temporarily opposing the admission of China to the General Assembly. The US wished Chinese exclusion for the whole session, but Britain was willing to agree on it only for the immediate autumn meeting. According to the correspondent, the resolution would forestall the possibility of another breach between Britain and the US like that over India's admission to the Korean political conference.

sphere of religion. It is a dangerous sphere applied to politics; applied to ethics and morals, religion is all right, but if it enters the political sphere it has a minus effect on morals; it is only sheer bigotry.

That is why in another context we have ventured to point out the danger of mixing politics with religion and calling it communalism in this country. However, here is this peculiar position in the world today, when it is not possible for one great country to coerce any other great country. It cannot do so. They are too big to be coerced by anybody. What then is the way out? Well, one, of course, is war, an attempt to coerce one by the other. The other is to give up the idea of coercion, accepting the fact as it is and trying to arrive, if you like, if not at a permanent settlement, at least at a temporary understanding of live and let live. That is possible, because the only other alternative means conflict on a major scale and in these days of atomic and hydrogen bombs the House can well imagine what the result of that will be.

Now, these matters are coming up before the United Nations soon and I understand that the People's Government of China in their reply to the United Nations' proposals have made some counter-proposals.⁸ First of all, it should be remembered that all the parties agreed to the fact of a political conference being held in Korea to carry on the work of the armistice and to try to settle the problems there. They agreed to the functions of that conference. The only question that is being considered or is in controversy is the composition of that conference. It should be remembered also that a conference like that does not proceed by majority vote. It does not decide that way—obviously not. It has to decide by more or less — if not unanimity — consensus of opinion, and agreement of the major parties concerned. So it does not much matter whether there are a few more on this side or that side, except that the more there are, a larger crowd may create difficulty in getting down to business; otherwise, there is no particular difficulty.

The real question that arises is whether there should be neutral countries represented in this conference. It has been our view that it would be helpful if such countries are represented, simply because they can sometimes help in toning down differences and easing a tense situation. The real agreement will naturally have to come between the others. The neutral is not going to bring about an agreement; he will only help in providing a certain atmosphere which might lead the others to agree. However, that is a matter for the United Nations and the other party to decide and we have absolutely no desire to be there in this conference. We have undertaken a very heavy burden in Korea as it is. We are in this Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and we have sent our troops there, and they have only begun their work there. But from

8. See *post*, pp. 525-526.

such information as we have received, they are having to face considerable difficulties. It is not at all an easy matter for them to deal with—not difficulties, if I may say so, from the South Korean people; well, they hardly come in contact with them—but other difficulties. Somehow passions have been so roused among these prisoners that it is not particularly easy to deal with them. But thus far, honourable Members must have seen from reports in the Press, the way our officers and men have handled this question has elicited the praise of everybody there and I should like our representatives there in the Commission as well as the officers and men in the Armed Forces to feel that they have the goodwill and active sympathy of this House and of the country.

I would not like to discuss these matters that are before the United Nations in greater detail, because that might well prove embarrassing to our own representatives there or to us or to other countries. They are difficult questions. Some honourable Members suggest in a fit of frustration that we should withdraw from the United Nations. That, if I may say so with all respect, is immaturity. It is not an understanding of the question. One cannot run away like this from a problem. The United Nations, in spite of all its failings—and they are many—nevertheless is a great world organization. It does contain within it the seeds of hope and peace, and it would be a most unfortunate and rather perverse attitude for any country to try to destroy this structure because it is not to its entire liking. And apart from that, if a country does that, have no doubt that it is that country which would suffer more than the organization. So, from the narrowest point of view it is no good. We cannot remain isolated in the world, cut off from everything, and living a life of our own in our limited sphere. Most of us in India are so situated—the House will forgive me for this observation—as to be normally isolated in our minds, in our social habits, in our eating, in our drinking, in our marrying, etc. We isolate ourselves in castes, this division and that division, with the result that it is a unique habit in India which does not prevail anywhere else in the world. We live in compartments, and therefore, perhaps naturally, we think in terms of isolation easily as a country too. But the fact is that that isolation in the past has weakened us tremendously and left us rather in the lurch when the world has advanced in terms of science or other developments, and we were left behind. So it is a dangerous thought—this thought of isolation—and we have to keep in touch with the rest of the world, naturally keeping to our own ways. That way, we may learn things from others. But we cannot be isolated. In fact, no country can be. Therefore, to talk of getting out of the United Nations or of otherwise keeping apart from all these problems is not to take cognizance of the realities of the situation.

There is one other matter to which I should like to refer before I close my present remarks, and that is Kashmir. I have already informed the House—

on two occasions, I think—of certain developments in Kashmir in the course of the last five or six weeks. Those developments did not come out of the air or as a result of some secret conspiracy. Those who had been following events in Kashmir saw this crisis developing for several months past, and the crisis was not so much a crisis vis-a-vis India — though we may take that aspect also — but it was an internal crisis which had affected all other relations and questions. Before I went to Europe in May, I paid a brief visit to Srinagar. I had always kept myself in fairly close touch with events there. I went at the end of May there, and I was surprised and distressed to see what was happening there—what had happened regarding the state of affairs—economic, political and other—internally.

In the past couple of years, Kashmir has been praised by us for various land reforms and they were very good reforms. I do not withdraw my praise for those reforms. But, unfortunately, while the reforms were good, the manner of giving effect to them was not good. It was not good in two ways: one, that other consequences were not thought of; secondly, in the actual implementation

The other thing which gave me some disquiet, a good deal of it, was the fact that over a year ago we had arrived at some kind of an agreement with the Kashmir Government¹⁰ which the House knows well. This House approved of it; the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir approved of it. It was in a very small part given effect to and then the rest remained in cold storage. Now, I could very well understand certain difficulties which, perhaps, the House does not appreciate. So, if there was some delay I would not have minded it. This delay was largely caused by certain events in Jammu which suddenly accentuated a peculiar situation and produced its reactions in the Kashmir Valley. It produced its powerful reactions in the Kashmir Valley and those who are not friends of ours, or friends of the Kashmir Government, exploited this position fully. This created another tremendous complication there and delayed the implementation of the agreement.

All these things worked together and, as I said, when I went there in May last I was gravely disturbed. I went away to Europe.

When I was away my respected colleague, the Education Minister,¹¹ who has been closely connected with developments in Kashmir, and my colleague, the States Minister,¹² who also, in his official capacity, has been connected with it and who had followed developments there, visited Kashmir. The Education Minister went there at the invitation of the Government and gave them a lot of good advice. Nevertheless conditions continued to deteriorate and when I came back these reports reached me. I invited Shaikh Abdullah to come to Delhi. In fact, even when I was in Europe I had sent word that he should be invited. On return I invited him. He did not come; then he said he would come a little later. Later again this invitation was repeated by telephone, by letter. Ultimately he did not come. Meanwhile—in fact, before I had come back, Shaikh Abdullah and some others began speaking in a way which seemed strange to me and distressed us greatly. I could do nothing about it, except to remonstrate with him and ask him why he did so. Obviously he was troubled by these problems to which I have referred, economic and others, that had arisen in Kashmir and for which he could not see any easy remedy. There were remedies, of course; there are remedies, but he did not see them. So he drifted in a different direction, and rather unfairly cast the blame for some of the economic occurrences there on the Government of India—lack of help or whatever it is. Anyhow the position we took throughout was that it is for the Kashmir Government to decide what policy they will follow. Let their party decide, let the Government decide and have one policy. If that policy was in

10. The Delhi Agreement. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 19, pp. 211-309.

11. Abul Kalam Azad.

12. K.N. Katju.

keeping with the Government of India's policy, as we would like it, of course, and as we have always endeavoured it to be, to have a joint policy in regard to matters affecting Kashmir, well and good. If not, if the Kashmir Government had a policy with which we differed completely, then it was up to us, the Government of India,—I told Shaikh Abdullah and other members of his Government — to sit together and consider, even if we parted company, what we could do about it.

The fact of the matter was that Shaikh Abdullah himself was in a minority in his Government in these matters, and a still smaller minority in his party, It was that which produced this element of confusion. So, apart from giving good advice and feeling rather distressed, I felt I could do very little. The situation was developing in this way. Ultimately it blew up as the House knows and changes took place.

Now, having been connected with Kashmir, politically speaking, for a trifle over twenty years and having been intimately connected in the Government with all these developments that have occurred during the past six or seven years, the House can well imagine the extreme distress that all these developments have caused me. It is not a personal matter, I mean. We have always considered this Kashmir problem as symbolic for us, as having far-reaching consequences in India. Kashmir was symbolic for us to illustrate that we were a secular State, that Kashmir with a majority, a large majority of Muslims, nevertheless of its own free will wished to be associated with India. It had consequences both in India and Pakistan, because if we disposed of Kashmir on the basis of that old two-nation theory, well, then, obviously millions of people in India and millions in East Pakistan would be powerfully affected. All kinds of consequences would flow from it. Many of those wounds that had healed might open out again. So that this problem was not, it has never been, a problem of a patch of territory being with India or not. It has been a problem of infinitely deeper consequence.

Kashmir is a place of infinite beauty. What is more, Kashmir is a place of great strategic importance, and it has always been unfortunate for a country to be situated strategically, because envious eyes fall upon it. Certainly, so far as we are concerned, it is desirable for us from a strategic point of view. But however that may be, we cannot impose our desire or wish in this matter. Therefore, we have put it aside and right from the beginning we have laid stress on this, that the people of Kashmir should decide this question — not other considerations. We have held by it, and we hold by it still, that they must decide it in the proper way, in the proper context, not in the way that one would imagine some people in the Pakistan Press want it done. We have been pretty well used to the tone and contents of the Pakistan Press and sometimes to the statements of their people, more or less responsible people, in the past few years, but the actuality in the last few weeks has far exceeded

the wildest of my imagination in this respect. It is amazing that there should be so much wild hysteria without the slightest justification. I can understand irritation, I can understand strong language, but this type of wild hysteria does rather make one feel that one is not dealing with a matter which can be dealt with by logic or reasoning or by any argument.

As for the kind of facts, so-called facts, that are given in the Pakistan Press about happenings in Kashmir, they are so very very far from truth that they cannot be called exaggerations. The number given as killed in Kashmir, I say, is false, whoever may say it — and there are people who have said it in Delhi — and I say, after due enquiry, that these statements of happenings in Kashmir are 100 per cent false. I say so with full responsibility having sent our own men regardless of the Kashmir Government....¹³

I wish Dr Khare would not behave all the time like a Pakistani.

Of course, there has been trouble in Kashmir; of course, there have been disturbances, demonstrations and all that; I do not wish to minimize that. Big things have happened; big upsets have happened, because the National Conference which represented the national movement during all these years there had a sudden split — some on one side and some on the other. All these things have happened. I should say, taking everything into consideration, that it is surprising that very little trouble has happened there, not so much. Anyhow, we have to approach this question with as much calm and wisdom as we possess. It is a difficult question and I repeat that that question is going to be decided ultimately by the wishes of the people of Kashmir. Whether it is Kashmir or any other part, we are not going to hold it by strength of arms.

Now, a great deal has been said. Much has been said about foreign interference in Kashmir. These kinds of charges are often made, and if there is a modicum of truth in them, that is greatly exaggerated as expressed and it becomes a little difficult to deal with them. In a matter of this kind, it is not easy for me to state every fact, that may come in our knowledge, before the House, but, broadly speaking, I would say that in the course of the last few weeks, in the course of past few months and some time more, hard cases of this type of interference have come before us—individual interference. It would not be correct to call it governmental interference, but individuals have not behaved properly, because again you must remember the basic fact that Kashmir is a highly strategic area. Many countries are interested in it and they seek sources of information, intelligence and all those things. You go to Kalimpong. It is a nest of spies, international spies of every country—it is perfectly amazing and sometimes I begin to doubt if the greater part of the

13. At this stage, N.B. Khare of the Hindu Mahasabha quipped, "Thank you for once."

population is not. News comes out of Kalimpong which sometimes may have some relation to truth — usually it has none. So that inevitably in a place like Kashmir, the people are interested and individuals are interested. There is espionage and the rest, but having said it, it would be unfair for those wild accusations to be made in the Press or elsewhere. Individuals have functioned there. I suppose they try to get contacts and sometimes no doubt the information is passed on from hand to hand and all that and we have checked it often enough, but that kind of thing is happening in international affairs in many places — not in Kashmir only. It may be that sometimes it happens even in the city of Delhi. So I don't think it is right for these wild accusations to be thrown out, and if there is any trifle evidence of something, well, naturally we take action. If there is not, mere shouting is not helpful; in fact, it is definitely harmful.

The House knows that recently I saw the Prime Minister of Pakistan when he was here in Delhi and we issued a statement which was an agreed statement.¹⁴ Soon after the return of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, a tremendous propaganda started there in the Press, partly against me and partly against our country as a whole. Now, I should like to say that Mr Mohammad Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and I discussed this question at great length and we discussed it in a very friendly way, trying to find some way out of the difficulty, trying to take at least one step, if we cannot decide about others immediately. And, therefore, I was surprised at this barrage of Press propaganda, from Karachi especially and later from Lahore. This was chiefly directed to the subject of Admiral Nimitz being Plebiscite Administrator or not. It so happens that since the day Mr Mohammad Ali left Delhi — since the day our statement was issued to the Press, I have not discussed this subject in public anywhere till today. I have not said a word in public — in private or in the Cabinet I might have mentioned a little of it, but I have not seen a pressman as a pressman. And an enormous barrage of propaganda started that I was undermining this agreement that I have made with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and undermining it, well, apparently through the devious method of bringing in Admiral Nimitz into it. I confess I have been greatly surprised at this and I found some difficulty in dealing with it, in correspondence elsewhere,¹⁵ with a situation which seems to me difficult to understand or grasp. Here I am, quietly sitting here, and I am being accused of this kind of deep conspiracy. Well, I should like to make it perfectly clear,

14. See *ante*, pp. 344-346.

15. See *ante*, pp. 353-358 and 361-368.

and I am quite certain that Mr Mohammad Ali has not only not liked this but actively disliked much of this propaganda there.¹⁶

Now, so far as Admiral Nimitz is concerned, he is a very eminent person and I would hate to see anything at all in criticism of him. He is a person whom I have had the privilege of meeting. He is not only eminent in his own field but otherwise too he struck me as a very admirable person. I have nothing against him. He was appointed as Plebiscite Administrator about more than four years ago. In a sense he functioned, that is to say, he had an office in the United Nations building, maybe for a year. Then, about three years ago, he himself felt that nothing much was happening and was not likely to happen soon. So far as we are concerned, we thought that in all probability the thing had ended. But apart from this, frankly the reason I put forward before Mr Mohammad Ali was this: I said much has happened in these three or four years—just then the discussion in the Political Committee was taking place, this argument about India being in the political conference in Korea or not—I told him quite frankly that if we are to get on with this question of Kashmir, as we want to get on, we must try to isolate it from big power politics. Big powers are admirable individually, and maybe collectively....¹⁷ Therefore I said it will not be fair to any of the big powers to ask them to supply a representative as a Plebiscite Administrator, however admirable he may be, because that would be embarrassing and needlessly creating suspicion, not in my mind necessarily, but in some other big power's mind. I said therefore it is far better for us—there are plenty of countries in Europe and Asia which are fortunately not too big—let us try to select the man from there. That was all that I said, and having said that, as I said in public, it should have gone away anywhere. So, I would beg the House, if I may say so, and the Press and others that in this matter of Kashmir, we should not lose our bearings merely because the Pakistan Press has no bearings at all.

16. During a talk with the Indian High Commissioner, Mohan Sinha Mehta, on 30 August, Mohammad Ali admitted that the propaganda against India in the Pakistan Press was officially inspired and a Cabinet colleague of his was secretly supporting a journalist who had been leading the anti-Indian campaign. Mohammad Ali confided to Mehta that his position was "extremely difficult"; he had once threatened to resign if his policies, including the agreement with Nehru, were not endorsed by his colleagues, and it was then that they had all yielded. Reporting this conversation to Nehru on 2 September, Mehta observed that while some intriguing politicians inside and outside the Cabinet were creating difficulties for Mohammad Ali, and even secretly sabotaging his public policies, "they are not in a position... to have a change in Prime Ministership. No Punjabi would be acceptable to Bengal!.. There is no satisfactory or workable alternative in front of them."

17. At this point, Nehru was interrupted by N.B. Khare, who commented, "Then withdraw the question from the UNO."

We have to keep firm to our position and to hold by the statements we have made and continue functioning calmly and dispassionately. That is the best way of dealing with this situation as indeed with any situation. Whenever any important occurrence takes place, I shall naturally come to the House for the advice of the House, for such guidance as the House can give me.

I have taken a good deal of the time of the House and have referred to some matters. It is a confused picture that one sees all over the world. We may not always unravel it; we may often make mistakes here and there as we no doubt made, but if there are certain basic principles which guide us in our policy, I think that on the whole we shall not go far wrong. It is well known to this House that the policy we have pursued in the past—foreign policy—has not only had a very widespread approval in this country—otherwise we could not have pursued it—but has been progressively appreciated in most countries of the world. And even those who have not agreed with it have reluctantly sometimes expressed their appreciation of it or, at any rate, their understanding of it. If that is so, I have no doubt that we shall continue to pursue that basic policy with such variations as may be necessitated from time to time.¹⁸

18. This statement, which was made in the morning, was followed by a discussion on the motion. Nehru replied to the debate later in the afternoon. See the next item for Nehru's reply.

3. Unanimity on Basic Principles¹

Sir, honourable Members of this House have dealt with what I said so gently and so generously that I feel somewhat embarrassed. There have been certainly some loud and very very strident voices laying stress on some petty matter here and there, but, generally speaking, honourable Members have accepted and approved of all the basic policies, aims and objects that we endeavour to pursue. Now, that is naturally very heartening, although it is sometimes said that if there is some kind of general unanimity one might very well doubt as to the validity of that unanimous opinion.

1. Reply to the debate on foreign policy, 17 September 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)* 1953, Vol. VIII Part II, cols. 4143-4162.

I need not, therefore, say much about these basic matters except to venture to put before the House that every single problem that we have to face—whether it is in the context, let us say, of the foreign establishments in India or of Indians overseas or anything else—is to be viewed today in this big context of the world. I have repeated this perhaps too often, but I do wish to lay stress on this fact. Some might imagine that each problem can be separated and isolated and dealt with in compartments. In the world of today it cannot be done. Every little thing that happens anywhere has its reactions elsewhere.

I suppose the two major problems, territorially speaking, of the world today are the future of Germany and the future of the Far East. They are the two big problems, round about which gather together all these questions of future war or peace. All other problems are secondary; all other problems can be settled or can be disposed of and they do not give rise to these major issues of war or peace in the world.

Now, we are not directly connected with the problems of Germany or of Europe. We are in a sense not directly connected with the problems of Korea, but we are somewhat connected partly because we are nearer to them in many ways, and partly because problems of Asia have a way of acting and interacting among the nations of Asia. But whether we are directly connected or not, well, the fact remains, let us say, that something that happens in Germany or that might happen there is going to have worldwide repercussions. We are interested, we are connected in that way. Of course, we can do nothing about it—maybe, if some questions come up in the United Nations, we may express our opinion. Then again, those two problems are connected very much with the question of rearmament. Now, it would be perhaps not becoming for me to express opinions about other countries—what they want to do or what they do not want to do. But it is rather odd that while, on the one hand, people in the world talk about disarmament, at the same time people also talk and indulge in rearmament. I think Acharya Kripalani said something about our not laying stress on disarmament.² I am sorry if in the course of my previous speech I did not say anything about it. But the fact is that, of course, we do lay stress upon it; all along we have been laying stress upon it. It is of vital significance. It is, in fact, the other side of the picture. That is, once you lessen tension in the world, once people gradually, step by step, go towards some peaceful settlement, then you create an atmosphere for disarmament. Otherwise, talking of disarmament does not mean very much—just as some ardent and enthusiastic people talk about world government,

2. J.B. Kripalani was in complete agreement with the basic principles of India's foreign policy, but wished that India should have stated that she stood for disarmament.

world federal government and the like. Now, I suppose there are many Members here, certainly I am one of them, who believe in that ideal very much more. Believing in it, yet, it seems to me at the present moment a very much unreal thing to talk about. While on the one hand to talk and prepare for war and these conflicts and tensions, and on the other to talk about world government, does not seem to fit in—although it is a right ideal, I have no doubt at all. Perhaps it is good to talk about it so as to prepare people's minds. Anyhow, disarmament is most important, more important than ever before, that is, more important since the coming into the picture of the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb. In fact, if by any manner of means, it could be laid down that the atomic and the hydrogen bombs are not going to be used anyhow, that itself would bring tremendous relief to the world, although I believe there are plenty of other weapons now unknown to those people which are almost equally bad and destructive. So you cannot deal with any question, whether it is the Korean question or the German question or the disarmament question, almost any question, without dealing with the whole lot. You cannot separate them. And, therefore, if this House has to think about a particular question in relation to which we are deeply interested, we cannot isolate it from the rest. That is the difficulty.

The world has grown—it is an obvious thing which has often been said—so close together by various developments that both the power of doing good and the power of doing evil have increased tremendously. We are all the time sitting almost at each other's doorsteps, each country's doorsteps; there is no question of isolating one and getting about the other—it is there. And we have to choose, ultimately, between world cooperation and world disaster. There is hardly any middle way left for any country or any of us.

Now, the United Nations was an earnest attempt to find a way towards some measure of world cooperation. If you read the Charter of the United Nations I think you will be impressed by its noble phraseology. I have no doubt that the fathers of the United Nations meant very well indeed. I have no doubt also that what they did then was perhaps the best they could do in the circumstances. We often criticize the United Nations—what it has done or not done, but the United Nations Organization merely reflects the state of affairs in the world. It is not the fault of the Organization or the Charter; it is a fault of us, that is, individual countries and the States of the world, which is reflected in it. If it is not reflected, then it becomes something unreal, not in touch with what is happening.

There is some talk about the revision of the United Nations Charter. All kinds of proposals are coming in. Some I believe are good; some I think are not good. Some can proceed from that rather unreal point of view, of having some kind of a broad document which does not take into consideration various obvious facts in the world. Facts, I said; here are the facts: that very few

countries dominate the world today by virtue of their military or financial or other strength. It is a fact. It is no good telling those two or three powerful countries, whatever they may be, that you should abide by the majority votes of 20, 30 or 40 countries, little countries spread out all over the world. It is odd enough, as I mentioned this morning, for a question in regard to India's inclusion in this political conference to be decided by the votes of very estimable countries in Central America and South America. In terms of population, there is an enormous difference. In terms of territory or population, there is an enormous difference between those voting on one side and those voting on the other. So you cannot have some kind of paper constitution, a democratic constitution for the United Nations because that ignores the facts of today. You cannot ignore that. That is why when the United Nations started, the fathers of the United Nations tried to make some provision for that. It was perhaps not a happy provision, but it was an inevitable provision at that time. Well, I am not going into this question of changes in the United Nations Charter which would come up in 1955, normally speaking.

But there is this basic question before us as to whether the United Nations, well, is a United Nations or is not—is it something else?—whether it is an organization which offers scope to every independent country to come into it, or whether it is a selective organization of nations representing some particular viewpoint, and closing its doors to countries not representing that viewpoint. That is an important thing, because there is no doubt at all that when the United Nations were formed, it was intended to include all the independent nations of the world—there may be some doubt whether a nation is fully independent or not, but it is a different matter—because there is a tendency today to make the United Nations not an organization of all the nations of the world but of selective nations, however eminent they may be. Now, if that happens, of course, that puts an end to the basic conception which underlay the whole idea of the United Nations. It becomes a group; it may be a powerful group; it may be a big group; it may be a 90 per cent group; but it is a group. It represents not the entire world in a sense—though it would be unfortunate if that development takes place, because inevitably others are left out from their separate groups, and then you have two United Nations, call them what you like.

Now, I wish just to deal with another matter, if I may repeat what I said. The basic fact is that when you have, as you have today, power concentrated in a few nations, a very powerful country—looking at it quite objectively—has no great difficulty in coercing or influencing, to the point of coercion, a very weak country. When you have two, three or four powerful countries which cannot see each other what is going to happen? War may happen. It is an attempt at coercion, by violent means. Whether it is a good thing or not, that is another matter.

We have arrived at a stage when it is patent that power is so equally divided, or at any rate it is not so unevenly divided, between the most powerful countries. I am not thinking in terms of ideologies and views, but am simply presenting the situation objectively. When power is not too unevenly divided, then you cannot coerce either by threat of war, or indeed by war itself. The result is that either you go in for the gamble of war with its inevitable and tremendous destruction, or you come to the conclusion that it is folly to destroy everything, destroy even what you are trying to get: you get nothing out of it.

In fact, if I may say so with all respect, every intelligent person can see today that war has ceased to be a successful instrument of policy in the big sense of the word. Of course, you may have war, it may be thrust upon you—it is a different matter. But generally speaking, it is not a successful or an effective means of policy, as it may have been in the past.

Therefore, the only alternative is to seek ways other than war. How can one do that? Well, first of all try not to interfere with each other, that is, live and let live. Since your interference is not going to lead to getting what you want, the obvious way of discretion is not to do something which leads you nowhere at all, except to large-scale destruction. It does not lead you to what you want to get. That means that one must accept the world as it is, and not interfere with each other, whether ideologically, militarily or otherwise. There may be petty conflicts, there may be all that, but in the major sense one accepts things as they are.

Now, is the world prepared to accept that position, in view of two very powerful nations, blocs, which look at each other with extreme suspicion and fear? I do not know. But I think there is a growing body of opinion, certainly in Europe—I leave out Asia, because Asia is to a large extent outside that picture of conflict—which is the centre of conflict, to live and let live, not to take these risks of war, etc.

We talk of great blocs of nations and all that. There is no doubt that wherever there are large associations, there are also differences of opinion among them, differences of approach, in this direction or that, political, economic and others. So let us not think of solid, integrated blocs here.

So we get to this position that by any intelligent approach there is not virtue left in continuing these major conflicts. Now, for the moment, the current issue is the dominant issue in the sense that if it is solved, undoubtedly it would mean a lessening of tension all over the world. Even as the signing of the armistice brought a lessening of tension, the actual conclusion of some kind of a settlement in the Far East would go a tremendous way and would encourage the forces of peace in the world. On the other hand if that breaks down, if no political conference takes place, obviously tension all over the world increases, not only in the Far East, but in Europe and elsewhere too.

These are the dominating features of today. Behind them, of course, lie other matters, economic, trade, etc., whether you want to divide up this world into separate compartments not dealing with each other, not trading with each other, and so on and so forth.

Again, you will find in Europe, a very strong tendency in most countries of Europe, desiring a relaxation of these barriers, desiring trade between even countries which do not agree with each other on other matters. I have no doubt that if there was such trade it would help in lessening this tension. I venture to put this particular aspect before the House again so that we might consider our other problems in the light of this.

Now, a few questions were put to me. Practically speaking the major point which was stressed by some honourable Members opposite was an old theme. In fact, many old themes were repeated today, but the major one was our continued association with the Commonwealth. I confess to a feeling of surprise at this constant reiteration of an empty theme—of something which may be, of course, talked about in language of eloquence and passion, but something which has no content, I say. I want to see the content in it: I want them to tell me the content: I was waiting and waiting to hear the content of it—but nothing; only as the honourable Member, Professor H.N. Mukerjee said, 'contamination'—let us not be contaminated.³ I am afraid this is an old Hindu caste outlook coming in this business of untouchability; I said this morning that the terrible thing is that we are getting back in world politics—not we in India, but all over the world—this bigoted religious frame of mind without some of the saving graces of religion, and you see this business of untouchability, this business of not meeting, not talking. I am not blaming any one country—it is fairly widespread on every side. Now, this is not only a wrong approach, it is an approach which puts an end to the right approach, that is the approach to seek for a settlement. Obviously, if you treat the other as an untouchable, as something that contaminates, then obviously there is no settlement, you remain apart. You may have conflict, or if you subsist apart from each other you may do so for some time.

3. H.N. Mukerjee of the Communist Party of India cautioned against linking India's destiny with the Americans and the British who, he said, were "running the world to ruination." Mukerjee asked, if India could take up with the UN, through the Asian-African bloc, the question of Tunisia and Morocco, what prevented her from taking the issue of Malaya or of Kenya to the UN. He further said, "Let us be doing right things...and not be contaminated by continuous contact with these imperialist forces which have not changed and which cannot possibly change their complexion and their character."

Now, take this business of this Commonwealth association again. I should like to know, I repeat, what we have done, or what we have refrained from doing which we ought to have done, because of this Commonwealth association. I should like to know, because that is the test, surely. There is no other test, except your likes and dislikes: you do not want to be with them. This contamination business is another matter. That is no argument, and if at all that is a wrong argument put forward. There are countries in the world which have been associated in the past greatly, and in the present somewhat also, with these old imperialisms and colonial domains, etc. Undoubtedly so. There are countries in the present which have expansionist tendencies. I am not blaming them. Great power brings in expansionist tendencies, wherever it may be, whatever ideology pursued by the country may be—tendency to influence, tendency to bring round, tendency practically to coerce other countries and come into line with them. That everyday happens all over the place in the name of peace. What is that? Call it by any name you like. Therefore, I should like to know which of them—which of us—is free from blame. Are we blameless in all our actions? We talk about Indo-Pakistan relations and I have myself often criticized what had happened in Pakistan and what had happened in India, in the last few years. I have very often reminded the House that we are open to blame and I am not able to say that we are blameless in regard to Indo-Pakistan relations. If we were completely blameless, then no amount of blame on the part of Pakistan would come in the way. That may be a theoretical proposition, but I think it is fundamentally true that ultimately if you are completely in the right, you will win through. But nobody ever is 100 per cent in the right—that is a different matter. I say that this business of trying to consider ourselves as pinnacles of virtue and others bad and not to be contacted with, is not either good politics or good sense. It has no real meaning. They come into contact with each other—the countries of the world in the United Nations. They smile and laugh with each other whatever they may say in their public speeches there. They come into contact in their various chancelleries elsewhere—our Ambassadors are constantly doing, and rightly doing so. There is no other way to get on in this world. Therefore, let us not talk about this.

Also, if we constantly think in terms of the past, that is also not good. We never catch up with the present and never prepare for the future. If we are continuously thinking, let us say, what the British did in India was bad, it will produce complex in us and produce complex in other countries. Fortunately, I think it is an extraordinary thing that we have more or less got over that complex in India because of the manner of solving this problem with England. Of course, memories may remain, but it has been a major event for ages that this problem has been solved so as not to leave any complex behind. So, everybody knows about Britain's imperialism in the past

and the relics of it today. Other imperialism everybody knows; also of other countries today which are expansionist, which are even sitting on the heads of imperialist countries of today. So, how are we to deal with it? Not by retiring into purdah ourselves, but we have to deal with those countries and deal with them not in an unrealistic way, not cursing everybody for the evils they did. I try to avoid this as far as I can. We ought to avoid mere denouncing and criticism of other countries for their internal deeds just because we don't like them. We should avoid that on the whole. Sometimes those internal happenings may affect the human race—that is a different matter. Suppose there are some questions in Africa. I have no desire, from a variety of points of view, to criticize any of the happenings in East Africa or North Africa which are not the concern of India, politically speaking, but there are two things that induce me to say something about this. One is the tradition of the last at least two generations in India. We have grown up, all of us, in certain traditions—anti-imperialist, anti-communal, anti-racial domination and having grown up in them one cannot easily submit to these things, but one should restrain oneself realizing that constant talking and denouncing does no good to that part of our training. The other fact is that there are some things, if I may say so, which raise the question of the extent to which racial discrimination has proceeded in various parts of Africa and that raises a human problem of the utmost magnitude. When such human problems arise, then it is wrong to be silent. Therefore, we may have to say something—we may do it in a restrained way—because it is a sign of your strength and your mode of judgment. If you refer to these things in a restrained manner, it goes further instead of merely shouting about it, which is no indication of strength at any time.

So coming back to this question of the Commonwealth and looking back over these 5 or 6 years, and especially during the last nearly 3½ years, that is to say, since we became a Republic, I have not a shadow of a doubt in my mind that our association with the Commonwealth has helped us and helped the causes for which we stand. I have no doubt in my mind. That does not mean that I approve of everything that happens in the Commonwealth. Obviously I am entirely opposed to everything that is happening in the Union of South Africa, but that does not affect my being in the Commonwealth. Am I to leave the United Nations because I don't like some countries thereof? I seek as many spheres of cooperation as possible. For instance, India functions in the Arab-Asian group. There is nothing to bind us to it. We function and go our way. We function with every individual country to the east of India in a very friendly way. Nobody talks about that. We function in the Commonwealth with complete freedom to do what we choose. How does this affect our freedom, I want to know. In fact, I think that our entry into the Commonwealth has enabled India to play a more vigorous role in our affairs

and to advance the causes we stand for than we might otherwise have done. I do not want to put it at a high level; we must talk and think in modest ways. Undoubtedly we do play a role in the world today. That role is all the greater because we work in various associations of nations, whether it is the Arab-Asian, whether it is the Commonwealth, and so on.

Shri Mukerjee read various statements and various articles from newspapers and from periodicals. It is an extraordinary thing, because certain of the periodicals that he does not approve of have said in praise of me, not from their point of view, nor yours and not mine. That in itself must prove that he had gone wrong. He also read from *The Economist* where something was said about General Smuts and me.⁴ It may be he is thinking all that is right. Are we to know our actions and our policies by quotations from such periodicals and newspapers?

One thing rather surprised me. Shri Mukerjee read from an answer that the Colonial Secretary of the United Kingdom laid in the House of Commons of the British Parliament. When some reference was made, a question was put about what I had said here in India—it was I think at a meeting of the All India Congress Committee in Agra. I had said something about events in Africa.⁵ I did not mention any particular question of Africa, but I had expressed myself in fairly vigorous language about these happenings in Africa. And the question being asked, the Colonial Secretary gave the reply which, I think, Professor Mukerjee read out. The question was:

So and so asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what representations Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have made to the Government of India regarding recent official public statements by leading Ministers which have led to an increase in the unrest and racial tension existing in Eastern Africa.

4. In fact, Mukerjee quoted from an article "Changing Commonwealth", published in the *Fortnightly Review* of August 1953, wherein Lord Birdwood, a former Commander-in-Chief of India, had, while referring to Nehru's acceptance of the British Commonwealth, compared him with General Smuts, and said that Nehru might "well be experiencing something of that readjustment of the human faculty of loyalty which was the great feature of the early years of Smuts." Mukerjee also quoted from *The Economist* of 27 June 1953 which said that both Nehru and Mohammad Ali were keenly aware of the British views on the subject of the security of the Middle-East and "there is certainly much to be said for any policy which could lead to the positive exercise of joint Indian and Pakistani influence on Middle-East affairs." Mukerjee wanted Nehru "to beware of the tendencies which are the inevitable concomitants of the imperialist system."
5. See *ante*, pp. 22 and 29.

Mr Lyttelton: I assume that my honourable Friend is referring to recent speeches by Mr Nehru, in which occurred certain remarks about conditions in Africa. Mr Nehru has been left in no doubt that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom categorically reject these remarks in relation to the territories in Africa for which Her Majesty's Government are responsible, and deplore their possible effects on public opinion.⁶

Now, if I may say a few words about this, I do not quite know what he means when the Right Honourable Gentleman says that he categorically rejects my remarks. I make the remarks, not he. They are an expression of my opinion. He might say he does not agree with them. It is open to him to say that. If I say a fact he might say it is not true according to him. But I do not understand when he says he rejects it.

Secondly, I should like to draw Professor Mukerjee's attention to this fact that this mere question and answer and what preceded it, that is, in regard to what I said, might bring some light to him as to our position in the British Commonwealth. It might show to him how we function without fear or being forced into any direction against our own.

Thirdly, I would say this that just as the Right Honourable Mr Lyttelton said that "Mr Nehru has been left in no doubt that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom categorically reject", may I say that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has been left in no doubt as to how we feel about this matter. And there the matter rests.

We feel very strongly about them and we feel about them in spite of the fact that we do not wish, on account of international decorum and procedure, to interfere in other countries' internal affairs. Because, if that is done, then international affairs would gradually become a beargarden. To some extent of course they do approach that condition. Even though one does not object to things, there are some things one does, one cannot suppress. And in such matters we have expressed our opinion freely and frankly, not offensively or aggressively but freely and frankly. But I have no doubt in my mind that in expressing these opinions we represent not only, of course, the vast majority of the people of India but the vast majority of other peoples in Asia and, if I may say so, a very large number of people in England also.

6. Quoting this reply given by Oliver Lyttelton, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in the House of Commons on 29 July 1953, Mukerjee had exclaimed, "So here is our friend, the British, trying to do this!"

So when honourable Members consider the question of the Commonwealth let them look at this. Does our association with the Commonwealth prevent us from doing anything which we want to do or which we ought to do? Does it make us do something which we do not want to do? I may leave out minor considerations; in the balance, has it helped the cause of peace in the world or not? I say definitely that it has helped—to what extent, of course, is a different matter. But it has helped. If we have been influenced by others occasionally, we have also influenced others very greatly. And that is what you can see in a variety of ways, how the voice of India, the opinion of India counts....⁷

I do not quite know. Mr Nutting⁸ is no doubt a courteous gentleman who uses the proper diplomatic language unlike the honourable Member opposite. We were helpful in what? We informed the British Government that we cannot permit the continuation of any Gurkha recruitment on Indian soil. Well, this was, naturally, rather not very agreeable to them. It upset some of their plans. We said: we are very sorry, but this cannot go on. Then they told us, agreed; they mentioned something about their applying to the Nepal Government. We said: certainly, you can do, it is between you and the Nepal Government, we do not come into the picture. They asked us whether a part of our agreement—the agreement in regard to transit of people in civilian attire—was going to be affected or not. We looked into the matter, and from every point of view we found that we could not; it would not be proper for us to, upset that agreement. All people in civilian attire, normally they can go. That is the measure of the help—apart from the fact that it was an agreement entered into in 1946, that is to say, before the change-over in India and all that. But it was a subsisting agreement. That is the measure of the help we have given. If Mr Nutting has referred to it in courteous language, I do not know what inference Professor Mukerjee draws as to how we go about recruiting further or what we do about it.

Dr Lanka Sundaram put some questions about the UN Observers in

7. At this stage, H.N. Mukerjee intervened to say, "You were very helpful regarding the recruitment of Gurkhas. And that was the statement made by Mr Nutting, Under-Secretary of State."
8. (Harold) Anthony Nutting (b. 1920); Conservative Party Member of British Parliament, 1945-56; Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1951-54; Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 1954-56, resigned; Leader, UK delegation to UN General Assembly and to UN Disarmament Commission, 1954-56; wrote several books including *I saw for Myself* (1958), *Disarmament* (1959), *Europe Will Not Wait* (1960), *Lawrence of Arabia* (1961), *The Arabs* (1964) and *Nasser* (1972).

Kashmir: what are the duties of the UN Observers?⁹ Well, I am replying to this question without the book. I do not exactly know, but I think more or less I am correct in saying their duties are to look after the ceasefire line. Then, why have they their headquarters in Srinagar? Obviously because Srinagar is a pleasanter place to live in than the ceasefire line. Whether they behave or misbehave there, is another matter. But you can hardly ask persons to live always in an imaginary line in a wilderness or to put up an office there. But, it is true that in the past while on the one hand we deprecated any wholesale charges being thrown about—it is not right that we do so—in individual cases we have had to take note of objectionable activities. I am not talking of recent past; I am talking of the last 2 or 3 years. We have protested, reported and taken action. We have declared some Observers *persona non grata*. They have been withdrawn. All this has happened in ones and twos in the past. But, because of that, I would not be justified in saying that all of them are like that. One has to, and certainly when I speak with some responsibility I have to, weigh my words. I know, of course, that in Srinagar or in Kashmir there are people—I am not talking of UN Observers; there are others—whose activities are highly suspicious. They may not be actionable as such. Sometimes, they are. Then, we take action. We do not publish all these things to the wide world. But, if any such information comes, if it comes to Kashmir Government, they will take action, and if it comes to us, we will take action. We shall do so. But, allowing ourselves to run away with the idea of some kind of widespread scare, I think, will not be desirable and will not lead us to understand the situation. We will imagine that some mysterious persons are creating all the difficulties.

Dr Lanka Sundaram then put me the question, how far the ceasefire line is from Gulmarg. It was not quite clear to me, unless he meant it in relation to Shaikh Abdullah going to Gulmarg.¹⁰ I cannot give the exact distance. It is not far from Gulmarg; maybe a few miles....¹¹

Maybe. Personally, I can tell him that I am quite sure in my mind that Shaikh Abdullah did not go to Gulmarg with any such scheme about the

9. Lanka Sundaram, an Independent Member of Parliament, asked why UN Observers were being allowed to roam about the whole of Kashmir.
10. Lanka Sundaram wanted to know if any steps had been taken to prevent incursions across the ceasefire line. He also wanted to know what action was being taken against the foreign agents who were understood to be waiting to receive Shaikh Abdullah on the night of 8 August and were arrested along with him.
11. Some Members remarked that the ceasefire line was five or six miles from Gulmarg.

ceasefire line or crossing it. He went to Gulmarg, as he often did, for the week-ends....¹²

Not to my knowledge. I have no idea.

Then, Professor Mukerjee laid great stress on our Red Cross Unit that was returning from Korea not being allowed to land in Penang, Malaya.¹³ I have the greatest respect for Professor Mukerjee. But sometimes his facts are weak.

It is perfectly true that they were not allowed to land there. Nobody was allowed to land from any other ship because there was quarantine in Penang at that time. It had nothing to do with any other reason. It was quarantine period. If they were prepared to stay there long enough, they would have been allowed to land. They could not afford to do that. There was absolutely no question of discrimination or where they were coming from or whether they were Indians or others. The reason he gives is extraordinary: that because Indians and others had been carrying on a brave fight in Malaya, somehow the landing of these people would have made a difference. I do not see how the argument follows. There is no doubt that in this case it was a sheer case of quarantine. That is why they were not allowed to land.

Dr Syed Mahmud made a suggestion, and I think it was vaguely supported by one or two others, about my convening a conference of Asian and African nations.¹⁴ This kind of thing is often suggested. But it is not quite clear to me what people mean by it. One functions either in a governmental capacity, as the Government of India, or as the Prime Minister of India or Foreign Minister, doing some such thing or approaching other Governments, or one functions in some kind of non-official capacity, inviting leaders of other countries. It is, of course, difficult to function in a non-official capacity when one is the Prime Minister or a Minister. Some years back, we had an Asian Conference here in Delhi, in 1947.¹⁵ That was convened by us before any of us were in

12. Lanka Sundaram asked whether there were certain foreign elements in Gulmarg and whether Shaikh Abdullah had met them on the night of 8 August.
13. H.N. Mukerjee asked whether Indians were suspected to such an extent in Malaya that the Indian Ambulance Unit on its way back from Korea was not permitted to land in Penang for a stop-over. He quoted from a statement of S.K. Banerjee, the leader of the Ambulance Unit, who had spoken about the disappointment caused by permission being denied.
14. Syed Mahmud, a Congress Member of Parliament, suggested that the Prime Minister should call a conference of all Asian and African nations with a view to understand the difficulties and hardships of the peoples of these nations, the colonial oppression perpetrated on them, and to find ways to mitigate their hardships. He said that Indonesia and Burma, apart from the countries of Africa and West Asia, desired such a conference to be called.
15. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 2, pp. 501-523.

the Government, as non-officials. When it took place we were in the Government. We had invited non-official organizations as well as Governments on a strictly non-political basis, on a cultural basis, because, otherwise, most people did not want to come. That went off successfully. There was another Conference convened by me on a special basis, the Indonesian Conference, at a particular moment when the Netherlands Government had started their second campaign in Indonesia. That was in January, 1949.¹⁶ It was a very special case and a very special position had been created. Even in the Indonesian Conference, which was very special, some countries of Asia did not come. Why did they not come? They sympathized, but, they did not wish to get entangled in these political problems. People do not seem to realize that if we had a conference of this kind, we would embarrass greatly every country that we invited. Some may overcome the embarrassment and come. Others will certainly not come. Not because they would not like to confer with us, but because of the embarrassment caused to them. Because, what does it mean? This kind of conference meets together to consider the world situation and issues challenges to various countries that this must be done and this must not be done. It is not an easy matter to do that this way. Normally a country functions in the diplomatic way. We send a demarche or *aide memoire* formally or informally to other countries and express our views. They send their reply. There are various informalities and formalities in dealing with other countries. This is not normally done: one country calling a public conference to condemn another country. People seem to get mixed up between the agitational aspect of the question and the governmental aspect of the question. I know this aspect is getting mixed up, because all kinds of conferences take place, sometimes with right objectives too like peace—peace congresses and the like where the agitational aspect and the governmental aspect get hopelessly mixed up. I am not going into the merits of it. This business of calling for a conference is not the way Governments function. They don't. It may be the function of some small weak Governments who do not count. It does not matter what they say, this way or that way. Where a country values its opinion, it speaks with some dignity. This is not the way to speak in a dignified manner.

Dr Lanka Sundaram put me a question and suddenly threw Article 352 of the Constitution at me in relation to Kashmir.¹⁷

16. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 9, pp. 143-182.

17. Lanka Sundaram asked whether Article 352 of the Constitution was invoked by the Jammu and Kashmir Government in seeking assistance from the Government of India to deal with the domestic situation in the State in August 1953. He also requested Nehru to counteract the propaganda in foreign countries about the part played by the Indian Army or the Government of India during the change-over in Kashmir.

I suppose it was some kind of a rhetorical question asking me if any one in Kashmir had invoked, or anybody has invoked—we here or anybody—the emergency provisions of the Constitution. Well, the answer, of course, is “No”. Nobody did. Article 352 was not invoked. There is no question, in fact, of invoking it, and we have not interfered in that way at all in any sense. But I should like to make clear, absolutely clear, that at no time during these last eight weeks in Kashmir has the Indian Army participated in the slightest; not a single member of the Indian forces in Kashmir has participated. Of course, it is true that they are there both on the ceasefire line and round about in some cantonments, but I should like to make clear one thing: it is true that some of our Central Reserve Police Force, some of our police forces, had been there, and they have been there, some of them, previously, because the police force of the Jammu and Kashmir State are very small in number, relatively small considering everything, and, therefore, some of our Police was sent to them, and has been lent to them from time to time. In regard to our Army, some misapprehension has occasionally arisen because some years back we gave to them or sold to them some surplus uniforms we had here, and they were used for their Militia. So, they put on some of our old military surplus uniform, and maybe, sometimes, those who do not know might mistake them for Indian Army uniforms.

Finally, after all, we come back to this, that in spite of the greatness and power of nations, they all seem to suffer from fear, fear of encirclement, fear of attack, fear of infiltration, all kinds of fears, fear of the Atomic and Hydrogen bomb on the other side; and unless one gets rid of that fear, any scheme of things that we draw up is not likely to give effect. I think I can say with some measure of confidence that in spite of our lack of strength in most ways that count in a country—we are, of course, nowhere in the military race; financially we are a poor country, and all that—that we are not afraid of any country round about. Changes have taken place in the North East with China there. We sometimes have trouble with Pakistan and all that, and people seem to think, if you read some books or articles written in other countries, that because of these changes we must live in continuous apprehension and fear of something happening. Well, we don't. What is more, we are less afraid than the other great countries; and we are not afraid, partly because we have absolutely no designs on any other country; we are absolutely determined also to protect our frontiers from any incursion, invasion etc., however, wherever it might take place. Otherwise, we are not interested really, except in a humanitarian or a human way, what happens elsewhere. Anyhow, long ago when we functioned in our struggle for freedom without arms or anything, in some measure we imbibed the lesson of the Master not to be afraid, and so we carry on without fear to the best of our ability.

II. BILATERAL RELATIONS

(i) Pakistan

1. To Mohan Sinha Mehta¹

New Delhi

July 12, 1953

My dear Mohan Sinhaji,

... Since you so insist, I am deciding to spend the whole of the 27th July in Karachi and to leave Karachi on my return journey on the early morning of the 28th July.²

As desired by you, I shall attend the reception organized by the Indo-Pakistan Cultural Association.

As for the Nazrul Academy, I do not attend such functions here. Indeed I hardly attend functions in Delhi as I wish to preserve my energy. But, if you so wish it and if there is time, I have no objection to going there for a short while. But I certainly do not want to listen to a long programme of music.

When I was last in Karachi, I called on Miss Fatima Jinnah.³ Probably it will be enough for Vijayalakshmi to go to see her this time.

I think it would be desirable for you to invite Khwaja Nazimuddin⁴ to your house. But in such matters, you should previously consult Mohammad Ali.

You are making a very tight and heavy programme for me leaving little scope for adjustment. Now that I have extended my stay by a few hours, you will no doubt fill these up also. I wish you had left more free time.

About G.M. Syed⁵ and his friends, I think you might invite them to one of your parties. I should like to meet them but I have no time to accept their invitation.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. When Nehru met Mohammad Ali in London in June 1953, he promised to pay a brief visit to Karachi some time in July. On 5 July, he informed Mohammad Ali that he intended to reach Karachi on the forenoon of 25 July and return to New Delhi on 27 July. Nehru further informed Mohammad Ali on 9 July that Vijayalakshmi Pandit would accompany him.

3. Nehru last visited Karachi on 26 and 27 April 1950 and was accompanied by Indira Gandhi and her husband, Feroze Gandhi. They called on Fatima Jinnah, sister of Mohamed Ali Jinnah, on 27 April.

4. Nazimuddin, the predecessor of Mohammad Ali, had been dismissed by Ghulam Mohamed, the Governor-General of Pakistan, in April 1953.

5. A leader of the Muslim League from Sind. In the fifties he started the Jiye Sind movement to oppose Punjab's domination over Sind.

2. Boundary between East Bengal and West Bengal¹

I do not think it will serve any purpose whatever to argue about these matters—either the Pakistani claim or our claim—with the Pakistan Government.² There is not a ghost of a chance of any agreement being reached. But we should always keep ourselves prepared for the legal and like points which might be raised.

1. Note to Anil K. Chanda, Deputy Minister, MEA, 21 July 1953. File No. P III/52/19362/1, MEA.
2. On 21 July, Chanda drew Nehru's attention to India's claim over twelve thanas of Sylhet district which had been wrongly included in East Pakistan owing to a misinterpretation of the Radcliffe Award and said that possession of at least a part of this area would save Tripura from virtual isolation. He added that India had an arguable case in support of this claim, which might be put forward as a counter-claim to a portion of Jalpaiguri thana including the whole of the Berubari Union claimed by Pakistan.

3. To G.S. Bajpai¹

New Delhi
July 24, 1953

My dear Girja,

Your letter of the 15th July. I do not know what the exact interpretation of the Constitution may be in regard to consultations with the Governor, but it is always desirable to have such consultations.

When Ghazanfar Ali Khan's name was mentioned as prospective High Commissioner here, I wrote to Mohan Sinha Mehta and told him that we have the lowest opinion of him in many ways.² Later, Mohammad Ali mentioned him to me in London. I told him again that he did not have a good reputation in India and was not considered a person of integrity. Also that he had been associated with anti-Indian propaganda. Nevertheless I said that if he wanted to send him, we would raise no objections. In spite of all this they have decided to send him.

I am going to Karachi tomorrow morning. They are making a big fuss

1. JN Collection.

2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.22, pp. 325-326.

about my visit. But, from all accounts, things are in a mess in Pakistan and no one trusts his neighbour.

You sent me a note about Kashmir some time ago. My difficulty is that I just do not know what Shaikh Abdullah might or might not say or do.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Talks with Mohammad Ali¹

I began by referring to the long agendas prepared by the Steering Committees.² I said that many of the points mentioned there, though important in themselves, really flowed from other decisions that might be taken. Some of these matters would necessarily have to be discussed and worked out in detail by our respective officials. But it would be necessary for us, that is, the two PMs, to give a clear indication of the policy and the lines to be pursued.

I referred to the evacuee property problem and to the suggestion I had made that Shri Mehr Chand Khanna should come here to discuss it.³ I said that it was hardly possible for us to go into details, as this was a complicated matter with five years' history behind it. Various proposals had been made by us from time to time, but there had been no common agreement about them and hence everything had continued in a suspended state. This was unfortunate as vast numbers of people, both in India and Pakistan, were personally interested in evacuee properties. If we could settle this problem, or at any rate the lines of settlement, that will go a long way in promoting better relations between India and Pakistan as well as in giving relief to large numbers of refugees in both countries. These refugees had been the principal cause of

1. Note, Karachi, 25 July 1953. JN Collection.

2. The steering committees of India and Pakistan, led by B.F.H.B. Tyabji, Secretary, Commonwealth Relations, MEA, Government of India, and J.A. Rahim, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, respectively, met in Karachi from 14 to 16 July 1953 and prepared a long agenda for the Nehru-Mohammad Ali meeting.

3. Nehru suggested to Mohammad Ali on 9 July that the problem of evacuee property could be more expeditiously settled through personal discussion instead of long distance communication and offered to send Mehr Chand Khanna, Principal Adviser, Ministry of Rehabilitation, to Karachi for this purpose.

bitterness between the two countries. Wherever refugees had gone, they had been a source of infection. The settlement of this problem was, therefore, necessary not only from the humanitarian but from the political point of view.

I gave a brief account of some of the proposals we had made. I referred to the three classes of property:

1. Land.
2. Immovable urban property.
3. Movables.

I pointed out that the suggestion made to allow people to exchange properties would not be fair to the large numbers of evacuees who are interested in the common pool. Also that delay in deciding about this urban property was harmful as these houses were deteriorating rapidly. In fact, many had fallen during the recent rains. At the request of Pakistan we had postponed the proposed auction of some of these houses. But a decision had to be made soon so that we can proceed with our schemes for finalizing these matters.

PM of Pakistan generally agreed with what I said and was of the opinion that we should go ahead with this matter. He agreed that we should send for Shri Mehr Chand Khanna immediately so that we could discuss some of the principles with his help and, if possible, give directions for the future. Shri Mehr Chand Khanna can stay on after my departure for further talks and in order to work out details.⁴

2. Canal Waters: We were agreed that this matter should be left to the working party which was functioning with the help of the International Bank and which was going to meet in September next. We hope that that would lead to an agreed approach.

I gave a brief account of the development of irrigation in the old Punjab and how it was intended to extend this to Eastern Punjab. In fact, it was with a view to this that the Bhakra-Nangal Project was evolved long before the Partition. So far as East Punjab was concerned, there was no alternative source of water supply and if we could not take advantage of the waters coming through the Bhakra-Nangal reservoir, etc., this meant that East Punjab as well as other areas, including parts of the Bikaner desert, could never develop. That was obviously a position which we could not agree to.

4. Mehr Chand Khanna along with some officials of the Ministry of Rehabilitation reached Karachi on 26 July.

The only right approach was that both parties should do their utmost to find a maximum use for the waters of the Indus Valley. This should be enough and more than enough for both not only in the present but for the future. It would probably involve some engineering works construction, etc., to link up various canals and reservoirs. This was an engineering matter which was by no means difficult. So far as the financial aspect was concerned, the International Bank would probably help.

The legal aspects may be important and should, no doubt, be considered. But far more important was the human aspect. Both parties should proceed in a cooperative way to help the other as far as possible, realizing that East Punjab must have more water to develop and West Punjab must not be deprived of its essential needs.

PM of Pakistan asked if there may not be a 10 per cent reduction in water supply next year because of Bhakra-Nangal. He was under the impression that I had said so in London. I did not myself remember this, but I said that the Bhakra scheme will start functioning in about a year's time and undoubtedly that will mean greater use of water on this side. Normally this will make no difference to the other side, but occasionally in a year of drought or for a short period there may be some difficulties. These could be provided for by engineering works suggested. I said that I had heard that some canals had already been made in Pakistan with this object in view. PM, Pakistan, said that something of the kind had been done.

I suggested, and PM, Pakistan, agreed, that we should instruct our representatives at the next meeting of the working party in Washington to try their best to find cooperative solution of the problem.

3. East Pakistan and West Bengal, etc: I said that fortunately this eastern zone had not been tied up with all kinds of intricate evacuee property laws, etc., as in the western zone. It was, therefore, easier to approach normality there. We should, of course, endeavour to bring about normality both in the east and the west. In the east there was no major obstacle, but there were many minor difficulties which could be got over if the right approach was made on both sides.

I referred to the passport and visa system and said that it should be possible to do away with the visa system or to make it much simpler than it was. We should encourage trade and communications.

I referred to the border areas between East Bengal and Assam and East Bengal and Tripura, which had suffered greatly because of the Partition, more especially in regard to the local trade. I said that we should put an end to these difficulties which were felt on both sides and facilitate normal trade across the frontier in these areas. PM, Pakistan, agreed.

The general approach in the eastern zone should be to bring back normality.

4. Enclaves: I mentioned the case of these enclaves.⁵ Mr Mohammad Ali said that his Government had agreed to exchange them. The only remaining difficulty was that West Bengal wanted some territory to make up for its loss by this exchange.⁶ Apparently, this amounted to about seven square miles. PM, Pakistan, said that it may be difficult to give a piece of territory like this. But he was prepared to consider giving some compensation.

I said that we might view it from another point of view also. Instead of one piece of territory to be handed over, an attempt might be made to adjust the frontier of West Bengal with East Bengal. This might involve minor rectifications of the border. Mr Mohammad Ali said that this was worth considering. In any event, this question ought to be taken up soon and settled.

5. Gurdwaras in West Punjab: I referred to these gurdwaras and said that the principles governing them should obviously be that shrines and sacred places should be protected and full facilities given to people to go there. Mr Mohammad Ali agreed. I said that there were large properties attached to these gurdwaras. I gave also some account of the way the British Government had dealt with this matter, the passage of the Gurdwara Act and the formation of the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee.

Mr Mohammad Ali said that, so far as he knew, these gurdwaras were well looked after and their properties had been kept separate. He asked me if the SGPC wanted to control them directly. I said that no doubt they would like to do so, but probably it would be better and more feasible to have a separate committee consisting of Sikhs for the purpose which could cooperate with the SGPC. It was decided to go into the details of this matter of the gurdwaras later.⁷

5. The Cooch-Bihar enclaves had passed under the control of the British following the exit of the Moghul Empire who had earlier seized them from the rulers of Cooch-Bihar. As a result of the Partition in 1947, these fell under the control of Pakistan.
6. There were 95 Pakistani enclaves inside West Bengal, with an area of 18.3 square miles and a population of 11,000, and 129 Indian enclaves in East Pakistan, with an area of 26.8 square miles and a population of 12,600, the majority of the population in both cases being that of Muslims.
7. Nehru cabled from New Delhi to Mohan Sinha Mehta on 30 July, asking him to inform Mehr Chand Khanna that "we would like him to raise the question of gurdwaras and shrines during his meetings there. He should specially enquire about Gurdwara Bawli Sahib and Gurdwaras Chaubacha Sahib, Mozang and Shahid Ganj, all in Lahore city. Our information from our Deputy High Commissioner in Lahore is that Bawli Sahib has been razed to the ground by the Improvement Trust and the others are in a very dilapidated condition."

6. Kashmir: Finally, the problem of Kashmir was referred to and Mr Mohammad Ali said that in effect this was the only really difficult problem, all others could be easily adjusted. I agreed but added that every adjustment of other problems helped in creating an atmosphere for the solution of even this problem which was so tough.

I repeated what I had said in London that foreign interference should be kept out and every upset should be avoided. Else any attempt at a solution would create even more difficult problems.

I gave a brief history of Kashmir, going right back to the Greek period and after, how Kashmir had been a big cultural centre throughout this period and a place where there had been an astonishing amount of cooperation between different elements, Hindus, Muslims, etc.

I am leaving this note as it is without saying much more about our talks on Kashmir. In fact, there was not much more said as time was up. We shall continue these talks tomorrow morning.

5. Indo-Pakistan Problems¹

I should like to express my very grateful thanks to the Governor-General, Prime Minister and others for their hospitality and friendly gesture, even more so, if I may say so, to you gentlemen and the people of Karachi for the extraordinary friendliness shown to me. I felt absolutely at home the moment I arrived here not only because I have very old friends here, but more so because of the very friendly atmosphere that surrounded all the places I went. People have been extraordinarily kind and gracious to me and I have been moving in a general atmosphere of friendliness here, which I cannot take merely as an expression of personal friendliness for me, although it is something of that also, but just something more. I think and I feel the ties of friendliness between the two countries have grown closer and closer.

I am sure that those feelings will be reciprocated in India, so that when

1. Address at a Press conference, Karachi, 27 July 1953. From *Jawaharlal Nehru: Press Conferences, 1953* (New Delhi, 1954).

we are considering our mutual problems this extraordinarily helpful atmosphere of friendliness in the two countries—which is something which I do not think existed to this degree during the last five years or so—will be helpful. This atmosphere itself is much more important than any minor or major decision which we may arrive at. This is a basic thing out of which decisions come, and we have been impressed by this change which has taken place in the two countries. Those horrors that took place after Partition created a barrier between the two countries of unfriendliness, frustration, fear, and even, to some extent, hatred. It was not difficult to understand all that. It was the suffering which the people had gone through and yet it was very great because of the consequences.

When we deal with any particular problem it is very difficult to come to grips with it because of imponderable factors like suspicion, fear and dislike. If you look at the world as a whole, there are major problems all over—they are in the Far East and they are in Europe; everywhere there are problems. Statesmen meet and talk about a particular subject. But how are they to deal with something which is imponderable? They try to change that atmosphere.

Coming to India and Pakistan, we have had this imponderable atmosphere of fear and suspicion. Many in India and many in Pakistan have had fear and suspicion. It is, therefore, a matter of deep gratification for me that that vicious atmosphere has now largely gone. That is a very good omen for anything further that we might do.

Now, about the questions that you have asked me.² You will appreciate, gentlemen, that it is not particularly easy for me at this stage, when we are carrying on our talks, to enter into details of those talks, to tell you exactly what we have been discussing, what are our difficulties and so on and so forth. That would not help at all. So I cannot go into details.

I have already referred to this atmosphere of friendliness, which means also a desire to do one's utmost to remove the cause of unfriendliness or suspicion between the two people. I can tell you that the Prime Minister of Pakistan and I have been actuated by that desire. We have been working towards that end not merely because we are influenced by this atmosphere but because we are influenced with certain basic facts which cannot change even though people's feelings may change. There is the basic fact of geography. There we are: two countries adjoining each other. They inevitably adjoin each other whether we like it or not. There it is. It is geography.

2. Nehru invited questions at the start of the conference and answered them collectively in the course of his address.

Second: It is the fact of history. History: whether you take it in terms of hundreds of years; whether you take it in terms of the last generation; twenty years; thirty years, during which we struggled for our national freedom and independence. People in Pakistan and India jointly struggled and jointly suffered for it. These are the major things that great people cannot in one day forget. It is not something which belongs to the past alone. These are basic and common features that are in our background and in our culture and in our language and in hundred other things.

The biggest test of it is that suppose some Indians and some Pakistanis go to another country anywhere in Europe or America. They may have some political arguments between them, if they want to argue! But leaving that political argument aside, they meet in foreign countries as people akin to each other. They talk to each other in their own language; they discuss problems; they discuss their common friends and so on and so forth. They are nearer to each other than the nationals of any two countries can be. They may sometimes quarrel about political matters but then they have had common sufferings and culture and the like.

So, because of geography, in a sense, certain other factors arise: economic factors—trade and commerce, etc. Normally trade is influenced by geography unless we wish to twist it for political reasons. So, all these factors inevitably bring Pakistan and India nearer to one another. They cannot help it. They may occasionally, because of resentment or anger, do something to injure the other party but that is a temporary thing. But the basic thing is that they are there. The basic thing is hundreds and hundreds of years of living together—quarrelling together, if you like, but still together. Now, because of these basic factors one has inevitably to function together whether you look at it from the long-term view or from short-term view.

Today we are tied with problems which are not basic. These are the outcome of Partition and what happened afterwards. These are temporary problems. The basic problems of India and Pakistan are essentially similar: development of industries; raising the standard of the people and generally to create more wealth in these countries by productive effort and to see to it that the wealth so created is properly distributed; that it does not go into a few hands: it does not make the rich richer and the poor poorer. These are the basic things and we stand more or less on the same footing in regard to them. India is slightly more industrial; Pakistan undoubtedly will develop.

In treading this path it is obvious that we can help each other and we can also hinder each other. Unless we are so immature and so selfish just to do things through sheer spite, regardless of consequences, we should realize that anything done to injure the other country reacts and injures our own country. If you look back the last five or six years and notice the story of



AT THE PARLIAMENTARIANS' CHARITY CRICKET MATCH, NEW DELHI,
13 SEPTEMBER 1953



LAYING THE FOUNDATION STONE OF THE CENTRAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
PILANI, 21 SEPTEMBER 1953

relations between India and Pakistan you will find that attempts either by India or by Pakistan to do something which might injure the other country acted as a boomerang; it injured the first country, because the things are so interconnected.

Whether you consider this question historically, culturally, geographically—sentimentally, if you like—and strictly on a practical level, and if I may say so, from the opportunist level, you will come to the conclusion that it is necessary and essential for there being the greatest measure of cooperation between the two countries. This is to our mutual advantage and there is nothing which comes in their way because the national interests of one country are not opposed to the national interests of the other country. I need not give instances. In Asia and Europe the instances are there. The national interest of India and the national interest of Pakistan do not basically come against one another. If I may say so, the questions which we are discussing, they are not basic. They are important but not basic.

Situated as we are, any intelligent person can only work towards improving that relationship and going towards greater measure of cooperation. Many people both in India and Pakistan always realize that. Unfortunately, there are also many others who prejudice our passions in realizing that. Therefore, they work in a different direction. But they can ultimately be prevailed upon. If my analysis is correct, then this policy of theirs is opposed to the basic interests of the two countries. So that is my approach and I feel sure it is also the approach of Pakistan. So I say the approach to problems should be based on a large measure of understanding, and I am sure there are a vast number of people both in Pakistan and India who are earnestly creating goodwill and mutual understanding between the two countries. It is true there are other people also who may be called rather small or narrow-minded, who get excited at small things and forget big things and, therefore, come in the way of development of this cooperative working in the two countries.

So, I tell you, gentlemen of the Press, that it does not serve any good purpose to spread ill will. We must discourage it and, on the other hand, promote goodwill. We must inculcate the spirit of goodwill and mutual understanding and integrate all forces which may create a friendly atmosphere between the two countries and discourage all activities aimed at producing hate and dislike for each other. That is, to my mind, the basic approach.

Here, I might say that it is not quite proper for me to discuss details of the problems we are discussing. Many of you are obviously interested in the Kashmir problem, which, of course, during the last five or six years has become an old problem and is still more and more intricate and complicated—not that there have been any basic changes, but because when other factors come in, a new situation arises and one thing overlaps the other. So it becomes complicated. When we have to deal with a problem, we have to see that it is

dispassionately and objectively considered; because it has become tied up to the people's passions and when the people's passions are aroused, then it becomes more difficult, as they do not use logic in solving it. Reactions from our side are followed by the other side, resulting in distrust and ill will. The obvious thing is that things are not understood in their true perspective. So in understanding a problem—obviously an intricate and difficult problem—past background should not come in our way and one has to be very careful that in every step that one has to take one must avoid making it further complicated. That is most important, gentlemen, not only in this connection but in every problem that you may be confronted with, logically speaking.

We are in the habit of—and for that matter the world is—trying to solve a problem, and afterwards producing a dozen more difficult problems. We have had two world wars, which were fought with the object of ending war and to establish democracy. On the one side, there were tremendous victories as far as military goes, and on the other, there was complete defeat. Very soon after the victory and defeat, the world was faced with problems which were far from solution. They have become more difficult. So it is not enough to consider a problem in an academic or debating society way. We have to consider its inter-relationship to all kinds of other problems and the consequences of every step, so that we may not be faced with fresh problems. One has to face all this complex situation in its various aspects in a calm and dispassionate atmosphere.

Now, you have asked me about the United Nations' part in tackling the Kashmir problem. The United Nations, of course, had a fair go in this matter for the last five years. I am not going to argue as to whose fault it is, but the fact is that having had a fair go, it has not succeeded. Other people and other countries have been rather too generous with their advice, but that has not brought forth any remarkable results. Now, because of this, as well as because of other reasons, one feels, without any disrespect to the United Nations and other countries, that it would have been slightly better if we had dealt with the problem ourselves directly, without bringing others into the picture.

We have got minor as well as major problems in India and Pakistan. Minor problems, of course, will go on continually between the two countries and they can and will be solved mutually. Of the major problems, one might say, there is the Kashmir problem. Then there is refugee evacuee property business, which is also a major problem for obvious reasons, because it affects millions and millions of people, and anything which affects hundreds of thousands or millions of people is a major problem. It affects their future; it affects more directly their personal life than any other problem.

Then there is, as you know, the canal waters problem. There is also the general problem of the eastern Pakistan zone, because you will remember

that that part has been dealt with differently from West Pakistan and the rest of India. Here on the western side you have all kinds of remarkable laws and legislation which came into existence long ago. I do not want here to trace their legal history, but unfortunately in the eastern zone there is no such thing. So the situation there being what it is, has been tackled differently in the past and ought to be tackled in a different manner. In tackling one single major problem, there are a number of minor difficulties which come in our way and give us trouble. They are obviously capable of solution if our minds are directed properly. A large number of people living on both sides of the border in East Pakistan and West Bengal, Assam, Tripura, etc., have been suffering tremendously. Those things can be dealt with in other ways.

Our objective should be everywhere in India and Pakistan to deter from causing injury to the feelings of the other side and to create amiable conditions, promote goodwill and discourage ill will. It is not easy to get rid of these things by a stroke of the pen, because these very laws and other conditions have produced an intricate relationship in the last five years. So we cannot just wipe out everything in just five years, but our objective should, in my thinking, be a return to normality, as two independent friendly nations. That should be our aim and we should develop it, and I think if we try, we can, not suddenly, but step by step, go back to this normality.

I have just mentioned that both in Pakistan and in India the evacuee property laws are extraordinary and I do not know if they are prevalent anywhere else in the world, especially of this particular type. I do not like them. I would like to get rid of them, but I cannot isolate them from other factors which are all tied up. Therefore, the simple way of dealing with a problem is to go step by step in its solution. It may not be a cent per cent solution, but if we know the right approach and we take a few steps regularly in that direction, success can come ultimately.

As regards the canal waters, we know that this matter has been referred to a working party of engineers. It was first referred to the International Bank. They have been carrying on their work for the last eighteen months. They have held various meetings. They are going to meet in September and I hope that will yield substantial results as to how to proceed. Because of this, there is no great necessity at this stage for us to go into details. Mr Mohammad Ali and I discussed it at times and both of us agreed that it should be dealt with in a proper way which would yield results. But remember, that in this canal waters business, it does no good either to India or Pakistan to be cross with each other.

Nobody is going to put an end to all your schemes of development. You might say that it is a national conflict—national conflict of this type will be

solved by finding some solution or by some legal methods, leaving out war, of course. The first thing is to know the quantity of water: how much is available. Is it enough or is it not enough? It is said that water in the Indus basin is only used either by India or by Pakistan to a very limited extent, and the rest goes to the sea. So it has become an engineering problem: how to reach water, by dams or by earthwork, whatever it may be. Obviously neither Pakistan nor India is going to accept anything which means the stopping of the development programmes. After all, you have to satisfy the needs of both the countries. Some formula is going to be evolved by the parties which are working on it very shortly. Finances required are not of stupendous magnitude and anyhow it is a matter for loans, etc. However, the International Bank will also be helpful.

There are other outstanding issues such as gurdwaras or shrines of Sikhs. They are naturally greatly excited on this account because their gurdwaras are in Pakistan. Well, it is a matter of principle. If both Pakistan and India agree that shrines, etc., should be preserved and facilities should be given to the visitors of such shrines or gurdwaras, then we will solve this problem. I am quite sure that the Government of Pakistan will look into this matter more thoroughly. I entirely agree with the principle of the preservation of mosques in the same manner.

Some questions have been asked about Junagadh and Hyderabad. All I can say is that you had been sleeping for so many years. I have forgotten this question. There is no such question; there is no such problem these days.

There is another very interesting question about the "no war" declaration. You will remember that I suggested to your late Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan that such a declaration is necessary. You have seen the effect of "no war" declaration in Europe, etc. The real object of such a declaration is to remove the sense of fear and suspicion.

India has avoided any relations with other countries which might have any deep political or military significance. We have not aligned ourselves with any group of nations. There is no argument for that. We feel that from the short and long range points of view of peace as well as from the national point of view, it is not desirable for us to align ourselves with any power bloc. However, naturally from the world point of view, I would like other countries to have the same policy not because it strengthens me but because it increases the area where war is unlikely. It increases the area which exercises a certain influence against war.

I do not imagine that India has got so much influence in world affairs that it can prevent any war or any catastrophe or any happenings. The world is too big. There are great, powerful countries which can decide the fate of

the world. But every country, big or small, at the same time can make a little difference and that difference counts. I feel that such a declaration would be very helpful in creating an atmosphere of less fear and suspicion with each other. With any such declaration and assurance that may be possible in future, without any commitments, I can say it may be possible for us to confer together, to consult each other with regard to international matters, foreign affairs; if necessary, domestic matters.

We consult each other in the United Nations. There is an Arab-Asian Group which is now called Asian-African Group. The point is this, that a number of countries in Asia and Africa consult together and function together although each country is independent. Our functions are friendly and we constantly consult each other about international affairs. I am sure the Government of Pakistan will see that we should, much more frequently, consult each other in our affairs, about our economic policies, trade policies and even domestic policies, so that the area of mutual consultations and cooperation should grow without the slightest compulsion on either side.

There are some suspicions in the minds of some people that India has some nefarious designs on the independence of Pakistan. Now, that is completely without any foundation. You cannot stop half-witted persons in India saying anything. An individual may say anything but you can yourself, without any hesitation, say that that is absurd, on the very face of it. It is neither good for India nor for Pakistan. So we proceed on the basis of recognizing each country's independence, integrity and respectability. It is desirable to recognize the necessity of cooperating in as large a field as possible. That must help us to remove suspicions and fears.

Someone mentioned about political prisoners in Pakistan and India. I would like to know what he meant by that. I cannot speak for Pakistan, obviously. In India I do not know whom you may call political prisoners. Normally we call people detained without trial as political prisoners. Ordinary prisoners have to go before a court of law for trial under regular rules of law. They are tried for their offences. We have in India a Detention Act but it is extremely difficult to use it. At the utmost, the maximum detention that can be put in practice is one year. You cannot go beyond that. And within a month or two, the case of the person who is detained has to go up to the High Court judges, not as a case but for their opinion. If they say, "No, there is no ground for detention", out he goes. Not many people are therefore detained in India now. What happens is that sometimes, at the time of trouble, we may detain persons for a week or a fortnight but after that, they go out. Beyond this, the only case is that of persons who are convicted after normal procedure and appeal, etc. That is a matter of individuals and no question of political prisoners as such arises.

Now, someone asked me about suggestions regarding joint defence. In a sense, you might have observed that I have suggested something—though not joint defence, of course—which is consultation in international matters without binding down anybody. Now, defence and foreign policy are closely allied. You cannot separate them even if you want to. If the general foreign policy of two countries is similar, they automatically, without any alliance or agreement, think even in defence matters in common terms—I mean provided their foreign policy is allied.

There is another way, another aspect of this question. Now, in the world today—I am stating facts and not criticizing—large organizations have grown up for what is called mutual defence: in Western Europe, for instance, the community of western world called North Atlantic Community, or the ANZUS. It is open for any country to have such organizations. But, if I may say so, with all respect to them, my own approach to this question is without creating any hostile alliance. I do not deny the necessity of any country or group of countries protecting themselves or taking steps to protect themselves against possible danger. They may do so by all means.

At the same time again and again what a country should decide is, whether its policy generally leads towards promoting a peace or war atmosphere? Now, sometimes I find very little difference; people talk of defence whether it is defence or something else. In a specific case, one country calls it defence and the other country says that this defence is aimed against it. The other country also talks about defence and takes some other measures. So they go on mounting armaments. If you see the world today, tremendous armament is going on. I do not want to be a party to any alliance of a military type with any country so that similar other alignments may be created. The moment such an alliance is done with another country, the question inevitably arises against whom that alliance is directed? It is not in the air absolutely. It is directed against some possible enemy. Now, the moment you do that, you are already taking a position that another country is the enemy. Now, when persons talk about joint defence, if that means any kind of military alliance, it goes against our policy of having any military alliance with any country. But understandings are a different matter. Understanding in approaches and in consultation are always welcome.

Something was said about visas. Already so far we have tried to lessen many early difficulties about passport system, as much as possible. Wherever possible, we will do away with the visa system. It is a matter of common discussion with us.

Shall I now go on to another point, namely, truce in Korea? Some reference was made about it. Well, today is the 27th of July. I thought of the date as exactly a month ago I returned to India from Europe. I was in Europe for about five weeks. At that time we were almost certain that truce was coming

within a few days. But after that, as you know, all kinds of difficulties arose and we became a little apprehensive and doubtful whether the truce will come or not. Personally I was sure all the time that the truce would come. I was sure for the simple reason that every party wanted to put an end to this warfare. They wanted to end it as soon as possible.

Nevertheless there were so many hitches in this, so many obstructions, that nobody wanted to say definitely what would happen. Even yesterday when news came that truce would be signed tomorrow, it was thought better to wait till it was done, as possibly something might happen, nobody being sure. Now it has been signed. I think that it is a big thing that this truce has been signed, and all the parties concerned deserve congratulations. I do not think we should go into it now. The fact is that it has been signed. It is an end of a very horrible war.

The war started, I think, with idealistic motives. But since then, all kinds of developments and changes have taken place. Certainly so far as the Korean people are concerned, they have been exterminated and destroyed to a very large extent. For Korea, it is a terrible thing. People call it a little war whereas from the point of view of casualties and money and destruction, I doubt if a war barring the last two world wars, would come up to that figure. It is really a very big war except from the point of view of world wars.

But big as it was, the real danger behind this war was that it might be extended, that it might envelop not only Korea but all the Far East, which may again develop into world war. That was a terrible outlook. Now, people who are in Pakistan, as people in India, if I may say so with all respect, think and talk rather lightly about war. Perhaps because they have had no personal experience—both our countries. War came to the north-east corner of Assam. If you go to Europe, there you will find persons despaired of war. You will find very terrific reaction to the very idea of war, which means extinction for them, for the belligerents.

This Korean war was tied up with the possibility of world war—that being of vast importance. Now that the truce has been signed, well, that possibility goes. Of course, what is important is that now the world trend is towards peace. I know tremendous difficulties have been surmounted and I know it is a very big step towards world peace. That would lead to pleasure all over the world and so it is a very happy occasion.

We, in India, have reluctantly agreed to participate in the UN Commission for repatriation of prisoners. We have agreed to send troops to guard prisoners of war but it is a very heavy responsibility. We do not like to take up such responsibility normally outside India. But it was a very great compliment to India that great countries who have been fighting each other, both jointly, invited India to undertake this responsibility.

6. The Karachi Talks¹

The Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India held several meetings on July 25, 26 and 27 and discussed at some length various problems affecting Pakistan and India. These talks were frank and cordial and both the Prime Ministers were actuated by the desire to solve the problems outstanding between the two countries and to promote their cooperation in matters of common interest.

Among the subjects discussed were Kashmir, canal waters, evacuee and trust properties and shrines, problems between East Pakistan and West Bengal and Pakistan enclaves in Cooch-Bihar and Cooch-Bihar enclaves in East Pakistan.

In regard to evacuee and trust property issues, the Principal Adviser of the Government of India in this matter and senior officers were sent for from New Delhi. They have arrived and have started a detailed discussion of the various issues involved with the officers of the Pakistan Government with a view to finding a satisfactory solution to them.

As regards Cooch-Bihar enclaves, it was agreed that these should be exchanged. The terms and conditions of such exchange are to be considered further.

During the talks the question of restriction of travel and trade between the two countries also came up for consideration. It was agreed that these restrictions should, as far as possible, be removed or minimized. This matter will be examined further.

The major part of the Prime Ministers' meeting was devoted to a discussion of the Kashmir dispute which was examined in all its aspects. These talks were necessarily of a preliminary character. They have helped in a clearer understanding of each other's point of view, of the issues involved and of the difficulties that stand in the way of a settlement. They have prepared the ground for further talks which the Prime Ministers expect to resume in New Delhi in the near future.

The Prime Ministers are agreed that the independence and integrity of the two countries must be fully respected, each country having full freedom to follow the policy of its choice in domestic as well as in international affairs.

At the same time, the Prime Ministers are convinced that the interests of

1. Joint communique issued by Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammad Ali at the conclusion of their talks, Karachi, 27 July 1953. Published in the newspapers on 28 July 1953.

both countries demand the largest possible measure of cooperation between them and that, therefore, every effort should be made not only to resolve the existing Indo-Pakistan disputes, but also to promote goodwill and friendship between the two countries. They consider this essential to progress in both countries and to the promotion of welfare of the common man, which is their primary concern. It is hoped that the Prime Minister of Pakistan will visit New Delhi in the near future to continue these talks.

7. To Ghulam Mohammed¹

New Delhi
July 29, 1953

My dear Governor-General,

I came back yesterday from Karachi and I have been wanting to write to you since then, although writing a formal letter on such an occasion is a very inadequate way of expressing one's feelings. So this is not a formal letter, but a very informal and rather personal note to tell you how deeply moved my sister and I were with your friendly and generous hospitality and all the affection that you showed us. I can truly say that I felt among friends and completely at home. The tragedies of the past few years seemed to fade away.

You need no assurance from me about my earnest desire to do everything in my power to remove every obstacle that comes in the way of true understanding and cooperation between India and Pakistan. Indeed, it would be a tragedy if this was not so. I feel convinced that we shall succeed, even though difficulties may come in our way.

I am moved, as you no doubt are moved, by personal considerations, but we are both also moved by national considerations. There can be no doubt that in this matter our national interests are one and that both countries prosper or not in the degree that they come nearer to each other. We have to contend against wrong and sometimes evil forces, but if we aim aright and pursue right causes, I have no doubt that we shall succeed.

1. JN Collection.

I have brought back with me the happiest of memories from Karachi and I am deeply grateful to you.²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. On 29 July, Nehru also wrote to Mohammad Ali, conveying his gratitude to him and his wife, the Members of his Government, and "the warm-hearted people of Karachi." In this letter he stated, "The overwhelming impression that I carried with me is of the goodwill and friendliness that I experienced there at all hands. I am exceedingly grateful to you and Begum Mohammad Ali not only for your hospitality, which was generous, but even more so for this atmosphere of friendliness that surrounded us. I am sure that if we function in this way and approach our problems in this manner we shall achieve success in this and in many other matters."

8. To Mohammad Ali¹

New Delhi
July 29, 1953

My dear Prime Minister,

In the course of our talks in Karachi, we discussed the question of the Cooch-Bihar enclaves. You told me that you had decided that these should be exchanged. You mentioned, however, that the enclaves in Pakistan at present are somewhat bigger, from the point of view of territory, than the enclaves in India. The difference is really a small one and, according to what you told me, is about 7 square miles. Thus, if an exchange is made, Pakistan would get 7 square miles of additional territory. The West Bengal Government had suggested that this surplus area might be given to them somewhere else so as to make this exchange an even one. You told me that you would prefer giving some compensation for the surplus area.

I then suggested to you that it might be desirable to consider, in this connection, minor rectifications of the border which might be advantageous both to India and Pakistan. You said that this could be enquired into.

This matter really relates to East Pakistan on the one side and West Bengal on the other. We agreed that the proper course to adopt would be for representatives of East Pakistan and West Bengal to meet and consider this question and make their recommendations to the respective Governments. If they agree, there would be no difficulty in the Indian and Pakistan Governments also agreeing.

1. JN Collection.

I suggest, therefore, that a conference might be arranged in Calcutta to consider this question. This would consist of representatives of West Bengal and East Pakistan Governments and also, if necessary, some representatives of the two Central Governments.

There were a number of other matters relating to the Eastern Zone comprising East Pakistan, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura, which we also discussed. These related to travel facilities and visas, trade, more especially border trade, and other matters relating to that area. These could also be considered conveniently at a conference in Calcutta. But that conference should consist of, apart from those mentioned above, representatives of Assam and Tripura also.

Perhaps the first conference could extend itself and deal with these other problems later. I should like your views on this matter.

So far as the evacuee property and like questions are concerned, they are being dealt with at present by our representatives in Karachi. I hope that these discussions will yield satisfactory results. They will include, I hope, questions of gurdwaras and other shrines.

There is one matter to which no reference was made in our talks. This was in regard to the recovery of abducted women in both countries. This recovery work has been one of the satisfactory instances of cooperation between the two countries. It has been rightly considered on a human and social level and not the political level. I hope we will continue this work at least for some time to come. I write this because I find that there is some misconception in this matter and it has been thought that we might discontinue this work. I do not think the time for that has come yet.

One important matter which we did not mention at all relates to our financial accounting. On the one hand, Pakistan owes India certain sums annually for the repayment of debt. On the other hand, India owes some sums to Pakistan. There have been some talks about this previously between representatives of our respective Finance Ministries. I think that it would be desirable to finalize these questions. This will have to be done at a fairly high level, preferably by the Finance Ministers. I understand that your Finance Minister is likely to come here some time in September for a Colombo Plan meeting. If so, he could deal with these matters then, or preferably if he came a little earlier. Anyhow, we shall be glad to have him here for these talks at any time.

I have mentioned a number of matters in this letter for your consideration. I shall be glad if you will indicate to me what you think about the suggestions I have made.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. To Mohammad Ali¹

New Delhi
July 29, 1953

My dear Prime Minister,

I mentioned to you in Karachi the case of some prisoners held by Pakistan and India respectively. In May 1950, there was a general exchange of prisoners between the two countries. Since then, because of some reason or other, some additional prisoners were taken or retained. The number is not large. It is possible that some of them are deserters or some may have been taken in some border affray. All these relate to operations on the ceasefire line in the Jammu & Kashmir State.

We have no accurate information of the prisoners in Pakistan's custody. But, according to our information, there are at least four and possibly some more of men from the Indian Army. There are also probably about a hundred of the Jammu & Kashmir forces or militia. Possibly a number of these are deserters.

The following are in the custody of the Indian Army:

4 men of the Pakistan Army,
22 of the 'Azad Kashmir' troops, and
3 Northern Scouts,
i.e., 29 in all.

I suggest that such of these prisoners as are in custody either of India or Pakistan should be returned or exchanged. I am particularly interested in the Indian troops which are only a few in number.

You raised the question of whether prisoners who are unwilling to go back should be returned. According to the Geneva Convention, this question should not arise at all. But we have recently had the Korean example. I am, therefore, prepared to consider that those who clearly state that they are not prepared to go back may be released and allowed to go where they like.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
July 29, 1953

My dear Bidhan,

I have just come back after three days in Karachi. The first impression that I received was one of great popular welcome. The Government there went all out to welcome me and show me every consideration. But more than the Government, the people did so. I could not have been welcomed more warmly by the people in any city in India. There was a friendly and expectant atmosphere. Everyone was anxious and eager that we should put an end to our conflicts with Pakistan, and they seemed to think that perhaps I could do so. Pakistan's position has been bad politically and economically. There are all kinds of intrigues afoot and there is no real stability. Mohammad Ali is, in a sense, popular, but he has no roots and no basic strength. It is quite possible that his present popularity may fade away soon, if he does not show any results. In effect he is not the most important man there.

It was really rather pathetic to see and experience the desire of the people there for a settlement with India. One old man in the street shouted out to me: "*Aye Hindustan ke Badshah, Pakistan ko apnao.*"

The refugees there are still in a terrible way. There are, I believe, four or five lakhs of them round about Karachi, all living in miserable huts which are in various stages of collapse. In fact the refugee picture there was what we saw in India five years ago. I should imagine that given the chance, a vast number of these people would return to India, as they see no future for themselves in Pakistan.

All this, of course, has exerted a powerful pressure on the Government of Pakistan. Also other events. I think the leading people there are fully convinced now that there is no hope for them in carrying on conflicts with India, and they are prepared to go pretty far in resolving them. Certainly that is the feeling of the people. Many persons spoke to me with tears in their eyes on this subject.

The main stumbling block is, of course, Kashmir. I talked at length on this subject, but it was obviously not possible for us to find a way out of impasse. I shall be seeing Mohammad Ali again after a month here in Delhi.

Among the other subjects discussed were evacuee properties, the Cooch-Bihar enclaves, and general trade and communications and travel facilities between East Bengal and West Bengal and Assam, etc. About evacuee properties, for the first time during the last few years, we are having a real and earnest talk with them. I could not go into the details, but we have left some of our senior officials there who are carrying on these discussions. I hope they would result in some good.

1. JN Collection.

In regard to the Cooch-Bihar enclaves, Mohammad Ali told me that both his Central Government and the Bengal Government had agreed to exchange them. He mentioned that there was an excess of about seven square miles on the Indian side and that your Government had asked for additional territory to that extent. He said that this would be difficult, but he was prepared to give compensation for this additional territory (how to compute the compensation for seven square miles, I do not know). I said that there was another possible approach. Instead of a chunk of additional territory, perhaps we might try to straighten out our frontiers which should be convenient for both parties. Mohammad Ali said that he would like to examine this and it might be possible. Thus, the position is that these enclaves have to be exchanged. This is agreed. As for the additional territory, there might be either some kind of compensation or some straightening out of the frontiers. I remember your writing to me something to this effect once. I have suggested to Mohammad Ali that this matter might well be examined at a conference consisting of representatives of West Bengal and East Bengal. This conference might be held in Calcutta. He liked the idea. We can have Central representatives at that conference also. If you agree, as I am sure you will, you might proceed with arrangements for such a conference. I am writing to Mohammad Ali formally about this and certain allied subjects. A copy of this letter² will be sent to you.

This conference of East and West Bengal and, of course, Assam also might well consider various other matters relating to the Eastern Zone, such as trade, travel facilities, visas and the like.³ I had pointed out to Mohammad Ali the difficulties in border trade, more especially with Assam and Tripura. You could deal with almost any matter relating to that area in this conference. I would suggest that the approach might be somewhat informal and not too rigid.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

2. See *ante*, pp. 440-441.

3. A conference of officials of India and Pakistan to discuss the exchange of enclaves, border trade, freedom of movement across the border and other issues relating to the Eastern Zone began in Calcutta on 30 September 1953.

11. To Zakir Husain¹

New Delhi
July 29, 1953

My dear Zakir Husain,³

I have seen a letter that you have written to the Ministry of Education about students from Pakistan being enrolled in the Aligarh University. You will no doubt hear from that Ministry on this subject. Meanwhile, I am indicating to you how I think about the matter.

On general principles, it is desirable that students should go to universities in other countries. We should on the whole apply that principle and allow some students from Pakistan to come to Aligarh. But it would be desirable to go a little slow at first and to make sure that the right kind come here. The proper course appears to be that applications for admission to the Aligarh University should be sent to you through our High Commissioner in Karachi. He might indicate his views on them, or he might forward such as he thinks proper. Your University could then decide from the educational or any other point of view whether you are prepared to have them.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim University.
3. Nehru noted on 29 July that he had a talk with Abul Kalam Azad, Minister of Education, on the subject and he generally agreed with Nehru's views.

12. Relations with Pakistan¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: Let us begin with my visit to Karachi although I have said a good deal about it, chiefly at my Press conference in Karachi² itself. As I have said, that visit was remarkable for the atmosphere, the friendly atmosphere, that prevailed there. And that, I think, is really a much bigger thing than perhaps many people imagine. Every problem that one deals with

1. Remarks at a Press Conference, New Delhi, 30 July 1953. From *Jawaharlal Nehru, Press Conferences, 1953*, Information Service of India, New Delhi, 1954. For other parts of the Press Conference, see pp. 77-78, 459, 496-497 and 540-542.
2. See *ante*, pp. 428-437.

becomes simpler if the approach is a friendly and informal one rather than a rigid and formal one.

Now, take evacuee property. I do not know at the present moment what the results of the talks that are going on there in Karachi in regard to evacuee property will be, but I do know that for the first time probably in the last few years, these talks are taking place in a different way, not in a formal, rigid way, arguing across the table, but in a friendly way, trying to understand the problem and to find a solution. Maybe, the solution, the entire solution, will not be found suddenly but it is a different way of approach, and, if I may say so, that applies to every problem that we discuss.

It was being much too over-optimistic to think that suddenly every problem would be solved by our meeting together, but something which is very important was this that we discussed many of our important problems in a much better way than had been done before. Some minor problems were solved; some major problems are being tackled more effectively, while some other major problems have not been solved. Nevertheless I will say that we are nearer the solution of every problem because of this approach. That is the background.


Now, it is not profitable or indeed proper for me to go into details as to what my talks with Mr Mohammad Ali were, say, in regard to Kashmir or in regard to any other problem. It is not desirable to talk about matters discussed in private talks, otherwise they lose that frankness and flexibility which one can give them in private. So you must not expect me to go into detail about these matters. Such information as I can give, I will gladly give you.

I should like to repeat what I have said elsewhere, to express my gratitude to the Pakistan Governor-General, the Prime Minister, and the rest of the Government for the very gracious hospitality they extended to all of us. But more particularly, it was very moving for me to receive the popular welcome that I received there. Many people had come from outside Karachi for the purpose—hundreds of them—and we are grateful to them. As I said there, I felt in Karachi completely at home. The fact is that apart from certain political controversies that we have between us, we are very near to each other. Hundreds of persons I met there were my colleagues in India. There are thousands of persons in India and Pakistan who have a brother, a sister or a father not only in the other country but possibly in the governmental services of the other country.

So all these are innumerable bonds. Then there is the very deep bond of language. We talked to each other in a language which belongs to both of us, not in a third language. If I talk to Mr Mohammad Ali or the Governor-General, it is mostly in our language, not in any other. It had a tremendous advantage and I had no feeling of being in a strange country or in an alien



AT THE INAUGURATION OF THE SOCIAL WELFARE BOARD, NEW DELHI, 12 AUGUST 1953



RECEIVING BEGUM MOHAMMAD ALI AND MOHAMMAD ALI, PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN, NEW DELHI AIRPORT, 16 AUGUST 1953

country. I do not know if you wish to ask me more questions about this matter, otherwise I will go on to Korea and the Political Conference, etc.

Question: In today's papers are Mr Mohammad Ali's remarks about Kashmir and about your talks at Karachi.³ He is less optimistic now that the Kashmir problem may be solved within one year. Is this losing heart or really becoming pessimistic?

JN: A year is a long way off. Why lose heart?

Q : Another point he has mentioned is that, in all probability, these agreements and other problems will be dependent on Kashmir. Is that your impression?

JN: That is not my impression and in fact we are going ahead with other problems. The common feature which affects all problems, the connecting link, is the manner of approach, the friendly manner of approach. If the approach is one full of suspicion, well, it affects all problems and difficulties come in the way. If the approach is in a friendly way we can go ahead. And so it happens that every little step that we take and succeed, that helps in the second step. That is one particular way of looking at it. Every problem solved helps in the solution of the second and the third problem. That I think is perhaps a better way of looking at it than to expect everything to be solved suddenly. It is true that in almost every problem that we discussed, big or small, we made very good progress. I cannot say if any problem was solved. It requires further consideration at official level or some other level. We could not discuss some matters in detail but our general approach was similar.

You have heard about these Cooch-Bihar enclaves, which was not a major problem but which has been hanging for some time. Well, we practically solved it subject to certain details being worked out. It is proposed now to hold a conference probably in Calcutta because the East Pakistan and West Bengal Governments are chiefly concerned with these matters. They can meet there and not only discuss this Cooch-Bihar matter but other matters affecting what is called the Eastern Zone and go ahead with them. Any difficulties that arise may be referred to the Prime Ministers. Other matters too, gurdwaras, shrines, etc., are being dealt with in Karachi now by our team discussing

3. At a Press Conference in Karachi on 29 July, Mohammad Ali stated that the progress he had anticipated in regard to Kashmir had not been made during his talks with Nehru. Though he earlier contended that the problem could be solved within six months, he now felt that it might not be solved even by the end of the year. Mohammad Ali, however, hoped that an amicable settlement would be reached in a year's time.

evacuee property. You will see, if I may say so, the astonishing progress that was made in these talks in regard to the actual subjects dealt with but the most satisfactory feature was the approach, the friendly approach, and the desire to find satisfactory solutions.

Now, it is true that so far as Kashmir was concerned, we did not find a full-fledged solution nor, frankly, could we suddenly expect one, however earnest our attempt. But even in regard to Kashmir I think our frank talks helped a great deal in our understanding each other's position and therefore, if I may say so, helped towards the solution. Quite a good deal has been accomplished and the way opened out for progress and accomplishment in a number of directions.

You refer to Mr Mohammad Ali's statement. That does not directly affect Indo-Pakistan problems. Indirectly it might. For instance, I believe Mr Mohammad Ali has referred to India's foreign policy and pointed out that that was not exactly the policy of Pakistan.⁴ Well, you will remember the proposal made about joint defence. Defence has no meaning except in relation to foreign policy. Also, so far as we are concerned, we have thus far avoided—and we hope to avoid—any military alliance of any kind because even in an alliance for defence, it might have another character which is looked upon by others as not being of defence. Also, the question arises, in having alliances, exactly against whom you have the alliance, or is it just in the air? All these questions arise which are dependent on the foreign policy we pursue.

What I suggested to Mr Mohammad Ali, and what to some extent he has accepted, was that we should naturally retain complete freedom in our foreign or domestic policies but that we might consult each other in regard to important matters of policy. That will be helpful and yet it would leave each party free to carry out any policy it chose.

Q : Before you proceed further, Sir, some authoritative word from you on the current situation in Kashmir might be helpful since a series of rumours are in the air, which do not necessarily find their way into print but which are of a very-disturbing character.

JN: Well, I think your question is completely justified. There is an amount of confusion at the moment in regard to—I won't call it the internal situation of Kashmir—but in regard to the expressions of opinion by leading personalities

4. Mohammad Ali was asked at his Press Conference on 29 July how it would be possible for Pakistan to discuss matters of foreign policy with India, since the latter had adopted an attitude of strict "neutrality". Mohammad Ali replied, "There is no obligation. It is not binding that there should be uniformity of policy." Replying to another question he said that the foreign policy of Pakistan was not identical with that of India.

in Kashmir which tend to produce this confusion. And, frankly, I am slightly confused myself. But I think if you look into the matter, apart from a lot of verbiage in it, the position is not different from what it was.

There is a feeling, naturally, of frustration in the minds of many there because of certain uncertainties and the rest, and this is given expression to in a variety of ways. The position so far as we are concerned about that—I can state it quite clearly—has been, throughout this period, that Kashmir by accession became a part of the Indian Union, but always we considered it as a special case. We never thought of it, because of various circumstances, as if it was any other State in India which was put into A or B or any other category. The reasons for that were not merely the fact that there were military operations in Kashmir or that the matter had been referred to the UN—those were reasons too—but there were other reasons which pertained chiefly to the whole geographical situation, the background, etc., in Kashmir which required this particular and special treatment. And that is our policy still, that is, to consider Jammu and Kashmir State as a special case requiring special treatment, as a part of the territory of the Union of India but with certain special considerations attached to it.

You will remember about the rather special position relating to Kashmir when the Republic came into existence and the new Constitution was finalized. It was somewhat indeterminate then. Even last year, when there were talks which resulted in what is called the Delhi Agreement, certain things were agreed to but always in the context of a special position for Kashmir. So that is the position so far as we are concerned about it.

Q : Before you left for Karachi it was stated in the Press communique that the talks in Karachi would be exploratory. How is the position now?

JN: I think you will find in the joint communique⁵ issued about these talks of the two Governments that these talks, most of these talks, have been of a preliminary nature. So you can weigh the words “exploratory” or “preliminary nature”, if you like. A talk is always exploratory because it explores avenues of a settlement, at every stage; till you arrive at a settlement, you are searching for the settlement.

Q : You have given us a very optimistic picture of your Karachi visit. Rather the other side of the shield was given in this morning's Press. There is a report of Mr Mohammad Ali giving an overall picture of the whole conversation that took place at Karachi where he is reported to have said that “the progress anticipated by me has not materialized.” Did

5. See *ante*, pp. 438-439.

he make any concrete suggestions to you which were turned down by India? What does he mean by that?

JN: These reports tend to emphasize something. I was just looking through a report. Here is the report. It says:

Mr Mohammad Ali's attention was drawn to the report of Mr Nehru's remarks in New Delhi that the problem was not nearer solution. Mr Ali did not feel that way. What Mr Nehru was reported to have said had not damped his enthusiasm. He was confident that both countries would go on making the best efforts to find a solution.

So it depends on the context and everything. It is clear we have not solved every problem. I think it is equally clear that we have gone a good way towards the solution of some problems and towards a fuller understanding of others, which is itself a way to solution. And if any report had appeared in the *Dawn* that I was pessimistic I do not think that report is justified. I think something I said at the airport was probably reported that way.

Q: In regard to joint defence you said, "Against whom is it going to be?"⁶ Then why should India or any other country have a defence at all?

JN: That is, if I may say so, a typical question which verges on what is called *shastrarth*, a metaphysical controversy.⁷... It is quite a good question. The question was: if it is said that joint defence means defence against somebody, some aggressor, well, then, why have defence at all if you have no aggressor in view? Why have an Army, Navy and Air Force at all? I think there is a good deal of difference between the two. I think it will be a very good thing if a country was strong enough to give up entirely its defence apparatus. The strength would come from other sources—the capacity, nevertheless, of meeting any aggressor, any invader, and not allow him to come in, and be prepared to die in the attempt and let the whole country die. That kind of strength few countries possess. I am sure that would be the most effective way if we were strong enough, but that is rather pure theory, and people are not in any country yet adequately developed to that end. So the most one does is to make it difficult and very uncomfortable for an aggressor to think of invading.

Now, there are two types of defence. One is literally defence of your own country and your borders. The other is, what is perhaps not correctly called defence, defence outside your country. We are only concerned with defence of our country. Now, it is patent when we talk about defence that we

6. See *ante*, p. 436.

7. A correspondent asked, "What was the question?"

are no match in terms of defence forces with the great countries of the world—obviously not, even apart from modern developments like the atom bomb. We have no atom bombs to throw about, or other modern weapons. So I may at once say and quite logically, when you don't have them, you cannot beat an atom bomb. But there is a middle stage when your means of defence apparatus plus the will of the people to defend make it difficult for any outside party to think of invasion. You may not be competent for going outside your country for warfare in a big way maybe, but you may be competent, very competent, in your own country to defend it by all kinds of ways which include very much the ways in which the people can join.

We do not think of the defence of India in terms of an army only. We think of the whole nation, man, woman and child, defending it if there is any invasion. So the whole conception is different. The man, woman and child cannot go outside India to defend it elsewhere, but they can in India, if only we tone it up, discipline it. But, when you go about making an alliance with other countries—to use the colloquial word, “ganging up” against others—it has a different interpretation, it has a different meaning.

Q: Have you given thought to Pakistan's new foreign policy, as stated by Mr Mohammad Ali, of being a partisan to the Big Power struggle or conflict which is going on?

JN: Mr Mohammad Ali has stated what was fairly well understood previously. So there was nothing new about what he stated.

Q: I heard over the radio last night that whereas India is neutral, Pakistan is definitely a partisan as far as this conflict is concerned.

JN: That has been the position for a long time past. There is nothing new about that except a clearer statement.

Q: Do you propose to associate the leaders of Kashmir directly in the future talks with the Pakistan Prime Minister?

JN: During the last five or six years, at every stage whenever Kashmir has been discussed in the United Nations or with the representatives of the UN, or with Mr Liaquat Ali Khan and others, we have always been in touch with the leaders of Kashmir and we have consulted them. In fact, usually there has been a representative of the Kashmir Government who was sent with the team to the UN or to Dr Graham. Always we have been in close touch with them because it is obvious that we cannot come to some conclusion over the heads of the people of Kashmir. It is for them to be consulted, to agree.

Q: Have you ever taken the trouble of consulting any non-official people from Jammu and Kashmir?

JN: I do not quite understand that. Governments consult Governments. If I go to England, I have non-official friends but my consultations are with the Ministers of the UK Government. I have plenty of contacts with Kashmir non-official friends. I know very well what their views are by privately meeting them, but I consult the Government of the State.

Q: There has been in existence a third party which has hindered solution of the Kashmir problem. Now that mutual negotiations have started between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, would you like the Kashmir question to be withdrawn from the UN, if possible?

JN: That question was put to Mr Mohammad Ali, and his answer is that unless the question has been discussed by both of us, no action was to be taken. I think that answer should for the moment suffice.

Q: What do you propose to do with the bronze head presented by Pakistan to you?

Answer: Presumably it will go to some museum. This head was made in November 1946 when I went to England.⁸ It was produced before Partition and was sent to Lahore and was there at the time of the Partition. Now they have been good enough to present it to me.

8. The bronze statue of Nehru's head was made by Jacob Epstein.

13. To G.S. Bajpai¹

New Delhi,
30th July, 1953

My dear Girja,

Thank you for your letter of the 28th July,

My visit to Karachi was, I think, worthwhile in many ways. Nobody could expect that the Kashmir problem would be solved by that visit. But we

1. JN Collection.

made a good deal of progress in regard to other matters, and if the present favourable atmosphere continues, it might be quite possible to go ahead with the evacuee property problem and the East and West Bengal problems.

The outstanding impressions of the Karachi visit were the excessive anxiety of the Government there to arrive at a settlement with India about various matters, and more especially the Kashmir matter. In fact, it was repeatedly stated that if Kashmir is solved, everything else follows immediately. The other impression was the popular welcome that I got from the people generally. This was remarkable and I rather doubt if any Pakistani leader ever gets anything like it. This was evidently spontaneous and not organized.

Among the people there is a passionate desire for a settlement with India and a feeling that the past policy of conflict has been foolish and harmful. Generally speaking, Kashmir is not such a live issue with them as it used to be. They are much more interested in economic issues and evacuee properties. In this matter, I think the Government has been pushed somewhat by the public demand. The Government itself is not very stable. Mohammad Ali, though popular to some extent, has no real roots or strength and depends on others. The others intrigue against each other. The conflict between West Pakistan and East Pakistan is as bad as ever. On the whole, Ghulam Mohammed, the Governor-General, is probably the most important figure. The Army Chiefs count for a lot with Iskander Mirza,² the Defence Secretary. Among the senior Civil Servants, Mohammad Ali³ has considerable influence. So also Aziz Ahmed, now Chief Secretary.

Shaikh Abdullah has given me more trouble in recent months than Pakistan. I really cannot explain his new attitude except on the uncharitable assumption that he has lost grip of his mind. Anyhow, there it is and I do not know where it is going to lead us.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. (1899-1969); served in Army, 1921-26; joined Indian Political Service, 1926; served the Government of India in the Ministry of Defence, 1946-47; Defence Secretary, Government of Pakistan, 1947-54; Governor of East Bengal, 1954; Minister of Interior, States and Frontier Regions, 1954-55; Governor-General of Pakistan, 1955-56, and President, 1956-58.
3. Choudhary Mohammad Ali (1905-1980); joined Indian Accounts and Audit Service, 1928; member, Steering Committee of Partition Council, 1947; Secretary-General to Government of Pakistan, 1947-51; Minister of Finance, 1951-55; Prime Minister, 1955-56.

14. Visas to Visitors from Pakistan¹

I have read these various notes of the Home Ministry and External Affairs.

2. We have been approaching this question for some time past with a view to make trade, business and travel easier as between the two countries. In fact, even in my recent talks with the Prime Minister of Pakistan stress was laid on this by me. We have even been suggesting that the system of visa be abolished. If that is our general policy, then I do not understand how this question arises at all.

3. I am entirely opposed, from every point of view, to any suggestion or proposal which entails long delays in considering an application for a visa. No question of even security can justify this delay which is more irritating to people than anything else. In regard to visas to foreigners from countries other than Pakistan, I have repeatedly laid stress on avoidance of delay and on quick disposal. We have, I believe, laid it down that normally our Missions abroad should issue visas and only refer the matter to us in doubtful cases. Any other way stops business, tourists and brings discredit to our country.

4. If we adopt this rule about all foreign countries, how can we change it in regard to Pakistan? As for security, there are probably more dangerous elements in India, that is, among Indian nationals, than outside India. All kinds of slogans are raised from day to day advocating murder. This is done at Hindu Mahasabha and Jan Sangh gatherings. We put up with that and allow even these organizations to function. I do not see how any additional danger to anybody's security comes in from Pakistan. In fact there is far less danger from Pakistan than from certain elements in India.

5. I do not understand how certain areas in India can be cordoned off for this purpose. That will create great many difficulties. Also as Punjab is one of such areas and the Punjab is a border State, anyone passing through the Punjab will be affected even though he is going elsewhere.

6. We have been proceeding along certain lines in our talks with Pakistan. We have come to certain agreements. We must observe those agreements in their entirety and not seek excuses to get out of them.

7. Therefore, I am quite clear that the proposal of the Home Ministry in this matter cannot be accepted and the State Governments concerned should be informed accordingly. The other suggestions made can, of course, be considered and, where possible, acted upon....

1. Note, 1 August 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.

15. To Mohammad Ali¹

New Delhi
August 20, 1953

My dear Prime Minister,

I enclose a clean copy of the Press communique that we agreed upon.² This will be issued this evening and released in the morning papers tomorrow, simultaneously in India and Pakistan.

I mentioned to you the desirability of some statement being made about the progress achieved in regard to the evacuee property question. This relates chiefly to movable property. I think that this should not be mentioned in our communique here. But a separate note might be issued by the two Governments in the course of the next few days.

Our Minister for Rehabilitation³ had sent me a draft for this purpose. I am enclosing that here for your consideration. After you go back to Karachi, this matter might be considered. If you approve of this draft, this can be intimated to us and a date for publication fixed. Otherwise, any changes suggested by you might be communicated to us.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Mohammad Ali visited New Delhi from 17 to 20 August 1953. For record of talks between Nehru and Mohammad Ali and the joint communique issued at the conclusion of their talks, see *ante*, pp. 331-338 and 343-346.
3. Ajit Prasad Jain.

16. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi
August 24, 1953

My dear Ajit,

Occasionally, the question has arisen as to whether property of Government servants, who opted for Pakistan, should be declared or should continue to be treated as evacuee property. Wherever this question has arisen, it has been

1. File No. 48(58)/53-PMS.

stated that this is a Cabinet decision. I do not remember when this matter was considered and whether it was considered by the Cabinet Committee or by the full Cabinet.

The matter is of importance and concerns a principle. The fact that Pakistan may have acted in a particular manner is no adequate reason for us to offend a well established principle.

I think, therefore, that this question should be fully considered, preferably by a full Cabinet meeting. Perhaps you could have a brief paper prepared on this issue.

I should particularly like to know how many persons are involved. I doubt if more than a dozen or so are affected. But I should like to know.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

17. Requirement of Additional Water for Bhakra-Nangal¹

I am quite clear that both the International Bank and the Pakistan Government should be informed that our Bhakra-Nangal Scheme will have sufficiently advanced by April next for us to require some additional water. We have, in the past, expressed our readiness to accommodate Pakistan in this matter as far as possible. But it is obvious that this matter cannot be kept pending indefinitely. No doubt, this should be done with skill and tact. But often the best way is to be frank about a subject. Mr B.K. Nehru and Mr Khosla² should be informed about it. I do not see why we should fix any date like the 15th October. We should refer to the middle of next year. We may, as a matter of mutual arrangement and compromise, extend the period somewhat later.

1. Note to Secretary-General and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 11 September 1953. JN Collection.
2. A.N. Khosla, Special Secretary, Ministry of Irrigation and Power, and Chairman of the Board of Technical Consultants for the Bhakra Dam.

2. I do not see how we can collect any data of what will be the effect of our withdrawing some water on the canal system in Pakistan. If Mr Sivasankar can give us some facts, he should do so. But obviously the data in our possession is limited. We do not know fully what steps Pakistan has taken to build canals during the last three or four years. There is no doubt that they have built many canals and, in fact, during the conference with our engineers some months ago, I raised this very question. The answer that was given to me was that Pakistan is fairly advanced in this respect and has only very little more to do. But this was more or less of a guess. Anyhow, we should collect such data as we can and send it to our delegation in Washington.³

3. The External Affairs Ministry should keep in full contact with all these developments so that they can be related to our talks with Pakistan.

4. As for my informing the Pakistan Prime Minister I think that no formal intimation should be sent by me in this way at this stage. Later, this might be considered or I might tell him informally.

3. Representatives from India and Pakistan at this time were engaged in discussions in Washington under the auspices of the World Bank to reach an agreement on a comprehensive plan for the division of water resources of the Indus basin between India and West Pakistan.

18. To Swaran Singh¹

New Delhi

September 23, 1953

My dear Swaran Singh,

I want your help in a matter. This is the work we are doing in regard to the recovery of abducted persons. On the whole, there has been cooperation between India and Pakistan in this matter, both official and non-official. We have laid stress in the past on the work being done not only by governmental agencies on both sides, which was inevitable, but also with non-official help.

1. JN Collection.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

We felt this very necessary because of the human element in it. The official approach is apt to forget the human being.²

Previously, Gopalaswami Ayyangar took charge of this and was continuously consulted. His advice was acted upon. Apart from general questions of policy, etc., day to day matters arise in individual cases which require consultation and advice.

Mridula Sarabhai has played an important part in this from the non-official side. She has done very fine work indeed, though she has often managed to rub people the wrong way. She is now taking leave for some time, and I have been wanting to examine the whole organization.

Unfortunately, I cannot find the time for it, at any rate, at present. Mridula's departure also necessitates such an examination.

What I would like you to do is, for the present at least, to consider yourself more or less in ministerial charge of this work. Chopra,³ Joint Secretary, External Affairs, is in charge of it on the official side. I have asked him to see you and show you the papers and to consult you on the organizational side. Also, if any question arises about an individual, he will seek your advice.

When I come back to Delhi, I shall have a talk with you as to how you should arrange these things for the future. For the present, I do not want any major changes to be made in organization or personnel. Suggestions to that effect might be noted for future consideration.

It will probably be desirable for us to have a small conference to which we might invite Mridula also.

I hope you will agree.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. In reply to a question on the subject in the Council of States on 16 September 1953, Nehru had said: "...In both India and Pakistan, it has sometimes been stated that officials and leading citizens have possessed, or are in possession of, abducted women. The Central Recovery Offices in both countries have enquired into cases brought before them. They came to the conclusion that it was not possible to make any definite statement about this matter till they have completed an investigation of all the claims."

3. I.S. Chopra.

II. BILATERAL RELATIONS

(ii) Nepal

1. The Situation in Nepal¹

Question: What is the situation in Nepal?² What is India's policy?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not know of any particular situation in Nepal.

Q: Recently the Prime Minister of Nepal came here and discussed a number of questions.

JN: He discussed a number of matters.³

Q: Is there any understanding about sending our troops in Nepal whenever there is any trouble there?

JN: There is no such understanding.

² What is India's policy?

particular situation in Nepal.

came here and discussed a number

ng our troops in Nepal whenever

etimes Nepal troops are given
n a view to enable them to go

Question: What is the situation in Nepal?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not know of any particular

Q: Recently the Prime Minister of Nepal came here and discussed a number of questions.

JN: He discussed a number of matters.³

Q: Is there any understanding about sending our troops in Nepal whenever there is any trouble there?

JN: There is no such understanding. Sometimes permission is given to Nepal troops to go across Indian territory with a view to enable them to go from one part of Nepal to another.

2. To M.P. Koirala¹

New Delhi
August 15, 1953

My dear Maitrika Babu,

Yesterday and the day before I met B.P. Koirala² and Surya Prasad Upadhyaya.³ I had a fairly long talk with them.

Bishweshwar Prasad said that he was eager and anxious, in the interests of Nepal, to cooperate with your Government⁴ but that you had not opened the door for such cooperation. Indeed, after you had orally agreed to the terms he had suggested, you went back on that later.⁵ What was he to do in the circumstances?

2. I told him that I was not much concerned with any terms that might have been offered or any other conversations that might have taken place between you two or others. The major fact before me was that something had to be done to prevent deterioration and disintegration in Nepal. Even to talk of high policies was beside the mark when the basic question of an effective administration was itself unanswered.

3. Briefly, I referred to the last two and a half years, since the change-over in Nepal,⁶ and the ups and downs that we had witnessed. Repeatedly opportunity had come to make good, but it had been lost. Tall talk had been indulged in, but the simplest duties which a Government should perform had been neglected. There was much talk of democracy, but democracy envisaged

1. JN Collection.

2. President of the Nepali Congress.

3. A supporter of B.P. Koirala and former Home Minister of Nepal.

4. M.P. Koirala was sworn in as Prime Minister on 15 June ending the system of government by the King through an Advisory Council which had functioned since the resignation of Koirala's previous Cabinet in August 1952. The new Cabinet included four members from Koirala's National Democratic Party and one Independent.

5. In his letter of 3 July to Nehru, B.P. Koirala wrote that M.P. Koirala had been installed into power by the King in utter disregard of democratic practices and conventions, and that his Government could not last long without the cooperation of the Nepali Congress. The Nepali Congress had offered their cooperation, if M.P. Koirala agreed to (i) implement a programme given by them; (ii) allow them an effective parity in the Cabinet; and (iii) function with them as a coalition in the Government. B.P. Koirala added that on 26 June, M.P. Koirala had accepted these terms, but later started finding excuses for backing out.

6. The despotic control of the Rana family who ruled as hereditary Prime Ministers was ended in 1951 following a popular agitation led by the Nepali Congress.

certain conditions. It did not exist in the air. If these basic conditions were lacking, then there would be no democracy and something else would take its place. This did not mean that the people of Nepal were more backward than the people of India in any basic sense. But they had not got that experience, that training and self-discipline, which it was our good fortune to have in India for a long period of time and, more especially, under Gandhiji. I could well understand that after a hundred years of Rana rule, the sudden change-over could not immediately produce those basic elements of democracy in Nepal. Yet, unless there was cohesion and self-discipline and a measure of administrative efficiency and integrity, democracy was bound to fail. The previous record of Nepal under the Rana rule had been not only autocracy but periodic assassinations and palace intrigues. It was not easy to get out of this background and the new-found liberty could and would lead to licence and disintegration, unless strong cohesive and integrating forces were at work.

4. It is quite possible that, but for the background of India, the disintegrating forces in Nepal might have worked even more swiftly and politics in Nepal become just an arena for personal conflict and attempts to remove each other from the scene of action. India had no desire to interfere in Nepal. But the mere fact of a relatively strong India across the borders undoubtedly had a restraining influence. Nevertheless, it was obvious that Nepal could be built up only by its own people and by their developing those essential basic qualities which were so necessary in any country and, more especially, in a democratic one. If this was not done, there would be periodic upheavals and ultimately some kind of an authoritarian, possibly military junta would control the situation.

5. Geography was important all over the world. In the Far East, the dominating factor was geography. China, Korea, the Soviet Union and Japan, being all close together, none of them could be ignored. Distant powers, however big, might interfere for a while, but ultimately geography would prevail. So also geography was having its powerful influence in India and Nepal. India was influenced greatly by the rise of new China and by the new importance of our long frontier with the Chinese State. These facts could not be ignored.

6. So also the close geographical association, apart from cultural, between India and Nepal inevitably led to certain results. This did not mean that Nepal should not be fully independent. For our part, we had not only said so but firmly believed in the independence of Nepal for a variety of reasons. But this did mean a certain close association between India and Nepal and the exclusion of any close association between Nepal and other foreign countries.

7. I referred to the occasional agitation in Nepal against India and

mentioned that B.P. himself had indulged in it.⁷ So also Upadhyaya. I referred to certain articles in some official newspapers of the Nepali Congress. All this did not do much harm to India directly, but they did a lot of harm to Nepal and showed the narrow and limited outlook of leading personalities and others in Nepal. On this negative basis they could do nothing except add to their difficulties.

8. B.P. denied any anti-Indian feeling or participation in such an agitation. He said he was convinced that India and Nepal should pull together. In fact he had grown up with these ideas and he wanted to work for them.

9. I referred to the demand for the withdrawal of the Indian Army deputation there to train the Nepalese Army.⁸ This had done very good work in training four or five battalions of the Nepal Army and so long as it was wanted, it would continue. I understood that they intended training nine or more battalions. This trained force could be of great advantage to Nepal in the future and in maintaining its integrity and in preventing disintegration. Of course there was always a risk that if there was no efficient civil power, the military might gain control. That risk had to be taken because even otherwise this might happen if the civil power failed.

10. Finally, I pointed out that it was of the utmost importance for a stable Government to function in Nepal with such cooperation of leading personalities and groups as possible. The first essential was a more or less

7. The Nepali Congress frequently charged India with treating Nepal as a dependency of hers like Sikkim. C.P.N. Singh, who was India's Ambassador to Nepal, 1949-52, was said to be often present at the meetings of the Nepali Cabinet, and criticized for meddling in the internal affairs of Nepal. When M.P. Koirala was appointed as Prime Minister in November 1951, B.P. Koirala accused C.P.N. Singh of trying to balance one leader against another. The interventions of the Indian police to restore law and order in 1951 were described by opposition groups as infringement of Nepal's sovereignty and independence. The Indian Military Mission, which was invited when B.P. Koirala was in the government, was interpreted as a device for suppression of political parties and gradual annexation of Nepal. As conditions worsened in 1953, a section of the Nepali Congress whipped up the anti-India campaign, with the Working Committee of the party calling up on India to withdraw her civilian advisers and the Military Mission in the interest of "healthy relations between India and Nepal." The Kosi project agreement also aroused intense bitterness in Nepal and its opponents accused the Government of bartering away Nepal's future.
8. The Indian Military Mission went to Nepal in February 1952. During its stay of just over a year, the Mission had introduced (1) uniformity in dress, (2) rational pay scales and (3) other basic reforms, apart from imparting training to 150 officers who would form the nucleus of future Army leadership. The number of generals was reduced to the minimum and hereditary right to rank was abolished. The barracks system was introduced and the troops had to undergo intensive training.

efficient and honest Government. All policies came afterwards. Even development schemes and the rest could not really be given effect to, unless there was an effective Government functioning. Therefore, the administration must have integrity and must function properly. The judiciary also should be trusted. Simple reforms, which were obvious, could be immediately introduced for cleaning up the administrative apparatus and adding to the revenue of the State considerably. The present revenue was absurdly small.

11. As a matter of fact, no real internal change had taken place in Nepal since the change-over two and a half years ago. The old habits inculcated in the Rana regime continued. There was inefficiency and wastage. It was natural that people should be disgruntled at this. The rich continued to be as rich as ever and the poor as poor as ever. Taxation hardly hit the rich. Instead of thinking of major reforms (which of course were necessary) it was possible immediately to introduce some reforms which would balance the picture somewhat, add to the revenue of the State, and make the people generally more optimistic and hopeful.

12. All this could only be done if there was a stable Government functioning. It seemed to me, therefore, the duty of every earnest and well-intentioned Nepali to cooperate in the establishment of such a Government and to put aside all personal feelings and differences. My advice to B.P., therefore, was that he must offer this cooperation and that this should be unconditional. It was no good making conditions and putting forward terms. Conditions could be broken and terms ignored if there was suspicion and intrigue.

13. B.P. said that his offer of cooperation was quite *bona fide* and he had no intention of creating trouble or breaking away. I asked him if any approach in a bargaining spirit created a good atmosphere. All this talk of blocs, etc., had no meaning. After all, an individual or a group could always break away or dissociate himself or itself if a crisis arose. Therefore the offer should be unconditional in the interests of the people. That was a dignified approach, which would create a greater impression on the other party as well as on the public.

14. B.P. said something about only three of his men being taken and how was he to face his party and group and so on? I said I was not interested in this matter. This was a question to be settled in private and friendly talks. But there must be no spirit of bargaining or laying down conditions. Cooperation must be frank and unconditional. That would raise the person who offers that cooperation in the public eye.

15. B.P. said: Would he get a fair deal from you? He offered his cooperation in a perfectly *bona fide* way, but would it be accepted as such? I told him that I could not answer for others. But I was sure that if a right approach was made, the response would be a right one. In any event, one

should act rightly without caring too much of what someone else says or does. The interests of Nepal urgently required a pooling of resources and a pulling together. Everything else must be subordinated to this.

16. This was the general burden of my argument and I believe I produced some impression upon him and Upadhyaya. I told him to write to you or, better still, to speak to you in this spirit. I also told him that I would be writing to you about this. The basic fact today was your Government and that must be helped. Any attempt to weaken it was bad for the country.

17. I hope you will see him and talk frankly without any reservations. As a leader, you must inspire confidence in others. Thus the circle of confidence grows and affects the general public.

18. May I add a few words which I hope you will not mind. I think it is absolutely important that the Nepal Government should pull itself out of the old habits and ways of the Rana Government. It should set an example not only of efficiency but of economy and straight living. I am astonished at the extravagance of your Government occasionally. The delegation your Government sent to the London Coronation⁹ probably cost you far more than most delegations that had gone there from a variety of countries, big and small. Our Indian delegation,¹⁰ and it was a business delegation, must have spent less than 10 per cent or even 5 per cent of what your delegation spent. I understand that, according to old habit, each person who goes out is given a considerable sum for private expenditure. Nobody from India, including the Prime Minister, is allowed any such freedom of expenditure from the public funds.

19. This is just one instance, but one gets the impression of this extravagance throughout and it does not fit in at all with a poor country struggling hard to better itself.

20. All this business of night clubs and heavy drinking and foolish expenditure reacts powerfully on the public. An impression has to be created of simplicity, austerity, integrity and hard work. That is much more important than big talk about big policies.

21. One of the big reasons for Shaikh Abdullah's recent unpopularity in Kashmir was his extravagance in getting expensive cars and the like. We in India have banned all expensive cars. They cannot even come to the country. My own car is a small Hindustan. We have a few hang-overs from the past in the shape of some expensive cars that we had got several years ago. We buy no such cars now. In fact, their import is prohibited. That applies to all

9. The Nepalese delegation to the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II which took place at Westminster Abbey on 2 June 1953 was led by Prince Bir Bikram Shah Himalaya.

10. The Indian delegation was led by Jawaharlal Nehru.

luxury articles. There is no reason why Nepal should not function in the same way.

22. News from Calcutta about the King's health is not good.¹¹ I have asked Dr B.C. Roy especially to look after him. Dr Roy informs me that the case is serious, but if care is taken and the King takes absolute rest, he might recover. He added that the King cannot be moved for some time at least and he must remain in Calcutta for three or four weeks and take absolute rest there.

23. I am writing this letter to you on August 15, which is our Independence Day. It is a historic day for us and, I think, for the world, and on such an occasion my mind thinks not only of the past great struggles we have gone through but of the future with its struggles. We should triumph no doubt, because we are determined to succeed. I want that spirit of determination to enthuse the activities of the leaders of Nepal and a larger tolerance of each other so as to get as great a measure of cooperation as possible in the great and difficult tasks you have to face.

I send you all my good wishes.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. King Tribhuvan was suffering from serious heart trouble.

3. To B.K. Gokhale¹

New Delhi
August 21, 1953

My dear Gokhale,²

... This morning General Bijaya, the Nepalese Ambassador, came to see me. He spoke first of all about the King's condition. For many weeks the King was not likely to be well enough to go back to Kathmandu. This may well be several months. He is also thinking of going abroad. He asked me if it was not desirable for the King to appoint a Council of Regency to function for him during his absence.

I told him that I thought that some arrangement was necessary both to relieve the King of his burden and to expedite the work of the Government in

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Ambassador of India in Nepal.

Nepal. This could either be done by the appointment of a Council of Regency or, perhaps, by some other devolution of authority about which I am not quite clear.

Bijaya then told me about the lack of concord between the Crown Prince³ and the King. The Crown Prince had heard reports about the possible appointment of a Council of Regency and had reacted very much against it as he thought he ought to be charged with this responsibility during the King's absence.

I said that it would be improper for a Council of Regency to be appointed leaving out the Crown Prince. That would merely add to conflict. On the other hand, it would not be right for the Crown Prince to be the sole Regent. Perhaps a Council of three, including the Crown Prince, might be desirable....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Prince Mahendra.

4. Cable to B.K. Gokhale¹

Your two telegrams of August 22nd.

I have already sent you full report of my talks with Koirala with a letter² for Prime Minister.

General Bijaya has seen me and intended going to Calcutta to see the King.³ He had in mind discussing the question of Regency with the King during his absence and illness. I have no present intention of going to Patna. I shall gladly meet the King if he comes to Delhi.

1. New Delhi, 23 August 1953. JN Collection.

2. See *ante*, pp. 460-645.

3. Gokhale stated that King Tribhuvan would wish to meet Nehru in Patna if the latter visited Bihar; otherwise he would go to Delhi. Gokhale further said that the doctors in Calcutta had apparently advised the King to go abroad for treatment.

In Nepal people are very apt at exaggeration and rumour-mongering.⁴ Therefore, all reports must be checked and not taken at their face value. I am inclined to think that some reports reaching you are greatly exaggerated. But I have had independent reports about spread of American activities in Terai area also.

It is for the Nepalese Government to take action in these matters. You can draw attention of the Prime Minister.

Recent happenings in Kashmir are likely to have contrary effect on American activities in Nepal as Kashmir reports, which have been very exaggerated, have rather alarmed them.

We agree that Govind Narain and Pai should revert to India on completion of their work.⁵ You can speak to King and Prime Minister about this. Govind Narain's future work will be considered later.

4. Gokhale reported that there were rumours that some officers including Secretaries to the Government of Nepal were getting regular allowances from the Americans, who were said to have established "cells" in the Army and the Secretariat. The Americans were also reported to be penetrating into the interiors where they distributed cash, clothes and medicines.
5. Gokhale stated that Govind Narain, Adviser-cum-Secretary to the King, would be completing his term of deputation in Nepal by September 1953, and would have practically no work when the King went abroad. Also, D.D. Pai of the Reserve Bank of India, on deputation to Nepal as an adviser, had no work either. Gokhale thought that "the atmosphere of distrust and suspicion unjustly created by the Nepali Congress against these two officers now makes it difficult for them to do any further good work in Nepal." Gokhale argued that the King's going abroad gave a genuine opportunity to recall these officers to duty in India.

5. To Amrit Kaur¹

New Delhi

September 11, 1953

My dear Amrit,

Your letter about Nepal. As you say, the Government and people of Nepal are terribly backward in everything. In fact, their Government hardly functions. I think it is rather absurd for them to talk about tuberculosis campaigns when they have not got the most elementary medical services....

The first thing to do, therefore, is to build up this simple general medical

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

service. However, you can agree to send somebody to advise them, after they have sent you this information. As for material help, we should not enter into any commitment.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To B.K. Gokhale¹

New Delhi
September 15, 1953

My dear Gokhale,

I am sending this letter to you through K.P. Bhatia,² who is going to Kathmandu for a few days in connection with the Colombo Plan. There is going to be a Colombo Plan Conference in Delhi soon³ and it would be helpful if we knew definitely what could be done in Kathmandu in this connection.

We have to discuss many things in regard to Nepal—political, economic, judicial, administrative and developmental—but somehow nothing gets a move on. This is most depressing.

It seems to me that it would be better if we had small schemes which we could go on with and show results than to have fine big paper schemes which never get moving. What Nepal requires more than anything else is some achievement, something for people to see instead of merely to talk about. I hope, therefore, that this will be kept in mind and the programme drawn up will be such as can show results as soon as possible.

As you know, there are a host of foreign technicians, experts and the like in Nepal. What solid work they do there, I do not know. But my impression is that they have not achieved any substantial results.

I had a visit from General Bijaya last night on his return from Calcutta. He told me that the King was much better and that it had been decided that he should go to Kathmandu for two or three days before leaving for Switzerland. I am glad he is going there. It would have been unfortunate if he went direct to Switzerland from Calcutta. Even a brief visit to Kathmandu

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. The Government of Nepal had sought the services of K.P. Bhatia of the Uttar Pradesh Government for developmental work in Nepal under the Colombo Plan.
3. The meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee was to be held in New Delhi from 28 September to 18 October 1953.

will have a good effect. If he can speak to his people through the radio, that will be better still.

As I think I wrote to you, I had arranged to see the King in Bombay before he sailed. I understand that Dr Roy is now anxious that the King should go to Switzerland by air and not by train and steamer. Dr Roy thinks that this long journey involving many changes, both in India and in Europe, is likely to upset the King. There is bound to be irregularity and change in food and all the good that a fixed regime had done the King during the last few weeks might well be washed away. If the King goes by air, that would take him just a day or less and he can go straight to the Nursing Home at the other end. The air journey might be slightly tiring, but it will not last very long and the aircraft is pressurized. The journey from Bombay to Geneva is only about 16 hours or so. Therefore, Dr Roy was definitely of opinion that the King should go by air and as soon as possible. The King apparently would like to go by sea.

I telephoned to Dr Roy last night and spoke to him on this subject. He repeated his opinion about going by air, but said that if the King was very anxious to go by sea, he would not come in his way. I suggested to Dr Roy to see the King and to speak to him and then a final decision could be taken.

One of the reasons for the King wanting to go by sea was, perhaps, because he wanted to see me before his departure. I would myself like to see him, but, after all, it is more important that his health should be looked after. If it is better for him to go by air soon, that should be preferred. He can also come back by air too, and the sooner he comes back, the better. The end of September and the month of October are just the right months in Switzerland. It would be a pity to waste much of the time in travelling by sea....⁴

T.N. Kaul⁵ was sent by me to Calcutta to see the King and talk to him about the proposed State Council. That has been fixed up, the Council consisting of the Crown Prince, the Second Prince and the two Queens. I think it is as well that no one else is added to it. The Council will thus be a four-man Council, with delegated powers from the King for particular purposes. It is not a Regency.

T.N. Kaul had talks with the King and with M.P. Koirala. Both of them gave him the impression that they would like to have more advice and help from you than they were getting. They had a feeling that you kept yourself away rather for fear of interference and met them only when you were sent for. If that is their feeling, I think you should remove it and cultivate closer acquaintance with them so that they might get the full value of your advice.

4. The King arrived in Mumbai from Calcutta by air on 29 September and sailed from there for Genoa on his way to Switzerland on 11 October.

5. Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs.

All these people in Nepal lack experience completely and have little initiative. Therefore, sometimes a push has to be given to them so that they might act. I hope you will bear this in mind. M.P. Koirala's present government will be a complete failure if nothing substantial is done by it. If it fails, there is hardly any suitable alternative. Therefore, we must try to make this government a success. That means that we must help them to get something done, administratively or in the sphere of development. If we are asked to send some officials or engineers, we shall do so. We have pursued this matter in the past in a very passive way waiting for something to be done at the other side. Naturally, we cannot function unilaterally, but we can push the other side forward to take steps.

I am anxious about the intrigues that some foreign people are carrying on there. I hope you will keep us fully informed of them.

It appears that Mahabir Shamshere, Subarna Shamshere and others are intriguing again in a new way together. I do not know much about it.

When you see the King, please convey my greetings to him...Tell him also that I am most anxious that he should get well as soon as possible. I hope that he will take care of himself and not relax his regime.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Indian Assistance for Developmental Purposes¹

... 2. I agree generally with the notes of F.S. and Joint Secretary, Kaul. While we should, of course, give assistance to Nepal for developmental purposes, it is clear that our resources are limited and we cannot think in large terms. The kind of development schemes that should be developed in Nepal should be relatively small ones which yield results quickly. Some results have to be shown as soon as possible after this long period of inaction. Development schemes should be carefully scrutinized and supervised by our own people as there is no one in Nepal who can do so. The money we give should not be wasted.

3. I agree that our Embassy should take a more active part than they appear to have done in the recent past. It is clear that the Nepal Government

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, and Foreign Secretary, 15 September 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.

is not capable of initiative. To some extent, we have to supply that initiative. We should not care very much about the anti-Indian propaganda. If we show results, there will inevitably be a favourable reaction. It is only when there are no results that criticism multiplies. Therefore, we should not be reluctant to send officers when needed and asked for. We may even suggest that some officers for a particular work might be sent. Of course, we should send no one unless the Nepal Government agrees. But we should not be afraid of putting forward proposals and taking the initiative in such matters.

4. Our Ambassador should keep in close and friendly touch with the King and the Prime Minister especially, and, to some extent with other Ministers too. They should feel that they can go to him for advice. It should be kept in mind that our Embassy in Nepal has to play a special role which is different from that of our Embassies in other foreign countries. In fact Nepal is not quite a foreign country. It is something nearer to us than that both geographically and politically. Therefore, our Ambassador should take a particular interest in improvements in Nepal, political, social and economic, and offer his help wherever needed.

5. K.P. Bhatia is already on the way to Nepal and nothing more has to be done about it.

6. As the Prime Minister wants a legal and constitutional adviser and some engineers immediately, steps should be taken to select these and send them.

7. I gather that the King of Nepal was anxious that Govind Narain should continue in his present post at least so long as the King is away and possibly some time after. His wishes should be respected and Govind Narain should continue as heretofore. After the King's return, this matter can be considered afresh.

8. I agree that our Embassy should issue a weekly bulletin in Nepali. This should give some items of news interesting to Nepal and discuss concrete proposals for the help India has given and is prepared to give. Brief references might be made also to development schemes in India.

9. I agree that all our officers and staff in Nepal should learn the Nepali language. This rule applies to all Missions abroad. It should apply much more to Nepal.

10. Our Embassy should keep itself fully informed of the activities of foreigners in Nepal and should report about them to External Affairs.

11. It may be desirable for the Foreign Secretary to hint to General Bijaya in a friendly way that far too many foreigners are going to Nepal. General Bijaya himself talks about this to me. If he feels that way, he need not encourage this movement.

12. I am not quite clear if a Counsellor is needed at Kathmandu at present. He may be necessary later. In any event, Govind Narain is not available for this post at present....

II. BILATERAL RELATIONS

(iii) Myanmar

1. To K.K. Chettur¹

New Delhi
September 4, 1953

My dear Chettur,²

Your letter of the 26th August.

As you must know, our Food Minister, Mr Kidwai, wrote a letter to the Burmese Prime Minister when he saw the reference in the Press to which you have drawn attention.³

I confess that I was surprised and distressed at this Press statement by a Burmese official. Our attitude all along has been to accommodate Burma to the largest possible extent. When their mission came here, we went out of our way to give them the commodities they required.⁴ As for our purchasing rice, it is obvious that our rice position has improved very greatly and we have got plenty of it. This is positively so because of our big rice crop here, and partly this is due to the fact that wheat has taken its place. We would gladly go back to rice, but we would only do so if rice was not much more expensive than the wheat we are using.

The Burmese are quite wrong in thinking that we want to come in the way of their selling rice at a good price. Certainly, they can do so. But how can we be expected to upset our present economy by buying rice at a much

1. JN Collection.
2. India's Ambassador in Myanmar.
3. In an interview published in the *New Times* on 26 August, a "responsible official" of the Burmese Government accused Rafi Ahmed Kidwai of "flippancy" and "arrogance" and of scuttling the projected Indo-Burma barter trade deal during discussions with the Burmese trade mission in New Delhi in June-July 1953. Kidwai was alleged to have wanted rice at incredibly low prices, asked for exorbitant rates for Indian goods, and even told Thakin Thakin, the Burmese Commerce Minister, "Why don't you go to an enemy country for your rice transactions?" Kidwai denied all the charges against him in the House of the People on 7 September and stated that he had written a letter to U Nu, requesting him to ask Thakin to contradict the report.
4. The range of Indian exports to Myanmar was widened under an exchange of letters signed between the two countries in New Delhi on 3 July 1953, modifying the five-year Indo-Burma trade agreement of 1951. India also agreed to make increased supplies of a number of commodities, notably iron and steel, during the next six months.

higher rate than we can afford. The fact is that the price of rice has gone down in the world market. Anyhow, I am drawing the Food Minister's attention to your letter.⁵

Our entire policy has been to be as friendly and accommodating to Burma as possible on all issues and we propose to continue this policy.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Asking him to write to U Nu to clarify the position, Nehru had stated in a letter to Kidwai on 27 August: "I am afraid some of your statements have rather irritated the Burma Government, and they feel that you are injuring their prospects with other customers." Nehru further wrote, "There was some talk of a Ceylon Minister going to Burma for purchasing rice. He wanted some advice from you about the price. I do not know whether you have given him any advice. I think we should be very careful about these matters. Burmese friendship is important to us and, in any event, why should we come in their way when they deal with other people?"

2. Message to U Nu¹

I have very recently had reports that your Government have just introduced new Land Nationalization Bill reducing compensation payable on graduated scale from twelve years to one year's land revenue. You know that we are entirely in favour of far-reaching land reforms and in any event it is for your Government to decide your policy in regard to land or any other matter. I would be reluctant to interfere in any way, but I confess that these reports distress me because they indicate your Government's intention to carry through a very radical amendment to previous Act without any consultation or even intimation to us when it so vitally affected large numbers of people in India. I have been flooded with telegrams from South India where the life-savings of many thousands were invested in Burmese land. As you know, we have made numerous representations about previous Act and are still negotiating this matter with you. This makes present move even more surprising. I would earnestly urge, in view of extremely friendly relations between our two countries, our common interests and desire to promote mutual welfare, that

1. New Delhi, 8 September 1953. JN Collection.

you will be good enough to postpone consideration of this Bill to permit mutual consultation about certain matters affecting many people here. I would suggest such postponement till at least early next year. I do not wish that any injury might be done to Indo-Burmese relations which we both have very much at heart and are desirous of promoting.

3. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

...The talks at Bangkok about withdrawal of KMT troops from Burma broke down this afternoon as a result of refusal by KMT leaders to consider latest Burmese proposals.² Probably this matter will come up before Assembly. You will of course give full support to the Burmese.

1. New Delhi, 17 September 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. Representatives of Taiwan had been conferring with officials from Thailand, Myanmar and the US since 22 May about repatriating their troops estimated by Myanmar to number 12,000. The KMT troops had been fighting Myanmar Government forces for three years on Myanmar's eastern frontier.

4. To U Nu¹

New Delhi
September 21, 1953

My dear U Nu,

I have just received your letter of the 19th September about land nationalization. May I say that I am very grateful to you for the letter you have written to me and the trouble you have taken in explaining the situation to me? I appreciate very much your friendly approach, and I can well understand your difficulties. So far as I am concerned, I would certainly not like to add to them. Also, in the matter of land reforms or land nationalization, I accept fully the principle underlying them.

1. JN Collection.

It is true that large land-holders in any country have usually profited considerably from their land in the course of years, at the cost of the tenants. It may well be argued that many of them hardly deserve any additional compensation. But this theoretical approach is not always a practical one or a helpful one. Sometimes it is even an unjust one. Therefore, it is usually considered better from all points of view to give some compensation and thus bring about a social change in a better atmosphere than would otherwise be the case.

Of course, these are general propositions which have to be applied to particular cases having regard to the circumstances prevailing there.

You have been good enough to write fully to me on this subject of your new measure. I shall not trouble you at this stage by dealing with this matter in detail. I am not competent to do so. I shall have this matter examined fully, and, whatever we have to bring to your attention, we shall place before you later. In any event, please rest assured that we shall approach this matter with the utmost friendliness and with a desire not to create difficulties for you. It was exceedingly good of you to postpone a particular clause in your Bill till early next year, thus allowing us time. Quite apart from the merits of any measure, it is always I think rather unfortunate if it is pushed through in a hurry and without giving adequate opportunities to the persons concerned to have their say.

I am sending you a telegram in answer to your message about rice.² It is evident that some statement in the Press misled you. We have no intention of allowing any large-scale import of rice on private account. All that had happened was that a small quantity of superfine rice of high quality was allowed to be brought in as there was some market for it, and we do not give this quality in our large governmental deals. We have in India an area which is rationed and controlled so far as rice is concerned.

We have also a very large uncontrolled and unrationed area. We shall always prefer to make our large-scale purchases on Government account from Burma if that is at all feasible. We hope to let you know in November what our requirements are likely to be.

2. On 17 September, U Nu had drawn Nehru's attention to a reported decision of the Government of India to entertain applications from traders for the grant of licences to import rice from countries in the soft currency area; the imported rice was meant to be sold only in non-rationed areas. U Nu argued that private traders could not procure rice at a price less than that fixed for Government-to-Government transactions and suggested that rice at lower rates could be made available for the Indian masses through purchases made from Myanmar at the governmental level. Nehru's telegram is not available.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

I was informed some time ago that you intended visiting Pakistan.³ If so, I hope you will spend some days with us also.

I have been deeply moved by the letter you have sent me. It is a letter from a friend and it is in that spirit that I have read it and have been affected by it.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. U Nu wrote to Nehru on 29 August that he intended to visit Pakistan about the end of October on an invitation from the Government of Pakistan. Myanmar had concluded a treaty of friendship with Pakistan on 25 June 1952.

5. To U Nu¹

New Delhi
22 September 1953

My dear U Nu,

Thank you for your message which was communicated to me by your Ambassador here on September 17. I entirely agree with you that you and I should address each other freely and frankly and without mental reservations on any matter of common interest.

2. I was surprised to get your message because there has been no intention on our part to encourage any large-scale private trading in rice. We rely for our rationing commitments entirely on Government purchases and we would always prefer to deal with another Government in this matter. We would also prefer to obtain our rice from Burma through your Government rather than from any other foreign source.

3. I have made enquiries into this matter and I find that all that has happened is that we have permitted, as a special case, import of a small quantity of superfine rice from Iran amounting to 5,000 tons. Also 1,000 tons of fine rice from Pakistan. This is of superior quality and meant to meet a special demand outside our rationed and controlled areas. The decontrolled area in India is very large. This does not affect at all our normal requirements of ordinary rice which, to the extent necessary, we would continue to import

1. JN Collection.

officially. We have no intention of importing rice from Burma on private account.

4. It is true that our rice crop in most parts of India has been exceedingly good this year. But it is also true that very extensive floods have destroyed some part of the next crop. We hope to be in a position in November to estimate our requirements and we shall, as already promised, intimate to your Government what these requirements are likely to be.

5. You can rest assured that we shall give preference, wherever possible, to purchases from Burma and through the Burmese Government.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

II. BILATERAL RELATIONS

(iv) Sri Lanka

1. To Dudley Senanayake¹

New Delhi
August 27, 1953

My dear Prime Minister,²

I thank you for your letter dated the 23rd July, 1953. I regret that it has remained unanswered till now. During the last few weeks we have been faced with a number of pressing problems.

2. I greatly appreciate the opportunity that you have given me to comment on your proposed Bill.³ This measure will undoubtedly affect Indo-Ceylonese relations; and I am particularly happy that before taking action on it, you

1. JN Collection.

2. Of Sri Lanka.

3. With the object of circumventing the judgements of 6 and 9 October 1952 of the Supreme Court and the Privy Council of Sri Lanka which granted right of citizenship to 40,000 Indian settlers, the Sri Lankan House of Representatives passed on 13 November 1952 a "Bill to Amend the Immigrants and Emigrants Act No.20 of 1948." This Bill, which enabled conferment of citizenship only on those applicants who had been residents of Sri Lanka since 1939, however lapsed while in the Senate as the session of Parliament was prorogued. On 23 July, Senanayake sent to Nehru for his comments a copy of the Bill, which the Sri Lanka Government proposed to reintroduce in the next session of Parliament.

have written to me and asked for my views. Such mutual consultation between us cannot but cement still further the close relations that exist between our two countries, and bring them together in a mutual understanding of their common problems. Our London talks⁴ helped greatly in giving me, as I hope they did you, an appreciation of how inter-related our problems were, and how necessary it was for us both to make a cooperative approach to them.

3. We have studied your proposed Bill with care, and, if I may say so, with the desire to understand the Ceylonese point of view.⁵ It seems to me, however, that this measure cannot be considered in isolation from the larger question of Indo-Ceylonese citizenship. It is not, though on the face of it, it may appear to be, merely a measure to check illicit immigration into Ceylon.⁶ It will inevitably affect the position of large numbers of persons of Indian origin in Ceylon, whose fate is still uncertain, and about whom we have not yet been able completely to agree.

4. I would, therefore, in all earnestness and desire to be helpful in your perfectly legitimate objective of stopping illicit immigration into Ceylon, urge you to postpone the further consideration of this Bill, until such time as we have had an opportunity to conclude the talks, which we began in London, on the larger issue of Indo-Ceylonese citizenship. It is very desirable that we should deal with this problem as a whole. The sooner it is solved, the better it will be for both our countries. I do not think, however, that it will be at all helpful, if, in the meantime, piecemeal measures are taken to deal with particular aspects of it. That will only complicate matters, and might wreck the favourable atmosphere that you and I have so painstakingly built up for its resolution.

We must take full advantage of the favourable atmosphere that now prevails for a settlement of our main problem, and not be diverted into side

4. See *post*, pp. 569-570. Also see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.22, pp. 350 and 524.

5. Senanayake wrote that during the previous year thousands of Indians had illegally entered Sri Lanka through hundreds of miles of unprotected Sri Lankan coastline, thereby creating serious problems in respect of food and labour there. The immigrants had devised methods to evade arrest, and, even if an immigrant was arrested, it was practically impossible to obtain a conviction in a court against him under the existing law. He added that an amendment to the law was the only effective remedy.

6. Under the existing law, Indians possessing temporary resident permits were entitled to unrestricted stay in the island, with the privilege of visiting India periodically. But the amending Bill sought to restrict the period of validity of such permits to five years, with the Sri Lanka Government having the discretionary power to reject applications for renewals. Moreover, the proposed law granted wide powers to the police to name any person as an illicit immigrant on mere suspicion.

issues. I was therefore glad to see the statement that you made a few days ago,⁷ expressing your willingness to discuss this larger question here at an early date. I welcome that statement. We shall be very happy indeed to receive you in New Delhi whenever you can make it convenient to pay us a visit. If it suits you, sometime in the middle of October next would perhaps be the most convenient.

5. In the meanwhile, I enclose a note,⁸ which contains our comments on the proposed Bill, which you may like to have as an indication of our approach to this problem. We can discuss this further, along with other matters, when you come over here.

6. Before I conclude, I should like to refer briefly to what you have said in paragraph 4 of your letter.⁹ You refer to some new rule alleged to have been introduced by us, regulating the entry of persons into India from Ceylon. I think that this is based on some misunderstanding. No new rule was promulgated or introduced by us. All that we did was to implement our existing regulations. We have not the slightest intention of encouraging illicit immigration into Ceylon or to anywhere else. We are actually doing all we can to stop it; and we shall gladly cooperate, as in fact we have been, with your Government in all reasonable measures which may be devised to prevent it. In the particular incident to which you refer, I feel that no misunderstanding and misgivings would have arisen, had the Ceylon authorities accepted the suggestion made by our High Commissioner¹⁰ to delay the deportation for a few days of the several hundred fishermen that were involved, pending consultation between our two Governments. You will no doubt agree that before accepting any deportees from any country the receiving country is entitled to satisfy itself that they are its own nationals; and that for this purpose, it is essential for that country to satisfy itself of the nationality of the persons concerned.

7. Senanayake declared in the House of Representatives on 24 August that Indo-Sri Lanka talks would be resumed as soon as conditions for reopening discussions were favourable. His Government realized the extreme necessity of maintaining cordial relations with India. He added that conditions in Asia had undergone considerable changes, and it would be so in future also.
8. Not available.
9. Senanayake alleged that without consultation with the Sri Lankan Government, the Government of India had enforced changes in procedure regarding passport rules governing the entry of persons into India from Sri Lanka. He said the new procedure was likely to create the impression in the minds of illicit immigrants that once they had managed to enter Sri Lanka, there was very little chance of their being dealt with thereafter.
10. C.C. Desai.

7. I have little doubt that all these matters can be settled to our mutual satisfaction if there is a spirit of give and take between our two Governments, and we keep in constant touch with each other. So far as we are concerned, we would welcome such consultation and cooperation; and it gives me great satisfaction in believing that that is also your policy. I shall look forward to hearing from you at an early date of your decision to visit us in New Delhi. You will be very welcome.¹¹

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. John Kotelawala succeeded Dudley Senanayake, who resigned due to ill health on 12 October 1953. Kotelawala visited India from 15 to 19 January 1954. During his visit India and Sri Lanka signed an agreement to take steps to stop illegal immigration. The Sri Lankan Government also agreed to register all persons of Indian origin by the end of 1955.

II. BILATERAL RELATIONS (v) China

1. Invitations to Individuals from China¹

A letter from the Chief Minister of Bombay is attached.

2. I think that I raised this question some time ago in another form. I suggested that the Chinese Ambassador here might be told that we find it very odd that people are invited to China either by the Government or by semi-official organizations directly. If we have to invite some one from China, or even if any organization in India wished to do so, that would be done through us and through the Chinese Government and not directly.

3. I do not know if the Chinese Ambassador was spoken to on this subject. This matter should be cleared up. It is embarrassing for us and embarrassing for others, including the Chinese authorities, to continue the present procedure. We are suddenly told indirectly that a large crowd of artists have been invited. We do not know who has invited them, who is paying for them, etc.

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, and Foreign Secretary, 14 July 1953. JN Collection.

4. In future we would definitely like to deal with the Chinese Government in all such matters and not directly with any organization or individual. We would also suggest that the Chinese Government should inform their various organizations that if they have to invite anyone from India, that invitation should come through the Chinese Government to our Government and should not be sent directly. We will follow the same procedure.

2. Military Attache in China¹

The argument in the notes as to whether the Military Attache should be a Colonel or a Brigadier does not impress me very much. The comparison with the USA or other countries is also not very relevant. The work of our Military Attaches elsewhere is of a varied kind, including purchase of stores, etc. In China we require a particular type of officer. He will not have to make any purchases or the like. But he will have to be exceedingly wide awake, intelligent, receptive, capable of getting on with people and understanding them, even though the environment may be completely different.

2. Therefore, it is not very relevant whether a person sent is a Brigadier or Colonel and the question of finance also does not arise. We should certainly send a Brigadier, provided he is the right person to be sent and not because he is a Brigadier.

3. I am anxious that the choice should be a good choice and the normal considerations in choosing a man to act as Military Attache do not wholly apply in the case of China, where one has to deal with an entirely new situation and a new social structure. Only a person who is exceedingly alert mentally and who has some understanding of the changes that have taken place in China can be of much use. Merely military knowledge will not be enough, although that is necessary.

1. Note to Minister of Defence Organization, 7 August 1953. JN Collection. In a note addressed to Secretary-General, MEA, and Foreign Secretary, Nehru had observed on 16 July 1953 that since China had got a Military Attache in New Delhi, India should also have one in Beijing. Nehru had also suggested that the Chinese Ambassador might be requested to refer to his Government India's desire to have reciprocity in this and other matters and also the urgent necessity of India having a Military Attache in Beijing to deal with many matters connected with the discharge of her responsibilities under the Korean armistice arrangements.

4. Therefore, the argument in these notes about the rank of the person sent should be a secondary factor. We should consider a number of names both of Brigadiers and Colonels from the point of view mentioned above by me. I would suggest that MDO should see them or some of them and then I could finally interview them. It is not much good some one person being sent up to me because of his rank, etc.

5. It must be remembered that a person who does not fit in in China will do us more harm than good and we have therefore to be particularly careful. It is easy to get on well with the Chinese if we approach them in the right way. If not, then we do not get on at all with them.

6. Before formal recommendations are made, informally some names should be suggested and considered and even interviewed, if necessary.

7. I am therefore leaving the matter at this stage at present. I attach importance to this appointment and I feel that the normal service reports, though helpful, really do not carry us very far in choosing a man of this type.²

2. Nehru wrote to Mahavir Tyagi on 24 August 1953, "I have seen and talked to Brigadier R.K. Kochhar, who has been suggested for the post of our Military Attache in Peking. I agree to his appointment."

3. To Balvantray Mehta¹

New Delhi

August 24, 1953

My dear Balvantray,²

I enclose a press cutting about a proposal to observe "Tibet Day" on September 12.³ I do not know who form this committee apart from the names mentioned,

1. File No. G-11/1953, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. General Secretary, AICC.
3. A committee reportedly set up in New Delhi on 22 August to observe "Tibet Day" was to organize meetings and pass resolutions expressing sympathy for the people of Tibet in their "temporary subjugation" and warning the people in India of the "danger that lurks on India's borders" by the presence of Chinese troops in Tibet.

that is, Professor N.G. Ranga,⁴ M.S. Gurupadaswami⁵ and Rajbhoj.⁶ I should like you to find out who else is in the committee, and, are there any Congress members in it?

Obviously, no Congressman should join such committee or participate in the observance of "Tibet Day". This is an unfriendly act to China and is against the policy we have pursued during these years. There is absolutely no reason for observing such a day now. I really do not understand why Professor Ranga or the others should suddenly decide to observe this day.

I think we should inform members of the Party that they should keep aloof from this. If you will remind me, I shall mention this at the Party meeting tomorrow.

If there is any reality about this announcement of "Tibet Day", it might be worth while for you to send a brief circular letter to our PCCs about it so that they might not be misled.⁷

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. He was a Member of the Council of States and represented the Krishikar Lok Party.
5. (b. 1923); participated in the freedom movement; practised law at Bangalore; editor, *Prajamata*, 1948-53; elected to the House of the People, 1952; Member, National Executive of Praja Socialist Party, 1957-63; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1960; Minister of State, Department of Atomic Energy, 1967, Food and Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation, 1967-69; later became associated with Janata Dal; Minister for Petroleum and Chemicals, December 1989-November 1990.
6. P.N. Rajbhoj, Member of the House of the People representing the Scheduled Castes Federation.
7. Nehru noted on 5 September 1953, "Joint Secretary, T.N. Kaul, was quite right in the answer he gave to the Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy about the Tibet Day. He might have gone a little further and added that this particular note in the Press... was made by some opposition splinter groups in Parliament who have no importance whatever. We disapprove entirely of this appeal by a few persons and we attach no importance to it."

4. Residual Problems Regarding Tibet¹

I have read through all these papers and notes. The course suggested in them seems to me to be much too slow. I think we should move more rapidly and more effectively in this matter.

2. I have drafted a telegram, which should be sent to our Ambassador in Peking, conveying a message² on my behalf to Premier Chou En-lai....

4. As for the points in issue, I do not think there is any doubt in our mind about the line we should take up. We shall undoubtedly have to withdraw our military escorts. If the Chinese Government want us to remove our Post and Telegraph Offices on the trade routes to Gyantse³ we shall have to agree. But they must offer sufficient substitutes for them. There should be no difficulty about normal trade or trade agencies or right of pilgrimage. Anyhow, all these matters have to be discussed with them.

5. For the present, we need not raise the question of the frontier, but this will have to be brought in in a larger settlement. In that settlement I should like to make clear our special position in the border States. Perhaps an occasion might arise even before that settlement for us to make this clear. But, for the present, no mention need be made.

6. I agree that it will be desirable to confer a Military rank on the Maharaja of Bhutan. This matter might be taken up with the Defence Ministry.

7. For the present, we shall send my message to Premier Chou En-lai and give an Aide Memoire to the Chinese Ambassador here. The Ambassador should be informed that I have sent a direct message to Premier Chou En-lai on this subject....

1. Note, 30 August 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. See the next item.

3. According to the Indo-Tibetan Trade Regulations of 1914, India had its trade agency at Gyantse, where the Indian Trade Agent, with his small military escorts, was posted. Gyantse was also the terminus of the Indo-Tibetan telegraph line maintained and run by the Government of India.

5. Message to Chou En-lai¹

It has been a matter of deep satisfaction to me to note the growing cooperation between our great countries in international affairs. I am convinced that this cooperation and friendship will not only be to our mutual advantage, but will also be a strong pillar for peace in Asia and the world. I hope that our two countries will maintain full contact and cooperate with each other in dealing with problems of mutual interest. That has been Your Excellency's wish and I reciprocate it fully.

2. Developments in Tibet in the last three years have naturally led to a new situation. We have recognized this situation and are fully prepared to adapt ourselves to it. We have pointed out that certain rights have grown out of usage and agreement which are natural between neighbours. Your Excellency informed our Ambassador last year that there is no difference of point of view in regard to Tibet between India and China and that your Government is anxious in every way to safeguard Indian interests in Tibet. You added that there is no territorial dispute or controversy between India and China in this matter and that "we are not desirous of abruptly bringing to an end existing institutions and arrangements, as such a course would create a vacuum."

3. The Government of India have been anxious to come to a final settlement about pending matters so as to avoid any misunderstanding and friction at any time. On the 2nd August 1952, they presented a note to Your Excellency's Government about all pending matters expressing their willingness to discuss them and to modify certain practices and even to remove some of them, if they are considered as affecting the dignity of China. Subsequently, at the request of the Chinese Government, they agreed to the establishment of Consulates-General in Lhasa and Bombay. No further steps have been taken since then to negotiate a settlement of other problems in Tibet.

4. The Government of India feel that it would be advantageous to both our countries to deal with all remaining problems together. Piecemeal consideration of each problem does not lead to satisfactory solutions. Indeed, difficulties and frictions have arisen from time to time over relatively petty matters. Recently, some incidents have taken place when the local authorities in Tibet stopped our Trade Agent in Western Tibet from proceeding on his official tour to Rudok and his staff to Taklakot, both important trade marts for Indian traders and pilgrims. There has been a forcible seizure of his wireless

1. Sent on 1 September 1953 to N. Raghavan to convey it to Chou En-lai. From *Agreement between India and China on Trade and Intercourse between India and the Tibet region of China, 1954*, GOI, MEA.

set which is essential for the performance of his duties. We learnt of this incident with surprise and regret, because it did not seem to us in consonance with the friendly relations between our two countries.

5. The Government of India's concern in this matter was conveyed to the Chinese Embassy here. It was pointed out that Your Excellency had agreed that, pending settlement of all outstanding matters, existing usages would continue. A request was made for the return of the Trade Agent's wireless communication facilities and for the Tibetan authorities to be instructed not to interfere with the functioning of our Trade Agent. The Embassy was also informed about the replacement of the escort at Gyantse and Yatung and the proposed inspection visit of our Political Officer in Sikkim to our Trade Agencies at these places. A reply has been received from the Chinese Embassy,² but this has apparently been made without full knowledge of the facts and of assurances given by Your Excellency.

6. I do not wish to trouble Your Excellency with further details, but I would suggest that our respective Governments take the earliest opportunity to consider all pending matters so as to avoid such incidents. Meanwhile, I would request that instructions may be issued to insure that there is no interference with existing usages. I would invite Your Excellency's Government to confer with our Government at the earliest suitable opportunity, either in Delhi or in Peking, on all such matters affecting relations between our two countries. I am convinced that this will lead to a satisfactory settlement and remove every cause of possible friction.

2. See the next item.

6. Restrictions on Indian Representatives in Tibet¹

The Government of India have noted with deep satisfaction the growing cooperation in international affairs between India and China. It is their desire and firm policy to encourage this cooperation and friendship between these two great countries and thus to serve the cause of peace in Asia and the world. With a view to further this friendship, it has been their wish to settle by negotiation such pending matters as exist between the two countries.

1. *Aide memoire* drafted by Nehru on 2 September and presented on 5 September 1953 to the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi. From *Agreement between India and China on Trade and Intercourse between India and the Tibet region of China, 1954*, GOI, MEA.

2. In the course of the last three years, developments have taken place in Tibet which have created a new situation. The Government of India have recognized this new situation and expressed their readiness to adapt themselves to it.

3. All such pending matters affecting relations between the two countries in Tibet were specified in a note handed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, on the 2nd August, 1952. The Chinese Government had, on 14th June, 1952, expressed the desire that all such matters should be settled by negotiation and gave the assurance that they "were not desirous of abruptly bringing to an end existing Indian institutions and arrangements in Tibet, as such a course would create a vacuum". The Government of India were in entire agreement with that desire and welcomed the assurance given by the Chinese Government.

4. From time to time, incidents have taken place in Tibet which have caused the Government of India some concern. In the course of the last few weeks, more especially, some incidents have taken place which affect the functioning of the Government of India's representatives and other personnel in Tibet. Their Trade Agent in Western Tibet has been prevented by the local authorities from proceeding on his official tour to Rudok. His staff has been prevented from visiting Taklakot on official duty. Both Rudok and Taklakot are important trade marts for Indian traders and pilgrims. The Trade Agent's wireless set, which is essential for the performance of his duties, has been seized.

5. Other incidents have also taken place. It is the practice for the military escorts at Gyantse and Yatung to be replaced from time to time. The Government of India have been informed that the Chinese Government are not in a position to agree to the replacement of these escorts. The replacement of one of these escorts has already crossed the border and has reached Yatung. This movement took place before the Chinese Government's reply was received. The Government of India have also been informed that their Political Officer in Sikkim must present a passport, duly visaed by the Chinese authorities, when he pays a visit to Gyantse and Yatung.

6. The Government of India learnt of these incidents with surprise and regret. They drew the attention of the Chinese Embassy in Delhi to these incidents. The Chinese Embassy informed the Government of India on the 24th August, 1953, that the Chinese Government proposed to make certain changes in the existing arrangements. The proposed changes have not been discussed by them with the Government of India. This unilateral procedure does not appear to the Government of India to be consistent with the assurances given by the Chinese Government to the Indian Ambassador in Peking and with the friendly relations which exist between India and China.

7. The Government of India would like to draw attention to the fact that as early as 8th May, 1953, information had been conveyed through the Indian

Consul-General in Lhasa regarding the replacement of Indian escorts at Gyantse and Yatung. They would also like to draw attention to the existing position in regard to Indian and Tibetan nationals and officials not being required to observe any passport and visa formalities. This practice has been observed on a reciprocal basis.

8. The Government of India are gravely concerned over the reported interference with the legitimate movement of their Trade Agent and his staff in Western Tibet and have already requested that the wireless communication facilities, which are so essential for the performance of his duties, along with other facilities to move to important trade marts, should be immediately restored to him.

9. The Government of India are willing to discuss with the Chinese Government all pending matters as soon as possible. Piecemeal consideration of separate problems does not lead to satisfactory solutions and, therefore, the Government of India suggest a consideration of all pending matters. A friendly settlement by negotiation will remove all possibility of such incidents in future. They would further strongly urge that, pending an amicable settlement of these issues by negotiation between the two countries, no action be taken to effect unilateral changes in their existing agencies and arrangements in Tibet, as such a course is likely to lead to a vacuum which both Governments wish to avoid. They would, therefore, request the Chinese Government to issue necessary instructions to this end to their local authorities.

II. BILATERAL RELATIONS (vi) United States

1. Training of Defence Officers¹

This raises an important issue.² Our exchanging officers or sending our men for training in the UK is understandable and is continuing an old tradition.

1. Note to Minister of Defence Organization, 8 July 1953. JN Collection.
2. On 26 May 1953, the Ministry of Defence had in a letter to the Indian Embassy in Washington asked them to make efforts "to obtain on a reciprocal basis a vacancy for an Indian Naval Officer at the Naval Staff College in the USA." In a note on 2 July 1953, Nehru expressed surprise at such a letter having been sent without reference to the Defence Minister or consultation with the Ministry of External Affairs.

But it is an entirely different matter for our officers to be sent to the USA and, even more so, for their officers to come here. This becomes an issue of high political importance, apart from other difficulties that might well arise. It means some kind of a tie-up, however vague it might be, with the US Army.

That affects our entire policy or, at any rate, it will be understood to affect it. I am quite clear that we should not in any way encourage the coming of the US officers to India. Similarly we should not send our officers to the US.

Apart from political reasons, I am not at all clear in my mind if any training for our officers in the US will really be helpful. It might well be the reverse of helpful. The US Army is built up to use the latest technical devices. We work at a much lower level, although no doubt we might hanker for the new devices. Any of our officers trained there will feel rather frustrated here because of the lack of that very specialized equipment.

The American Army proved totally inadequate in the early months of the Korean campaign against an army which had very second-rate equipment. This was because the American Army could not function at all without its specialized devices and equipment and these latter were not of much use to it in the conditions prevailing in Korea.

A few days ago I was discussing the general question of education with a very high American authority.³ He said that it was very foolish of us to send our people to be trained in America except in very special cases. They got a specialized training in a different context and atmosphere, which was not available to them in India. That training was not only rather wasted but produced a sense of frustration in these people.

3. Nehru met Harry B. Friedgood in Delhi on 1 and 4 July 1953.

2. To Mishrilal Gangwal¹

New Delhi
July 21, 1953

My dear Gangwalji,²

I see from a report from the papers that the US Ambassador went to Gwalior on a one-day private visit on July 19th with his two sons. It is reported that

1. JN Collection.

2. Chief Minister of Madhya Bharat.

he was received at the airport by the Rajpramukh and a number of officials of the State Government.

It seems to me that we are apt to overdo our receptions to foreign Ambassadors. Courtesy should be shown to them, of course, but there is no reason why crowds of officials should go to receive them. This is improper.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Export of Strategic Materials to China¹

I agree.² While we gladly cooperate with the USA, we cannot consider ourselves bound by the provisions of the Battle Act³ or any other legislation of another country which goes counter to our policy. As a matter of fact, we do not carry on any substantial trade in these materials. But to deny even a small quantity to a particular country, when we supply these small quantities to other countries, would be against the policy we have been pursuing. Generally speaking, we do not export war materials to any country. But some materials have peace-time use also, more especially in small quantities, such as thorium nitrate.⁴

While this is our general policy, it would be peculiarly inappropriate for us to vary it in the sense of stopping all exports of this kind at a time when every effort is being made for a peaceful solution of the Far Eastern problems. To refuse export of a small quantity of thorium nitrate can hardly be considered as an act promoting our peaceful efforts. We are therefore not in a position to give an understanding that we will not export this material in small quantities to China or any other country.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 23 July 1953. JN Collection.

2. The US Embassy had sought clarification from the Government of India about the reported consignment of 2,248 pounds of thorium nitrate sent by the Indian Rare Earths Limited to China on a Polish vessel. They had also drawn attention to the terms of the Battle Act under which any nation exporting embargoed materials to the USSR and its satellites would have all US military, economic, or financial assistance terminated. One of the strategic materials embargoed was thorium nitrate.

3. The US Mutual Defence Assistance Control Act, known as the Battle Act (named after its sponsor, Representative Laurie Battle of Alabama), was signed on 26 October 1951.

4. Although an atomic energy source material, thorium also has widespread ordinary commercial uses, such as incorporation in incandescent gas mantles, ceramic products, photographic films, plates and paper, etc.

I have not got the Battle Act before me, but the quotation from it in the note above states that the shipment of certain items should not be made to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or countries under its domination. China is certainly not under the domination of the USSR.

If a further enquiry is made from the US Embassy, a reply in the above terms should be given.

4. Offloading Thorium Nitrate at Colombo¹

Your telegram No. 3698 July 25th.² Please see my notes on this subject.³ It is not possible and would be very undesirable to offload consignment at Colombo or elsewhere. This will not only be opposed to policy we have declared in Parliament but would also have far-reaching consequences in India affecting our relations with the United States. There would be strong feeling against the United States for attempting to compel us to act against our own policy and in accordance with their wishes to restrict trade. More particularly in view of Korean truce, any action of this kind would be wrong and I think putting us and the United States in embarrassing position.

As stated already our general policy is not to export strategic materials. But for us to give guarantee for future, to which no doubt will be given publicity, would create difficulties.⁴

We can examine entire position on my return to Delhi and from the point of view of new developments resulting from Korean truce.

1. Cable to C.D. Deshmukh, Karachi, 26 July 1953. JN Collection. Nehru was on a visit to Pakistan at this time.
2. Deshmukh had reported to Nehru that US Ambassador, George V. Allen, had suggested to him on 25 July that the consignment of thorium nitrate be offloaded from the ship, which was at the time in Colombo, its last stop prior to its departure for China, otherwise the US President might be compelled to take action under Section 103(b) of the Battle Act which called for termination of aid to countries which "knowingly permit" export of embargoed materials to prohibited countries. An official note on the above lines was also delivered to R.K. Nehru, Foreign Secretary, by the US Embassy on 25 July.
3. See the preceding item.
4. Deshmukh thought that since India was not likely to be able, in the near future, to develop trade in thorium nitrate, she might therefore give an indication to the US of her intention not to permit further exports, so as to prevent the US from terminating aid to India.

5. India and the Battle Act¹

I had a fairly long talk with the American Ambassador this evening. He was accompanied by his Economic Counsellor.² I made it clear to him that it was not possible for us to offload the shipment of thorium nitrate which had been sold to China. In fact we were in no position to do so as this was no longer under our control. We had been paid for it and it had been handed over to other parties.

2. Apart from this, we did not think it desirable to take any such step as this would have grave consequences and it no doubt would be subjected to criticism in Parliament and in the country.

3. Mr Allen pointed out to me that the technical aid, etc., were given subject to the provisions of the so-called Battle Act. I reminded him that at every stage of our transactions with the US we had made it clear that we were perfectly free to carry on any policies, political or commercial. I recognized the right of the US to take any action in terms of the Battle Act, but we were not prepared to vary our policies because of that US legislation. Nor were we prepared to give any guarantee for the future about our policy, but we could consider cooperatively what we should do about the disposal of thorium nitrate in the future and we would gladly give it to the US if a proper price was offered to us.

4. I pointed out further that, in view of the truce in Korea, the application of the Battle Act seemed to me unwise and, in any event, our submitting to it in this matter would be entirely contrary to our policy.³

5. I think you should send a brief reply to the note from the American Embassy. In this reply you may state that it is true that a certain small shipment of thorium nitrate has been made with the permission of the Government of

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, 28 July 1953. JN Collection.

2. John A. Loftus.

3. Reporting his conversation with Nehru to Washington, Allen stated, "Nehru asked whether signature of truce in Korea had made any difference in operation of Battle Act. I said it had not." John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, replying to Allen on 30 July, observed, "Department concerned deteriorating trend our relations GOI in broad context need to continue aid in support economic progress and India's role in Korea." He suggested that it might be indicated to officials in India that Washington was studying all aspects of the problem with great care but it hoped that "they will find it possible carry out effective administrative controls shipments strategic materials...."

India to China. This has been paid for and the ownership of this consignment has thus passed into other hands and the Government of India is not in a position to offload this consignment or to deal with it in any other way at this stage.⁴

4. A note on the lines indicated by Nehru was sent to the US Embassy on 29 July.

6. To G.L. Mehta¹

New Delhi
7 September 1953

My dear Gaganvihari,²

I have seen a copy of a letter which Azim Husain³ wrote to you dated 24th August. This deals with a talk he had with Paul Hoffman.⁴

I am merely writing briefly to you to indicate, what you know already, that the argument that Paul Hoffman put forward is one with which I completely disagree. It is very good of Hoffman to talk in a superior way, as Americans do, about what can be done about China's recognition and what American reactions are to certain events.⁵ It so happens that other countries have also popular opinion to consider and have also their own views about certain subjects and they are very far from accepting American views as correct. Indeed, few things have been more patent in recent years than the instability and incorrectness of American policy.

1. JN Collection.
2. India's Ambassador in USA.
3. Consul-General of India in San Francisco.
4. American business executive and President Eisenhower's special emissary to India and Pakistan.
5. Hoffman told Azim Husain on 20 August that it was futile to expect an early recognition of China "in the context of current hysteria and the internal political situation in the US", but there could be "a long term solution of making Formosa and Communist China members of the UN and replacing Nationalist China in the Security Council by India." Hoffman also foresaw a struggle between China and India for the "soul of Asia" in which, he thought, it was obviously desirable to help India. According to him, however, "The only way of having India's future role in world affairs accepted in the US would be to bring out in Indian publicity the ideological struggle between India and China in Asia." He also said that Nehru's position in the US with reference to his role as a mediator between the East and the West would continue to be weak so long as India did not settle her disputes with Pakistan by peaceful means.

It is sheer impertinence to say that India should behave in a certain manner towards China in order to have India's future role in world affairs accepted in the US. We are not particularly anxious for our role to be accepted by the US. As we know that that apparently means that we should submit to US ways and policies. We are not going to become a satellite of the US as many countries in Europe and Asia have become. So far as we are concerned, we go our way and neither US way nor the Soviet way nor the China way. At the same time, there is no ideological or other struggle between India and China. We are quite reconciled to have US criticism of our policies.

I am really astonished at the immaturity of important public men in America and the way they presume to talk about other countries.

This is just for your information and not to be repeated to Hoffman or others.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

II. BILATERAL RELATIONS (vii) Soviet Union

1. Message to Indira Gandhi¹

Your letter of 1st July giving your programme. You will no doubt be asked in Russia as well as outside about your impressions of Soviet Union. I would suggest your avoiding saying much except of course to express your gratitude for courtesy and hospitality shown to you and your pleasure at seeing many things which indicate the progress that has been made. Everything said about Soviet has political implication. We have therefore to be careful as to what we say and where we say it. Love. Papu.

1. New Delhi, 14 July 1953. JN Collection. Indira Gandhi was on a private visit to the Soviet Union since the last week of June 1953.

2. Interview with the Soviet Ambassador¹

I have just had an interview with the Soviet Ambassador, Mr Benediktov.² He said that there have been some talks previously about trade between the Soviet Union and India and, more particularly, about the purchase of wheat from Russia in exchange for goods from India. These talks had not led to any results thus far and trade between the USSR and India was at a very low level. He hoped that this trade between the two countries would increase and would much more be in keeping with their importance and size. He referred to both a long-term treaty and short-term arrangements.

2. I told him that we would welcome trade with the Soviet Union on terms which were mutually advantageous. As for wheat, we would gladly get it from the USSR provided, of course, the price was reasonable and compared favourably with other prices. I said (after enquiring from the Food Minister) that we would be prepared to have some arrangements for the purchase of wheat for the next five years if the price was favourable.³

3. In this matter I suggested to him to see our Minister for Food & Agriculture.

4. About general trade matters, I said that he would have to discuss these with External Affairs Ministry and the Ministry of Commerce & Industry. I told him to get in touch with External Affairs on the subject.

5. He said that there were other matters too which he wished to discuss with me, but he would not take any more of my time now and would first discuss them with the Ministries concerned. Among these matters was the question of films—Soviet films coming here and Indian films going to the Soviet.

6. I told Mr Benediktov that as he had been Minister for Agriculture in the Soviet Union for a number of years, we hoped to profit from his experience. He said he would gladly place such experience as he had at our disposal as also the experience of better experts from the Soviet Union.⁴

1. Note, 20 July 1953. JN Collection.

2. Ivan Alexandrovich Benedictov, an expert in agriculture, took charge as Ambassador of the Soviet Union in India in the first week of July 1953.

3. In a note addressed to Secretary-General, MEA, on 5 August 1953, Nehru recorded that the Food Minister had told him that his Ministry would be prepared to buy from the Soviet Union about 300,000 tons of wheat annually for up to five years provided the price charged was the same as the price for the Punjab wheat. "To this, apparently, the Ambassador agreed."

4. Benedictov left for Moscow on 2 September 1953 to join the USSR Cabinet as Minister for Agriculture.

3. Post-Stalin Developments in USSR¹

Question: In paying tributes to Marshal Stalin, you had said in Parliament that you hoped people's minds would turn towards peace and cooperation.² Do you feel encouraged in that hope by the post-Stalin developments?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not know what particular effect these events³ had or not but we can all judge from many things that happened internally in Russia, in the Soviet Union, as well as in its external relations within this period. There is no doubt about it that the policy pursued by the Soviet Union in the last two months has been definitely a policy of a search for peace and of relieving tension.⁴ People sometimes question the *bona fides* of their policy. Nobody can answer such psychological questions about what people have in mind. But there is no doubt that one can judge a country's policy even more by what happens internally than what happens externally.

The fact is clear that the Government of the Soviet Union has been trying to lessen tension in Europe, etc. I think that will also be true of the Chinese Government. It was very easy for the Chinese Government to have taken up a stiff attitude because of what President Rhee had repeatedly said and because of a definite breach of the terms of the prisoners-of-war agreement by President Rhee. Nevertheless, apart from protesting, the Chinese Government did not allow that to come in the way of a final armistice. That itself shows that they were anxious to have an armistice and peace even though it involved their ignoring certain important things that happened.

1. Remarks at a Press conference, New Delhi, 30 July 1953. From *Jawaharlal Nehru, Press Conferences*, 1953, Information Service of India, New Delhi, 1954. Extracts. For other parts of the Press conference, see pp. 77-78, 445-452, 459 and 540-542.
2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 21, pp. 614-618.
3. L.A. Beria (1899-1953); an influential member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for many years and Minister of Internal Affairs and Chief of the Soviet secret police, was arrested on 10 July 1953 on charges of acting as an "enemy of the people" and executed in December 1953. Widespread purges of political and party leaders in a number of Union Republics, notably in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine, occurred both after the death of Stalin and after the arrest of Beria.
4. In a funeral oration at Stalin's interment on 9 March 1953, Georgi M. Malenkov, the new Premier, spoke of the Soviet Union's devotion to a policy of world peace based on "peaceful co-existence", while emphasizing the need for military preparedness. Addressing a special session of the Supreme Soviet on 15 March, he declared that "any country in the world which has the interests of peace at heart including the United States can rest assured of the firm peace policy of the Soviet Union."

Q: Does your reference to internal developments include Mr Beria's fall?

JN: I was really referring to what happened before Mr Beria's fall but those policies have been continued since then. I cannot quite give you my opinion about Mr Beria's removal. But apart from personalities, that policy, in search of peace, seems to have been followed previously and apparently continues....

II. BILATERAL RELATIONS

(viii) Israel

1. Complaints by Indian Jews¹

I think that it would be desirable for the Deputy Minister to make a brief statement in the Council of States, with the permission of the Chairman. Such a statement would be given enough publicity and would remove any wrong impression that might have been created.

2. The statement should refer to the written answer given on May 11 (the actual question and answer might be quoted).² The supplementary question should then be referred to and the answer given.³ After this the statement should proceed as follows:

The answer to the supplementary question has evidently been misinterpreted and the Government of India have received a number of protests. The Government of Israel have also drawn the attention of the Government of India to the impression created by this answer to the supplementary question which, according to them, has no relation to facts. They say that "To the people of Israel who have

1. Note to A.K. Chanda, Deputy Minister for External Affairs, and Foreign Secretary, 26 August 1953. JN Collection.
2. In reply to a question asked by M. Valiulla, Lakshmi Menon, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister, stated in the Council of States on 11 May that out of an estimated 2,395 Jews who emigrated from India to Israel since 1948, 337 had returned by December 1952.
3. In a supplementary question Violet Alva asked, "Is the colour bar in Israel one of the reasons why they have returned?" Lakshmi Menon replied, "Yes, it is one of the reasons."

suffered so much from racial discrimination there is no charge that comes with greater irony than that they themselves have erected in their own land a bar against fellowmen based on the ground of colour."

The Government of India are very glad to have this clarification and assurance. It is not their intention at any time to suggest that there was a colour bar in Israel. They had received complaints from some Indian Jews who had returned from Israel that there was some discrimination against them on account of their colour. It was to these complaints that reference was made in the answer to the supplementary question. Government have not verified any of those complaints, and, in any event, such an individual complaint does not justify a statement that there is a general colour bar.

The Government of India are glad to have the assurance from the Israel Government in this matter and wish to clarify the answer given previously in order to remove any misunderstanding.

3. Some such answer should be drafted. It should be shown to the Chairman and, with his permission, read out after Question Hour one day.⁴

4. An answer to the Israel Government should be sent after this giving the text of the statement.

4. A statement on the lines advised by Nehru was made by A.K. Chanda in the Council of States on 8 September 1953.

2. To K.P.S. Menon¹

New Delhi
8th September, 1953

My dear KPS,²

Please refer to your letter to me dated August 18, in which you refer to cooperation between India and Israel in the field of Atomic Energy. I have consulted our Atomic Energy Commission about it. For some time past, Dr Blumenfeld³ (brother-in-law of the late Dr Weizman) has been pressing Dr Bhabha⁴ on this subject and has asked him to go to Israel to see the work

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Ambassador of India in the Soviet Union.

3. J. Blumenfeld; brother-in-law of Chaim Weizman, the first President of Israel; lived in France; was a chemist and in charge of a chemical plant.

4. Homi J. Bhabha, Chairman, Indian Atomic Energy Commission.

being done there. We can certainly accept the principle of such cooperation, but before we commit ourselves to any detailed scheme, it would be necessary to see the work that is being done in Israel. We suggest, therefore, that one of our Atomic Energy Commissioners (probably Dr H.J. Bhabha) should visit Israel. This will have to be some time next summer. It is difficult for him to go earlier. Details of any scheme of cooperation could be worked out after that visit....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Opening of New Missions in West Asia¹

I agree about the appointment of a Minister to Syria.

2. As regards Saudi Arabia, I see no objection to our Ambassador in Cairo being accredited to Jeddah. But the Education Minister appears to be firmly of opinion that it would be better to have an independent representative there, even though he might function under the general superintendence of Cairo.

3. As regards Israel, I think we should not raise this question now.² There is a bitter controversy going on about the digging of a canal to which SG refers. Israel also took up a passive attitude in the voting in the UN Political Committee on the constitution of the Korean political conference. However, there is no harm in asking Shri Panikkar's opinion in the matter.³

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, 28 September 1953. File No. T/54/1723, MEA.
2. R.K. Nehru, Foreign Secretary, noted on 26 September that although the previous year the Prime Minister had wanted the question of exchange of diplomatic missions with Israel to be taken up fairly early, no steps had been taken due to developments connected with the setting up of the Middle East Defence Organization, and felt that the time was still not opportune. N.R. Pillai, Secretary-General, MEA, noted on 28 September that Israel had not created the requisite conditions for India to make a move in the matter by its rejection on 24 September of the order of the UN Truce Observation Corps to stop the digging of a canal in the demilitarized zone bordering Syria.
3. Pillai doubted if K.M. Panikkar, India's Ambassador in Cairo, would be enthusiastic.

III. KOREA

1. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
July 2, 1953

My dear Krishna,

I have received your airgraph of 26th June;² also your note about Kashmir.

Pearson³ sent me a reply which stated that he agreed with what I said but he would prefer to wait till American negotiations with Rhee were over before calling a meeting of the General Assembly. I sent him a reply to this.⁴

Today's news was that, in spite of every effort by the US to appease Syngman Rhee, they had failed and that the prospects of an armistice were receding.⁵ I do not quite know what more we can do. We have made our position perfectly clear. As a matter of fact, at my Cairo press conference, I spoke fully on the lines of my message to Pearson.⁶

I take it that Pearson will convene a meeting of the General Assembly fairly soon. You should keep yourself in readiness to go for it. We have informed the India House to keep you in touch and make all necessary arrangements.

Your note on Kashmir⁷ is helpful but the internal position there is really

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Krishna Menon mentioned that in his interview with Selwyn Lloyd, the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, the latter said that the United Kingdom "should wait on the results of Eisenhower's intervention with Rhee and that we should not antagonise United States' opinion." According to Menon, the UK was very much dissatisfied with the attitude of the US towards Rhee and urged sterner action.
3. Lester B. Pearson, Foreign Minister of Canada, and President, UN General Assembly.
4. See *Selected Works* (second series) Vol. 22, pp. 474-475.
5. On 1 July Rhee demanded an automatic security pact with the US as his price for agreeing to an armistice which the latter thought to be unacceptable to them.
6. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, p. 471.
7. Krishna Menon wrote that following his talks with Graham's colleagues and Habib Rahimtoola, he had got the impression that Pakistan would be willing to consider the partition of Kashmir as a possible solution to the problem. He further wrote, "Gilgit should be used as a bargaining point... to give it up in the beginning would probably mean that Pakistan will ask for more territory, which would be the Vale." India should also make it clear that "we have made all the concessions we can" in regard to conditions for plebiscite. He also noted that the idea of an independent Kashmir had "no practical soundness, even apart from political or other considerations or justice of rival claims, etc. There would be little hope of a stable administration and greater scope for outside intervention." Menon added, "India ought to stress that she intends to hold the external line now between the Pakistan held territory and the rest of Kashmir."

bad. This has been much worsened by Dr Mookerjee's death. The state of affairs in Delhi and even more so in Calcutta has also been badly affected by propaganda concerning Dr Mookerjee's death. In this matter, I do not think the Kashmir Government is at all to blame except that they were somewhat inefficient during the last few hours in communicating the news of the death.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

2. Maintaining India's Neutral Character¹

So long as the armistice is not signed, we cannot make any definite arrangements, but we should make all preliminary enquiries.²

2. In everything that we do, we should preserve our neutral character. I am, therefore, anxious to avoid taking any step which may be misunderstood by either party. If we have to engage foreign ships, this will only be done after consulting both parties. In the normal course, the Chinese cannot provide shipping, but I shall approach them nevertheless and ask for their advice. I shall equally approach the USA and the UK.

3. It would be a good thing if even a part of our troops are sent on Indian ships. The *Jalagopal* should therefore be kept in view and the Scindia Company informed that we might require it for this purpose. They should be asked if they can provide other ships also....

7. Our forces are not likely to exceed five thousand at the most and probably they will be less. We might, for the present, think in terms of four thousand.

1. Note, 4 July 1953. File Nos 12/62/NGO-52 and 12/64/NGO-52, MEA. Extracts. Also available in JN Collection.
2. R.K. Nehru, Foreign Secretary, had suggested that immediate enquiries should be made from Indian shipping companies as ships might be needed in August to transport Indian forces numbering about 4,000 to Korea. He further noted that *Jalagopal*, with accommodation for 1,100, being the only suitable ship available, it might be necessary to take a troopship on charter from the UK Government.

3. Korea and World Peace¹

The AICC welcomes the general improvement in the international situation and the lessening of tension between the great powers. The Committee trusts that a conference of representatives of the great powers will meet at an early date to discuss informally the various questions that have tended to produce conflict in the past, and will further consider the question of disarmament.

2. The conclusion of an agreement in regard to the prisoners-of-war in Korea removed the final obstacle to an armistice and it was confidently hoped that peace would be established in that country which had been devastated and ruined by war. That hope has not yet been realized because of the attitude adopted by the President and Government of South Korea, who have acted in clear violation of the terms of the prisoners-of-war agreement, and are making impossible and immoral demands for a continuation of war or a resumption of it after a stated period. The authority of the United Nations has thus been flouted and the hopes of peace imperilled. A situation has thus been created which is full of dangerous possibilities not only for peace but for the future of the United Nations.

3. The Committee trusts that the General Assembly of the United Nations will meet at a very early date to consider this critical situation and to take adequate measures to curb the warlike and dangerous ambitions of the South Korean Government, and to give effect to the terms of the armistice which have been agreed to.

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru for the meeting of the AICC at Agra, 5 July 1953. JN Collection.

4. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Your telegram 187 dated July 8. We have seen text of Chinese Government's letter² to General Clark.³

In view of possibility of armistice being signed soon, we are addressing US and UK Governments and asking them what steps they suggest that we should take. In particular we are pointing out to US Government that peaceful conditions should prevail in Korea to enable us to discharge our duties. This is necessary in view of Syngman Rhee's threats.

We are also asking them how many prisoners will have to be guarded and where they are kept.

Please enquire from Chinese Government if they have any suggestions to make to us about our future work in Korea.

We intend as soon as armistice is signed to send small team of five civil and military officers to Korea to consult people there and advise about next step to be taken.

1. New Delhi, 9 July 1953. JN Collection. N. Raghavan was India's Ambassador to China.
2. The Chinese Government, in a letter of 7 July to General Clark, had stated that although their side "is not entirely satisfied with reply of your side, yet in view of indication of desire of your side to strive for early Armistice and in view of assurances given... our side agrees that Delegations of both sides meet at an appointed time to discuss question of implementation of Armistice Agreement and various preparations prior to signing of Armistice Agreement."
3. Mark Wayne Clark (1896-1987); US General; Deputy Commander under Eisenhower for invasion of North Africa and Commander of the 5th Army at the Salerno landings, 1943; led the US 6th Army in the Far East, 1947-49; Commander, UN Forces in Korea, 1953-55.

5. Approach of the Canadian Government¹

...2. You might inform the High Commissioner for Canada that we appreciate his courtesy in giving us this memorandum and that, without going into any details, we should like to say that we are largely in sympathy with the approach of the Canadian Government in this matter. The two principal questions that arise are:

- (1) The composition of the conference; and
- (2) terms of reference.²

So far as composition is concerned, it is obvious that the People's Government of China and North Korea should be in it. Also, of course, the Soviet Union. South Korea should normally be in it, but I do not quite know what the effect of President Syngman Rhee's attitude might be.

3. As for the terms of reference, we are inclined to agree, at present at least, that the main subject referred to should be the Korean question.

4. We agree also that New York will not be a desirable location. We would welcome New Delhi as a meeting place....

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, 9 July 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. The informal memorandum given by the Canadian High Commissioner to N.R. Pillai on 9 July set forth the preliminary views of the Canadian Government on matters concerning the political conference on Korea. Among other points it said: (1) the conference should be a round table conference; (2) India should be invited to it; (3) its scope should be limited to consideration of the Korean question; and (4) it should preferably be held in Asia.

6. Message to Lester B. Pearson¹

In view of latest development in Korea it appears that while Syngman Rhee continues to be obdurate and proclaims his intention of obstructing armistice, the Chinese and North Korean Governments may still agree to an armistice. If armistice is signed soon it would have to be considered immediately by the General Assembly in the light of the new situation created by Syngman Rhee.

1. New Delhi, 9 July 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.

If, on the other hand, armistice cannot be reached the General Assembly must review entire situation and the political and other issues involved.

The situation is thus delicate and difficult and has reached critical stage. I think that it will help efforts to promote peace and to prevent any political development which might come in the way of peace later if General Assembly is summoned. The Washington meeting will also have taken place.² In view of these developments I suggest for your consideration that steps should now be taken to convene a meeting of General Assembly to consider new situation which will arise either by signing of armistice or if armistice cannot be reached. I hope that armistice will be agreed to before the General Assembly meets.³

2. The Foreign Ministers of Britain, USA and France were to meet in Washington from 10 to 14 July 1953 to discuss the questions of German unification, the situation in Indo-China and an armistice agreement on Korea.
3. On 11 July 1953, Pearson replied that there was a possibility of an armistice being agreed to in the next few days. If it materialized, he would call a meeting of the General Assembly immediately and if it did not, then he would, by circulating Nehru's message as an official request, seek approval of other member nations for a meeting of the Assembly.

7. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Chou En-lai's message sent with your telegram 188 dated 9th July was communicated by me to Pearson and Secretary-General, UN, and UK and USA Governments.

Questions put by Chinese Government are valid and require elucidation from our point of view also.²

1. New Delhi, 11 July 1953. JN Collection.
2. During the talks with Raghavan, Chou En-lai, while expressing China's desire for an armistice, wanted a definite answer from the US about the participation of Rhee's army in the signing of the armistice agreement as he found Clark's assurances incomplete. He also wanted to know clearly whether the "Rhee clique", after signing the agreement, would carry out ceasefire within twenty-four hours of signing it; retreat its troops two miles from demarcation line; would not cause trouble to the Chinese and Korean Explaining Teams; would not obstruct the working of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Teams; and give assurance that prisoners electing direct repatriation be enabled to do so and repatriation commission with India acting as chairman, carry out all its obligations, including functioning of Indian troops. He added that in case the reply was negative then Rhee might continue fighting leading to the cessation of the armistice. Chou further wanted to know whether the US sincerely desired armistice or they would connive with Rhee to sabotage it.

It is likely that Pearson will convene General Assembly so as to meet about end of month.

You will express my appreciation to Chou En-lai for keeping us informed of developments.

8. Message to the US Government¹

In their desire to give such help as they could in bringing about a peaceful settlement of the Korean war, the Government of India accepted certain responsibilities cast upon them by the Prisoners of War Agreement and other terms incorporated in the proposals for an armistice in Korea. The Government of India have avoided any entanglement abroad and more especially were averse to sending their armed forces overseas. But in response to the friendly invitation of the US Government on behalf of the UN Command as well as of the Government of the People's Republic of China, the Government of India felt that it would be improper for them to try to escape this trust and responsibility that had been cast upon them in the interest of peace.

2. Since then many developments have taken place which have affected the original basis for the Prisoners of War Agreement and the armistice, and a new situation has arisen. The Government of India have noted that the United States Government have made every effort to get over these new difficulties that have arisen and that it is still hoped that an armistice will be signed in the near future. The Government of India will be happy if this result is achieved.

3. During this recent period, it has come to the knowledge of the Government of India that the authorities of the Republic of Korea have often used highly unbecoming language in regard to India and have even uttered threats in the event of India undertaking the role which the terms of the armistice allotted to her.² The Government of India have noted this with deep regret and have refrained from any comment or criticism of these attacks on their *bona fides*. They have adhered to their resolve to fulfil the duties that

1. New Delhi, 15 July 1953. File Nos 12/62/NGO-52 and 12/64/NGO-52, MEA. The message was sent through India's Ambassador in Washington. Copies of the message were given to the representatives of UK, USA and Canada in New Delhi.

2. During his negotiations with Robertson, Syngman Rhee reiterated his earlier stand that he would not allow the Indian troops to land in Korea since India was known to be "pro-Communist".

might be assigned to them and to carry out the assurances that they had given. But it is clear that they can only do so under conditions which are proper and honourable to them. It is not clear to them what the position is at the present moment. They have seen the joint statement issued on behalf of Mr Robertson and President Syngman Rhee.³ But this statement has given little information and subsequent statements made on behalf of Dr Syngman Rhee have created grave doubts about the decisions arrived at in the course of the recent consultations in South Korea.⁴ The Government of India would, therefore, be grateful if full information is supplied to them about any proposed variations to the original terms of the armistice, more especially in regard to the duties assigned to India.⁵ It is only when this information is available to them that they can decide what action they should take in this matter.

4. The Government of India would again repeat the assurance that they are anxious to do their utmost to discharge the duties assigned to them under the terms of the armistice. But they cannot be expected to accept a position which is not in keeping with their self-respect or in which they are called upon to function in a furtive manner where the movements of their own representatives are limited and confined.⁶

5. It is the intention of the Government of India to send, as soon as an armistice is arranged, a team of four or five officers to Korea to meet the UN Command as well as North Korean and Chinese Command and discuss with them the further steps to be taken.⁷

6. The Government of India will be grateful to the United States Government for such information as might help them to understand the present position and decide on their own course of action.

3. The statement of 12 July 1953 reaffirmed the determination of the two sides to oppose coercion on prisoners of war and agreed to collaborate on political, economic and defence matters.
4. Soon after, Rhee declared that his offer of cooperation was conditional and that the truce would remain effective only for 90 days after the armistice was signed.
5. On 21 July 1953, the US State Department clarified that there had been no alteration or modification of the Prisoners of War Agreement entered into by the UN forces and the Communists on 8 June.
6. The US State Department's reply drew special attention to General Harrison's statement of 13 July that personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission would be protected and given facilities for their work. Further, the UN suggestion that the prisoners not desiring repatriation be moved to a demilitarized zone, to be established by the armistice agreement, was still under consideration of the Communists. This move, the reply explained, would materially lessen the contacts between Indian troops and the South Korean populace.
7. The State Department further observed that the Indian advance team could first go to Tokyo and meet General Clark there and at an appropriate time go to Korea where it could begin preparations for assuming its functions under the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

9. Message to the US Government¹

The Government of India are grateful to the US Government for their reply to the inquiries addressed to them in regard to the functioning of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces to be sent for guarding prisoners of war.

As one of the five Powers named in the Prisoners of War Agreement of June the 8th they are required to accede to that Agreement under clause 26.² They are glad therefore to know that no modifications of the Agreement of June 8th have been made.

As regards the POW Camps, any location which is acceptable to both parties and which enables the Commission as well as the forces guarding the POWs to function effectively will be acceptable to us.

The advance team which the Government of India propose to send after the signing of the armistice will report to us to enable us to take further steps. That team will not be a part of the Commission and will return to India after meeting the two Commands and making a general appraisal of the situation and what India is required to do in the circumstances. The team will consist of Mr R.K. Nehru, Foreign Secretary, Leader; Major-General S.P. Thorat, representing the Indian Army; Mr Balwant Singh Puri, representing the Indian Red Cross; one senior medical officer and three Army staff officers. The team, as suggested, will first proceed to Tokyo. They will have to visit North Korean and Chinese Commands also as well as the places where the POW Camps are going to be situated. We shall be glad to be assured that full facilities will be given to this advance team to carry out the work entrusted to them.

1. New Delhi, 21 July 1953. JN Collection. The message was sent through India's Ambassador in Washington.
2. The Prisoners of War Agreement of 8 June 1953, incorporated by reference in the Armistice Agreement of 27 July, stated: "In order to ensure that all prisoners of war have the opportunity to exercise their right to be repatriated following an armistice, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be requested by both sides to appoint a member to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which shall be established to take custody in Korea of those prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining power, have not exercised their right to be repatriated," and "sufficient armed forces and any other operating personnel required to assist the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in carrying out its functions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by India, whose representative shall be the umpire in accordance with the provision of Article 132 of the Geneva Convention."

In view of the many contradictory statements that have been made during past weeks, the US Government will no doubt appreciate the desire of the Government of India to be assured that their representatives as well as armed forces will be able to carry out their responsibilities and to function in a manner befitting the self-respect and dignity of India.

10. To John Foster Dulles¹

New Delhi
27 July 1953

My dear Secretary of State,

I am grateful to you for your message² which your Ambassador has handed to me. I share with you the feeling of great satisfaction at the conclusion of the armistice agreement in Korea and I would like to congratulate the United States Government on the success of the earnest efforts they have made in this behalf.

India will endeavour to discharge the heavy responsibilities which she has to shoulder in all earnestness and humility of spirit and in the earnest hope that this armistice will lead to further advances in the cause of world peace. In this great task it will be our privilege to give our cooperation to the United States Government.

With regards and all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. In his message of 17 July 1953, Dulles had expressed his appreciation of India's willingness to "assume the chairmanship of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission with all heavy responsibilities attached to this position."

11. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Just returned from Karachi. Received your telegram 200 dated 27th July.²

Please convey my congratulations on signing of armistice agreement to Chou En-lai.

Our advance party is leaving Delhi on 5th August reaching Tokyo 6th night. After two or three days there, they will proceed to demilitarized zone where POWs will be kept. From there they hope to go to Pyongyang. Hope Chinese and North Korean authorities will make arrangements for them to go there.

We are having difficulties in securing shipping for transport of our troops to Korea. No suitable Indian ships available. Only one British ship thus far arranged. We are trying to get more British ships. Can Chinese Government make any arrangements for this shipping or suggest to us what other arrangements we can make? If UK cannot supply enough ships and we cannot make any other feasible arrangements, then only alternative appears to be to ask USA for one or more ships. I would prefer not to do so unless there is no other choice.

Please enquire from Chou En-lai what he would suggest in this matter.

1. New Delhi, 28 July 1953. JN Collection.
2. Raghavan had informed Nehru that during his meeting with Chou En-lai, the latter had told him that the armistice agreement would be signed on 27th morning. He further said that as a result of fighting the battle line had been pushed south by some miles and over 23,000 prisoners, of whom 1,400 were Chinese and the rest North Koreans, had been agreed to be handed over to the Neutral Nations. He also said that the armed forces of India, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Red Cross personnel should be allowed to enter and operate in South Korea as per the NNRC agreement.

12. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

In view of the meeting of the UN General Assembly in mid-August we should like to know views of Chinese Government in regard to matters likely to be

1. New Delhi, 29 July 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.

raised there. The most important subject will be the constitution and functions of political conference. Hammaraskjoeld,² Secretary General, UN, thinks that membership should consist of USA, USSR, UK, China, North Korea, South Korea, France and India. He thinks that Canadian inclusion would be helpful and perhaps also some European neutral and another Asian country. In his view membership should not exceed ten or twelve.

Regarding agenda he suggests that it could be confined to Korea in first instance and other complications to be avoided at present.

Conference should meet informally as round table and not cross table conference. Approach should be flexible and previous consultations with important countries desirable. Hence necessity of knowing Peking's views.

As regards venue, New Delhi, Colombo and Geneva have been suggested. We are naturally quite willing to have it in New Delhi but we do not wish to suggest this ourselves or to press for it. We shall accept any venue which is agreed to. You know perhaps that Washington wishes to exclude India from membership of the conference and to confine such membership to belligerents only. Hammaraskjoeld considers this unreasonable.

Please consult Chou En-lai about these and connected matters and ascertain the views of his Government.

2. Dag Hammaraskjoeld (1905-1961); Swedish statesman and Secretary General of the UN, 1953-61. At the UN, he helped to set up an emergency force in Sinai and Gaza Strip, 1956, and worked for conciliation in the Middle East, 1957-58; awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace, 1961.

13. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram 3114, dated July 30th.

We enquired from Chou En-lai about political conference. He replies that this matter not been discussed yet between Chinese and North Korean Governments and so he was unable to say anything concerning composition, agenda or venue. He promised to inform us as soon as any decision was taken. He added however that the political conference had to settle vital political questions to ensure peace in the East and it should therefore be a high-level conference.

1. New Delhi, 31 July 1953. File Nos F-12/62/NGO-52 and F-12/64/NGO-52, MEA.

Situation is undoubtedly confused because of private commitments probably made to Rhee. It is clear that, without Chinese acquiescence and participation, political conference would have no significance.²

I rather doubt if much more light will come during the next few days to enable us to determine our line of action for Assembly.³ It might be more advantageous for you to explore this in New York with other delegations. I would have preferred your coming here after Assembly meeting for consultation when situation might be somewhat clearer. But I realize gravity of issues and importance of our taking definite line in UN and not merely waiting for others.

If you think it necessary, therefore, you can come here for consultation before Assembly meeting.

2. Analysing the post-truce situation, Krishna Menon had mentioned that grave private commitments were made to Rhee by the US with "aim stated as Korean unification but at the same time with US guarantee to Rhee." He wanted to know what line India should take "if decision of Assembly is sought to be rushed irrespective of Chinese acquiescence."
3. "In view of the gravity of issues," Menon offered to come over to New Delhi for consultation forthwith.

14. Message to Chou En-lai¹

You will recall that our Ambassador had mentioned to you, on 29/30th July last,² of our desire to ascertain your views and approach in regard to the political conference, which should be called within ninety days of the signing of the Armistice Agreement.

2. As this matter is the principal topic to be considered at the UN Session when it meets in New York on the 17th August, and will probably come up for initial consideration on the first day itself, we are most anxious to inform ourselves of your views even if such views as you express to us at the present stage may only be tentative and of a general character and only by way of communicating to us for our information (and guidance).

3. The three matters that initially come up are the composition, the terms of reference and the venue of the conference.

1. New Delhi, 5 August 1953. JN Collection. The message was sent through N. Raghavan.

2. See *ante*, p. 510.

4. We entirely appreciate the point of view you have clearly stated to our Ambassador that the UN cannot take decisions in regard to the conference which are binding on China and that the Chinese and North Korean Governments alone can make decisions on behalf of their sides.

5. We are, however, anxious to ensure that the appropriate steps are taken by the Assembly to enable the Conference to be decided upon without delay and in a manner which can evoke your ready cooperation. We would therefore like to enquire your views on the following:

- (a) Whether the composition of the conference should be confined to belligerents and other powers directly concerned with the Korean issue, such as, the Soviet Union.
- (b) Whether in addition to such States as contemplated by (a) above, other member States of the UN, who have not actively participated in the war, should be included.
- (c) In the event of your considering (b) above as the correct solution, could you enlighten us as to the State or States from among whom certain number could be added.
- (d) What would be your idea about the size of the conference (and perhaps the proportion of non-belligerent States, if these are included, that you would prefer).
- (e) Whether you would consider that it is desirable and possible that the conference should seek to work on a round table basis, at least to a great extent. And if this were not possible, what you would regard to be a suitable procedure to arrive at decisions, in the event of (a) and in the event of (b) being adopted.
- (f) Would you consider any initiative from us or from any other party to put forward proposals as a basis for your consideration and agreement as a suitable method or would you prefer that the UN should make proposals and invite China and North Korea to make similar proposals from your side?

6. With regard to the terms of reference, our present view is that the conference is called as provided in para 60 of the Armistice Agreement and, therefore, the wording of purposes stated therein should stand. The conference at its various stages is the best place to consider the scope of these words and to fix its own agenda.

7. With regard to the venue, New Delhi has been mentioned. We shall be glad to offer the facilities of our Capital if it is agreeable to all concerned, but do not desire to make any proposals ourselves in regard to New Delhi or any other venue.

8. As I have said, we seek this approach to assist us to form our own

opinions and to ensure ourselves that the steps that we take are in fact calculated to further our common purpose.

I shall be grateful for an early reply.

15. Message to V. Molotov¹

The Government of India would deeply appreciate such indication of the views of the Soviet Government as it feels able to give at the present stage in regard to the political conference, to be set up under the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement, and to which the forthcoming meeting of the UN Assembly would have to be decided upon.

2. Two important issues will have to be considered before the conference can come into being. These are the composition of the conference and its terms of reference. In addition, the venue will have to be decided upon.

3. It is obvious to us that there should be general agreement upon these points within the United Nations and with the Chinese and North Korean Governments. Considering that the methods pursued and the nature and content of possible proposals are of great importance to a successful outcome, and desiring to assist towards such a result, we are seeking to inform ourselves about your views and approach on this matter.

4. It is recalled that in the autumn sittings of the Assembly, the Soviet Government had proposed a conference for the settlement of the Korean question representative of Member States of the UN, both belligerent and non-belligerent as well as China, North Korea and South Korea. Would it be the view of the Soviet Government that the UN should itself include the names of the representatives of the Chinese and North Korean side or invite the Chinese and North Korean Governments to do so and itself propose only the names of States associated with the UN Command, or alternately, such States and other member States who are directly concerned in the Korean question as may be considered useful for a successful conference?

1. New Delhi, 6 August 1953. JN Collection. The message was sent through India's Ambassador, K.P.S. Menon, to Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister.

5. Would it be the view of the Soviet Government:

- (a) that the UN proposal should be on a similar basis to that of your autumn proposal, setting forth the full composition of the conference?
- (b) that the UN should propose only the side representing the UN Command?
- (c) that the UN should or may propose the States as in (b) above as well as others directly concerned, such as the Soviet Union or other member States not at war in Korea?
- (d) that the Chinese and the North Korean Governments should be invited to make their nominations and proposals?

6. We would consider that proposals from the UN should be put forward as a basis of agreement amenable to adjustments unless it is found possible as a result of prior consultations, to put forward proposals which are known to be acceptable to Chinese and North Korean Governments.

7. With regard to terms of reference, the Armistice Agreement in Clause 60 sets out purposes of the proposed conference. The adoption of the terms of reference as set out there, would leave to the conference itself the fixing of the agenda and the consideration of the scope of the deliberations of the conference. We shall be grateful for any views that your Government feel they can communicate to us at this stage.

8. We have no strong views on the venue of the conference.²

- 2. The Soviet message received on 17 August 1953 stated that the composition of the political conference should be based on an understanding between the parties which had signed the Armistice Agreement and that only such proposals which were acceptable to China and North Korea should be suggested in the UN Assembly.

16. To Mohammad Ali¹

New Delhi
August 8, 1953

My dear Prime Minister,

As you know, a Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly is being held soon in New York to consider the Korean truce and the political

1. JN Collection.

conference that is a consequence of that truce. In this matter we should like to keep in touch with your Government so that, in so far as possible, we might be able to cooperate in the UN Assembly. We have advised our principal representative, Shri V.K. Krishna Menon, to keep in touch with your delegate² at the Assembly.

Our High Commissioner will give you some idea of our line of thinking in this matter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Zafrullah Khan.

17. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Your telegram 218 dated 11th August.² Under the armistice agreement, personnel provided by India will certainly take over prisoners of war camps and replace all others. But this can only be done when the first stage of repatriation has been completed and prisoners remaining over are put in demilitarized zone under our control. In any event we can only take charge when our men are there. We are making arrangements to send our military detachments soon. They will begin to function as soon as the Repatriation Commission becomes responsible under the Agreement.

1. New Delhi, 12 August 1953. JN Collection.
2. The message, quoting para 2 Article I of terms of reference to NNRC that the operating personnel needed should be exclusively provided by India, conveyed a protest by General Lee Sang-Cho on behalf of the Chinese Government at Military Armistice Commission meeting on 10 August against continuous US pressure through the agents of Chiang Kai-shek for forcible retention of prisoners in violation of the armistice agreement.

18. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram No.234 dated August 14.²

Regarding India's membership of political conference, we should not come in the way of others proposing our name, nor should we state that we will avoid any such membership if offered to us. But we might make it clear that we have no desire to push ourselves in. Our only wish is to promote cause of peace and if it is the general wish of others that we should be there, we shall not refuse to accept responsibility.

I propose to make a statement³ in Parliament on Monday morning.

1. New Delhi, 15 August 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Krishna Menon, in his message, referred to his meeting with Henry Cabot Lodge on 14 August 1953 in which the latter had opined that the United States was "opposed to the nomination of India" for the reasons that the "conference should be strictly on the basis of clause 60 and therefore composed of representatives of parties." Menon added that though there was "considerable opposition to the United States view", he hoped, "others would see the reasonableness in it." He argued that other Asian issues should not come into the conference because he said "that would mean Rhee would be admitted into talks on Indo-China."
3. See *ante*, pp. 385-389.

19. Message to the Custodian Force¹

Our officers and men of the Indian Army have been charged with a unique task and a great responsibility. At the request of many leading nations, we have undertaken the task of providing a Custodian Force for the prisoners of war in Korea who have not already been repatriated. India and the Indian Army are honoured by being asked to undertake this task, but the responsibility is a heavy one. I am sure that our officers and men will discharge it worthily and thus maintain the honour of our country. They are going on a mission of peace and goodwill. They are going as neutrals with ill will to none and with friendship for all. They should therefore behave with all courtesy and friendship

1. 17 August 1953. JN Collection, NMML.

to all they come in contact with there, to the prisoners of war whom they will serve for some time and to the Korean people who have suffered so much in the past. They must always remember that they have to act in a completely impartial manner and to carry the message of peace and friendship on behalf of India to that unhappy country. The honour and good name of India are in their keeping. Let each soldier ever remember this and demonstrate to the world that the soldiers of India stand for peace and the service of the people whether in India or abroad.

I send my good wishes to those who are going and wish them well.

Jai Hind.

20. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Your telegram 227 dated August 16th.² I have conveyed it verbatim to Krishna Menon who would, no doubt, be helped by it.

This morning I had visit from Soviet Ambassador who gave me message from Molotov in reply to my enquiry sent ten days ago.³ Molotov has not said anything definite in regard to the points raised. He refers, however, to Chinese Government's message to us.

1. New Delhi, 17 August 1953. JN Collection.
2. Raghavan conveyed the message to Nehru from Chou En-lai in which the latter, while thanking Nehru for his message on the political conference, said that it would be appropriate to "work on a round table basis" and to have the following eleven nations to participate: People's Republic of China, Soviet Union, United States, Britain, France, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, South Korea, India, Poland, Sweden and Burma. As regards the terms of reference, they should be in accordance with provision of paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement which said that Conference should first settle through negotiations withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and peaceful settlement of the Korean question and thereafter settle through negotiations other questions.
3. In his meeting with the Ambassador, Nehru while thanking Molotov for the message he had sent asked the Ambassador to inform Molotov that the Indian delegation to the UN had been asked "to keep in close touch with the Soviet delegation in this matter." Nehru also pointed out to the Ambassador that "Molotov's reply did not give any indication about the precise view of the Soviet Government regarding the three or four points that had been raised" and "as reference had been made to the Chinese Government's message to us," Nehru presumed that the Soviet Government agreed with the Chinese suggestions.

As Chou En-lai enquires about our views, please inform him that I have conveyed his message to our delegation who are keeping in touch also with Soviet delegation. Generally speaking, we are in agreement with approach of Chinese Government in this matter. But it is difficult to fix definitely names of countries which should be represented in political conference. This question is being discussed in New York and, as is known, there is difference of opinion between United States and United Kingdom and other countries in several matters. An attempt is being made to come to decisions only after prior negotiation and, if possible, agreement by both parties to armistice.

As regards India's inclusion, we are willing, but we have made it clear that we shall accept only if both parties desire us. The fact of United States' opposition by itself need not matter provided UN expresses its wish to have us. Thus far UK, Canada and several other countries are anxious to have India.

Regarding terms of reference, we agree with Chou En-lai's suggestion and I think that this is likely to be adopted by UN.

Regarding venue, we shall accept New Delhi if it is decided upon, but there is likely to be much opposition to this and we do not wish to press it.

Probably after today's meeting of UN Assembly, there will be short adjournment for consultations and instructions from Governments.

21. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Krishna Menon's messages indicate considerable confusion in UN over possible resolutions and generally US attitude predominating, which might result in no solution agreed by both parties to dispute.² This will mean deadlock as Political Conference could hardly function in those circumstances. Unfortunately Chinese suggestions came rather late. They have now been embodied in Russian resolution. But, in existing circumstances, this resolution is bound to be lost.

2. Resolutions being considered now are four apart from Russian resolution. First one is fifteen-power Resolution which includes in political

1. New Delhi, 20 August 1953. JN Collection.

2. Nehru informed Raghavan on 20 August that "in view of urgent developments in UN Assembly, we have now decided to instruct Krishna Menon to abstain from voting on all resolutions on ground that none of them are likely to enlist support of both sides. He will explain our position, and await further developments. This will be in conformity with our neutral attitude in this matter."

conference all UN belligerents in Korea. This has objectionable clause authorizing US to convene political conference.

3. Second resolution recommends Soviet participation. Third resolution recommends India's participation. Fourth resolution expresses satisfaction at success of collective action.

4. If no other resolution proposed, resolution one, two, four will pass with explanations and reservations. Resolution three about India might perhaps pass. All this will worsen situation.

5. We should like to know immediately Chinese reactions to this present situation and what they would suggest should be done. Would they agree to present Fifteen-Power proposal with modifications if Russia and India are also voted in or would they agree to five additional UN belligerents being added to eleven nations suggested by China. As decision should be by general agreement, numbers would not make much difference. Or thirdly, new proposal might be made suggesting amend resolution one treating Clause 5 therein and also resolutions two and three as recommendations of Fifteen Powers to Assembly, noting these as also noting other resolutions including Russian resolution, stating object, composition which can reasonably command adherence of both sides.

22. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

American Ambassador here has been trying to see me to convey an urgent message from his Secretary of State. I have been too busy to see him this evening. I shall probably meet him tomorrow morning. I understand, however, that the message from the State Department relates to India's participation in the political conference. It says that "No country appreciated more highly than the United States the part played by India in bringing about a truce in Korea. The United States Administration could, therefore, have no possible objection to India's participation as such. Like India, however, the United States was anxious for the successful outcome of the political conference, and the United States Administration could not help thinking that, conditions

1. New Delhi, 25 August 1953. File Nos. F-12/62/NGO-52 and F-12/64/NGO-52, MEA. Also available in V.K. Krishna Menon Papers.

being what they are, India could play a more useful part behind the scenes than in the conference itself. That India was in no way connected with the negotiations at Panmunjon was probably one of the factors which assisted her in playing special role with regard to Korea. Similarly, by keeping out of the political conference, she could make a better contribution to the cause of peace.

2. You will take this into consideration in deciding your line of action. Probably, we should take the vote in the Committee but later make the statement you indicated in your last telegram, that is, avoid a contest in the plenary session. You will exercise your discretion.

23. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram No. 249 dated 25 August.²

I spoke fully about this matter with Mohammad Ali and Zafrullah Khan who promised to look into it on their return to Karachi. Their decision therefore is a considered one and not likely to be changed. I am however immediately getting in touch with our High Commissioner in Karachi and asking him to communicate with the Government of Pakistan.

You must have received additional telegram from Raghavan conveying Chou En-lai's strong views about India not withdrawing.³ Obviously Peking cannot keep in touch with developments in New York and are therefore inclined to take narrow view.

You must decide for yourself having regard to all factors.

1. New Delhi, 26 August 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Krishna Menon informed Nehru that he had learnt that the Pakistan Delegation had received instructions on 25 August from their Foreign Office in Karachi to vote against Resolution nominating India for political conference.
3. After his talk with Chou En-lai on 25 August, Raghavan had cabled to Nehru stating that the Chinese were anxious that "India should not, on any account, withdraw her name from membership of political conference" even if it was defeated for want of two-thirds majority unless it would mean that "because of such defeat, India would be precluded from being nominated later."

24. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

I have been giving much thought to the position that has arisen in the United Nations Assembly. As I have told you I have left decision in developing circumstances to Krishna Menon. It is clear that many of those who have sponsored Resolution² for inclusion of India in the political conference are disturbed at turn of events and even fear that this might play into the hands of Syngman Rhee by creating a situation which almost amounts to a deadlock.³ That is exactly what Syngman Rhee wants. Should we allow such situation develop? India is bound to be defeated in plenary session in circumstances which will largely disable her from playing any important part later. Nomination by China at that stage will not help at all because then we shall lose somewhat our neutral position.

If we avoid voting on India in plenary session, we prevent deadlock, making our position clear. Such a gesture would be appreciated by most countries and would raise India's capacity for working for peace at later stages. I understand that this is Panikkar's view also.

I do not yet know the result of voting in the Political Committee. I want you however to appreciate position that might arise so that Chou En-lai might understand it.

1. New Delhi, 26 August 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. UK, New Zealand, Canada and Australia recommended India's participation in the political conference.
3. On 24 August 1953, Pyun Yung Tao, the South Korean Foreign Minister, told the UN Political Committee that it would find it next to impossible to collaborate with India on the same side, for he found India to be in "mortal fear" of Communists.

25. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Your telegram 245 dated August 26th.² We have not taken up passive attitude in this matter. Our attitude is positive and active but at same time of neutrality in keeping with our Chairmanship of Neutral Commission in Korea.

Position in United Nations is continually changing. Even Pakistan is now likely to oppose us and this has affected some Arab countries. Therefore all factors have to be borne in mind and longer view taken so that we might not disable ourselves from taking effective action at later stage. We have therefore kept Krishna Menon informed of all these developments and left final decision to him. You may inform Chou En-lai accordingly.

Some of our difficulties have arisen because we have not been informed of China's views till very late moment when it became difficult to canvass opinion in favour of them or to fit in our action with them. We have to keep our real objective of peace before us and not imperil it because of some development now. At present there is strong body of opinion in UN opposed to US stand and sympathetic with Chinese views. A wrong step might weaken this position and thereby produce difficulties in way of future action.

1. New Delhi, 26 August 1953. JN Collection.

2. Raghavan informed Nehru that Chou En-lai had telephoned him "and said again he fully hoped India would on no account withdraw or take passive attitude on Resolutions proposing her for political conference. He is for pressing them to vote both in Committee and Plenary."

26. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Although UN Resolutions about Korea are not entirely to our liking,² there can be no doubt that the discussion there has brought no credit to the United States, which has been almost isolated. Voting on Indian Resolution very significant. Apart from South American bloc and Formosa, only Greece and Pakistan voted with the US. Thus, practically the whole of Europe and Asia opposed US stand. In the result, India has emerged with credit and there is general approval for Chinese approach. It is clear that this does not finalize the matter. US Government beginning to realize that their rigid attitude was a mistake.³

It is important that the Chinese answer should take full advantage of this position and should not be rigid or final. Mere rejection would give initiative to the US. Straightforward acceptance might also play into their hands and probably lead to a Conference which argues interminably and bitterly without coming to an agreement as at Panmunjon.

I would like you to maintain contacts with the Chinese Government on this issue and discuss various possibilities and inform us of their views. As you will appreciate, delay in our being informed makes it difficult for us to take any effective step.

Krishna Menon is going to London and will visit Foreign Office there. He is expected in Delhi on Thursday, 3rd September.

1. New Delhi, 30 August 1953. JN Collection.
2. On 28 August, the plenary session of the General Assembly passed a resolution presented by fifteen nations recommending that the countries participating in the political conference on the UN side should consist of the sixteen nations contributing armed forces to the UN Command, together with the Republic of Korea. It also passed a resolution moved by Australia, New Zealand and Denmark recommending the participation of the Soviet Union in the conference "provided the other side (that is, North Korea and the Chinese People's Republic) desires it."
3. After V.K. Krishna Menon announced at the plenary session that India would withdraw her proposed nomination for membership of the political conference, Henry Cabot Lodge, the US Representative, paying tribute to Krishna Menon's "generous and statesmanlike" gesture, declared: "His desire.... not to add to the heat of battle has come from a great representative of a great leader of a great nation.... Our position on this question was not directed at India as such. On the contrary we feel deeply that at any later discussions or conference on Far Eastern matters India must play a central and constructive role, and we in the United States will do all in our power to facilitate her participation."

27. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Your telegram 257 September 6.²

2. I have discussed situation with Krishna Menon. It is difficult for us to make suggestions without knowing Chinese reactions. If we know Chinese views in time, this will help us in conferring with others and possibly taking initiative. Otherwise initiative passes to others and it is difficult to catch up.

3. Recent debate in the UN demonstrated that nearly all European and Asian countries did not agree with American approach but some of them at the last moment were not prepared to oppose the US and reluctantly abstained. Indian resolution passed by the UN asking for reference to China and North Korea and report back and its almost unanimous acceptance indicates wish that door to reconsideration should not be wholly closed. If China and North Korea reject UN proposals out of hand, then those who do not want success of political conference will be happy and will cast blame on China. Merely repeating Russian resolution would also not be helpful.

4. Possible helpful attitude might be to express earnest desire for political conference paving way to settlement. At same time to point out that success of this conference would appear to require presence of neutral nations on agreed basis. Names need not be specified to begin with. This will cast responsibility on the UN for reconsideration.

5. US attitude appears to have hardened and many countries feel unhappy about this. It might be advantageous to gain support of some of these countries by adopting attitude indicated above.

6. This is not intended as text of message to be conveyed but for your guidance in discussion with Chou En-lai.

1. New Delhi, 7 September 1953. JN Collection.

2. Raghavan reported to Nehru that the Chinese had received the Resolution only two days back and that Chang Han-fu had asked him whether he had heard from Nehru or Krishna Menon after Menon's return from New York.

28. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

Raghavan, after long discussion with Chou En-lai, informs me that the Chinese have not yet received full record of proceedings. They had only received thus far 15-Power Resolution and Resolution on Soviet participation.

2. You will have seen China's reply suggesting addition of India, Burma, Pakistan and Indonesia. These Asian nations named are the only ones, apart from Mongolia and Viet Nam, having diplomatic relations with China. It is worthy of note that China has not suggested Poland or Czechoslovakia, but has confined herself to Asian nations. After much consideration, China decided to mention names of neutral nations and not merely emphasize principle. Probably, they are not particularly keen on all these countries, but they would very much like India's participation. They hope that India would press for acceptance of principle of participation of Asian and neutral nations without specifying names and also for acceptance of round table idea.

3. Chou En-lai expressed appreciation and admiration for the work India and Indian soldiers were doing impartially at Panmunjon.

1. New Delhi, 13 September 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Copy was sent to V.K. Krishna Menon also.

29. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

Trevelyan, British Representative,² saw Raghavan to enquire whether Chinese would later agree to conference if Americans again rejected Chou En-lai's demands. Raghavan gave his impression that Chinese would not materially alter their stand further. Result of outright rejection by US would be stalemate. Further, the Chinese sincerely are desirous of friendly atmosphere at conference even with Americans. Hence, their desire for presence of outsiders to smoothen matters. Chinese anxious that they and North Koreans should be invited to take part in discussion, as this may help in arriving at agreed formula.

1. New Delhi, 15 September 1953. File Nos 12/62/NGO-52 and 12/64/NGO-52, MEA. This cable was also sent to V.K. Krishna Menon. On 14 September, Vijayalakshmi Pandit was elected President of the UN General Assembly.
2. Humphrey Trevelyan, British Charge d'Affaires in Beijing, saw Raghavan on 14 September 1953.

30. To K.S. Thimayya¹

New Delhi

September 18, 1953

My dear Thimayya,

Thank you for your letter of the 13th September which I have read with great interest and which I have shared with some of our other friends here. I am glad you are going to write to me once a week. Whatever information telegrams may convey, they can hardly take the place of a letter which tells us much more. We are naturally greatly interested not only in the events that take place in Korea but in the background of those events. Your letter gives us this background which helps us greatly to understand.

I must say that I am a little surprised to learn of the extent to which your prisoners have been conditioned and frightened. Some months back there were repeated outbreaks on a large scale in these POW camps and much shooting and killing. Perhaps the prisoners misbehaved. But it is clear that those who looked after them also did not behave well and were bent on coercing them into a certain pattern of behaviour. I think also that it is highly likely that a number of prisoners who were not POWs were mixed up with them to help in conditioning them. You will no doubt have a tough job, but I am sure that you and Chakravarty and your colleagues will succeed.

Ever since your demand came for more troops, we have been making all kinds of arrangements for them. The real difficulty of course was transport. We got into touch with the UK Government also. Ultimately, as you know, we decided to send our troops to Hong Kong from where they were to be lifted by UN aircraft. Our Air Force men were rather keen on doing this job as far as they could....

All good wishes to you, your colleagues and our *jawans*.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

31. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram 283² and 285 of September 21. I have explained position to Raghavan.

It is difficult for me to advise you in changing circumstances. You must therefore exercise your discretion about procedure and timing.³ I do not want India to appear as claimant of membership of political conference or any other position. Our attitude, however, must be to help in seeking way out of deadlock. More particularly, we are interested in prisoners issue and cannot allow this to remain unsolved and continuing burden on us.

PsOW are giving a great deal of trouble to Neutral Commission and our forces in Korea. At Thimayya's request, we are sending another Battalion by air to Korea. Our forces there have thus far behaved with exemplary patience and, though firm, have avoided any incident. They have elicited all round praise.

1. New Delhi, 22 September 1953. File Nos 12/62/NGO-52 and 12/64/NGO-52. Also available in V.K. Krishna Menon Papers.
2. Menon reported that Lodge who was in charge of the session in July and August was out of the picture; Dulles was far from bellicose and was receptive and the US position could no longer be regarded as inflexible. He added that India's successful effort in making the Secretary General make a report had speeded processes and forced the US into accepting the new situation.
3. Menon felt that the time was not ripe for any 'overt step' and India should indicate that the Chinese would not yield to ultimatums. India should urge the conference meeting at least to deal with prisoners issue. He wanted that India should rally opinion for compromise solution and "as far as possible prevent Chinese from doing something which will throw onus on them." India should consider a fresh initiative to deal with the problem if there was no conference and suggested that mid-October would be the suitable time for making a move.

IV. AFRICA

(i) North Africa

1. Cable to H.S. Malik¹

Your telegram 113 dated August 14.² I am deeply distressed to learn of developments in Morocco. If situation develops in manner feared, you should certainly intercede in a friendly and informal manner and point out the grave effects on public opinion in India and all over the East apart from the effects in Morocco itself. You should exercise your discretion in this matter.

1. New Delhi, 15 August 1953. JN Collection.
2. Paret, Councillor in the French Union Assembly and General Secretary of the France Maghreb Committee, and Caid Bakket, representative of the Pasha of Sefru, who were supporting the Sultan of Morocco, informed H.S. Malik, India's Ambassador in France, on 14 August that demonstrations leading to police action were taking place in several Moroccan cities, the Imam of the Mosque at Marrakesh had been assassinated, and large-scale bloodshed was feared. They also urged immediate friendly intervention by India to help relieve the situation. Malik asked Nehru whether he might, if the situation worsened, intercede with the French authorities requesting avoidance of any action which might lead to a civil war in Morocco and forceful repression of Morocco's legitimate national movement.

2. Developments in Morocco¹

I enclose a telegram received from the leader of the Istiqlal Party² in Cairo about the Moroccan developments.³

2. These recent developments are very serious. I saw a telegram from our

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, 22 August 1953. JN Collection.
2. The Independence Party.
3. Sidi Mohammad ben Yousef, the Sultan of Morocco, who was supporting the nationalist movement in his country, was deposed by the French authorities on 20 August 1953.

Ambassador about them. Last night I sent a brief telegram to our Delegation in New York on this subject.⁴

3. I do not know what we can do in a public way. But we should certainly give expression to our great uneasiness and distress at these developments privately to the French Ambassador here and also to the US Ambassador and the UK High Commissioner. We should tell them of the strong feeling that exists in India on this subject and the likelihood of repercussions.

4. A brief telegram might be sent to Malik in Paris acknowledging his telegram and asking him to keep us informed of developments.

4. Nehru cabled to V.K. Krishna Menon on 21 August saying, "We are much concerned at developments in Morocco. I cannot suggest any move but our Delegation should cooperate fully with Arab-Asian Group in this matter." A spokesman of the Asia-African bloc in the UN said in New York on 20 August that an emergency meeting of the bloc to be held later in the day might make an approach to the Security Council.

3. Help to the Tunisian National Movement¹

The reasons given for the discontinuance of our help deserve consideration.² But this would be particularly an unfortunate time to discontinue it. The whole of the Arab world is terribly excited, and rightly so, over the French action in Morocco. It is generally believed that the next step will be in Tunisia. At this moment for us to withdraw help would create a very bad impression. I think, therefore, that we should continue it for the present. You may further find out from the lady in charge about the activities of the office and as to when Mr Slim is coming back here or where he is.

1. Note to Balvantray Mehta, General Secretary, AICC, 12 September 1953. File: Foreign Department (1953), AICC Papers, NMML.
2. The AICC had been giving financial assistance of Rs 500 per month since March 1953 on an experimental basis to the Tunisia office which was started in New Delhi in February 1953. It was suggested that the assistance might be discontinued for the following reasons: (1) the Tunisian issue had grown into a pan-African problem and the India-Africa Council was adequate to tackle it; (2) Taieb Slim being away, no Tunisian was in charge of the office, and the public opinion did not favour the English lady who acted as the Director; and (3) the funds collected for the Tunisian work had been exhausted.

IV. AFRICA

(ii) Egypt

1. To Ismail Kamal¹

New Delhi
July 2, 1953

My dear Ambassador,²

Thank you for the Egyptian cigarettes that you have sent me. They were an intimation that you have come back to India and I welcomed that information. You have now almost converted me to smoking Egyptian cigarettes.

I have had news from our Ambassador in Cairo³ that you gave an address in the Foreign Office in Cairo on India and further that your speech was a great one and was much appreciated by those who heard it. I am very grateful to you for your able advocacy of India before your own people.

It was a great pleasure to me to meet and have friendly talks with General Neguib and the Members of his Government.⁴ These personal contacts will help greatly in our understanding each other. I have asked Panikkar to convey my deep gratitude to General Neguib for his hospitality and for the very friendly way in which he and his colleagues received me in Cairo. I have come back with the pleasantest of memories of my brief stay there.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Ambassador of Egypt in India.
3. K.M. Panikkar.
4. Nehru visited Cairo from 23 to 25 June 1953.

2. Cable to B.G. Kher¹

Information received from our Ambassador in Egypt indicates that the situation there is rapidly deteriorating. Mohammad Ali, during his visit to Cairo,² repeatedly said that position was brighter and there were possibilities of an

1. New Delhi, 5 July 1953. JN Collection.
2. Mohammad Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan, visited Cairo in the last week of June 1953 on his way back from London.

early settlement of Anglo-Egyptian dispute. Egyptian Government now realizes that Britain has no intention of asking for resumption of talks.³ This has produced sense of bitter disillusionment. In recent important speech at Alexandria, Major Salah Salem⁴ said that American interest in Middle East was merely to find cannon fodder in case of war. He criticized British attitude also.

Panikkar says that situation is developing in a way which causes him alarm. The anniversary of the Revolution falls on the 23rd July⁵ and arrangements are being made for its celebration on a vast scale. The Revolutionary leaders have to decide between now and the 23rd July what they intend to do to secure a settlement of the Canal Zone question, for some kind of an announcement of their programme will have to be made on that day. As Britain has given no indication of a desire of resumption of negotiations, the Egyptian Government is forced by internal circumstances to take some decisive step and that step is not likely to be an invitation for resumption of talks.

I think you should bring this to the notice of Selwyn Lloyd or Salisbury.⁶ If Winston Churchill is well enough, they might keep him informed.

I have no desire to interfere in this matter. But I am naturally concerned at possibility of conflict in Egypt which can do no good to any party. I earnestly trust therefore that some way will be found for resumption of negotiations.⁷

3. Anglo-Egyptian discussions on the Suez Canal question which opened in Cairo on 27 April 1953 were adjourned indefinitely on 6 May. General Neguib, speaking in Cairo on 10 May, said that Egypt had "washed her hands" of the negotiations. Referring to Britain as "the enemy", he declared that Egyptians should prepare to "wage the great battle ahead" and be ready for "the supreme sacrifice". Selwyn Lloyd, British Minister of State, announced in the House of Commons on 12 May that Egypt had insisted on a number of conditions unacceptable to the British Government.
4. Egyptian Minister for National Guidance.
5. A military coup took place in Cairo on 23 July 1952 led by General Mohammed Neguib, who declared in a radio broadcast the same day that the object of the coup was to end governmental instability and corruption in high places.
6. Robert Arthur James Gascoyne Cecil, Marquess of Salisbury (1893-1972); Leader of the House of Lords, 1942-45, 1951-57; Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 1952; Lord President of the Council, 1952-57; Chancellor, University of Liverpool, 1951-71. Salisbury was acting as Foreign Secretary in place of Anthony Eden, who was seriously ill at this time.
7. Following Nehru's telegram, Kher talked with Salisbury on 6 July. Salisbury observed that the British Government were keen to come to an agreement with Egypt but Neguib himself had publicly been intransigent which made British position difficult. The British Government felt very strongly that the Canal Zone must be adequately defended and that without the help of British technicians, Egypt could not defend the Zone. Salisbury added that unless Churchill got an indication that Egyptian response would be conciliatory, he would not order resumption of negotiations.

3. Conversations with Egyptian Leaders¹

I spent three days in Egypt on my way back from Europe. My visit overlapped by a day the visit of the Prime Minister of Pakistan who had previously had talks with the Egyptian leaders. General Neguib and his colleagues were chiefly interested in what had happened in London during the Prime Ministers' Conference in regard to Egypt and what the attitude of the UK Government was.

2. It appeared that Mr Mohammad Ali had given a somewhat optimistic report. This created an impression that something was going to happen. When later nothing much happened and no move took place from the UK Government side, there was disillusionment in Egypt and bitterness.

3. I gave my own account of the Prime Ministers' Conference in London in regard to Egypt. I said that, while the UK Government were certainly very anxious to come to some agreement with Egypt, Sir Winston Churchill was angry and had worked himself up at what he said were the attempts to kick England out of Egypt unceremoniously. He said that he refused to be kicked out. According to him, the UK Government had offered very fair terms to Egypt and they could not go further. They were perfectly prepared to have negotiations.

4. My own impression was that Sir Winston Churchill went a little further than the Foreign Office of the UK wanted to go. Indeed the Foreign Office, as represented by Mr Selwyn Lloyd, appeared to be more amenable and more desirous of continuing conversations with Egypt. They had a feeling that a way out could be found.

5. I told the Egyptian leaders that I had no desire to interfere in this business except that I would be very happy if there was an agreement satisfactory to Egypt. In any event, Egyptian sovereignty must be fully recognized. In theory Sir Winston Churchill had said that he would recognize it. But how this will be interpreted in practice I do not know. It was for the Egyptians to consider how to proceed about this matter, but I ventured to suggest to them that strong language did not help and merely put a barrier to any calm consideration of the problem. They could remain quite firm in regard to the issues, but it would be helpful to put their case forward in moderate language.

6. This was my general approach. For the rest I talked to them at some length about our own struggle for freedom in India and how we had tried to

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, and Foreign Secretary, 8 July 1953. JN Collection.

function under Gandhiji's leadership; how he had always laid stress on building up our internal strength, etc.

7. I discussed with the Egyptian leaders also the broad trends of international affairs and the great change that had come about owing to the resurgence of Asia and the ferment in Africa. The old balances had been upset. Europe and America, however, though in a sense conscious of this fact, were unwilling to accept its consequences. Hence many of their difficulties. I referred to the situation in the Far East and the non-recognition of China which struck me as exceedingly foolish and unreal.

8. I think that my talks created some impression on the Egyptian leaders and it was noticeable that their language in public was somewhat more moderate than previously. Indeed, this was noticed by the other diplomats there also who came to the conclusion that this must have been due to my presence there. Apparently, Sir Winston Churchill also thought so because he sent me a message later thanking me for what I had done there. As a matter of fact, I had in no way spoken for the UK Government and, if anything, I had laid stress on the full acknowledgment of Egyptian sovereignty. I read with interest a few days ago a speech by Major Saleh Salem, one of the prominent members of the Egyptian Government and Council of the Revolution. This speech dealt with foreign affairs to some extent and part of his analysis appeared to me to be an echo of what I had said. The speech however was a pointer to the fact that the Egyptian Government was greatly worried at nothing happening and was obviously thinking of taking some big step. The hopes that Mr Mahommad Ali had raised in their minds had ended and they felt greatly disillusioned. It was clear that they would not take any step towards the resumption of the negotiations.

9. The anniversary of the Revolution takes place about the 23rd July and it is probable that on that day some kind of policy statement will be made by the Egyptian Government.

10. In view of this development, I communicated with our High Commissioner in London a few days ago and asked him to convey to the UK Foreign Office our apprehensions about the situation in Egypt and our hope that UK would take some step towards a resumption of negotiations.² The answer, just received, is not very encouraging. Perhaps nothing further could be said without reference to Sir Winston Churchill.

11. Anyhow the position in Egypt is definitely not good. Both parties are sitting firmly waiting for the other to do something and neither proposes to take the initiative. Meanwhile, the situation deteriorates. Internal conditions

2. See the preceding item.

in Egypt do not permit the present Egyptian Government to remain static. They are compelled by circumstances to do something.

12. It may be mentioned that the two most important persons in the Egyptian Cabinet, apart from the President and Prime Minister, General Neguib, are Col Nasser, Deputy Prime Minister, and Major Saleh Salem, Minister for National Guidance. In fact, from the policy making point of view, they are probably more important than the President. The President is, however, very popular with the public.

4. To K.M. Panikkar¹

New Delhi
July 11, 1953

My dear Panikkar,

Your letter of the 7th July with a note attached.

I am sorry that the situation in Sudan has deteriorated.

As I informed you, I communicated to the UK Government your message about the Egyptian situation and how it was rapidly deteriorating. I even suggested that the British Government might take the initiative in reopening negotiations. This was handed to Salisbury who gave a non-committal answer and wanted to know what the answer of the Egyptians would be. Naturally we could say nothing. There the matter stands....

As suggested by you, I am sending a photograph of mine for General Neguib. I am not sure if he will like it, although it has been taken by Karsh² of Ottawa and is certainly an expensive one. I am sending you two other photographs which are of a different kind and perhaps more typical of me. You may use them as you like or give them to any person who might appreciate them.³

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Yousuf Karsh (b. 1908); portrait photographer, born in Turkey; emigrated to Canada in 1924 and opened his own studio in Ottawa in 1932.

3. Neguib had presented to Nehru an album of photographs taken during Nehru's stay in Cairo. The inscription read: "To the great leader of East, Mr Jawaharlal Nehru, with true affection and great esteem of Egypt and Egyptians." Neguib also gave Nehru a string of 99 amber beads.

I wanted to send my *Autobiography* to General Neguib, but I just cannot find a copy anywhere. It is out of print at present. I am, however, sending some of my other books as detailed below. Could you kindly give them to him on my behalf. I enclose a letter for General Neguib also.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. The books sent to Neguib were: *The Discovery of India*, *Glimpses of World History*, *Independence and After* and *Mahatma Gandhi*. Nehru wrote to Neguib on 11 July, "I should very much like to have the criticism of a competent Egyptian authority on what I have written about Egypt" in the *Glimpses of World History*. He also wrote, "When I was in Cairo, I asked Panikkar to get for me a good picture of yours. I hope he will be able to get this for me and get your autograph on it."

5. Cable to B.G. Kher¹

We have learnt with satisfaction from the Egyptian Government that much progress has been made in the Cairo talks on the Canal Zone.² Agreement has been reached on all major points except in regard to the duration of the agreement. Here, the gap, though narrowed, has yet to be bridged. You will remember the discussions on this subject at the Prime Ministers' Conference and the importance attached by all to finding a solution of a dispute which has bedevilled a sector of international relations for so long. Earnest efforts by both sides have now brought a solution well within sight. The calmer atmosphere now prevailing, the spirit of accommodation shown and the absence of heat and passion from public utterances, all combine to provide a favourable opportunity, such as has not existed before, for arriving at a final settlement satisfactory to both sides.

1. New Delhi, 9 September 1953. JN Collection.

2. The Anglo-Egyptian discussions were renewed on an informal basis on 30 July 1953, when members of the delegations of the two countries met in Cairo at a dinner party given by Tayeb Hussain, Pakistan's Charge d'Affaires.

I would like you to call on Lord Salisbury immediately. You should convey to him in a friendly way our sense of satisfaction at the success which has so far attended the Cairo talks and express to him our earnest hope that in view of the favourable turn of events every endeavour will be made when the talks are resumed next week to reach agreement on the sole issue now standing in the way of complete accord.³

3. Though several meetings took place between the British and Egyptian delegations in August and September, the talks got deadlocked in October. The question of allowing the return of British forces to the Canal Zone in the event of an attack on any of the Arab States or Turkey, Iran or Pakistan, and the Egyptian objection to the presence of 4,000 British technicians in uniform in the Zone was at this time stalling the agreement.

IV. AFRICA

(iii) East Africa

1. To M.C. Chagla¹

New Delhi
July 1, 1953

My dear Chagla,

On my return from abroad, I have been looking through old newspapers and press cuttings. Among these I have come across a report in the *Times of India* of the 12th June, which gives an account of a meeting held in Bombay in support of the Africans in East Africa.² The meeting was organized by the India-Africa Council and you presided over it and delivered a speech.

Personally I agree with what you said on that occasion. The only question

1. M.C. Chagla Papers, NMML.
2. On 11 June 1953, at a public meeting held in Mumbai by the India-Africa Council to protest against the inhuman treatment meted out to Africans by the European settlers, M.C. Chagla, Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court, said in his speech that "judicial conscience was shocked" at the atrocities committed on Africans and that it was a shameful thing that the British jurisprudence should be debased and tarnished in the British colony of Kenya. He added that adhering to her foreign policy, India condemned colonialism and racial segregation. Joseph Murumbi, Secretary-General, Kenya African Union, also attended the meeting.

that arises is how far it is desirable for a judge of a High Court to participate publicly in a matter of this kind.³

I have been deeply troubled over events in East Africa as well as in some other parts of Africa. I think horrible things are being done there. In my own way I have tried my utmost to check this trend of events in Kenya and elsewhere. I have referred to these matters publicly, in Parliament, etc., in somewhat guarded language, and I have also spoken privately in England with everybody from the Prime Minister of the UK downwards. But I had to check myself in my public statements because of my official position.

Even when the India-Africa Council was formed, I told the founders that I could not join it and explained the reasons for this. We are an independent nation now and an independent country's politics are different from those of a dependent country. Persons in responsible offices do not publicly criticize the internal happenings in other countries. We would resent such criticism elsewhere and ask for explanation.

That does not mean that we should remain passive and inert spectators of wrongdoing. There are other and even more effective ways of helping a cause without offending the proprieties of diplomatic procedure.

If that is my position as an active politician, how much more should that apply to a judge? Therefore, I was surprised and somewhat distressed to read about your presiding over such a meeting which certainly is of an acutely political kind, even though important humanitarian principles are involved. I am, therefore, writing this personal letter to you to draw your attention to this aspect.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. On 3 July, Chagla, in his reply, while expressing regret, explained that he was convinced that the meeting was an all-party affair. Agreeing that "judges should not participate in controversial politics," Chagla said that "there is no objection... supporting a cause" about which there was no controversy in the country and on the African question there was no difference of opinion among the political parties in India. Also at times, a judge, presiding over such a meeting, added weight to the meeting "because it gives the meeting a wholly non-partisan complexion."

2. The Situation in Africa¹

It is true that I suggested to Apa Pant² that he should visit Cairo occasionally, both from his own point of view and from the point of view of Egypt. I think it is very important that the Egyptian Government should view the African problem generally as we do. I mentioned this matter to Shri Panikkar³ also.

I was not thinking of any extended tour in the Sudan or Egypt, though that might be helpful from some points of view. The main purpose of his visit would be to confer with Shri Panikkar and keep him in full touch with developments in East Africa and to get himself a wider outlook. A person living in East Africa or in any seat of trouble gets too much involved in the local atmosphere to be able to see it in proper perspective...I would normally say that he should go there once in six months to keep in touch with North African affairs. The situation in Africa, though complicated and different in various parts, must nevertheless be viewed as a whole. We must avoid the danger of looking at each picture separately as if it was not related to the rest.

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 2 July 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Indian Commissioner in Kenya.
3. K.M. Panikkar.

3. Africa and the Middle East¹

The AICC have noted with deep sorrow the conflict which is going on in certain parts of Africa resulting in the cruel and forcible suppression of large numbers of people. Behind this conflict lies the policy of racial and colonial domination. The Congress has always stood for colonial freedom and racial equality and this denial of both is a matter of gravest concern to it and can only lead to disastrous racial conflicts which may affect the whole of Africa and powerfully influence people in other parts of the world. Any assertion of racial domination will inevitably meet with resistance and no stable or peaceful

1. Draft resolution for the AICC meeting in Agra, 5 July 1953. JN Collection.

society can be based on the theory or practice of a dominating race or of colonial control.

2. The Committee regrets that no way out has thus far been found to resolve the conflicts in the Middle Eastern countries and that the path of negotiation is not being pursued. The situation in Egypt is particularly disturbing. A new Republic has been established there, which this Committee warmly welcomes, and the people of Egypt rightly demand the recognition of their full sovereignty in their land. The Committee hopes that negotiations for a peaceful settlement of such problems as exist will be carried on on the basis of a recognition of the sovereignty of Egypt.

4. Policy towards Africa¹

...Question: Your remarks at Agra on the Kenya and Africa situation have evoked strong protests in the United Kingdom including the latest outburst in the House of Commons yesterday.² Have you any comments?

Jawaharlal Nehru: My remarks at Agra about the African situation were general, affecting practically the whole of Africa, What I said represented roughly five per cent of what I had in mind. I did not deliberately refer to any particular incident or any part of Africa. What I said was that the entire question of Africa was of supreme importance, and people did not seem to realize it. It was important from many points of view, and if this fact was not realized, the world may well have to face major explosions and eruptions in Africa of the worst type, of a racial war type.

A few matters I pointed out specially. One was the desire for political freedom, and the other was racial discrimination or inequality. Those are exemplified in Africa more than anywhere else today. One can understand a certain delay in political changes or political progress, provided the objective is there. But I do not see why I should accept any non-recognition of racial

1. Remarks at a Press Conference, New Delhi, 30 July 1953. From *Jawaharlal Nehru, Press Conferences, 1953*, Information Service of India, New Delhi, 1954. Extracts. For other parts of the Conference, see pp. 77-78, 445-452, 459 and 496-497.
2. See *ante*, pp. 415-416.

equality. That is a matter which may be most evident in Africa, but it concerns each one of us here. It is an insult to every single Indian, the thirty-six crores of them—I am not mentioning the millions of others in Africa or Asia. At no time are we prepared to put up with the doctrine of racial inequality, whatever the consequences to India or to any one else. That I want to make perfectly clear.

It has been my desire, since I became Prime Minister to refrain, naturally, from saying things about other countries. But where policies are declared and followed like, for instance, in South Africa which, I think, are pernicious in the extreme, which are insulting in the extreme, to expect me to remain silent about it is to expect the impossible.

Apart from political considerations, I should like to know how far discrimination is exercised in regard to Indians in East Africa. I am not talking about other matters. The Dominion of South Africa is an independent country. Others are subject countries; and discrimination is still being exercised not only against the poor Africans, but against others. Who is responsible for that—I should like to know. They want to create new Dominion governments there, in various parts of Africa, and to perpetuate racial discrimination? I greatly regret that. We shall never agree to it; and where there is any question of racial discrimination, as I said in Agra, we shall do everything in our power, short of war, to oppose it.

I referred to the whole of Africa. I had in mind North Africa, Morocco, Tunisia and other parts, where the situation is different, of course, but nevertheless very serious. In fact, the only one part of Africa which is promising is the Gold Coast; and some parts of Africa, like Tanganyika, Uganda, are much better off than others.

Q: In one of the papers of America last week there was a very supposedly responsible assessment of the African situation. In that very important paper, it was said that Europeans in Rhodesia, in East Africa, and almost everywhere in Africa were feeling that India's policy was born of two reasons: One was that India wanted Africa to absorb its surplus population; and the second was that Mr Nehru wanted to start a new kind of imperialism based upon racial sentiment, and by creating an internal discontent, he would see the Europeans out, and the Indians will find a place for the surplus population. I might say that the paper quoted a responsible minister of Rhodesia. That paper was the *New York Times*.

JN: It is difficult for me to talk about our own policy and our own *bona fides*. But for the last many years, even before we came to Government, and after we came to Government, we have declared our policy in the clearest

terms to our people outside India, and that policy has been—to talk in relation to Africa—that “you will get no support from the Indian Government in any claims that you may advance against the Africans. You are there as guests. The interests of the Africans must be dominant. If you can serve them, well and good. If not, pack up and go, because we will not protect you there.”

Now, this was rather an unusual policy for a country to tell its own citizens. We were prepared to fight for the rights of those citizens, against any encroachment of those rights, but not when those citizens wanted for themselves special rights against the Africans—and I am not prepared to give them any protection then. This policy naturally did not meet with the approval of many of our own nationals in Africa, because thus far they had been trained up to demand rights for themselves. Seeing the European settlers taking advantage of the situation, by gaining special rights, special privileges, land, and all that kind of thing, the Indians also wanted a share in the spoils of Africa. We said, “No, we will not permit this.” And we have been pursuing that policy throughout. I do not mind if every Indian leaves Africa and comes away. But we will not permit him, so far as we are concerned, to claim a single privilege over the Africans.

To talk about Indian imperialism there is just nonsense. People seem to imagine that the earth in the fullness thereof is to be reserved for a few settlers from Europe. Well, other people in the rest of the world have a different opinion about it, and the rest of the world will ultimately count, not those few persons from Europe there.

Some reference was made to our Commission in East Africa. I should like to say that among the many people in our Foreign Service, one whose work we have appreciated almost more than any other is our Commissioner in East Africa, Mr Apa Pant, who from the first day of his arrival five years ago, has stood and worked for the establishment of a multi-racial society there, because it was patent very much that the only way for Africa to progress is by cooperation between the various elements of the population there. Naturally, the Africans form the biggest element. There are Europeans, there are Indians, there are Arabs. If this objective and ideal is to be attained, they should all cooperate rather than have conflicts, because the only alternative is conflict on a big scale. If there is conflict, first of all the smaller elements will suffer; but the bigger elements will also ultimately suffer terribly. They require to be assisted in many ways.

Anyhow, our Commissioner and our Commission have worked consistently for friendly relations between Africans, Indians, Europeans and Arabs there. This is recognized by all who know. Nevertheless, if people accuse him or his colleagues of creating trouble, all I can say is that some people who talk in this way have lost all clarity of vision and they cannot distinguish between things....

5. To Apa B. Pant¹

New Delhi
6 August, 1953

My dear Apa,

... There is strong feeling in India on this subject and there has been a good deal of feeling in England too, although it may not be expressed. I am quite convinced that this question of Kenya has a wide significance, much wider than that of Kenya. It certainly affects the whole of Africa and indirectly certain international relations. Some of the Kikuyus, and may be others, have acted rowdily. Their murder campaign has been not only intrinsically bad, but very harmful also. Nevertheless, the basic factor is the action taken by the UK Government's Colonial Department. This has been, in my thinking, exceedingly foolish. It has been the misfortune of Kenya to have Oliver Lyttelton as Secretary of State in England. No person more unsuitable for this task could have been chosen. He is exceedingly narrow-minded and vengeful. He has no good reputation even in England. Sir Winston Churchill is too old to go into these matters and is suffering from a reaction to events in Iran, because, as he says, the British allowed themselves to be kicked out of Iran. He wants to take a strong line elsewhere. That is not logic or good sense. I spoke to him personally about this.

It is even more the misfortune of England than of Kenya that this policy has been adopted by the British authorities. I am quite sure that this will do great harm to England. This is already becoming apparent and even some of the aggressive settler elements in Kenya are now beginning to think afresh. There can be no solution of the African problem now by this black and tan methods.

The British authorities in Malaya have had to deal with an insurrectionary movement there for the last six years.² In spite of large forces, bombing from air and all that, they have not succeeded in putting an end to this trouble in Malaya. All that they have done is to check it. That is a lesson which is obvious. Merely force and violence can no longer put down a movement of this kind. In Africa the situation is in some ways worse from the point of view of the colonial authorities. If they continue in the way they have done, they will no doubt cause very great injury to the Africans. But, in the process, they will undermine their position completely and even the profits that they get from Africa will fade away.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. The insurrectionary movement by Communist guerrillas, recruited from the immigrant Chinese population of Malaya, against the plantations, settlements and highway traffic started in 1948.

Therefore, the only possible course is to make a different approach, an approach with some measure of conciliation in it. The Africans no doubt are also tired in spirit and if any such approach is made, they would react favourably to it. That approach seems to me to be: to release some of the African leaders and allow them to appeal to Kikuyus and others to put an end to violence and to return to normality. A simultaneous approach should be political and economic....

Murumbi, who has been here for some time, is going, I think, to Cairo and from there to London. He has formed an India-Africa Council here, which consists of a large number of distinguished persons, but it has done next to nothing.

Murumbi has been talking about raising funds for Jomo Kenyatta's defence or appeal. We have told him that we cannot do anything officially in this matter, but it is open to him or to his Committee here to raise any funds they can.

I have also heard of the need for a press and a paper to support moderately the African cause in Kenya. I think this is a good idea provided, of course, that the right persons conduct that paper. Again appeals for money are made here. The amount asked for is not very large, but I do not quite know what to do about it. Officially we can take no steps.

Circumstances have somehow made India responsible to some extent for what should be done in East Africa. People look up to us and I feel this burden. I will not say that I am helpless in the matter, because I think already what we have said in India has helped greatly in creating world opinion for the Africans....

I hope you and your wife are well.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. The India-Africa Committee¹

I am certainly not going to this or any other meeting organized for Mr Evans.² While Mr Evans is doing some good work here from the point of view of

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 21 August 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Peter Evans, a British lawyer sympathetic to the cause of Africans, had been deported from Kenya and was in India at this time.

propaganda, I do not wholly like his method of approach and his running down Indians in Africa or here for their lack of support. There may be truth in what he says, but that is no reason why he should indulge in that propaganda here. He might as well go to England and do propaganda there.

2. The India-Africa Committee was formed in a wrong way and the wrong people were put in charge of it. We are not responsible for that.... In fact it is because of this bad beginning that the India-Africa Committee could never get properly going.

3. I do not think Mr Evans can possibly be made the Secretary of this Committee.... It will be wholly wrong for him to be appointed in this way.

4. The proper course appears to be for some smaller committee to take interest in this matter. We cannot take official action in this.

5. I gather that some arrangement has been made for some funds. Mr Balvantray Mehta, General Secretary, AICC, could be asked about this.

7. Pan-African Conference¹

I agree that Mr Pant should have informed us before taking any such step or giving publicity to it. I am rather doubtful, however, about our prohibiting him now from participating in this conference.² Obviously this conference must have been announced already in Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Very probably the idea is his. For him to be told to withdraw from it at this stage would very probably create difficulties and embarrass the Indians there as well as Mr Pant.

2. We know the views that Mr Apa Pant holds in such matters. They centre round the promotion of inter-racial relations with a view to establishing an inter-racial or multi-racial society. His views are thus not extreme in the usual sense. It is quite possible that the step that he is taking might have

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, 26 August 1953. JN Collection.

2. On 7 July 1953, it was stated that plans were being made in India for a 'pan-African conference' to include delegates from the Kikuyu and all coloured 'colonised' Africa. The conference, sponsored by India-Africa Council, would be supported by General Neguib.

good consequences provided, of course, every care is taken to deal with this problem in a constructive way and not merely in the way of condemnation.

3. To prevent Mr Apa Pant at this stage seems to me undesirable. He is generally friendly to the European elements and it is quite conceivable that the step he has taken has been in consultation with them. I would, therefore, reply to him somewhat as follows:

We are surprised to learn that you have taken this step without previous reference to us. Obviously your taking a leading part in proposed conference has political implications and you may be criticized for going outside your diplomatic field into the realm of controversial politics.

However, since presumably some steps have already been taken towards the holding of such a conference, we would not like to come in the way. Conference may be held, but we would advise you not to take too leading a part in it. You can guide and advise the sponsors privately. You may also attend the conference, but not as any kind of a delegate. The main thing is that you should always bear in mind the explosive nature of this question and the limitations on the behaviour of a representative of the Government of India.

8. Policy of Racial and Political Domination¹

You might write to Shri Apa Pant. You need not refer to Dewan Chaman Lall or his letter, but refer to the *Manchester Guardian* and *The Times of India* reports. Tell him that while it was quite right for him to say that the Government of India has no large-scale immigration policy, we are not against immigrants going abroad, provided they are welcome where they go to. To

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 11 September 1953. JN Collection.

refer to the "starry-eyed wild men of India and Africa"² is to irritate people both in India and Africa. There is, as Mr Pant knows, a great deal of feeling in India on the subject of the treatment of Indians and Africans by the European settlers. Everything that is said must be carefully measured, and the less that is said in public the better. Otherwise, the reactions are bad. The whole question is not one of some Indians or some Africans misbehaving or going further than they ought to go. The questions that are raised in East Africa today are of the widest significance in regard to national policies. We have attached importance to them because of that. On no account is India going to reconcile itself with the policy of racial or political domination of Europeans in Africa. We may not be able to do much for years, but we shall remain unreconciled to it. We have to keep the distant future in view as well as the present. Sometimes starry wild-eyed people are very desirable in a community.³

2. *The Times of India* reported on 3 September that Apa Pant, who arrived in Lusaka on 1 September to confer with the Government of Northern Rhodesia on the question of Indian immigration into the territory, had said that there was no truth in the allegation of the Rhodesian Government that the Indian Government was planning a large-scale entry of Indians into Northern Rhodesia before legislation limiting immigration was passed and that the Indian Government had no emigration policy except to tell the emigrants that they must first report themselves as citizens of the new country. Pant called the sponsors of the Pan-African Council incorporating nationals of Africa from the Union to the Mediterranean "starry-eyed wild men of India and Africa."
3. In a letter (not published) of 23 September 1953 to Apa Pant, Nehru wrote: "...I do not understand why you or anyone should get so excited about odd news items or about the reactions to them of European public opinion of Africa. If they can get worked up at such an item of news, they should appreciate that the people of India can be infinitely more worked up at their activities."

V. FOREIGN POSSESSIONS IN INDIA

1. To R.R. Diwakar¹

New Delhi
July 13, 1953

My dear Diwakar,²

Thank you for your letter of July 10th.

We all realize that Portugal understands action only. It is not difficult to

1. JN Collection.
2. Governor of Bihar.

take action in regard to Portugal, but people seem to forget that we are not dealing with Portugal only, but the world at large in this matter. Every action that we take has its reactions on the entire world situation. It is for this reason that we have gone rather slow.

As for Portuguese thought patterns, they are exactly four hundred years old.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Policy for the Liberation of Goa¹

The step we took in closing our legation in Lisbon² has almost everywhere been interpreted as a first step of a new policy. There is no new policy of course, but it is true that a certain dynamic phase has begun in regard to these Portuguese possessions. We cannot allow it to become static again. A possible next step would be to break off diplomatic relations with Portugal. But before we do that, we should be clear about other steps.

2. In particular, we should have the economic question examined fully to find out what steps we can take on the economic front.

3. The other question of registration of Goans in India should also be considered again. At present these Goans appear to enjoy a kind of double nationality.

4. These matters should be gone into as early as possible, because delay will be harmful.

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, and Foreign Secretary, 15 July 1953. JN Collection.

2. On 10 June 1953.

3. To B.V. Keskar¹

New Delhi
September 1, 1953

My dear Balakrishna,²

Your letter of the 31st August about Frank Moraes.³ I know him fairly well and do not like him. I have not encouraged him, but it is true that he has tried to exploit even a meeting with me.

He saw me two or three days ago because he said that he had been in Pakistan and wanted to tell me about his experiences. He had asked me for an interview previously, sending questions. I had refused to give him this interview. When he came, our talk was entirely about Pakistan affairs and he did the talking.

I am rather surprised to learn that Moraes supports the pro-Portuguese Goans in Bombay.⁴ I had not heard of this before. Can you verify this?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 43(261)/53-PMS.
2. Minister of Information and Broadcasting.
3. Francis Robert Moraes (1907-1974); Assistant Editor, *The Times of India*, 1938-46, and Editor, 1950-57; Editor, *The Times of Ceylon*, 1946-48; member, Indian cultural delegation to China, 1952; Editor-in-Chief, *The Indian Express*, 1957-74; author of *Jawaharlal Nehru* (1956) and *Nehru: Sunlight and Shadow* (1964). Keskar thought that Frank Moraes's "activities and psychology" had undergone a certain change since his taking over as Editor of *The Times of India*. He wrote that Moraes was "avowedly allied with the most reactionary Anglo-American interests" and in Mumbai he had been often heard to boast of his accessibility to Nehru.
4. Keskar wrote that Moraes "definitely expresses himself against the merger of Goa with India and he is one of the main Indian supports of the pro-Portuguese Goans in Bombay, though he does not write much about it in his own paper."

4. A Talk with Tristao Braganza de Cunha¹

I have had a talk with Mr Braganza de Cunha and I have also been impressed by him.² I have suggested to him that he might return to Delhi after he has met people in Bombay and discussed matters with them.

2. I have also asked him to put up a note about his proposals for economic and financial action to be taken by us.

3. As regards the Government of India appointing a Special Officer for Goa, I have told him that on the whole it will not be feasible to station such an officer in Bombay, but we could have someone here who could deal specially with these matters. He could visit Bombay from time to time or Mr de Cunha could come here from time to time, or both.

4. Anyhow, we should await Mr de Cunha's next visit here.

1. Note, 4 September 1953. From *The Liberation of Goa, Notes Memoranda and Decisions of Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, September 1946-May 1964*, Historical Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.
2. Tristao Braganza de Cunha, Goan freedom fighter and founder of the Goan Congress Committee, was on a visit to Delhi after having been in exile for seven years. He was released from prison in the Portuguese East Africa in December 1950 after serving a sentence for four and a half years, but was not allowed to be repatriated to Goa for more than two and a half years thereafter.

5. Customs Control in Goa and the French Settlements¹

...3. The argument that too much customs control hits the common people has often been advanced both in regard to Goa and the French Settlements.² I think we should revise our views on this subject. Probably we are going to do so in regard to Goa. It is obvious that any action that we take must hit the common people to some extent. We should be prepared for that and they should feel that existing conditions press hard upon them....

1. Note, 15 September 1953. File No. EI/53/1531/801, MEA. Extract.
2. Nettur P. Damodaran, a Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party Member of the House of the People, had written to Nehru on 16 July that the pro-French and anti-Indian elements in Mahe were "feeling elated" at relaxation of customs control in respect of certain items of food. R.K. Nehru, Foreign Secretary, however, noted on 15 September that a complete embargo on food exports would hit the common people and, with the French exploiting the situation, the pro-merger movement might suffer.

6. To K. Kelappan¹

New Delhi

September 19, 1953

My dear Kelappan,²

...In regard to Mahe prisoners, I find that there has been a lapse somewhere. The appeals were not lodged through our Embassy but were private appeals. We were certainly interested in them and tried to help as much as we could. Unfortunately the man in charge apparently fell ill and the lawyer could not be instructed in time.

Attempts were being made all this time through our Ambassador to secure an amnesty for political prisoners. This rather came in the way of our concentrating on the appeal. But, as I have said, the appeal was a private one and we could not officially interfere in the matter. It is true that the appeals were dismissed for want of prosecution. Since then attempts have been made to get them revived.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Koyapalli Kelappan (1890-1971); participated in the national movement; was imprisoned several times; led the Vaikom satyagraha in Travancore for the right of the Harijans to use roads around the temple; elected President of the Kerala Provincial Congress Committee several times; editor, *Mathrubhumi*, 1935-36, left the Congress to join Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, 1951; Member, House of the People, 1952-57; devoted himself to sarvodaya activities, 1957-71.

VI. UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

1. To Sidney G. Holland¹

New Delhi

July 2, 1953

My dear Prime Minister,²

You will remember writing to me in a letter dated 11th June about your

1. JN Collection.
2. Of New Zealand.

intention to put up a candidate for the Security Council at the end of this year. I sent you a reply³ to this from Switzerland.

As I said in my reply, we can have no objection whatever to a candidate from New Zealand being put up and we would normally welcome him. But this whole question of elections to the Security Council raises rather important issues affecting Asia. We have, therefore, addressed an *aide memoire*⁴ to the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America. This *aide memoire* briefly explains our position. I enclose a copy of this *aide memoire* for your information.

I shall look forward to seeing you in Delhi early in August.⁵

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol 22, pp. 494-495.

4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol 22, pp. 495-496.

5. S.G. Holland arrived in New Delhi on 2 August on a two-day visit to India on his way back to New Zealand from London, where he had gone to attend the Coronation.

2. Membership of the Security Council¹

As regards India's standing for the Security Council, I think that we should give up that idea completely for the present. It is clear that neither the US nor the UK will support us. Apart from that, I feel it is not consonant with our dignity to go about asking for support. If India is important, as she progressively is, others will have to take the initiative in this matter.

2. Apart from this, the membership of the political conference is more important a thing now than the Security Council.

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, and Foreign Secretary, 1 August 1953. JN Collection.

3. Presidentship of the General Assembly¹

... 2. You will remember our getting a letter from the Thai Embassy asking for our support for their candidate for the Presidentship of the UN Assembly.² Please send an answer to them telling them frankly that we regret we cannot give this support as we intend having our own candidate.

3. I have sent you a separate brief note about informing Rajeshwar Dayal and others about the clear indication we have got of American support in this matter. You should send a special telegram to our High Commissioner in London asking him to inform the UK Government of this.³ In view of this we have definitely decided to permit our candidate to stand and we hope that the UK Government will in these circumstances also support our candidate⁴...

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, 4 August 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. In June 1953, Thailand announced the candidature of Prince Wan Waithayakon for the Presidentship of the UN General Assembly during its Eighth Session. Wan had stood down in favour of Lester Pearson the previous year. According to convention, it was the turn of an Asian nation to assume the functions of Presidency.
3. Selwyn Lloyd had told B.G. Kher on 24 July that Prince Wan would probably receive British support. If, however, Vijayalakshmi Pandit contested the seat, the UK would not vote against a Commonwealth candidate, but the Thai candidate was still likely to get elected.
4. In the election held on 14 September, Vijayalakshmi Pandit got 27 votes against 22 polled by Wan Waithayakon.

4. ECOSOC Report on Forced Labour¹

I agree with JS.² I have not read the report and do not propose to do so. I am proceeding on the basis of JS's note.

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, 28 September 1953. JN Collection.
2. R.S. Mani, Joint Secretary, noted that the report of the Committee on Forced Labour appointed by the Economic and Social Council was extremely limited in scope and of negligible value in evaluating the extent of prevalence of forced labour. He felt that the report came down heavily against the USSR which had codified its system of "corrective" labour but let off lightly many Latin American countries, where forced labour existed on feudal lines, on the grounds that these practices "do not appear to be deliberately planned or tolerated by the government concerned."

2. I think it is illogical and wrong to accept forced labour if it is not sanctioned by law or administrative practice. If we accept this line of approach, then a great deal of forced labour in various parts of the world will continue to exist not only without objection but actually, one might say, with the approval almost of the ECOSOC Committee and the ILO. In fact this will enable various countries or Governments to continue forced labour under this pretence.

3. It seems to me still more extraordinary that forced labour should be accepted even when it is sanctioned by law, provided only it is on a small scale and is for non-political purposes. Apart from the difficulty of defining political purposes, if the principle of forced labour is accepted, then the argument against it loses force.

4. If this matter is brought up before the UN General Assembly, our delegation should say that this matter should be considered by the ECOSOC first.³ If the question, however, is considered on the merits in the UN, I think our delegation should express their disagreement in regard to the two points noted above, and abstain from voting. It would not be desirable I think for our delegation merely to abstain without some expression of opinion.. That expression of opinion need not be too precise at this stage, but our general approach should be indicated.

5. It is unfortunate that an Indian representative should have associated himself with this report.⁴ This is all the more reason why we should make our position clear right at the beginning. Otherwise, it might be thought that the Chairman of the Committee has spoken for India.

3. The US delegation to the UN wanted the General Assembly to record the seriousness of the forced labour situation as revealed by the Committee in its report and its determination that the practice should be abolished. R.S. Mani thought it would be premature for the General Assembly to pronounce any judgement ahead of the ECOSOC's consideration of the report.
4. A. Ramaswami Mudaliar was the Chairman of the three-member Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labour.

VII. OTHER MATTERS

1. Relations with Afghanistan¹

... I think that we must expedite the appointment of an Ambassador in Kabul....

I suggest that you might see the Afghan Ambassador and tell him that we are anxious to appoint a good Ambassador because we attach importance to this post and to our relations with the Kabul Government. You need not mention any name.

You might also tell him that our talks with the Pakistan Prime Minister do not affect in any way our friendly relations with the Kabul Government, which are based on a strong foundation and on mutual interest. Whatever the result of those talks might be, he can rest assured and he can assure his Government that we shall see to it that our relations with Afghanistan continue to be friendly and intimate.

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, 16 July 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Anglo-Iran Relations¹

You might mention to Dr Tara Chand² that Dr Mahmud conveyed Dr Mossadeq's³ message to me. Indeed he wrote to me when I was in London suggesting that I might take some action there.⁴

2. At the Prime Ministers' Conference and in private meetings with Ministers, I referred repeatedly to the general situation in Western Asia and Egypt. Iran was mentioned by me. I found, however, that Sir Winston Churchill was totally impervious to any kind of appeal. Indeed he felt very angry with

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 20 July 1953. JN Collection.
2. Ambassador of India in Iran.
3. Muhammad Mosaddeq (1881-1967); Iranian lawyer and politician; member, Majlis (Parliament), 1915-17, 1926-28, 1944-53, Prime Minister, 1951-53.
4. Syed Mahmud wrote to Nehru on 4 June 1953. For Nehru's reply to Mahmud sent from New Delhi on 29 June 1953, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, p. 419.

the Labour Government for having walked out of Abadan. In these circumstances, it is patently futile for me to try to plead the cause of Iran before the UK Prime Minister by making specific proposals as suggested. The USA have been trying to get some kind of a settlement, but they have failed in spite of their great influence on the UK Government. It is clear, therefore, that any attempt on our part as suggested and at this stage cannot possibly yield any useful result. It would only put us in a false and embarrassing position.

3. To Anand Mohan Sahay¹

New Delhi
August 1, 1953

My dear Anand Mohan,²
I have your letter of the 21st July.

As you know, we have decided to send you to Mauritius³ and, at your request, we have postponed your going there till October. Mauritius has an agreeable climate. We attach importance to these places where there are large numbers of Indians resident or people of Indian descent. They have been neglected in the past. In a sense, they have greater importance for us than big countries....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Commissioner for India, Port of Spain.
3. A.M. Sahay served as Indian Commissioner in Mauritius, 1953-54.

4. Japanese POWs in USSR¹

I remember meeting Mrs Tomi Kora² when she came to India. She came to attend a pacifist conference. I have no doubt about her sincerity.

2. I think it would be worth while for you to see the Russian Ambassador some time and speak to him about this matter.³ You can even give him a copy of the letter that Mrs Kora has written to me. This, of course, should be done in the informal level. After knowing his reactions, we could send a reply to Mrs Kora.⁴

1. Note to Secretary-General, MEA, 5 August 1953. File No. J/52/64512/14, MEA.
2. A Member of the Japanese Upper House; visited India in January 1950 to attend a meeting of pacifists at Santiniketan and came again in July 1952; met Nehru on both occasions; was Vice-President of the Gandhian Peace League in Japan.
3. Tomi Kora requested Nehru on 8 July 1953 to persuade the Soviet Government to enable the women members of the Japanese Diet to visit Moscow to negotiate the return of Japanese POWs from USSR on the principle of "people's control" of the repatriation problem. She stated that the Soviet Government were willing to let the POWs to return home only if Japan expressed its sincerity, but the Japanese Government were prevented from taking such a step due to US pressure.
4. The Soviet Ambassador, to whom N.R. Pillai spoke about the matter, asked for time to give his views.

5. To Grenville Clark¹

New Delhi
August 14, 1953

Dear Mr Grenville Clark,²

Thank you for your letter of August 7 and the preliminary print of "Peace Through disarmament and Charter Revision."

I shall read these proposals with great interest. I have a feeling, however, that this rather formal and perhaps legalistic approach, though necessary, does not go very far in overcoming the real obstacles in our way, which are largely

1. JN Collection.
2. (1882-1967); prominent New York lawyer and leading advocate of peace through world federalism; organized the National Lawyers' Committee that contributed to the defeat of Franklin D Roosevelt; authored *World Peace* (1958).

psychological and the outcome of fear. However, such an approach has to be made and I am glad that you have made it.

I am grateful to you for the kind words you have said about the policy we have pursued. It is difficult, in this world of passion, prejudice and fear, (and I include my own country in this description) to pursue any logical or reasonable policy.

With all good wishes to you,

Sincerely yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Peace Conferences¹

Please reply to General Sokhey.² Tell him that I fully appreciate what he has written. Nevertheless, I feel that a meeting of the Bureau of the Peace Council in India at present will not prove helpful in the larger sense of the word. A time may come later when this might be done. We are now engaged in a tug of war in New York and elsewhere over Korean affairs. The matters in issue there are relatively unimportant, but the principle behind them is important. In these circumstances and also because we are occupying a strictly neutral position in Korea, I do not think it is desirable at this stage for this Bureau of the Peace Council to meet in India.³

1. Note to Private Secretary, 24 August 1953. JN Collection.
2. Sahib Singh Sokhey, actively connected with the World Peace Council and a nominated Member of the Council of States, suggested in his letter of 10 August the holding of a meeting of the Bureau of World Peace Council in New Delhi. He said the meeting attended by about 30 leading figures of letters, arts and science, and in intimate touch with world affairs, would have the advantage of personal talks with Nehru and recommend to the peace movement of the various countries action best calculated to bring about secure and lasting peace.
3. In a note on 15 July 1953, Nehru observed, "so far as the question of world peace is concerned, such (peace) conferences have no meaning at all at present and only serve possibly to come in the way of peace. They are looked upon as political conferences for political objects and for this purpose Government does not wish to encourage outsiders to come to India."

7. To S. Radhakrishnan¹

New Delhi
August 25, 1953

My dear Radhakrishnan,²

I have just received your letter of today's date and the telegram. The world movement for World Federal Government is one of several rather similar movements. These have approached me very often for messages as well as for closer association with them. They wanted our delegates to attend their sessions and all that. I have hesitated to have any kind of close association. Sometimes I have sent a message which, while generally appreciating their aims, has pointed out certain unrealities in this whole business at this stage.³

Lord Boyd-Orr and some others connected with it are good people, well-intentioned, but they seem to me to function completely in the air. Their activities bear no relation to the problems which afflict us and the difficulties we are continually facing whether in the Far East or in Germany or elsewhere. They do not seem to me to make the slightest difference to the major question of war and peace. How they can produce a World Federal Government or even a very much changed United Nations, in the present context, is not at all clear to me.

These World Federal Government movements are naturally all confined to what might be called the Western group of countries and association with them would, to some extent, mean association with that group. I have, therefore, been reluctant to get tied up in any sense with them. If you become President, you would, of course, be intimately connected and, through you, India. I rather doubt if that will be helpful at this stage.

Then, again, I do not quite know what demand upon your time this might make.

I am returning your telegram.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Vice-President of India.
3. In his letter of 30 July 1953, Gilbert McAllister, Director, Parliamentary Association for World Government, England, had invited Nehru to attend the World Parliamentary Conference. Nehru, replying on 6 August, expressed his inability to attend the Conference.

8. The Indonesian Cultural Festival¹

I am glad to know that the International Centre of Kanpur is organizing an Indonesian Cultural Festival in cooperation with the Embassy of Indonesia in India.² All such cultural and other exhibitions and festivals dealing with foreign countries are to be welcomed as they add to our understanding of them and promote goodwill. More particularly, any exhibition dealing with Indonesia is to be welcomed, because we have much in common with that country and its people. India has been closely connected with Indonesia in the distant past. Now, in the present, we have renewed our contacts and friendship again.

All good wishes for the Indonesian Cultural Festival.

1. Message, New Delhi, 8 September 1953. File No. 9/148/53-PMS.
2. The festival opened in Kanpur on 17 September 1953. An exhibition of Indonesian arts and crafts, costumes and photographs of Indonesian dances and life of the Indonesian people was organized as part of the festival.

LETTERS TO CHIEF MINISTERS

1

New Delhi
2nd July, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,

I returned from Europe on the 27th of June, five days ago, and I have a multitude of subjects in my mind about which I should like to write to you. I could write about the Coronation in London and the numerous ceremonies and spectacles that accompanied it, the Prime Ministers' Conference and the subjects we discussed there,² the Conference of our Heads of Missions held in Burgenstock in Switzerland,³ my visit to Egypt soon after the declaration of the Republic there,⁴ and the ups and downs of the Korean situation and the new burdens that have been cast upon us in relation to it. I could also tell you about my meeting the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and Ceylon in London, and there are other developments in foreign countries which deserve your attention in Cambodia, where the King⁵ is playing a leading part in demanding independence from French colonial authority,⁶ in Kenya, where the situation continues to be most painful⁷ and terror has been met by overwhelming terror, in Morocco, and Tunisia,⁸ where the nationalist movements are being suppressed with harshness and severity by the French authorities. In Nepal a new Government has been formed, but the situation is far from satisfactory or stable.

2. I need hardly refer to internal events during the past month because you must know more about them than I do. An outstanding event which

1. File No. 25(6)/53-PMS. These letters have also been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Minister, 1947-1964*, Volume 3 (New Delhi, 1987), pp. 317-396.
2. Besides reviewing the situation in Korea, the problems in West Asia, and the economic developments within the Commonwealth, the conference, held from 3 to 9 June 1953, discussed the prospects of the forthcoming Bermuda Conference of the heads of Governments of Britain, United States and France.
3. From 17 to 20 June 1953.
4. Egypt was proclaimed a Republic on 18 June.
5. Norodom Sihanouk (b. 1922); Head of State of Cambodia, 1941-55, 1960-70, 1975-76; Prime Minister, intermittently from October 1955 to April 1957; Head of State in exile of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, 1982-88, 1989-90; President, since 1991.
6. Dissatisfied with the agreement with France signed on 9 May 1953 as it fell short of full independence, Sihanouk resumed the struggle against France.
7. On 8 June 1953, the Kenya African Union was declared unlawful by the Government.
8. Following the arrests by the French in June 1953 of several political leaders and trade unionists, the loyalist heir presumptive to the Bey of Tunis was assassinated on 1 July 1953.

saddened my homecoming was the death of Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee. He died suddenly and, because of that suddenness, all kinds of doubts and fears were raised and allegations made. It is so easy to be wise after an event. I can speak with personal knowledge that the Kashmir Government treated Mr Mookerjee while in detention with the greatest courtesy and gave him every possible facility. He was given a lovely private villa by the side of the Dal Lake and, to all appearances, he kept well there. No one suspected for a moment that his illness, when it came, was serious. It was only late in the evening that this assumed a serious character and within a few hours he was dead. The fact that Mr Mookerjee himself sent telegrams to his relatives in Calcutta from the hospital some hours before his death, telling them not to worry, is clear indication of how neither he nor others realized that the end was near. I think that it is very unfair to blame the Kashmir Government on this score. As a matter of fact, the Kashmir Government had decided to release him by the end of the month.

3. My visit abroad has helped me, as it always does, to look at things in broader perspective. From there, even more than from India, I realized how utterly wrong and injurious was the Praja Parishad-Jan Sangh agitation about Jammu and Kashmir. No one abroad understood it. It seemed to them an indication of a narrowness and exceedingly limited outlook, the type of outlook that has brought Pakistan near disaster. No one abroad attached the slightest importance to this agitation except in so far as it showed some weaknesses in our body politic. Another thing that was evident from abroad was the danger of provincialism. This again is evidence of narrowness in outlook, of forgetting big things for small, and an immaturity of political thinking. That does not mean that there should not be a reorganization of our States, but it does mean that the background of this agitation proceeds from a limited and narrow outlook, injurious to the best interests of India. It surprises me that men of ability should get swept away by this disintegrating tendency.

4. So far as we are concerned, we have declared quite clearly that after the Andhra State is well established, we shall appoint a high-powered Commission to consider the question of reorganization of States in all its many aspects. We do not propose to consider the question of one State separately now. Indeed this cannot be so considered because in every such instance many States are concerned. Nor do we propose to consider this matter on the purely linguistic plane, although language and culture are necessarily important. So also are other considerations. In spite of my clear declaration about such a Commission, I find that agitations continue in some parts of the country and sometimes people indulge in what are called hunger strikes. If this country and its policies are going to be controlled or influenced in this manner, then indeed we may say goodbye to any kind of progress or unity. So far as I am concerned, I do not propose to have our Government's policy

influenced in the slightest by these methods. Nor do I propose to take up the case of any single linguistic State. I am surprised that suddenly some people should have galvanised themselves into activity in regard to Hyderabad State and demanded its disintegration. Why they have chosen this particular moment to do this is not clear to me, unless it bears some relation to the formation of the Andhra State. I am sorry for this because it denotes an outlook with which I have no sympathy whatever and which, I am sure, if given free play, would bring utter chaos in a great part of India and lead to other disastrous consequences also. It is a matter of deep regret to me that Congressmen and even Congress Committees have fallen into this trap.

5. We shall therefore pursue our way in this matter as stated and will not be hustled by hunger strikes, attacks on railways and the like or other methods to coerce Government. If the people of India consider this matter of such vital importance as to be given precedence over all other questions, even to the detriment of our progress, then they will have to find some other Government to help them to do so. I cannot be responsible for taking a step which I am convinced means injury to the cause of India and to everything that I have cherished and worked for.

6. The final ascent of Everest has been a great achievement in which all of us should take pride. Here again there has been pettiness and the narrowest type of nationalism shown by some people. Controversies have arisen as to whether Tenzing got there first or Hillary and whether Tenzing is an Indian national or a Nepalese national.⁹ I was amazed to learn of these disputes and the excitement shown over them. It does not make the slightest difference to anybody whether Tenzing first reached the top or Hillary. Neither could have done so without the help of the other. Indeed, both of them could not have done so without the help of the whole party, and if I may take this idea a little further, the whole party could not have done so without the accumulated experience, labour and sacrifice of all their predecessors who tried to reach the top of Everest. Great human achievements are always the result of combined endeavours in which numerous people take part. It may be that one person takes the last step, but the other persons also count and should not be forgotten. For us to show a narrow and deplorable nationalism in such matters is not to add to the credit of our country but to lead people to think that we are petty in outlook and suffering from some kind of inferiority complex.

7. I have had the pleasure of meeting the Everest party and, in particular, Tenzing. Tenzing is a fine man. But I greatly fear that the uncontrolled adulation that has been thrust upon him might well spoil him and make him unfit for any great work in the future. I hope he will survive it. To honour

9. On 24 June, 1953, Tenzing stated that he was an Indian citizen.

him and praise him is right but to show an uncontrollable excitement and try to make this as if it was some national achievement only is not becoming for us.

8. I venture to write to you this because I have been watching, with restrained pride and pleasure as well as evergrowing sense of responsibility and humility, the growth of India's prestige in the world. It is not for us to talk about this and I have deliberately not attempted to praise India or to say much about any success that she may have achieved in her policy. That praise will remain locked up in my mind and heart and will give me strength for greater effort in the cause of the country we hold dear. Why should we talk of this to others? It is for others to do so, if they so choose. Facts are more important than praise or blame, and facts are compelling the world to give a new status and position to India in the larger scheme of things. But this, though pleasing, is also a little terrifying, for it brings tremendous responsibilities in its train. Are we, with all our petty controversies about linguistic provinces and communal agitations and casteism and Tenzing and Hillary, quite big enough to shoulder these responsibilities which are coming to us so swiftly and extensively? It is well that we think of this in all humility of spirit.

9. You must have followed the course of events in Korea, the success attained at long last in regard to the prisoners of war issue, which seemed to remove the final obstacle to an armistice. As soon as this was achieved I ventured to send my congratulations both to President Eisenhower and the Chinese Government.¹⁰ Everyone thought that the last hurdle had been crossed and this insensate slaughter of men in Korea was going to stop. But everyone, or almost everyone, had forgotten Dr Syngman Rhee. It is curious that, when history is on the march, some persons, encouraged and abetted by great powers, should try to stop that onward march. These persons — Syngman Rhee, Chiang Kai-shek, Bao Dai—belong to the past that is done with; they have no place in the future. History has passed them by and yet attempts are made to hold on to them and to shut our eyes to reality. It was this deliberate shutting of eyes to the reality of the new Chinese Republic that has led to many subsequent disasters. No effective policy can be framed on unreality, much less so in this vast changing world.

10. Syngman Rhee's action¹¹ was most embarrassing to the UN Command and the USA and indirectly to the United Nations itself. Was the UN Command in control of South Korea or not? How could an armistice be signed with the UN Command when they did not control the situation? There could be no armistice for $\frac{2}{5}$ ths of the front and not for the remaining $\frac{3}{5}$ ths. All manner of

10. On 8 June 1953. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, p. 448.

11. He had released the North Korean prisoners on 18 June 1953.

such questions arose and logically the position of the Chinese and the North Korean Government has been strong. The terms of the Agreement signed by them with the UN Command have been broken by persons who are supposed to be under the UN Command! All this has brought out the weakness of the UN position not only now but previously and has shown how the UN has got itself entangled in wrong courses of action.

11. I imagine that an armistice will be signed, though there are still obstacles in the way. The real reason is that there is no stomach for fighting left in any of the parties. And yet the latest news indicates that the chances of a truce in Korea are receding. The one way to make Dr Syngman Rhee see reason was for the United States to take up a strong line with him. Instead, it appears that they have tried to appease him by all kinds of assurances for the future. Syngman Rhee has taken advantage of this soft attitude and has made impossible demands.¹² Probably we shall know, in the course of the next week, what the outcome of all these talks is going to be. If, by some misfortune, an armistice is not signed and war goes on, then that war itself will be different from what it has thus far been. The UN, as an organization, may withdraw from it. It is highly likely that the UK, Canada and other countries, who have sent troops to Korea, may withdraw their forces. The US forces might remain together with, of course, the South Korean forces which have been trained and equipped by the USA. All this will produce a confusing situation not at all to the advantage of the Western allies.

12. The divergence in the policies of the United States and of the West European countries becomes more and more apparent. On the one hand there is a strong feeling that on no account must there be a break between them and perhaps this feeling will prevail in the end. On the other hand, both the political and the economic policies of the US are not approved of by the United Kingdom, France and other countries. This dilemma has continually to be faced. On the economic front, these West European countries do not like the idea of continued dependence upon the US and are trying to lessen that dependence. They have not succeeded thus far. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer¹³ went to the United States sometime ago¹⁴ to induce them to change their economic policies without success. The Chancellor, Mr Butler, used a significant phrase in the Prime Ministers' Conference. He said that he

12. On 23 June 1953, Rhee informed General Clark that he would agree to an armistice if the United States concluded a mutual defence pact with South Korea; United Nations and Chinese forces were withdrawn from Korea; and a political conference was held within ninety days of the signing of armistice. The next day, he declared that he would not allow Indian troops to land in Korea as India was "pro-Communist."

13. R.A. Butler, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1951-55.

14. 4 to 7 March 1953.

had gone to America to explain "the facts of life" to the American authorities, but even those obvious facts were ignored. There is a growing feeling in Europe for a reduction in US tariffs and for trade between the Western and Eastern part of it, just as there is a growing feeling for trade with China. But America comes in the way and does not approve of this.

13. Although peace in Korea is still uncertain, and we do not propose to send anyone to Korea till an armistice is signed, we are, nevertheless, making all necessary preparations at our end. We have to choose a member of the Neutral Powers' Repatriation Commission, who will function as the Chairman and executive authority of that Commission. We have to choose a considerable staff for him also. Then we are responsible for the guarding of the prisoners of war and will have to send our armed forces for this purposes. It is not clear how many will be required because we do not know definitely how many prisoners of war will remain over after the first transfer. Thirdly, the Indian Red Cross will be responsible for all kinds of Red Cross work there in connection with the prisoners of war. Sir Winston Churchill, as indeed many others, congratulated me on the unique honour done to us in that all the opposing parties have put their faith in us.

14. In the Prime Ministers' Conference we had frank talks. Naturally we differed about our approach and I made it perfectly clear that we could not tie ourselves up with NATO or any like organization. I laid special stress on Asia and Africa and asked for a clearer understanding on the part of Europe and America of the dynamic and even explosive position in parts of these continents. Without referring to any particular aspect, I spoke feelingly about conditions in Africa and the way the nationalist upsurge was being suppressed there. I said much to this effect on some public occasions also, though I used a restrained language as was becoming for a Minister when referring to other countries. I believe that my words produced a considerable impression both on the Commonwealth Governments and the British people.

15. The question of Egypt was also discussed there and Sir Winston Churchill was very angry at the aggressive speeches made by the Egyptian leaders. I did not go into any details about the Egyptian negotiations, but I think that the work we did was helpful in toning down respective attitudes and in lessening denunciation on both sides. The language used now is milder and more friendly and there is a general expectation that negotiations in regard to the Canal base in Egypt will be resumed. It has been our privilege to have received appreciation both from the Egyptian authorities and from Sir Winston Churchill in this matter.

16. I might mention that, generally speaking, the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and Ceylon adopted more or less the same line in these matters as we did.

17. The changes in Soviet policy were discussed and the question was

asked, as it is so often asked, whether these indicated a real or basic change or were merely tactical approaches. I had no doubt about the answer. I am convinced that they do represent a definite change of policy, though that does not mean of course that the Soviet has given up its basic communist policy or approach. I have no doubt that the Soviet wants peace and more cooperative relations with other countries. So also China. I reminded the Prime Ministers' Conference that just as they were doubtful about the *bona fides* of the Soviet and China, the latter two countries were doubtful about the *bona fides* of the US specially as well as, to some extent, of other Western countries. I gave them instances which somewhat justified the doubts of the Soviet and China. The last instance of Syngman Rhee breaking the POW agreement has been very much to the point. The fact is that there is a great deal of mutual suspicion and fear and it can only be got over gradually.

18. My talks with the Prime Minister of Pakistan were very general, as they were intended to be at that stage. Reference was made to the problems we faced, such as Canal Waters, Evacuee Property, East and West Bengal, and Kashmir. Mr Mohammad Ali took up a friendly attitude and expressed his eagerness for a settlement. He pointed out that his position in Pakistan was not a very strong one and he had to suffer many limitations. He was a new-comer to his task and had to face many difficulties. After our general talk, we decided to meet again in India or Pakistan. From some points of view it was better to meet in Delhi. Mr Mohammad Ali was perfectly agreeable to doing so, but he pressed me to go to Karachi even for a day or two and then later he would come to Delhi for longer talks. He said that my visit to Karachi would strengthen his position and generally create a favourable atmosphere in Pakistan. I agreed to go there, but I could not fix a date. Probably I shall go there about the fourth week of July for a day or two.

19. The Kashmir problem has been a difficult one. Those difficulties have increased because of internal troubles in Kashmir State. Indeed, our general position in regard to Kashmir is necessarily weak if internally we are not strong enough in Kashmir. I am troubled about these developments which are not only embarrassing but are very harmful for the future of Kashmir, unless they are tackled successfully.

20. In my talks with the Ceylon Prime Minister, certain tentative proposals were put forward on his behalf. Broadly speaking, these were that out of a total of 950,000 people of Indian descent there, 400,000 should be made Ceylon nationals and 250,000 should be given, what are called, permanent residence permits. These permanent residence permit holders would be in a curious position. They would not have the right to vote, but they would have all other citizenship privileges. Obviously, this was some kind of an interim measure, and, though there was no guarantee, it was almost inevitable that they should later become full citizens of Ceylon. This left 300,000 persons to

be dealt with. Of these about 150,000 are considered Indian nationals and may be excluded, leaving 150,000. The real trouble was about these 150,000 whom the Ceylon Government wants ultimately to push out of Ceylon. I told the Ceylon Prime Minister that pushing out these people in considerable numbers would create a grave situation both for India and for Ceylon. Indeed, it would upset even those who stayed behind in Ceylon. The whole object of a peaceful settlement would vanish. I realized his difficulties. I suggested, however, that he should increase the number of permanent residence permits to 300,000 and give an assurance that the others remaining over will not be pushed out for a fixed period, say, ten years, after which they may gradually be dealt with. Of course, if any of them went away of his own accord, he need not be allowed to come back. In the alternative, I was prepared to accept a figure of 250,000 for permanent residence permit holders, but the others should be guaranteed that they would be allowed to stay in Ceylon for life, unless they themselves went away.

21. The Ceylon Prime Minister was unable to accept my variation of his proposals at that time. He said he would have to consult his colleagues. There the matter ended for the time being. We need not call this a break and we shall continue to try our best to reach a settlement.

22. It was noticeable that both Pakistan and Ceylon were influenced by the new status that India was gaining in international affairs and this was a further inducement to them to have friendly settlements with India. Indeed they said so.

23. The conference of our Heads of Missions at Burgenstock in Switzerland was a very useful one and I believe all of us, who attended it, profited by it. Our Ambassadors and Ministers abroad, even though they keep in constant touch with us by letter and telegram, tend to become isolated. We, at Headquarters, also tend to take a partial view. Therefore to meet together and discuss fully the important problems that confront us is helpful for both. We had long discussions for three full days. We met at a rather critical moment in world affairs and tried to understand the backgrounds of various European countries. Just then the upheaval which shook East Germany took place.¹⁵ That itself was very significant and with far-reaching consequences.

24. On my return journey, I spent three days in Cairo. I was received with the greatest courtesy by General Nuguib and his colleagues and even the Egyptian people were kind and friendly to me, whenever I passed them in the public streets. Only three or four days before my arrival, the change to a Republic had taken place there. In effect this did not mean any change, as

15. Concessions announced by the East German Government had not pacified the workers, who, on 16 June, demonstrated against a new order that they should increase production by ten per cent without any assurance of corresponding increase in their wages.

the ruling group and even the same individuals continued. Nevertheless, the change came rather unexpectedly just then. I had long talks not only with General Neguib, but with his Council of the Revolution, which is the final authority in Egypt now. This Council consists of youngish men and is entirely military. On the whole, they struck me favourably as earnest and enthusiastic young men, though very inexperienced. During a trip on the River Nile I sat with the whole Council and we discussed various matters at some length. It was not right or proper for me to offer advice in regard to their internal matters or even their external problems. I talked to them of our own struggle for freedom in India, the methods we adopted, the objectives we kept before us, both political and economic, and how we gradually built up the strength of the nation under Gandhiji's guidance. I think my talk with them produced considerable effect. There is no doubt that in Egypt, as well as in the entire Middle East, India is looked up to, to some extent, as a guide and a friend. We are beginning to function as a kind of elder brother. That again brings additional responsibilities upon us which we can only discharge if we always look at things as a whole and in longer perspective and not lose ourselves in petty conflicts. Our domestic policy has a powerful effect on our international position.

25. You must be aware that we have closed our Legation in Lisbon. It served no useful purpose and our closing of it is at least some gesture to signify our strong disapproval of Portuguese policy in regard to Goa. This should not lead you to think that any further dramatic moves are in prospect. Certainly we should not allow the situation to become static. But it is better to proceed cautiously, step by step, whether in Goa or in Pondicherry. That may not be very pleasing to many of our people who want quick results and the assertion of the national will, but I think that, in the confused world situation today, it is better for us to move slowly though firmly. Generally it is recognized that both the Portuguese and the French possessions must come to India. Even Sir Winston Churchill said so to me and remarked on the extreme backwardness of Portuguese thought. The fact is that Portugal has played no important part in international affairs for hundreds of years. Therefore, they go back to what they consider their period of glory, the days of Vasco da Gama, etc. They live in those days still and seek to derive solace from that memory.

26. As for the French Government, you have seen how difficult it has been even to form a government in Paris.¹⁶ The whole French situation is

16. The resignation of Rene Mayer as Prime Minister on 21 May 1953 was followed by a prolonged crisis when France was without a government for five weeks. On 26 June 1953, Joseph Laniel formed a Ministry with the support of all parties except the Socialists and the Communists.

fluid and the war in Indo-China is bleeding France terribly. The French, in spite of everything, still remain the keenest and most logical of thinkers. But those who think do not always find a high place in politics and there are still memories of French military glory and imperial adventure. It is not easy to shed these illusions. I am much distressed by the way the French Government have dealt with the situation in Morocco and Tunisia. There is severe repression there and all prominent leaders are imprisoned. Even the Sultan of Morocco¹⁷ is in a precarious position because he favours the nationalist movement. In Egypt I came across representatives of Morocco and Tunisia who expressed their gratitude for the moral help given to them by India.

27. We have at present a Burmese Mission in Delhi discussing trade and like matters. I hope that this will lead to a satisfactory settlement. From every point of view, both political and economic, it is important that our relations with Burma should be close and intimate. Fortunately, political relations are exceedingly good and Burma has a leader in Prime Minister U Nu, who is of high quality and outstanding character. In the Prime Ministers' Conference in London, when reference was made to the "facts of life", I reminded them of the "facts of geography" which are also facts of life and which cannot be got over. It is the new attempt to ignore geography that has led to many of the troubles in Europe and Asia.

28. I shall not write to you much about the Coronation festivities in London. They were on a very big scale and were organized most efficiently and with every attention to detail. In spite of bad weather, they were a great success. They were meant to raise the morale of the British people and to show to the world that Britain still counted. I think they succeeded in this, more especially in regard to the morale.

29. Sir Winston Churchill naturally played a great part in all these functions. He is, I believe, about 78 years of age. He was particularly friendly to me personally although we were differing in many matters from day to day. His recent indisposition,¹⁸ no doubt due to the heavy burdens he had undertaken as well as the Coronation, is very unfortunate. He appears to be determined to do his utmost to give a lead for peace in the world.¹⁹ After

17. Sultan Sidi Mohammad ben Yousef was Sultan of Morocco, 1927-53 and 1955-57.

18. On 27 June 1953, the Bermuda talks were postponed as Churchill had been advised rest for one month.

19. On 11 May 1953, Churchill welcomed the "change of attitude" shown by the Soviet Union and called for a conference of the "leading powers without long delay", not for reaching agreements, but to generate a feeling "that they might do something better than tear the human race, including themselves into bits." He therefore proposed that after the Bermuda talks a meeting be held with the Soviet Union without any agenda.

success in war, he wants to end his days as the man who brought peace to a stricken world. By virtue of his position he can well play a very important part in this. His illness therefore is a misfortune because no one can play that part exactly as he might have done. It is unfortunate also that Mr Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary of the UK, has also been seriously ill. He is now slowly recovering after a third operation. British policy and British politics are considerably affected by this removal of leading figures from the scene of action.²⁰

30. During my visit to England I saw a good deal of Lord and Lady Mountbatten. I meet them as old friends. Not only do they retain a vivid interest in Indian affairs, but quietly and in their own way both of them try to help our cause in many ways. Their position is such that they can do much. Their activities in regard to India are considerable and continuous. Lord Mountbatten was particularly happy that some of the ships of our Indian Navy have been sent to him and placed under his temporary command for the naval exercises that are taking place there. These ships on their return will be visiting various countries of Southern Europe—Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, etc., with our message of goodwill to the people there.

31. A question has arisen about the language in which State Governments should write to the Central Government or rather the language of the reports that are submitted here. We are naturally anxious to promote the use of Hindi as well as the other great languages of India in their respective areas. Where reports are normally published by the State Governments in Hindi or the language of the State, these should be supplied as such. But where State Governments send us any statistical or other information required by the Government of India, it is desirable that they should send this in the English language. This will help us to keep proper statistics without unnecessary delay.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

20. On 29 June 1953, it was announced that Lord Salisbury would act as Foreign Secretary till Eden's recovery.

II

New Delhi
July 16, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,

Significant events continue to take place in various parts of the world reminding us that we live in a dynamic and explosive period of history. The fall of Mr Beria in the Soviet Union was startling news and immediately all kinds of rumours and surmises were let loose. Those who wished to believe so thought that the Soviet Union was cracking up from inside in a struggle for power and perhaps because of other reasons also.

2. I confess that I am unable to give at present any correct appraisal of the situation in the Soviet Union. But I am convinced that it is delusion to think that the Soviet Union is cracking up or collapsing. The USSR continues to be internally strong and a mighty power as it has emerged during the last world war. Even some conflicts at the top do not make much difference to this.

3. Nevertheless, those conflicts are important and significant. Do they confirm the new policy which has come into evidence since Stalin's death or are they directed against it? We shall no doubt know before long. My own belief is that that new policy will continue and that Mr Beria went because probably he did not fit in with this new policy.

4. The events that took place in East Germany¹ and, to some extent, in Czechoslovakia,² were even more significant and detrimental to Soviet prestige. They brought out the fact that the workers in these countries were reacting strongly against Soviet domination. The whole basis of the Russian case in these countries was thereby undermined. This also indicated that while the Soviet Union may be strong in its own territories it expands elsewhere at the cost of weakness there. Undoubtedly the Communist Parties in various countries must have been powerfully affected by these developments in East Germany, etc, as well as the fall of Mr Beria. The strength of the Communist Party's activities lie in a certain attitude of certainty, a certain fixity of belief. Where there is this kind of dogmatic faith in a doctrine, there is always danger of the faith cracking up if something happens that patently does not fit into it.

5. There is little doubt that in East Germany especially and, to some

1. In the renewed demonstrations on 10 July, resignation of the Government, free elections, and opening of the frontier to West Berlin were demanded.
2. There were demonstrations in Prague, Plzen, Brno and Ostrava between 2 and 9 June against the Czech Government's fixation of wages, announcement of a new formula of pension, and abolition of food rationing.

extent, in Czechoslovakia and Poland,³ powerful and continuous propaganda has been directed from the Western countries, encouraging resistance and revolt. But this propaganda, or even more definite subversive activities, could not succeed if the ground was not favourable and if the people in those countries were not tired of submission of Soviet domination. The Soviet authorities reacted quickly and rescinded all the unpopular measures in East Germany and condemned many of their own people who were responsible for them.

6. Probably these developments in Eastern Europe have made the chances of an East-West getting together rather less than they were. The West, or some countries in the West, feel that they might as well wait for other signs of weakness in the Soviet and are less eager therefore to go ahead. That, I think, is exceedingly short-sighted and unwise policy. It would be far better to take advantage of the situation to arrive at some settlement of outstanding problems or at any rate to go some distance towards a settlement.

7. Sir Winston Churchill's illness has had an unfortunate result. Ministers who met in Washington⁴ recently could not speak with the voice of Winston Churchill. This Washington Conference, therefore, has been just like any other conference and apparently has been rather dominated by the American viewpoint. The results are very disappointing. Winston Churchill's proposal for Big Power talks on an informal basis with no agenda and an attempt made to grapple with the world's problems in that way, have faded out and have been replaced by something feeble and ineffective in the extreme. It is now proposed that the Foreign Ministers should meet, not the Prime Ministers or Heads of States. Instead of an informal meeting without agenda, this is going to be a formal meeting with a more or less rigid agenda which is confined to Germany and Austria. The whole approach has become different and little can be expected from this approach.

8. In Korea, after about two weeks of continuous talks between Mr Robertson⁵ of the US and President Syngman Rhee, a brave document was

3. The reports of demonstrations on 25 and 29 June and 4 July in Warsaw and Silesia against the Communist Government and in support of the workers in East Germany were denied by the Polish Radio on 5 July.
4. The Foreign Ministers of Britain, USA and France met at Washington from 10 to 14 July 1953 and reviewed the question of German unity, Austrian independence, the armistice in Korea and the situation in Indo-China, and proposed a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Four Powers to discuss the German and the Austrian questions.
5. Walter S. Robertson (1893-1970); US Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1953-59.

issued on behalf of these two high dignitaries.⁶ That document said much without meaning anything precise and, soon after, a statement⁷ was made on behalf of President Rhee making it clear that he was not bound down by anything and that he would pursue his course after a certain interval. And so, everything is as vague as ever and the very pertinent questions that the Chinese Government put to the UN Command remain unanswered.⁸ The UN Command says⁹ that they are prepared to sign the armistice, but they do not say what exactly the armistice means now after what has happened and after these long talks with Dr Rhee.

9. Because of our acceptance of our proposed role in the armistice agreement, India is a part of that agreement. Any change in the original terms affects us and it does not follow that we are prepared to accept every change. We are anxious as ever to help in the settlement and we have no desire to back out of our undertaking or responsibilities. But we can only function effectively if nothing is done which affects our honour and self-respect.

10. It is said that the UN Command have been and are prepared to sign the armistice and yet most of us do not know what the present terms of the armistice are, i.e., how far the old terms have been modified after the Robertson-Rhee talks. India figured prominently in these talks and President Rhee was pleased to make many offensive remarks about India and to repeat his resolve not to allow Indian troops in South Korea. Obviously, this matter has to be cleared up before we can decide that we could do. It appears that the UN Command, in their anxiety not to offend Dr Rhee, have made the proposal that the POW Camp should be situated in the demilitarized zone near the ceasefire line. That would be beyond Dr Rhee's reach and, presumably, Indian troops can be sent there quietly without offending the delicate sensibilities of President Syngman Rhee. All this is very unsatisfactory and

6. On 12 June, the two Governments reaffirmed their determination to oppose coercion on prisoners of war, and agreed to collaborate on political, economic and defence matters and for the realization within the shortest practicable time of a free, independent, and unified Korea. The same day, Robertson said that Rhee had agreed not to obstruct the signing of an armistice.
7. Rhee made his offer of cooperation for peace conditional by stating on 12 July that it would remain effective for ninety days only following the signing of the armistice and commencement of the political conference.
8. On 24 June, the Communists alleged complicity of the UN Command in the release of the prisoners of war and demanded specific assurance that it would support the armistice in case South Korea resumed aggression.
9. On 29 June, General Clark asked the Communist commanders to conclude the armistice arrangements, and later, on 20 July assured observance of the terms of the armistice even if South Korea resumed aggression.

we have asked the US Government to tell us exactly how matters stand and how far the old terms of the armistice have been varied.¹⁰

11. This is not merely a question of how India will function, although that is important enough from our point of view. It is also a question of the future of the Korean problem. If President Rhee has laid down conditions which make any real solution of this question difficult and if these conditions have been accepted, then the outlook is not good. Dr Rhee threatens to re-start hostilities after a certain period. All this demonstrates that Rhee and his colleagues are not exactly the weak and innocent lambs who had been viciously attacked by a powerful neighbour. The past three years of war in Korea begin to appear as wasted effort.

12. In Egypt the situation has become tense again as between the Egyptian Government and the British Government.¹¹ I fear that there is not much chance of an understanding or a solution of the basic problem at present. And so, there will be a worsening of the situation, possible conflict and finally again attempts to resolve those conflicts.

13. At the AICC meeting held in Agra recently, I laid some stress on the situation in Africa. Africa is a big place and different conditions prevail in different parts of it. For instance, there is the nationalist upsurge in Morocco and Tunisia. That is against French colonialism. There is Egypt and the Sudan. In the far south there are the racial policies of Dr Malan's Government. In Kenya there has been much trouble which is both political and racial as well as economic. In Central Africa a new federation has taken legal shape. In the Gold Coast and in Nigeria there is a demand for independence. Thus all over Africa there is a ferment and the position becomes more and more explosive.

14. In the recent AICC session in Agra, special stress was laid on the problem of unemployment. Merely by passing a resolution, nothing much is done. But I think it is a definite advance that this subject is being given concentrated attention now. It is by far our most important subject. Even if we increased our production and our national wealth considerably, but did not affect the unemployment problem much, we would fail. A social system which cannot deal with unemployment cannot last. Every approach to the problem

10. On 15 July 1953, the Government of India, seeking satisfactory assurances from the US about India's position in Korea, stated that "they could not be expected to function in a furtive manner where the movements of their own representatives are limited and confined."

11. Tension increased in the Suez Canal Zone on 13 July when British forces subjected rail and road traffic to searches in Ismailia with a view to secure the release of their abducted airmen. To ease tension, the security measures were withdrawn on 14 July, as had been demanded by Egypt.

must be based on reaching full employment ultimately and fuller employment progressively.

15. Much is happening in India today which disturbs me greatly. While on the one side we see constructive activities and unifying forces at work, on the other hand we also see disintegrating forces and destructive activities functioning. I am constantly criticizing communalism, provincialism and casteism, and some people think that I overdo this. And yet I think that unless we realize the pernicious and deeply corroding nature of these tendencies and fight against them, we shall make little progress. There is something inherently disintegrating in our social outlook. Perhaps this is due to long years of functioning under the caste system which separates us into innumerable compartments. Whatever it may be due to, it is clear that we tend to disintegrate and to work in small groups at every provocation. The future of India depends on the strength of the cementing bonds which keep us together and prevent these disintegrating processes from working. The future of India, as indeed of every country, ultimately depends on the quality of the human beings there and how far they can rise above their parochial feelings and petty conflicts.

16. Looking round India, today, one sees a good deal of passion being shown over linguistic boundaries. People hunger-strike, hold up trains and the like because they do not like a particular boundary. A recent proposal in Madras for some kind of a change of form in the educational system again leads to violent demonstrations and stoppage of trains. In Calcutta, the increase of tram fares by an anna also leads to widespread disorder. In Assam there is much excitement because a proposal was put forward by the External Affairs Ministry some time ago to appoint a Commissioner for the North East Frontier Agency to function under the Governor who is in charge on behalf of the Central Government. This was a minor proposal, thought of in terms of administrative efficiency and with a view to go ahead at a faster pace in improving conditions in the North East Frontier Agency. This area has been terribly neglected in the past and is very backward. This simple and, as we thought, harmless proposal has been described by important personalities in Assam as a "diabolical move" by the Central Government against the interests of Assam. The poor Governor of Assam has been needlessly dragged into the picture, as it was thought that he was responsible for this proposal. He had nothing to do with it.

17. I have mentioned above some odd aspects of the Indian scene today. They may not be very important if one considers the whole picture of India. But they are disturbing as they indicate a pettiness in mind, a narrowness in outlook and an immaturity which ill becomes a nation and a people which claim to be advanced and mature in their thinking and action. This narrow outlook comes out in a variety of ways. In the UP and elsewhere there is a

deliberate attempt to push out Urdu which is spoken and written by large number of persons. No one challenges Hindi's supreme position in India and more especially in North India. To adopt this narrow and ungenerous attitude towards Urdu, a language of India, which has enriched Indian culture and thought, appears to me most unfortunate. As a matter of fact, we are encouraging the smallest tribal language in the North East Frontier. I mention this merely to indicate our tendency to function in narrow grooves of thought. If that is our background, it is difficult to make real progress on any plane, political, economic, social or cultural.

18. I could, of course, give a list of other aspects of India which are promising and which indicate the progress we are making. These are the constructive and unifying aspects. But I wanted particularly to draw your attention to our failings, for we are apt to forget our failings and then they come and overwhelm us.

19. I am going tomorrow on brief visits to Lucknow and Allahabad, returning on the 19th July. On the 25th July I go to Karachi for my talks with the Prime Minister of Pakistan. I expect to be there for three days. Some time, probably late in August, Mr Mohammad Ali is likely to come to Delhi to continue these talks.

20. We are having an International Exhibition on Low Cost Housing early next year.¹³ I understand that our Minister¹⁴ for Works, Housing and Supply has already addressed you on this subject. This question of low cost housing is of the greatest importance to us. The United Nations Organization and a number of foreign Governments are likely to participate in this exhibition. At the same time as the exhibition, there will be a seminar on housing organized by the UN Technical Assistance Administration and also a Regional Conference of the International Federation for Housing and Town Planning. I hope that your Government will cooperate fully in making this exhibition and connected activities a success.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. Held from 20 January to 5 March 1954.

14. Swaran Singh.

III

New Delhi
August 1, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,

The outstanding event of the last fortnight has been the signing of the Korean armistice. For six weeks or so this had been held up by President Syngman Rhee and there were prolonged discussions between him and a representative of the United States. We do not yet know precisely what assurances have been given to Syngman Rhee by the US Government, but certain recent statements made by Mr Dulles indicate that certain promises have been made which may create difficulties in the future.¹ Any such assurance must inevitably limit the field of free discussion at the political conference which is supposed to follow the armistice.

2. Indeed, there are signs of trouble already in regard to the constitution of this political conference. If China refused to participate in this conference because of what the US might have promised to President Rhee, then the conference will lose all significance. It is exceedingly improbable that there will be a return to military operations in Korea in spite of the threats held by President Rhee. All the parties concerned are tired of warfare and are most reluctant to resume it. Only President Rhee insists on war being resumed if a certain result is not achieved within a specified period.²

3. The attitude of President Rhee and the assurances given to him have created much misgiving in Western European countries, notably the United Kingdom,³ and there has been much criticism of the United States. In fact recent developments indicate a progressive variation in the policies of the

1. Dulles disclosed on 22 July that Rhee had been promised by the US massive help in the rehabilitation of South Korea, a mutual security treaty and steps, in cooperation with principal allies, to check renewed aggression in Korea. On 28 July, Dulles stated that Rhee had also been assured that the United States would opt out of the political conference if it found the Communist response inadequate. The next day, Dulles said he would visit South Korea to discuss the US guarantees.
2. On 22 July, Syngman Rhee declared that if no solution was found by the political conference at the end of ninety days, "we shall be at liberty to follow our own course of action."
3. The statements of Dulles were criticized in the House of Commons between 29 and 31 July. Attlee stated that Britain had entered the Korean war "to vindicate the principles of the United Nations. We certainly did not enter it on behalf of Syngman Rhee or to make Mr Syngman Rhee the ruler of a United Korea." R.A. Butler, the acting Prime Minister, clarified on 30 July that the British Government could not be involved in a war with North Korea in future without proper discussion and added that "our conception of the United Nations is that of a family of nations and not an anti-communist alliance."

United Kingdom and some other countries on the one side and the United States of America on the other. Both on the political and economic fronts this divergence is visible.

4. After a long period of "Cold War" certain steps were taken by the Soviet Government as well as the Chinese Government which indicated a new policy towards a lessening of tension. What this was due to it may be difficult to say with certainty. But there can be no doubt that step by step many things were done which indicated an approach to a peaceful settlement of problems. While this was welcomed by many, it produced a degree of confusion also in the minds of some other countries. They did not expect this kind of development and were taken aback. Sir Winston Churchill reacted to this by making his great speech in May last calling for a Four Power Conference. Since then, however, this proposal has lost much of its significance because of the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Washington. One can observe two rival pulls at work. For the moment the brave approach of Sir Winston Churchill has been effectively bypassed and the fear and caution have won the day. Nevertheless, there are strong forces working for peace and for a top-level conference and it is quite possible that Sir Winston Churchill might, on his return to work, make some other dramatic announcement.

5. The signing of the Korean Armistice casts many duties and responsibilities upon us. We are sending an advance party to Korea on the 5th August to confer with the UN Command as well as the Chinese and North Korean Command and make necessary arrangements for the various types of work that we have got to do. Our representative will be the Chairman and executive authority of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Our armed forces will guard the prisoners of war, and we shall also be responsible for the Red Cross work. We have selected Lieutenant General Thimayya as our principal representative. His colleague and alternate will be Shri B.N. Chakravarty, at present our Ambassador in Holland. There will necessarily be a considerable staff. We are proceeding with our arrangements, but they will be completed only on the return of our advance party from Korea and Japan about the middle of August. Our present difficulty is to find shipping to send our troops. We have thus far engaged an Indian ship, *Jaldurga*, and a British ship, but this is not enough.

6. The UN General Assembly is meeting on the 17th August to consider the consequences of the Korean armistice. Probably the most important question before them will be the constitution and composition of the political conference which is to follow. They have also to fix the venue of this conference. Among the various places suggested has been New Delhi, but I rather doubt if this will be the final choice. Probably Geneva will be chosen. It must be remembered that the political conference is the child of the Armistice and therefore decisions about it cannot be made simply by the UN General

Assembly which really represents one party to the Armistice, namely, the UN Command. It is necessary to have an agreement with the other party, the Chinese and North Korean Command or Governments. It has therefore been suggested that consultation should take place between the great powers concerned previous to a meeting of the General Assembly.

7. I have recently returned from a visit to Karachi. Much has been published in the newspapers about this visit and I need not therefore refer to it at any length. The welcome that I received in Karachi was not only extraordinary but rather moving, more particularly from the crowds in the streets, which included large numbers of refugees. The Government went out of their way to show us every courtesy and hospitality. Altogether, there was an atmosphere of great friendliness. In spite of all our conflicts and difficulties during the past five or six years, it was difficult for me to feel that I was in a foreign country. There were faces of innumerable old friends and comrades. There was the bond of common language as well as of old associations. For a moment, our present differences seemed rather small in the face of so many things that were common between us, in the past and in the present.

8. There was an extreme eagerness to find a solution of our problems, notably that of Kashmir, which was considered the basic obstacle to friendly relations. I had long discussions with the Prime Minister of Pakistan and our talks were frank and friendly. We made progress in regard to a number of matters but Kashmir continued to be a hard nut to crack. Yet, even in regard to Kashmir, I think that we had a greater understanding of each other's viewpoints.

9. A desire for a settlement in Pakistan or in India was natural and yet the eagerness in Pakistan required some further explanation. I had the impression that, while the Government of Pakistan was desirous of a settlement, the people there were even more anxious for it. They were tired of this continuing conflict which had brought them no good and they were becoming more and more convinced that they should pursue a different path from that of hatred of and enmity to India which had yielded no results in the past. I believe that even the anti-Quadiani agitation, which shook the West Punjab and resulted in martial law, was something much bigger than a religious feud. It represented extreme dissatisfaction with the Government at the time and a feeling of frustration at the policies that had been pursued by it. It represented, oddly enough, in spite of its narrow religious basis, an attempt to try a new and more friendly approach to India. That agitation was crushed ruthlessly, but that basic feeling remained. Political and economic difficulties, which were continuing, prevented these people from accepting the status quo and they searched for a new path.

10. I had some glimpses of the vast refugee population round about Karachi. This was in a pitiable state. Several hundreds of thousands live in

wretched temporary huts in various stages of disrepair. I was reminded of what I had seen in various parts of India five years ago, when we were tackling the stupendous migrations of people here from Pakistan. I suppose that Pakistan has settled many refugees and rehabilitated them. But vast numbers still remain and the outlook for them is pretty dim. I have little doubt that large numbers of them would gladly return to India if given a chance. Among these unfortunate people there was a dull feeling of resentment at the unkind fate that had pursued them since the Partition. They did not show any resentment or anger towards me, but looked at me with friendly eyes.

11. There was a vague hope that a settlement with India would better the conditions of the common people and so this strong urge for better relations with India had grown. This is good in its way and we should welcome it and ourselves work for that settlement and better relations. That is the only wise course for us. There are difficulties in the way and old passions have not quite died down. But there is no other way.

12. The Kashmir problem is still unsolved. Meanwhile a great internal situation has arisen in Kashmir. You may have sensed it somewhat from newspaper reports. Even those reports do not give a full picture. There is conflict between the leading personalities in Kashmir and this produces a great deal of confusion in the public mind. I have little doubt that one of the principal causes for this unfortunate development has been the Praja Parishad and Jan Sangh agitation. This naturally produced powerful reactions among the Muslims of Kashmir. They saw the communal face of India and were apprehensive lest this should at any time become the real face of India. All the work that we had done for the last five years suffered, and fear and suspicion took possession of men's minds there. And now we have to face an exceedingly difficult situation, which deteriorates from day to day.

13. We are apt to forget that India can only hold together and make progress if we practise a wide tolerance and understanding of the vast number of people who inhabit our great country. Attempts to regiment them to one way of thinking or living produces not the unity we seek, but a sense of suppression and disparity. We have to build up our unity, but that can only be done if we recognize fully and encourage the rich variety of India's life and culture. Nothing distresses me so much as the occasional evidence one sees of extreme narrowness of outlook and absence of vision. A recent instance of this has been the totally unnecessary conflict between Hindi and Urdu in some parts of India, more especially in Uttar Pradesh.

14. The position of Hindi is absolutely assured all over India. No language can rival it as an all-India language, though no doubt the great provincial languages will play their full part in their respective regions. Urdu cannot possibly come in the way of the advance of Hindi. Why then do some people

in their misguided enthusiasm try to suppress Urdu? Millions of people in India speak Urdu or the variation of Hindi which is called Urdu, and use the Urdu or Persian script. All these will necessarily have to learn Hindi and the Devanagari script. But they treasure Urdu, as they are fully entitled to do. Memories are short and perhaps few people remember the great stress that Gandhiji laid on this question of Hindi and Urdu. It is true that conditions have changed since then, but basic principles do not change. We encourage the smallest tribal language in its own area, but many of us resent even the mention of Urdu. And yet Urdu is very much a child of India and is a vital and graceful aspect of our many-sided culture. I am deeply grieved at this narrowness of outlook which so frequently comes in our way of our growth.

15. Calcutta has been the scene of continuing disturbances during the latter part of July and all because of a slight rise in tramway fares. I can give no opinion on the merits of the question. But this frequent resort to violence and public disorder is a bad sign. In Madras, there has been an agitation about some educational proposal. In Bellary, people fast because of our decision to add it to the Mysore State. Where does this all lead to? Are our policies on important questions going to be considered or decided in this way? I am greatly disturbed about all this as it shows not only immaturity in our public life but a certain continuing tendency towards disintegration. How can we devote ourselves to the major economic problems when we waste our energy over these trivial matters?

16. Among the countries of Asia, India rather stands out for its ordered political life and organized attempts to bring about economic progress. In most other countries of Asia there is an absence of both of these, and politics becomes a succession of *coups d'etat* and disorderly demonstrations. That is a normal condition of some of the Middle Eastern countries. Unfortunately, Indonesia has also displayed this weakness.⁴ Only the other day a Dutch statesman referred tauntingly to the present state of Indonesia.⁵ We have these examples before us and we also see the difference between them and India. Because of this difference, we have largely made good in the world's eyes

4. The coalition Government in Indonesia in office for fourteen months resigned on 2 June following disagreement between its two major components on questions relating to distribution of land in eastern Sumatra, nationalization of the Royal Dutch Shell Company and opening of a diplomatic mission in Soviet Russia. On 30 July, another coalition Government led by Sastromidjojo of the Indonesian Nationalist Party and supported by the Communist and radical groups was announced.
5. J.M.A.H. Juns, the Dutch Foreign Minister, said in New Delhi on 14 July after visiting Indonesia that he had useful discussions with the Indonesian leaders but "further talks of common interest would have to await the formation of a Cabinet in Indonesia."

and stand out. Some of our friends, however, would like to reduce us to the level of periodic violence and disorderly demonstrations.

17. There has been some controversy in recent months about Christian missionaries in India. A statement by the Home Minister Dr Katju in Parliament has led to this argument.⁶ That statement by itself was merely a reiteration of the policy we have been pursuing but somehow it led some people to believe that there was more in it and, as a result, it seems to me that too much zeal has been shown in some States against Christian and missionary activities. A certain feeling of alarm has been created among Christians in various parts of India. That is very unfortunate. Any such feeling of insecurity or differential treatment is against our basic principles and policy. We must, therefore, try to remove it by our statements and our actions. Complaints have come to me of harassment of missionaries and the like by the policemen, of censoring of letters, of strange questions being asked and threats being held out. Some of these complaints may be exaggerated, but the fact that there is apprehension in their minds cannot be doubted and that itself casts a burden upon us. Where information is required, as it often is, it is better for the State Government or the local authority to address the headquarters of the organization who will no doubt supply full information about its members. The practice of leaving it to police enquiries is not good. Of course where there is an individual case of a suspect, the normal police enquiries have to take place. Even in regard to visas, it is much easier and better to try to get the information about the individual concerned from the organization.

18. This question of missionaries arose some months ago in the North East Frontier Agency. This area as well as a certain area in the UP adjoin an important frontier of ours. We have, therefore, to take special care of frontier areas and we do not allow any foreigner to go across the inner line. In the past, some missionaries had undoubtedly carried on anti-national activities there. For political and military reasons, we have to be strict in those areas. Elsewhere, the same considerations do not apply.

19. The day after tomorrow Parliament begins. It is going to be a short session, but a heavy one.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Katju had stated on 15 April 1953 that the Government had been obliged to take steps against Christian missionaries in Central India on the basis of complaints that their proselytizing activities had been hurting the religious susceptibilities of the Hindus. He added that foreign missionaries were welcome in India as long as they confined their activities to social and educational work.

IV

New Delhi
August 22, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,

It is three weeks since I wrote to you last, three weeks full of important happenings in India and the world. Some of us here have had to work under peculiar strain during this period. Hence the delay in my writing to you, which you will understand.

2. In the world at large, strange things have happened. In Iran, there has been another revolutionary and bloody *coup* and Dr Mossadeq, from being a dictator of his country, is now in prison. In Morocco the Sultan has been forcibly deposed by the French.¹ In New York, there is an unseemly tussle going on in the General Assembly of the UN over the composition of the political conference for Korea. In Korea itself, preparations are being made for the next stage, and an advance party sent there by us has come back and reported.² Considerable number of Indian troops have already sailed for Korea from Madras. In quiet and peaceful Ceylon there has been violent labour trouble leading to a declaration of a state of emergency.³ In Indonesia, after a long interval, a Government has been formed. But this Government has no strong support and can hardly be expected to have a long life. In the Soviet Union there has been a meeting of the Supreme Soviet⁴ and several further steps have been taken⁵ which indicate a continuation of the new policy which was introduced soon after Stalin's death. This policy aims generally at a lessening of tension in Europe and elsewhere. In South Africa, Dr Malan has

1. On 20 August, the French authorities appointed Sidi Mohammad ben Moulay Arafa as the new Sultan of Morocco. This followed the arrest of a large number of Sidi Mohammad ben Yousuf's supporters and of the workers of the Istiqlal Party.
2. An advance party of nine officials led by R.K. Nehru, Foreign Secretary, and Major-General S.P.P. Thorat, returned to India on 18 August after visiting Korea and Japan for two weeks.
3. The demonstrations by the left wing against the rise in prices turned violent and there was police firing on 12 and 13 August. An emergency was declared in the country on 12 August.
4. It met from 5 to 8 August. Malenkov, in his address on the concluding day, reiterated the policy of the Soviet Union of "peaceful co-existence." He said that "it is the principle of our foreign policy to respect the national freedom and sovereignty of any nation, large and small." He also stressed the need for talks between the Big Powers and pledged support to the UN in its efforts to "strengthen peace."
5. On 16 August, the Soviet Union announced acceptance of the proposal of the Western Powers of 15 July to hold a peace conference on Germany.

come out again, very frankly and forcibly, as the champion against what he calls Indian imperialism.⁶ Thus he tries to cover up his blatant racial policy. In East Africa, the European settlers have also talked loudly about this "Indian imperialism".⁷ It so happens that the voice of India has been the stoutest, among the countries of the world, not only in regard to the freedom of suppressed peoples but, more especially, against racial domination and inequality. This has hurt those who indulge in this racial suppression.

3. In our own country we have had another Independence Day, and I unfurled our Flag for the seventh time from the ramparts of the historic Red Fort of Delhi before a vast audience. Parliament has been meeting and considering principally the Estate Duty Bill and the Andhra State Bill. The nationalization of air services in India has been completed and the two corporations, one for internal services and the other for overseas services, have been given a good start. The Prime Minister of New Zealand paid us a brief visit.

4. Far the most important events in India during this last fortnight have been connected with Kashmir. It was, as a consequence of these events, although not to deal with them directly, that the Prime Minister of Pakistan came here at the beginning of this week and spent four days with us. You must have seen the statement that has been issued by us about our talks. In the course of my address on Independence Day from the Red Fort, I appealed to the people of Delhi to give a warm welcome to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, who was due to arrive the next day. In the result, what the people of Delhi did surprised everyone and gratified me greatly. They gave Mr Mohammad Ali a welcome which they have hardly given to anyone in the past. It was a warm-hearted and overwhelming welcome and somehow these years of strain and trouble and conflict, since the Partition, faded away and Old Delhi stood out as a great city with an immemorial past, representing the many cultures that have flowed into it and become its own. There was a nostalgia in the air for that composite culture which had made Delhi so notable in the past. The Pakistan Prime Minister and his party were overwhelmed by this demonstration of affection and goodwill. Mr Mohammad Ali was little known; he had no great record behind him to inspire the people. Why then

6. On 11 August, D.F. Malan, Prime Minister of South Africa, spoke of the danger posed by India "not only to Africa but to all powers with interests in Africa. India was a danger for Africa in Southern and Northern Rhodesia and in East Africa."
7. For example, the *Kenya Weekly News* wrote on 12 August that "Pandit Nehru is a menace to Africa and to the Africans. Does Pandit Nehru imagine that the world would tolerate the decline of Africa to a vast zoological reserve while he prattled about political freedom and racial equality?"

did he receive such a welcome? To a slight extent, because of our appeal to the people of Delhi, but much more so, for other reasons. I think this astonishing demonstration represented a basic desire in the minds of men and women to have done with the conflicts that have embittered India and Pakistan. It represented also an appreciation of the fact that Mr Mohammad Ali has also represented that desire for friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

5. Some days before the Pakistan Prime Minister came to Delhi and while he was here, Pakistan was full of a raging and tearing campaign against India. The Press was full of it, the Radio talked of it, and prominent men, Ministers and Governors and others, repeated the same theme. The Independence Day celebrations of Pakistan were cancelled throughout the world.⁸ There were processions and meetings and hartals and the demand was for war and *jihad*. We have had many hysterical outbursts in Pakistan during the last few years, but this latest one exceeded all previous ones in virulence. It was difficult for me even to read extracts from the Pakistan Press. They were blood-curdling. I could understand the people in Pakistan feeling the shock of events in Kashmir and I could even appreciate some sense of resentment. But what happened was so terribly unbalanced that it passed all understanding. There was talk of putting an end to diplomatic relations, and if this takes place at any time, one can imagine the other consequences that would flow from it.

6. It is in this context of hysteria and wild outbursts in Pakistan that the visit of Mr Mohammad Ali to Delhi must be seen. The contrast between this and the warm-hearted welcome that he got in Delhi was remarkable. I have seldom felt so proud of my people as I did when I saw the men and women of Delhi behaving in this big way, in spite of the wild outbursts in Pakistan. There was an element of greatness in their behaviour and sobriety in facing a difficult situation. I wish we could always behave in this manner whenever a crisis or difficulty faces us.

7. The recent events in Kashmir are undoubtedly of primary importance not only in the Kashmir State itself but in the whole of India and, to some extent, in the world. Much of this importance is due to the fact that the events appeared to have come with the suddenness of a thunderbolt. In fact, few things happen with that suddenness and there are always longstanding and underlying causes behind events. Three months ago, in May last, I visited Kashmir for two days. This was before I went to England. I was surprised and dismayed to see the state of affairs there and the great deterioration that had taken place in many ways. There was a process of disintegration and an acute internal conflict among those who had been our colleagues for so long.

8. The Pakistan Cabinet took this decision on 12 August.

I was peculiarly unhappy to find how Shaikh Abdullah had changed. All I could do then was to beg of Shaikh Abdullah and others not to allow this process of disintegration to continue and not to take any step which might make the situation even more difficult. I asked them to stay their hands till I came back from Europe when we could discuss the various problems confronting us fully. When I was in England, I continued to have disturbing accounts of conditions in Kashmir. On my return, one of the earliest things I did was to invite Shaikh Abdullah to come to see me in Delhi. I had previously invited him to the AICC meeting in Agra. He said he could not come to Agra but he would try to see me later in Delhi. However, he did not come to Delhi in spite of repeated invitations. He sent Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and Mirza Afzal Beg later, but that was hardly satisfactory.

8. Meanwhile, the situation went on relentlessly towards the final crisis. Government did not function there and Ministers spoke against each other. The National Conference Party, that had been built up after more than 20 years' labour, started disintegrating. The people were confused and apprehensive. Visitors who had gone in large numbers this year to Kashmir, sensing this impending crisis, left the Valley and large numbers of petty shopkeepers who had invested their all in the handicrafts of Kashmir hoping to sell them to these visitors, were suddenly stranded.

9. We met people from Kashmir. Some of my colleagues went there at my request and otherwise and came back and reported. At every stage the report was worse than the previous one. It became clear that it was impossible to carry on in this way. Government could not function and everything was disintegrating. Shaikh Abdullah's attitude became more and more bitter and he seemed to be bent on upsetting everything in Kashmir. Indeed, in the course of a conversation with a friend, he said that he would set fire to the State. I do not know what he meant by that. But it indicated the state of his mind which was almost functioning as if it was unbalanced. So we came to live under constant apprehension of an impending disaster. It was a very difficult and distressing situation. There was no easy way out. To allow things to continue as they were was to invite disaster, and, in any event, that was a feeble way of meeting a situation. To take any steps to check it also meant inviting trouble. The choice, as often in our lives, was one of the lesser evil.

10. We were told repeatedly that something must be done. We were informed that the majority of the Cabinet held one view and the minority, including the Prime Minister, another; that majority commanded the considerable majority of the Executive of the National Conference as also very probably of the Conference itself and the Constituent Assembly. Our advice first was that some way out should be found for cooperation, as any other course was likely to lead to unfortunate results. If this was impossible, then a Government should be formed which could function and which held

one view and not several diverse views. The procedure must be fully constitutional. If the Cabinet split up, it should resign and go out of office and another Cabinet formed. We stressed that this should be done in the proper way in accordance with constitutional procedure. We realized, of course, that all manner of difficulties might arise. We could not deal with every possible consequence. We were anxious, however, that our Army should not be involved and we issued strict injunctions accordingly.

11. For some days, further disintegrating developments took place and then the final crisis came in the Cabinet resulting from the demand of Shaikh Abdullah for the resignation of a Member, who happened to represent the majority view of the Cabinet. Events followed in quick succession resulting in the dismissal of the Abdullah Cabinet, the swearing in of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad as Prime Minister and later in the arrest of Shaikh Abdullah himself. We learnt of these events after they had taken place. It was difficult for us to say anything at that stage because the resulting situation had to be dealt with on the spot and anything that we could have said from here, might only result in adding to the confusion and making nobody responsible. We had, therefore, to watch events as they happened. It appeared that, after the dismissal of the Abdullah Cabinet, there was a danger of Shaikh Abdullah promoting an upheaval and civil strife on a considerable scale. This was to be avoided and so the next inevitable step was taken by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, the new Prime Minister, to order his arrest.

12. It is easy to be wise after an event. But when events follow each other in quick succession, each leading to the other, it is difficult to stop or divert their course much. How and when did this deterioration begin leading to the final crisis? It is difficult to draw the line, but there can be no doubt that one of the most powerful elements at the back was the Praja Parishad-Jan Sangh agitation which created a great effect not only in Shaikh Abdullah's mind but in minds of the people in the Valley. This agitation embittered them and it appeared to them that the Jan Sangh and its supporters represented the prevailing sentiment in India and this frightened them. The people began looking in other direction. Shaikh Abdullah became peculiarly bitter and rather lost his moorings. We can criticize Shaikh Abdullah for going astray and forgetting the principles on which he had long stood, but that does not help much in understanding a situation which at first gradually and then rather suddenly confronted us. This situation was primarily the result of this communal agitation which went on in Delhi, in the Punjab and in some other parts of India for many months. Thousands of Kashmiri labourers, who come down to India in the summer, went back with bitterness in their hearts. They spread to the villages. We see here the dangerous results of wrong action. It is true that some of us condemned this agitation repeatedly in Parliament and elsewhere, but it is also true that many vaguely sympathized with it, not

realizing the dangers inherent in it. And so we have to suffer those consequences and those dangers.

13. The situation developed as some inevitable tragedy which could not be stopped. It has left a bad taste in the mouth and I have felt unhappy, for much that has happened has not been good, and a long trail of consequences will flow from it. If we believe, as we have done and must do, that the people of Kashmir must decide their own fate, then obviously things have happened which have weighted the scales against us. Some of our friends in the past have often demanded what they call "strong action", not realizing that what is always necessary is wise action.

14. We see here in this matter the unfortunate triumph of communalism. We have battled against this, but, in the particular instance, we have failed and the consequences may well be serious for the whole of India. It would be some small gain if we realized even at this late hour, how perilous and harmful this communal mentality is and how it is impossible to build up a strong and progressive India if we permit these reactionary and disintegrating forces to have play in this country. It does little good to blame others. Others will go wrong. The question always is how far we are functioning rightly. If we act rightly, then it does not very much matter what others do.

15. The city of Delhi acted rightly and magnificently in the welcome it gave to the Pakistan Prime Minister. By doing so, it changed the whole atmosphere of discord and applied the healing touch to a situation that was heading towards disaster. Here we have an instance of how right action always pays. But it cannot undo all the effects of wrong action.

16. In the Jammu and Kashmir State, the news of these sudden changes naturally came as a shock. While people knew of the internal troubles and discords, and there were all kinds of rumours about coming changes, still the actual events came as a shock. There have been many demonstrations and there has been some violence resulting in shooting and deaths. Considering everything, this has not been as much as might have been expected. The Indian Army has kept wholly aloof. Some misunderstandings, however, have arisen because the local militia wears a uniform which is rather similar to the Indian Army uniform. I believe they were supplied some years ago from our surplus stocks. Outwardly conditions are generally peaceful, but there can be no doubt that there is a good deal of sullenness and discontent among the people. On the other hand, there is also a certain realization that these changes had become inevitable. Most of the workers of the National Conference have supported the present Government. That Government will have to face the elected Assembly when it meets and its fate will naturally depend upon a vote of that Assembly. The Government believes they are likely to have a substantial majority in that Assembly. Nevertheless, the situation continues to be a difficult and distressing one and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, the new

Prime Minister, has to carry a very heavy burden. He desires all our sympathy and help.

17. Much has been said during these past few days, about foreign interference and about the activities of the UN Observers. There has been foreign interference of some kind or other during the past several years, and the behaviour of the UN Observers in the past had often been strongly objected to. But I think that the great stress laid upon this in recent days has been exaggerated. It is not good to exaggerate and, in any event, in the present circumstances, it will not help to cast blame on all and sundry. Where necessary, of course, action has to be taken.

18. In the talks I had with the Pakistan Prime Minister, some considerable progress was recorded in regard to the Evacuee Property issue. I think we can hopefully look forward to progress in this matter. So far as moveable property and like is concerned, we have practically arrived at an agreement which will be announced soon.

19. I have referred to communalism above and the dangers that flow from it. I am beginning to get as anxious about the disintegrating influences resulting from the demand for linguistic States in various parts of the country. Some recent speeches delivered in the House of the People in the course of these debates on the Andhra Bill are alarming in their general purport and outlook.⁹ People talk lightly about the disintegration of Hyderabad and about chopping and cutting up India all over the place. We have decided to appoint a high-power Commission to consider the reorganization of States. That will be done. But, if many of us still think in this narrow way, I fear that our progress as a nation will be much delayed and, indeed, we will go backwards rather than forwards. There is an inherent tendency towards disintegration of India, possibly resulting from our caste system and our general outlook on life. We do not mix easily and we live in compartments. Even in foreign countries, Indians are apt to lead their separate provincial lives. How are we to build up a nation if we think and act more or less in a tribal way? This is a matter of importance and it is not enough for us merely to pass resolutions against provincialism and casteism, but to feel strongly that they are dangerous and should be fought against and overcome, if we are to survive in a decent and honourable way. We read of revolutions in various parts of Asia. We are

9. During the debate some Members demanded the immediate formation of Kannada, Marathi and Punjabi-speaking States and a few demanded a Urdu-speaking State also. There was demand for immediate dissolution of the Hyderabad state and deposition of the Nizam. A change in the name from Madras to Dravidistan was also suggested.

told of the explosion of the hydrogen bomb somewhere in the Soviet Union.¹⁰ All these are portents which we must bear in mind, remembering always that we live in a dangerous age where only the strong and the united can survive or retain their freedom. But, unhappily we grow complacent and rather smug. We praise our own tolerance, even though we do not display it to our brother or next-door neighbour. We hold up our philosophy, which is magnificent, but it influences our lives very little. We spend our energy in futile controversies about languages, more especially about Hindi and Urdu. We get excited when some Christian missionaries function somewhere. We begin hunger-striking for political ends and, talking about peace all the time, indulge in violence. Must we not pull ourselves up and get out of this narrowness of mind and action? We have all the makings of a great nation and we have already achieved some distinction in the counsels of the world, but internally these narrowing and disintegrating influences continue to corrode our national life and to weaken us.

20. As I write to you, the special adjourned session of the UN General Assembly is meeting in New York. It has met to be told of the armistice in Korea and to give shape to the political conference that is to follow that armistice. The armistice was between two rival commands—the UN Command and the Chinese and North Korean Command. The political conference, therefore, cannot be simply a UN affair. The question is whether it should be looked upon merely as a meeting of two rival groups trying to manoeuvre against each other, or as some kind of a round table conference to hammer out peace. I confess that the outlook is depressing. The antics of Dr Syngman Rhee were amazing enough. Many an affront was offered to India but we held our peace. The US Government appeared to have gone all out to please Dr Rhee.¹¹ They have agreed to a military alliance with South Korea and they have apparently given them assurances which have not all been made public. Among them, apparently, is the promise to oppose India's inclusion in the political conference. But the most important of these assurances is that, after three months of the political conference, if no success is obtained according to their thinking, they will walk out of it. That means that they will put an end to the conference. If this is the approach of a great power like the United States, not to mention South Korea, then indeed, the outlook for the conference is bleak. It is obvious that Dr Syngman Rhee does not want that conference to succeed and he can block success therefore and then

10. This was announced by Malenkov at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet on 8 August 1953.

11. On 8 August, a mutual defence treaty between South Korea and the United States was signed.

walk out at the end of it. And now it appears that the United States would probably support him in many matters, and, more especially, in walking out. Dr Rhee has clearly said that he will start war again. So, if the world is to be dominated by Dr Syngman Rhee, we can confidently and hopelessly look forward to war at the end of 90 days of the political conference.

21. If this was not disconcerting enough, we have been told by the 16 powers who were fighting on behalf of the UN in Korea, that in case of aggression on behalf of China, they will immediately retaliate and the war then will not be a limited one.¹² We have been further told by some eminent people that, when this war comes, no holds will be barred and atomic weapons will be used.¹³

22. All this is an amazing approach to a peace conference. If this is the mentality just after the armistice, what can be expected from the political conference? There is evidently much difference in opinion between the USA on the one side and the United Kingdom, Canada, France and many other countries on the other. The latter have pressed for the inclusion of the Soviet Union in the political conference and have also proposed India. The United States have reluctantly agreed to the inclusion of the Soviet but with qualification. They are absolutely opposed to India being there, no doubt because President Syngman Rhee is opposed to it. While we see this difference of opinion between the Western European and other countries and the US, we also see repeatedly that finally the viewpoint of the USA prevails in most matters. The resolutions put forward before the General Assembly are not very happy and it is not clear that a political conference will emerge out of this wrangle. Even if it emerges, it is hardly likely to be an effective instrument for peace.

23. As regard the position of India, we have made it clear that we have no desire to push ourselves anywhere. But we see no reason also to withdraw merely because a particular country does not like us. I do not know how the situation may develop in New York, but our present instructions to our delegation are to abstain from voting on the various resolutions and to make a statement explaining our viewpoint. That is in keeping with the neutral position that we have taken up and that has been actually entrusted to us in Korea.

12. The joint declaration by sixteen members of the UN Command signed on 27 July was made public on 10 August 1953. It warned that members would jointly and unitedly resist in case there was a breach of the armistice and then "it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea."

13. The statement to this effect was made on 6 August by General Mark Clark, the UN Supreme Commander in East Asia.

24. While there is so much talk of war and competition in armaments, and the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb, it is well to remember that ultimate success of any country or group of countries will depend upon the economic strength and progress of that country or group. The Soviet challenge is obvious enough in the military sphere. Perhaps because of this, another aspect is not so much before us, and yet this economic aspect is important and significant. Recent economic developments in the Soviet Union have shown marked progress. The Soviet output per head already surpasses that of Italy and is likely to catch up soon with the present level of French output per head. It is estimated that, at this rate, it will overtake the British output per head in another seven or eight years. It has to be remembered that the population of the Soviet Union is about 200 million. Thus not only the output per head but the total output will be very considerable, and, within a decade, the Soviet Union may well have an absolute preponderance economically over Western Europe, unless progress in Western Europe goes ahead faster than at present.

25. The Soviet figures that are available to us are probably exaggerations. Even allowing for such exaggerations, they are significant. Prices have been cut repeatedly in recent years and consumption has gone up. While maintaining a high rate of expenditure on armaments, there has been an increasing expenditure on civilian capital development, resulting in an increasing standard of life.

26. While this is happening in the Soviet Union, we see the rapid disintegration in France. A great series of strikes recently have demonstrated this.¹⁴ Indo-China continues to drain the life-blood of France and, in spite of all this, France is going in now for a new phase of very active repression in Morocco.

27. Thus the Soviet challenge on the economic plane is probably more significant than even that on the military plane. Every European country has to face the dilemma of spending on increasing armaments or in keeping up its social services and standards of life. Generally speaking, the latter tend to go down. If this burden of armaments continues, there can be little doubt that Western Europe will remain static and it might even go down a little, while the Soviet Union, which incidentally has reduced its armament expenditure somewhat, goes on advancing in the economic domain.

14. Life in Paris and other cities was disrupted between 7 and 14 August as a result of the strikes by workers in Government and State-owned enterprises to press the demand for withdrawing the freeze on salaries by the Government, higher bonus against recent budget proposals which increased tax on essential commodities, and for the dismissal of Laniel's right-wing Government and installation of a left-wing Cabinet.

28. Generally speaking, rain has been bountiful all over the country. Indeed, it has been more than that and widespread floods have taken place bringing enormous damage and misery in their train. The Kosi river in Bihar, of evil reputation in this respect, has spread out over a vast area of Bihar converting this into something like an inland sea. The damage done by this can well be imagined. The Godavari in Andhra Desh has now done something which apparently it had never done before. The whole delta has been flooded and it is even difficult to get news of this area, because access is not easy. It is said that in Rajamundhry town alone four hundred people died. Possibly many more have died elsewhere. The rice crop of this granary of the south has been ruined.

29. It is most unfortunate that this heavy blow should have fallen on Andhra just on the eve of its establishment as a separate State. We are taking urgent steps to organize help and all our Ministries of the Central Government have been instructed to help in every way. Our Army has been so instructed also. I am issuing an appeal for funds.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

V¹

Camp: Ranikhet
27 September, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,

It is a little over a month since I wrote to you and I must apologize to you for missing one of my fortnightly letters. All I can plead is heavy work and a multitude of preoccupations. I am writing this letter now from Ranikhet in the Kumaon Hills of the UP.² I came here three days ago and I am returning to Delhi tomorrow morning. These three days have helped me to deal with some arrears of work and have also given me some leisure to think of the Indian scene in its broader aspects. Unfortunately, we are so tied up with our day to day work and difficulties that we can seldom have an opportunity for a quiet survey of our work and of what is happening in this vast country of ours. We work, usually, under some kind of nervous strain, which is perhaps

1. The letter was written at Ranikhet on 27 September and was despatched from New Delhi on 28 September 1953.

inevitable in the circumstances, but which can produce an unhelpful state of mind.

2. I am glad, therefore, that I came here, even for three days, and looked again at the Himalayan snows and breathed the mountain air. Nothing refreshes me so much as the sight of these high peaks and the fresh pine-laden air of these altitudes. I see before me here the great peaks of Nandadevi, Trishul, Kamet and Panch-Chuli and many other snow-covered peaks guarding our frontier and looking down upon the vast plains below. Ranikhet is a lovely place and it is peculiarly well situated for excursions, small or big, even right up to the high mountains. I like these Kumaon Hills. Generally, however, whenever I could find two or three days, I have preferred to go to some part of Kashmir. There is a peculiar something in the atmosphere there which affects the senses in a special way, if one is receptive to it. But, in existing circumstances in the Jammu & Kashmir State, I have no desire to go there.

3. India has figured largely in international affairs during the past month. There have been heated discussions in the Political Committee of the United Nations and later in the General Assembly itself.² Our representatives and our custodian force have gone to Korea.³ We have had two debates in Parliament on foreign affairs.⁴ You will have followed these events and these discussions and so I need not say much about them. The question of India being a member of the political conference in Korea became an international issue of significance. It became symbolic of an approach towards peace through the help of neutral nations. Unfortunately, the United States took up a very rigid attitude in this matter.⁵ Lately, they have somewhat relaxed and opened a small window which might lead to a reconsideration of that issue.⁶ I do not know yet what this will lead to. We are in no way anxious to be in the political conference, but we are anxious to see some settlement emerge in the

2. The eighth session of the General Assembly opened on 15 September.
3. The last batch of the custodian force from India reached Korea on 10 September 1953.
4. The House of the People debated and approved Government's foreign policy on 17 September and the Council of States on 23 September 1953.
5. The US representative at the UN had declared on 13 August that it would be "chaotic and perhaps catastrophic" to invite non-belligerents to participate in the political conference as this would be a violation of the armistice agreement which provided for the meeting of the "two sides" only.
6. The US explained, after India's withdrawal of her nomination to the political conference, that "our position on the question was not directed at India as such. On the contrary, we feel deeply that at any later discussions or conferences on Far Eastern matters India must play a central and constructive role, and we in the US will do all in our power to facilitate her participation."

Far East. If the political conference is not held, then the whole structure of the armistice in Korea begins to crack up. We are specially interested in the future of the prisoners of war who are now in the care of our custodian force.⁷ The final decision about those who do not go back to their homelands was to be determined by the political conference. If that conference does not take shape, then who is to determine the future of the PsOW? We cannot hold on to them indefinitely.

4. Our custodian force has had to face a very difficult position in Korea and there have been some kind of incidents almost daily. The PsOW, who have been handed over to the custodian force by the UN Command, have behaved in a very aggressive and even violent way.⁸ I must say that this does not do much credit to the detaining side, i.e., the UN Command. It is evident that on both sides every effort has been made to influence and condition the PsOW and make them afraid of going back to their homelands. On the Chinese and North Korean side the number of such prisoners is relatively limited. On the other side it is large. There appears to be some truth in the Chinese allegation that quite a number of non-prisoners have been mixed with the PsOW on the UN side. These people, apparently representing the Chiang-Kai-shek and the Syngman Rhee regimes, have created much trouble. It is difficult for our custodian force to distinguish between these and the real prisoners. Even proper lists of such prisoners have not been supplied.

5. We sent about five thousand men of all ranks, including medical men, Red Cross, etc., to Korea. Normally, this force ought to have been adequate to deal with 25,000 persons. But when those persons are organized into groups and indulge in violence, and live in a camp protected by wire-netting only, then it becomes difficult for our men to guard all of them and to prevent them from breaking through. Because of this, we received an urgent demand from Lieut-General Thimayya for another battalion, and we have sent 600 more troops by air to Korea. With these additional forces, Major-General Thorat, the Commander of the custodian force, will be in a somewhat better position to tackle this difficult situation. Meanwhile, our forces have drawn praise from all quarters for the firm and yet gentle and peaceful way in which they have managed to control the situation.

7. The UN and the Communist Commands completed on 23 and 24 September the transfer to Indian custody of the non-repatriated prisoners of war after barracks for housing them in the demilitarized zone in Panmunjom had been constructed.
8. On 25 September, about 500 non-repatriate Chinese prisoners held an Indian Major to ransom for the release of a repatriated person. There was a minor clash between the Indian and the Chinese soldiers, but further trouble was averted.

6. Parliament has adjourned after heavy work. Most of the time of both the Houses was taken up by the Andhra State Bill and the Estate Duty Bill. Both these were, of course, important and had to be passed during the last session. But, unfortunately, a number of important measures could not be taken up. I am particularly sorry for the delay in dealing with the Bills relating to Hindu law reform. I hope that first priority will be given to them during the next session of Parliament.

7. Within a few days I shall be going to Kurnool to inaugurate the new Andhra State. This is an event of considerable significance not only to the Andhras, for whom it has been a dream of long standing, but for India as a whole. We have started on the re-fashioning of India and this road may lead us far. As you know, it is our intention to appoint a high-powered Commission to consider the question of reorganization of States. We intend giving this Commission the widest discretion in this matter, so that they can consider this question from its all-India aspect, keeping in view all the factors, such as cultural and linguistic, economic and administrative, defence and security. The whole problem bristles with difficulties. I hope it will be considered as calmly and dispassionately as possible, so that the new picture of India that might emerge will not only give satisfaction to different parts of the country, but will also promote the unity of India.

8. It is of the utmost importance that the unity of India should be strengthened. Politically we are united, as well as in many other ways. But there are certain disruptive and fissiparous tendencies which alarm me. We call them provincialism, communalism, casteism, faction, etc. There is too great a tendency for us to think in terms of some smaller group or other at the expense of the larger community. Perhaps, if danger threatens, these minor groupings will diminish in importance. But danger comes not only from outside but from internal division and weakness. In the great problems we have to face internally—social and economic—internal cohesion and a common purpose are of the utmost importance. A common purpose does not mean uniformity of thinking or a regimentation of ideas. It does mean a certain broad common approach and objective and a certain desire to pull together to achieve it in spite of our differences. That is the test of a nation. Even the nation idea is perhaps not quite adequate in the modern world, where nation States fight each other, but the nation idea is certainly a great advance over the semi-tribal ideas of caste or province or religious grouping in politics. We have still to aim at and achieve the psychological integration of our country.

9. Independence released many forces in our country which had been kept in check by foreign domination. Problems, which had been kept in the background by the struggle for national freedom, uncovered themselves and assumed importance. All the conscious and sub-conscious desires of people sought to find rapid fulfilment. At the same time, the discipline that is always

necessary to build and construct in a big way, became progressively lacking. We have worked hard during the past six years and, I believe, have outstanding achievements to our credit. And yet, the question that we have always to consider is how far that tempo of progress keeps pace with events and with those desires and urges. Even the simplest enunciation of the problem is difficult to answer. To keep pace with population growth itself, a certain increase in national income is required, even if the general national level remains the same. We have to go much beyond this to make real progress.

10. We have deliberately adopted the method of planning and I think that one of the major services planning has rendered is to make people progressively planning-conscious, though, of course, most people's conception of planning is very vague. But planning for what and how? As I write this, I have before me an angry letter from our great veteran Shri Visveswarayya⁹ who accuses me of not following his advice and concentrating on industrial planning only, and, more especially, the manufacture of automobiles. He reminds me that he brought up this subject fourteen years ago in the National Planning Committee, of which I was Chairman, and, against his advice, we decided that planning should cover all national development and not industries only. Indeed, we then defined planning as follows:

Planning under a democratic system may be defined as the technical coordination, by disinterested experts, of consumption, production, investment, trade and income distribution in accordance with social objectives set by bodies representative of the nation. Such planning is not only to be considered from the point of view of economics and raising of the standard of living, but must include cultural and spiritual values and the human side of life.

Shri Visveswarayya objected to this wider approach, felt frustrated and resigned from the National Planning Committee.

11. And, yet, I cannot conceive of planning except on this wider basis and always with a view to the advancement of human welfare in the widest sense of the term. Planning has now become inevitable and even the ardent exponents of private enterprise in the United States of America have been compelled to accept planning, more especially in underdeveloped countries. But the question still remains: What kind of planning and what are the ultimate objectives to be aimed at? It is admitted now that Governments, even in the so-called capitalist countries, have not only to plan, but have to extend

9. M. Visveswarayya, an engineer and a planner from Karnataka.

governmental functions. Private enterprise becomes more and more hedged in by State enterprise, and even that private enterprise is controlled and powerfully affected by State action. The nineteenth century idea of private enterprise has faded away completely, and there has been a dramatic shift in Western countries towards governmental control. The world capital market no longer exists, and world trade is restricted and managed and controlled in a variety of ways.

12. If planning is inevitable, what do we plan for? What kind of picture of society do we have in view? There is much argument and a great deal of passion spent in discussing these problems. Some people, notably in the USA, want to divide the world into communist and non-communist. That is a simplification which has little justification either in politics or economics. There are many gradations between the two. Apart from a few countries, the general approach of socialism is accepted. We have what is called communist socialism or social democracy. But, on the whole, the final picture of both is not very different, though the approach and the methods employed certainly differ. In India, most progressive groups, and certainly the Congress, have talked of socialism in more or less precise terms for the last thirty years or more. We have thought of it more in terms of social democracy, keeping in view the special characteristics and outlook of India. The Congress, as a great national movement struggling for political freedom, drew into its fold various groups with differing economic ideologies. But the dominant approach and objective was that of social democracy. There is no essential difference in this respect between the Congress and the Socialist Party in India, except that the Socialists tend to be rigid and doctrinaire. They call themselves some kind of Marxists, although they are bitterly opposed to Communists.

13. Does that ideal of social democracy hold still for us or are we drifting away from it? Shri N.V. Gadgil,¹⁰ the other day, said that while India was moving towards the left, the Congress, and more so the Congress Governments, were static and perhaps inclined a little towards the right. These terms, left and right, have no precise meaning, but they have a psychological significance, and that is important. If people generally in India feel one way and our administrative apparatus aims in some different direction, then there is friction between the two and no major cooperative effort is likely to succeed. It is true that a Government has to function responsibly and cannot live in an atmosphere of slogans. But it has to keep in intimate touch with the mass of the people in a democratic State. It has to keep its ears to the ground and its feet on the soil.

10. Congressman from Maharashtra; was Union Minister for Works, Production and Supply, 1947-52.

14. To come back to planning, what do we plan for? We have to take as our base not only the economic conditions prevailing in the country, but the social characteristics of our society. The two are linked together. We have to think of striking a proper balance between material advance and other possible goals. What is our scale or standard of values? It is difficult to say and they are likely to vary among different groups. Certainly economics comes in. But, presumably, there are other factors also. We talk about priorities. There are the obvious priorities between industry and agriculture, between consumption and investment, between investment in public works and other productive activities, between investment in human beings and investment in material capital, and so on. We may consider this question in another way. How much importance should we attach and what priority should we give to fundamental science and applied science, both of basic importance to the world today? How much to education, how much to health? What risks should we take or should we avoid risks and consider security as essential? We talk of production, but the pattern of production will have to fit in with the pattern of consumption of the community.

15. A multitude of such problems arise which are certainly economic, but which are closely interlinked with social factors. Ultimately, any kind of progress, including economic progress, depends on the desire of the people for that progress and the social structure in which they live. Is that structure—political, social, economic, legal, etc.—favourable to such progress or does it impede it? The great era of material progress in Europe and America came when the old belief, encouraged by religion, in a predetermined fate, gave place to a belief in man's power to control his environment and to change it. This was the spread of the modern scientific outlook. Such a background helps change and progress. If, on the other hand, a people believe in fate, in pre-determination, in the effect of the stars on our activities, in astrology and the like, obviously the urge to progress and change is not there. The atmosphere is not favourable to it. I am not, for the moment, interested in decrying the virtues, such as there might be, of astrology. I am merely saying that this mental approach is not conducive to creating an atmosphere which vitalizes human beings and brings about change. Take again our general caste outlook or cow protection. All these may have some virtues, but they are uncertain factors. Caste petrifies society, prevents the mobility of labour and the change of occupations. Cow protection, oddly enough, leads to the lack of protection of the cow. In India cattle protection and the improvement of breeds of cattle are of great importance. But progress can only be made if we approach this scientifically and constructively and not in some negative and narrow-minded spirit.

16. You must forgive me for these vague generalizations. We come back, however, to the major problem of the day and that is employment and

increasing the purchasing power of the people. In the more advanced countries it is now admitted that the objective should be full employment, and only a policy which promises more or less full employment is adequate. Obviously, we cannot suddenly produce full employment in India. But our goal must be that. How are we to deal with the present situation in regard to this matter? It is not good enough merely to say that we are doing our utmost, unless we produce adequate results. Many partial remedies have been suggested and they should be examined with care and adopted, wherever possible. But any large-scale attack on unemployment apparently involves large-scale investment programmes, whether public or private. In a country like India they have to be very largely public. Such an investment programme requires not only the resources for it, but the existence of a suitable environment. Merely throwing money away does not produce employment. Also the danger of too much inflation has to be avoided. There is always a tendency for democratic government to seek escape in inflation. That is no remedy. The question thus is how to deal with unemployment in a large way and with fairly large-scale public investment without undue risks in regard to inflation.

17. There has been a good deal of discussion about unemployment and employment and we should welcome this public awareness of this vital problem. To some extent our discussions have been conducted within a certain framework of assumptions and premises. We have to consider whether we cannot explore some other avenue of thought and action.

18. Sometime ago we sent you copies of the Appleby Report dealing with public administration. I drew your attention to this then. The more I have considered this matter, and I have read this report two or three times, the more I have felt that we have to pay heed to Dr Appleby's advice. Our administrative apparatus is, I think, good and can compare with almost any in other countries. But the old structure of the administration derived from the British does not fully fit in with democratic and developmental urges. I must make it clear that a good deal of adaptation has already taken place. But more is necessary. We have good men, but the system is slow moving. Also there is far too much of social caste in our administrative system. It is interesting that an American like Appleby should point this out to us. Some of our rules and even some assurances given in the Constitution petrify this system in the services.

19. In any State, and more especially in a democratic State, the psychological appeal to the people is important. They have to feel that they are partners in the great enterprise of running the State machine, and that they are sharers in both the benefits and the obligations. The test of democracy is to create this sensation among the people. It was thought that elections under adult suffrage were adequate for this purpose. They go some way. But in a swiftly moving scene, something more is necessary than mere elections

at stated intervals. In planning, especially, this sensation has to be created so that the people may feel that the plan is something that has been evolved with their cooperation and that they are responsible for its success. It was inevitable that in the first attempt planning had to begin somewhere at the top. Even so, there was, as is well known, a great deal of consultation. In future we should evolve some method of making the smallest unit in the village feel that he is consulted in regard to his particular problems and is thus helping in evolving or in varying the plan. This is still more necessary in implementing the plan. The official approach, though necessary, is not enough and has to be linked with this non-official approach and widespread attempt at cooperation. We have now in most States vast numbers of *panchayats*. If these *panchayats* could be drawn into the network of planning and its implementation, that would bring the plan to the doorstep of the villager.

20. Democracy has meant political equality. It means also a progressive economic equality. Our professed aims are to develop a society where there are no great differences and where opportunity comes to all. Any vested interests and vested privileges do not fit in with such a plan of society. And yet, even our Constitution, and more so our economic and social structure and customs, protect many kinds of privilege and vested interest. There is some justification for them in the context of history, but we must always remember that they are anachronisms and are constant irritants to the people. In an economic sense, they might not make much difference, but they create an atmosphere of conflict and frustration and thus come in the way of our work. I have no doubt that these relics of old privilege will have to go. The question is whether we have the wisdom, as a people, to solve this problem peacefully and cooperatively.

21. I attach the greatest importance to the new national extension service which is a development of our community centre scheme. It has in it the seeds of a great revolutionary change in India. If we succeed that way, we can really change the face of India peacefully and without conflict. On the whole, the scheme appears to be progressing well and some thousands of village level workers have been and are being trained. The community centres also are generally doing well. It is particularly gratifying to find that the contribution from the people in labour has been very considerable and has often equalled the expenditure by Government. You will be getting quarterly reports of the progress of the community development programme. You must have got the last quarter's report. This will help you to compare the performances of the different States and to get ideas of improving the community work in your own State. The project advisory committees have thus far only been utilized in the meetings of that committee. It would be desirable to associate their members in the actual implementation of the

programme. Experience in the Punjab and elsewhere has shown that village people feel happy to be able to participate in discussions in the meetings of the project advisory committees. Here again is an opportunity to associate the people both in planning and in implementation.

22. The community programme is making good progress in almost all Part A and Part B States. The exceptions are Mysore and Rajasthan. In Rajasthan there appear to be administrative difficulties and a shortage of technical and administrative staff. This might be got over, as the Chief Minister is anxious to make progress. The case of Mysore is sad in this respect and there is no immediate hope of improvement. Of the Part C States, Bhopal, Bilaspur, Coorg and Cutch are doing well. Vindhya Pradesh, Ajmer, Delhi, Manipur and Tripura are unsatisfactory.

23. In Travancore-Cochin the Ministry was defeated in the Assembly on a vote of confidence and resigned.¹¹ There was no possibility of having an alternative government and the Assembly was therefore dissolved. A general election will take place as soon as it can be arranged. Meanwhile the Ministry will continue.

24. The position in Kashmir has improved in many ways and might be said to be outwardly normal. A convention of the National Conference, attended by between three to four thousand workers from all over the State, was held recently in Srinagar. This was a remarkable success and it supported Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's Government fully. This indicates that this popular organization is behind the present Government. At the same time, there are basic difficulties and we should not delude ourselves into thinking that the problem of Kashmir has become simpler than it was. The Prime Minister, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, has met a difficult situation with great ability and energy.

25. No particular development has taken place in our correspondence with Pakistan. This continues. The Pakistan Press behaved most hysterically and demanded war. But it has toned down recently.

26. Some time ago, I issued a statement about internal conflicts in our universities.¹² I am much concerned with the state of our universities, and more especially the atmosphere that prevails there. Everyone talks about this

11. On 23 September 1953.

12. Referring to the recent troubles in the Lucknow and Allahabad Universities, Nehru stated on 12 September that the university unions "should be voluntary and should have full freedom to choose their office-bearers and function as they liked.... If the system needs to be changed, let us be prepared to do so, but let us not look on passively and allow the rapid deterioration of a place" meant for fostering "character, discipline, knowledge, cooperative endeavour and a little bit of wisdom."

and deplores it. But we appear to be rather helpless in dealing with it. The responsibility is primarily of the university authorities, secondly of the State Government, and thirdly of the Central Government. In effect, it is the responsibility of all of us and it is no good blaming others. Discipline has gone. It might be possible to enforce discipline, but force does not help when we are dealing with the minds of people. We have to create a new atmosphere among the teachers and the students and somehow prevent the universities from becoming the battle-grounds of political parties. Money is required for our educational development, but it seems to me that it is not money that is the first need today, but some other effort to set things right. Here, as elsewhere, the human approach is necessary, and merely the official and governmental handling of the situation does not pay dividends. That human approach must be allied with firmness. Many people have begun to doubt whether our universities, as they are, are serving any useful purpose.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

GLOSSARY

acharya	a reverential term
Delhiwala	an inhabitant of Delhi
ilaqa	area / territory
Jai Hind	victory to India
jawans	soldiers
ji	an affix denoting respect
khadi	hand-woven cloth of hand-spun yarn
mohalla	locality
morcha	picketing
paisa	a coin worth $\frac{1}{64}$ th of a rupee
panchayat	village council
pandas	priests at a Hindu place of worship
pattu	handmade woollen cloth
swadeshi	indigenous produce
takht	divan
vana mahotsava	a programme of planting trees to develop forest wealth

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The present volume of the *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru* covers the period from 1 July to 30 September 1953, which was marked by some seminal developments within the world as well as within India.

At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held in London in June, Jawaharlal Nehru discovered that the Indian point of view carried a weight which it had apparently not carried earlier.... India and Britain were able to adopt similar positions on many issues crucial to the preservation of world peace. On the Korean problem, for instance, the two countries took a view which facilitated the discharge of the responsibilities exercised by India as the Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission....

If the suspicion and hostility between the Super Powers called for a pressing application of the healing touch, events at home had no less urgent a claim upon Jawaharlal Nehru's time and attention. On the domestic front, the vexed problem of Kashmir had assumed alarming proportions. In principle, the Delhi Agreement of 1952, which had defined unambiguously the position of Kashmir within the Indian Union, should have resolved all issues. However, Shaikh Abdullah, the leader of Kashmir, appeared to entertain doubts about the whole business; and spoke openly regarding the desirability of an "autonomous" Kashmir... The situation was further complicated by an agitation launched by Syama Prasad Mookerjee, the Jan Sangh leader, which gave a blatantly communal turn to the Kashmir imbroglio. In the upshot, the Jan Sangh leader died in Srinagar while in detention. Shortly afterwards, Abdullah was dismissed as the head of Kashmir Government and placed under detention. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was installed in his place as the new Chief Minister of Kashmir...

The attention which Jawaharlal Nehru devoted to world affairs, and to neighbours like Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka, among others, is understandable in view of the responsibilities which devolved upon a country of India's size, strength and potential. Yet Nehru realized all too well that in the final analysis India's stature would be determined by the extent to which economic growth; rounded social progress; and the establishment of liberal values and institutions; were secured in the short no less than in the long run.

These complex and multi-faceted problems, Jawaharlal Nehru fully realised, could not be resolved within a short span of time. The character of social transformation was dialectical in character; and there were bound to be slippages at the same time as victories were scored. Much patience was needed for the task... As Jawaharlal Nehru put it: "the future of India, as indeed of every country, ultimately depends on the quality of the human beings there and how far they can rise above their parochial feelings and petty conflicts."

